Oakes v Commissioner of Stamp Duties of New South Wales: PC 1953

oakes_csdnswPC1954

A father made a gift of land in favour of himself and his four children in equal shares but then retained wide powers of management for which he reserved the right to charge remuneration.
Held: The donor was entirely excluded from the subject-matter of the gift, which was the four fifths interest given to the children, and that his retention of powers of management did not affect the matter. This was because the donor is entirely excluded if he only holds the property in a fiduciary capacity and deals with it in accordance with his fiduciary duty. But the right to charge remuneration was a different matter. This amounted to a benefit to the donor by contract or otherwise.
Lord Reid referred to St Aubin and said: ‘it is now clear that it is not sufficient to bring a case within the scope of these sections to take the situation as a whole and find that the settlor has continued to enjoy substantial advantages which have some relation to the settled property ; it is necessary to consider the nature and source of each of these advantages and determine whether or not it is a benefit of such a kind as to come within the scope of the section’

Lord Reid
[1954] AC 57, [1953] 2 All ER 92
Citing:
CitedSt Aubyn v Attorney General HL 12-Jul-1951
The donor exercised powers of appointment ‘to make some part of the settled property his own’, and it was ‘wholly irrelevant that by a contemporaneous or later transaction he surrenders his life interest in other parts of it’. The different parts of . .

Cited by:
CitedIngram and Palmer-Tomkinson (Executors of the Estate of Lady Jane Lindsay Morgan Ingram Deceased) v Commissioners of Inland Revenue CA 28-Jul-1997
The deceased had first conveyed property to her solicitor. Leases back were then created in her favour, and then the freeholds were conveyed at her direction to her children and grandchildren. They were potentially exempt transfers.
Held: . .
CitedIn re Nichols, deceased CA 2-Jan-1975
The father, Lord Nichols, gave property to his sons who then leased it back to him. On the father’s death the revenue claimed duty.
Held: Goff LJ: ‘Having thus reviewed the authorities, we return to the question what was given, and we think . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Stamp Duty

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.223763

Attorney General of Hong Kong v Yip Kai Foon: PC 7 Dec 1987

High Court of Hong Kong – The prosecutor appealed against a quashing of a conviction on a charge of handling stolen goods. The defendant had been charged with robbery with handling as an alternative provided under statute.
Held: Where there are true alternative charges of re;lated offences, a jury must acquit on both charges unless one or the other can be proved beyond reasonable doubt to the exclusion of the other.
Lord Ackner said: ‘In their Lordships’ opinion the trial judge, but for the injection into his summing up of the passage quoted above from Chan Tat v R [1973] HKLR 114 at 119, directed the jury quite properly as to the way in which they should approach a count of robbery and the alternative offence of handling. The jury were required to approach the matter by two stages. First, they had to ask themselves whether they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was guilty of robbery. This would involve rejecting the respondent’s evidence and then being satisfied, so that they felt sure, that the ballistic evidence linked the respondent with the robberies or either of them. If they were not so satisfied, they would then proceed to the second stage, and ask themselves whether the prosecution had satisfied them in relation to each of the ingredients of the alternative offences of handling, which the judge had spelt out with great clarity. Of course, if less than a majority were in favour of convictions of robbery and less than a majority in favour of convictions of handling, then the judge would have to discharge the jury and order a new trial. This case gave rise to no special difficulty or complication.’

Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, Sir John Stephenson, Sir Edward Eveleigh
[1987] UKPC 35, [1987] UKPC 4, [1988] 1 All ER 15, (1988) 86 Cr App R 368, [1988] AC 642, [1988] 2 WLR 326
Bailii, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v James Langmead CCCR 1864
The defendant was indicted and tried at Devon Quarter Sessions on two counts, the first count for stealing and the second count for feloniously receiving a number of sheep, the property of Mr. Glanfield, a neighbouring farmer of the Parish of . .
CitedAndrea Obonyo v Regina 1962
East Africa ‘When a person is charged with theft [and the judge told the jury that they could read for ‘theft’, ‘robbery’ because it includes ‘theft’] and, in the alternative, with receiving, and the sole evidence connecting him with the offences is . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.443481

Maridakis v Kouvaris: 1975

(Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Australia) The tenant walked out on a lease. He returned the keys and left the premises. The landlord then closed and secured the premises and sought a replacement tenant. The landlord was, however, very particular about a replacement. He could have re-let the premises much earlier than he did.
Held: The landlord was under no duty to mitigate by taking steps to re-let the premises. The handing over and acceptance of the key, the securing of the premises and advertisements seeking a replacement for the tenant had not amounted to an acceptance by the landlord of the tenant’s repudiation of the terms of the lease. Only when a fresh lease was granted to a new tenant would a surrender of the unexpired portion of the lease occur.

Ward J
(1975) 5 ALR 197
Australia
Cited by:
CitedReichman and Another v Beveridge CA 13-Dec-2006
The defendants were tenants of the claimant. They vacated the premises and stopped paying the rent. The claimant sought payment of the arrears of rent. The defendants said that the claimants should have taken steps to reduce their damages by seeking . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.396617

Green v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand: PC 18 Jul 1989

Format of TV show not copyrightable

Court of Appeal of New Zealand – The plaintiff had developed the program ‘Opportunity Knocks’ on British television. He claimed copyright in the general structure or format of a similar television programme in New Zealand, and also in passing off. By ‘dramatic format’ the appellant meant the characteristic features of the show which were repeated in each performance. These were the title, the use of various catch phrases, the use of a device called a ‘clapometer’ to monitor audience reaction and the use of sponsors to introduce competitors.
Held: The format of the show was not was a dramatic work protected by copyright. The evidence given to the court was particularly diffuse, taling of gimmicks, such as the use of a ‘clapometer’, and there was no sufficient unity or coherence for a dramatic work to exist under copyright law.
Lord Bridge said: ‘It is stretching the original use of the word ‘format’ a long way to use it metaphorically to describe the features of a television series such as a talent, quiz or game show which is presented in a particular way, with repeated but unconnected use of set phrases and with the aid of particular accessories. Alternative terms suggested in the course of argument were ‘structure’ or ‘package’. This difficulty in finding an appropriate term to describe the nature of the ‘work’ in which the copyright subsists reflects the difficulty of the concept that a number of allegedly distinctive features of a television series can be isolated from the changing material presented in each separate performance (the acts of the performers in the talent show, the question and answers in the quiz show etc.) and identified as an ‘original dramatic work’. No case was cited to their Lordships in which copyright of the kind claimed had been established.
The protection which copyright gives creates a monopoly and ‘there must be certainty in the subject matter of such monopoly in order to avoid injustice to the rest of the world:’ Tate v Fulbrook [1908] 1 KB 821, per Farwell J . . The subject matter of the copyright claimed for the ‘dramatic format’ of ‘Opportunity Knocks’ is conspicuously lacking in certainty. Moreover, it seems to their Lordships that a dramatic work must have sufficient unity to be capable of performance and that the features claimed as constituting the ‘format’ of a television show, being unrelated to each other except as accessories to be used in the presentation of some other dramatic or musical performance, lack that essential characteristic.’

Lord Bridge
[1989] RPC 700, [1989] UKPC 26
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedTate v Fulbrook 1908
Farwell LJ said of the Copyright Acts: ‘The Act creates a monopoly, and in such a case there must be certainty in the subject-matter of such monopoly in order to avoid injustice to the rest of the world.’ Copyright subsists in different categories . .
CitedFrancis Day and Hunter Limited v 20th Century Fox Corporation Limited PC 12-Oct-1939
(Ontario) Copyright protection was asserted on in connection with the title to a film (‘The Man Who Broke the Bank at Monte Carlo’).
Held: It was not a literary work capable of attracting copyright protection. As a rule, such titles do not . .
Appeal fromGreen v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand 22-Sep-1988
(Court of Appeal of New Zealand) The plaintiff had created a hugely sucessful TV programme in the UK, called Opportunity Knocks. He now appealed against rejection of his claim in copyright alleging that the defendant had copied the format, and also . .

Cited by:
CitedIPC Media Ltd v Highbury-Leisure Publishing Ltd ChD 21-Dec-2004
The claimant magazine publisher alleged breach of copyright by the defendant in their magazine, as to the cover page designs used. It was not clear just which cover was said to have been copied.
Held: The first step in a copyright action is . .
CitedBaigent and Another v The Random House Group Ltd (The Da Vinci Code) ChD 7-Apr-2006
The claimants alleged infringement of copyright by the defendant publishers and author in the plot and otherwise in the book ‘The Da Vinci Code’. They said that their own work had been copied substantially, using themes and copying language. The . .
CitedNova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd and others ChD 20-Jan-2006
The claimant alleged copyright infringement in respect of computer games in the coin operated video market. It was said not that the games copied bitmap graphics, but rather the composite frames which appeared on the screen.
Held: The games . .
CitedMeakin v British Broadcasting Corporation and Others ChD 27-Jul-2010
The claimant alleged that the proposal for a game show submitted by him had been used by the various defendants. He alleged breaches of copyright and of confidence. Application was now made to strike out the claim. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Intellectual Property

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.231500

Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd: PC 12 Apr 1935

(Nova Scotia En Banco) The parties contracted for a charter of a fishing ship. It then became unlawful for a ship to use otter trawl, the only equipment available to the ship, without a licence, but the number of licences was restricted and did not include this ship. The charterers claimed that the contract was frustrated. The Supreme Court of Canada had said that the contract remaned binding since the charterers had selected other ships to be licensed.
Held: The decision to opt to licence other ships determined the appeal in favour of the owners. The loss of the St. Cuthbert’s licence was correctly described, quoad the appellants as ‘a self induced frustration.’
Lord Wright, referred to criticism of Krell v. Henry and said: ‘The authority is certainly not one to be extended: it is particularly difficult to apply where, as in the present case, the possibility of the event relied on as constituting a frustration of the adventure (here the failure to obtain a licence) was known to both parties when the contract was made, but the contract entered into was absolute in terms so far as concerned that known possibility. It may be asked whether in such cases there is any reason to throw the loss on those who have undertaken to place the thing or service for which the contract provides at the other party’s disposal and are able and willing to do so.’

Atkin, Tomlin, MacMillan, Wright LL
[1935] UKPC 1, [1935] AC 524, [1935] UKPC 20
Bailii, Bailii
Citing:
CitedBank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel and Co HL 12-Dec-1918
The defendant ship-owners contracted to lease the ship on charter to the plaintiffs. Before the term, the ship was requisitioned for the war effort. The plaintiffs did not exercise the contractual right given to them to cancel the charterparty. The . .
CitedKrell v Henry CA 1903
Mr Henry contracted to rent a flat located on Pall Mall from the plaintiff, Paul Krell for the daytime and on the days of the forthcoming cornation procession.. He was told that he would have an excellent view of, but this was not written down. He . .
CitedHirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co PC 1926
Lord Sumner described the doctrine of frustration as ‘a device by which the rule as to absolute contracts are reconciled with a special exception which justice demands.’ . .
CitedBank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel and Co HL 12-Dec-1918
The defendant ship-owners contracted to lease the ship on charter to the plaintiffs. Before the term, the ship was requisitioned for the war effort. The plaintiffs did not exercise the contractual right given to them to cancel the charterparty. The . .

Cited by:
CitedGold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd TCC 3-Mar-2010
The parties had contracted for the construction of an estate of houses and flats to be followed by the interim purchase by the defendants. The defendants argued that the slump in land prices frustrated the contract and that they should not be called . .
CitedNorth Shore Ventures Ltd v Anstead Holdings Inc and Others ChD 21-Jun-2010
Claim was made under a substantial loan where payments had not been made after assets were sequestered and only released after four years. . .
CitedGamerco Sa v ICM Fair Warning (Agency) Ltd and Another QBD 31-Mar-1995
The plaintiff Spanish concert promoter, and the defendant rock group, Guns ‘n’ Roses, agreed to provide a concert at the stadium of Atetico Madrid, but shortly before it was due to take place, the stadium was deemed unfit, and its licence withdrawn. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Commonwealth, Contract

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.245727

Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung: PC 8 Mar 1990

Deciding Whether person was an employee

(Hong Kong) The Board considered the conclusion that the applicant stone mason was not an employee of the defendant: ‘even if I leaned towards the opposite conclusion, it would nevertheless be quite impossible for me to say that no tribunal correctly directing itself on the law could reasonably have reached the conclusion under appeal.’
Lord Griffiths said: ‘Whether or not a person is employed under a contract of service is often said in the authorities to be a mixed question of fact and law . . where, as in the present case, the relationship has to be determined by an investigation and evaluation of the factual circumstances in which the work is performed, it must now be taken to be firmly established that the question of whether or not the work was performed in the capacity of an employee or as an independent contractor is to be regarded by an appellate court as a question of fact to be determined by the trial court. At first sight it seems rather strange that this should be so, for whether or not a certain set of facts should be classified under one legal head rather than another would appear to be a question of law. . [but] in O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc. [1984] Q.B. 90 the Court of Appeal . . held that whether or not a waiter was employed under a contract of employment within the meaning of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 was a question of mixed fact and law, and that the finding of an industrial tribunal on this issue, from which an appeal lay on a point of law only, could only be impugned if it could be shown that the tribunal correctly directing itself on the law could not reasonably have reached the conclusion under appeal.’ and
‘Their Lordships conclude that reliance upon these two dicta culled from cases of a wholly dissimilar character, may have misled the courts below in their assessment of the facts of this case and amount in the circumstances to an error of law justifying setting aside what are to be regarded as concurrent findings of fact.
Their Lordships are further of the opinion that the facts of the present case point so clearly to the existence of a contract of service that the finding that the applicant was working as an independent contractor was, to quote the words of Viscount Simonds in Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] A.C. 14, 29, `a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained’ and is to be regarded as an error law.’

Lord Griffiths
[1990] ICR 409, [1990] 2 AC 374, [1990] UKPC 1, [1990] UKPC 9, [1990] IRLR 236
Bailii, Bailii, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedEdwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow HL 25-Jul-1955
The House was asked whether a particular transaction was ‘an adventure in the nature of trade’.
Held: Although the House accepted that this was ‘an inference of fact’, on the primary facts as found by the Commissioners ‘the true and only . .

Cited by:
CitedClark v Oxfordshire Health Authority CA 18-Dec-1997
A nurse was employed under a contract, under which there was no mutuality of obligation; she could refuse work and employer need offer none. This meant that there was no employment capable of allowing an unfair dismissal issue to arise.
Sir . .
CitedYuen v The Royal Hong Kong Golf Club PC 28-Jul-1997
(Hong Kong) The applicant was dismissed as a golf caddie after nine years. The Club denied that he had ever been an employee. He was issued by the club with a number, a uniform and a locker. Caddying work was allocated to available caddies in strict . .
CitedGeorge Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd CA 3-Feb-2005
A land purchase contract had been rectified by the judge for unilateral mistake. A factor had been dropped from a formula for calculating the price.
Held: The judge’s conclusion that the circumstances existed to allow a rectification was . .
CitedAutoclenz Ltd v Belcher and Others CA 13-Oct-2009
Car Valeters contracts misdescribed their Duties
The claimants worked cleaning cars for the appellants. They said that as workers they were entitled to holiday pay. The appellant said they were self-employed.
Held: The contract purported to give rights which were not genuine, and the . .
CitedHalawi v WDFG UK Ltd (T/A World Duty Free) CA 28-Oct-2014
The claimant said that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of her religion. She worked as a beauty consultant at the airport, but through a limited company. Her airside pass had been withdrawn. She now appealed against rejection of her . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Employment

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.194297

Battan Singh v Amirchand: PC 1948

(Supreme Court of Fiji) The will was declared invalid because the testator had lacked testamentary capacity, although the judge had rejected the allegation that the will was invalid for want of knowledge and approval.
Held: Lord Normand discussed and approved the implication of Parker v Felgate: ‘That case decided that if a testator has given instructions to a solicitor at a time when he was able to appreciate what he was doing in all its relevant bearings, and if the solicitor prepares the will in accordance with these instructions, the will will stand good, though at the time of execution the testator is capable only of understanding that he is executing the will which he has instructed, but is no longer capable of understanding the instructions themselves or the clauses in the will which give effect to them.’ and ‘A testator may have a clear apprehension of the meaning of the draft will submitted to him and may approve it, and yet if he was at the time through infirmity or disease so deficient in memory that he was oblivious of the claims of his relations, and if that forgetfulness is an inducing cause of his choosing strangers to be his legatees, the will is invalid.’
Lord Normand
[1948] AC 161
Citing:
ApprovedParker and Another v Felgate and Tilly ChD 7-Jul-1883
Capacity to execute Will once instructions given
A will was challenged on the basis of alleged lack of capacity. The testatrix had capacity when instructing her solicitor, but suffered from Bright’s disease which affected her kidney, and she fell into a coma before it was prepared. She was roused . .

Cited by:
CitedPerrins v Holland and Another ChD 31-Jul-2009
The son of the deceased challenged the testamentary capacity of the testator and further claimed under the 1975 Act. The deceased was disabled and had substantial difficulty communicating.
Held: The will was validly made. Logically it is . .
CitedPerrins v Holland and Others; In re Perrins, deceased CA 21-Jul-2010
The testator had given instructions for his will and received a draft will. The judge had found that he had capacity to make the will when he gave instructions but not when it was executed. The will having been made in accordance with his . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.374721

Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Provincial Insurance Plc: PC 24 May 1993

Two insurance companies were liable to contribute equally to an amount payable to a third party. The doctrine of contribution could be modified by contract and the matter should be considered by reference to the parties’ contractual liabilities.
Lord Woolf
Times 09-Jun-1993, [1994] 1 AC 130, [1993] UKPC 22
Bailii
Citing:
Not FollowedLegal and General Assurance Society Ltd v Drake Insurance Co Ltd CA 15-Jan-1991
An insurance company, having paid under the policy to a doubly insured party, sought contribution from the second insurer, who had not been notified of the claim by the insured. The claim for a contribution was one in equity, but since the company . .

Cited by:
CitedBolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA 6-Feb-2006
The deceased had come into contact with asbestos when working on building sites for more than one contractor. The claimant here sought contribution from the defendants for the damages it had paid to his estate. The issue was as to liability on . .
CitedThe National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd v HSBC Insurance (UK) Ltd ComC 19-Apr-2010
Gavin Kealey QC DHCJ set out the concept of double insurance: ‘Double insurance arises where the same party is insured with two (or more) insurers in respect of the same interest on the same subject-matter against the same risks. If a loss by a . .
CitedZurich Insurance Plc UK Branch v International Energy Group Ltd SC 20-May-2015
A claim had been made for mesothelioma following exposure to asbestos, but the claim arose in Guernsey. Acknowledging the acute difficultis particular to the evidence in such cases, the House of Lords, in Fairchild. had introduced the Special Rule . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.80208

Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O’Malley: 1973

(Supreme Court Canada) Mr O’Malley and Dr Zarzycki were senior officers of the claimant (‘Canaero’). Having attempted, unsuccessfully, to procure a contract for Canaero to carry out a topographical survey and mapping of part of Guyana, they resigned from the company. Subsequently, they incorporated their own company, Terra Surveys Ltd (‘Terra’). Terra was successful, shortly afterwards, in obtaining the contract for the topographical survey and mapping. Canaero brought a claim against Mr O’Malley, Dr Zarzycki and Terra. The argument concentrated on breach of fiduciary duty; which was not how the case had been argued below. Laskin J: ‘Descending from the generality, the fiduciary relationship goes at least this far: a director or a senior officer like [the defendants] is precluded from obtaining for himself, either secretly or without the approval of the company (which would have to be properly manifested on full disclosure of the facts), any property or business advantage either belonging to the company or for which it has been negotiating; and especially is this so when the director or officer is a participant in the negotiations on behalf of the company . . An examination of the case law in this Court and in the Courts of other like jurisdictions on the fiduciary duties of directors and senior officers shows the pervasiveness of an ethic in this area of the law. In my opinion, this ethic disqualifies a director or other senior officer from usurping for himself or diverting to another person or company with whom or with which he is associated a maturing business opportunity which his company is actively pursuing; he is also precluded from so acting even after his resignation where the resignation may fairly be said to have been prompted or influenced by a wish to acquire for himself the opportunity sought by the company, or where it was his position with the company rather than a fresh initiative that led him to the opportunity which he later acquired.’ Referring to Regal (Hastings) neither the ‘no conflict’ rule nor the ‘no profit’ rule should be considered as ‘the exclusive touchstones of liability.’: ‘In this, as in other branches of the law, new fact situations may require a reformulation of existing principles to maintain its vigour in the new setting.’
Laskin J
(1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371
Canada
Cited by:
CitedCMS Dolphin Ltd v Paul M Simonet and Another ChD 23-May-2001
The claimant asserted that the defendant had, having at one point been a creative director of the claimant, left to set up an alternate competing business, and diverted business from the first company to the new one. There had been disagreements . .
CitedUltraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD 27-Jul-2005
The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.183219

Singh v Rainbow Court Townhouses Ltd: PC 19 Jul 2018

(Trinidad and Tobago)
Lord Reed, Lord Kerr, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes, Lady Black
[2018] UKPC 19
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedShaw v Applegate CA 1977
There was a covenant against the use of a property as an amusement arcade. Within three years the purchaser had installed amusement machines, but it was not until three years later that the plaintiffs issued proceedings for an injunction and . .
CitedWilmott v Barber ChD 19-Jun-1880
The lessee of three acres of land agreed in January, 1874, to let one acre to the Plaintiff for the whole of the residue of his term, and he agreed also to sell to the Plaintiff his interest in the whole three acres at any time within five years . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 September 2021; Ref: scu.621122

The Citizens Life Assurance Company Limited v Brown: PC 6 May 1904

(New South Wales) A malicious libel was alleged. The life assurance company was vicariously liable in respect of a libel contained in a circular sent out by a person who was employed by the company under a written agreement as its ‘superintendent of agencies’. By the terms of the agreement that person was to devote his whole time to furthering the company’s business and was to be paid a salary weekly as well as a commission on policies procured by him.
Held: He was a servant of the company for whose actions the company was liable. Once companies are recognised by the law as legal persons, they are liable to have the mental states of agents and employees such as dishonesty or malice attributed to them for the purpose of establishing civil liability.
Lord Lindley said: ‘If it is once granted that corporations are for civil purposes to be regarded as persons, ie as principals acting by agents and servants, it is difficult to see why the ordinary doctrines of agency and of master and servant are not to be applied to corporations as well as to ordinary individuals.’
Lord Lindley
[1904] UKPC 20, [1904] AC 423
Bailii
Australia
Citing:
RejectedAbrath v North Eastern Railway Co HL 15-Mar-1886
The plaintiff had brought an action against the company of malicious prosecution. It was rejected by the jury and again on appeal.
Held: The appeal failed. In an action for damages for the tort of malicious prosecution one of the elements of . .

Cited by:
CitedJetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others SC 22-Apr-2015
The liquidators of Bilta had brought proceedings against former directors and the appellant alleging that they were party to an unlawful means conspiracy which had damaged the company by engaging in a carousel fraud with carbon credits. On the . .
CitedJetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others CA 31-Jul-2013
Defendants appealed against refusal of their request for a summary striking out for lack of jurisdiction, of the claims against them arising from their management of the insolvency of the first defendant. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 August 2021; Ref: scu.419585

Siu Yin Kwan and Another v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd: PC 16 Dec 1993

Insurers are liable to undisclosed principals on an indemnity policy, provided it was made with the range of their authority. The claim arose out of the death of two seamen on their employers’ vessel but the employers were not named in the relevant policy.
Lord Lloyd said: ‘There are two reasons why their Lordships prefer the decision in Mark Rowlands . . In the first place the words ‘event or events’ in section 2, while apt to describe the loss of the vessel are hardly apt to describe . . liability arising under the common law, as a consequence of the loss of the vessel. Secondly, section 2 must take colour from the short title and preamble to Section 1. By no stretch of the imagination could indemnity insurance be described as a ‘mischievous kind of gaming’. Their Lordships are entitled to give section 2 a meaning which corresponds with the obvious legislative intent.’
Lord Lloyd of Berwick said: ‘For present purposes the law can be summarised shortly. (1) An undisclosed principal may sue and be sued on a contract made by an agent on his behalf, acting within the scope of his actual authority. (2) In entering into the contract, the agent must intend to act on the principal’s behalf. (3) The agent of an undisclosed principal may also sue and be sued on the contract. (4) Any defence which the third party may have against the agent is available against his principal. (5) The terms of the contract may, expressly or by implication, exclude the principal’s right to sue, and his liability to be sued. The contact itself, or the circumstances surrounding the contract, may show that the agent is the true and only principal.’
Lord Lloyd
Gazette 02-Feb-1994, Times 16-Dec-1993, [1994] 2 AC 199, [1994] 1 All ER 213, [1994] 2 WLR 370
Insurance Act 1774 2
Commonwealth
Citing:
AppliedMark Rowlands v Berni Inns Ltd CA 1985
The plaintiff owned the freehold and had let the basement to the defendant. The plaintiff insured the building. The defendant covenanted to pay to the plaintiff an insurance rent equal to the proportionate cost of insuring the part of the building . .

Cited by:
CitedFeasey v Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada and Another: Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd v Feasey ComC 17-May-2002
The fact that there was more than one insurance policy in place for the same interest would not preclude a claim under one of them. A mutual underwriting group insured members against personal injury and so forth through ‘lineslip’ policies. The . .
CitedBanca Nazionale Del Lavoro Spa v Playboy Club London Ltd and Others SC 26-Jul-2018
The Playboy casino required a reference for a customer, but asked for this through a third party. The bank was not aware of the agency but gave a good reference for a customer who had never deposited any money with them and nor to whom it had issued . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 August 2021; Ref: scu.89287

Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v The Rajah of Faridkote: PC 28 Jul 1894

(Punjab) THe Rajah of Faridkote had obtained in the Civil Court of Faridkote (a native state) ex parte judgments against Singh (his former treasurer), which he sought to enforce in Lahore, in British India. Singh was not then resident in Faridkote and did not appear in the actions or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction. It was argued, for the Rajah, that the Faridkote court had jurisdiction over Singh because, ‘[b]y becoming state treasurer, [he] submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Faridkote Court, for where a man takes office in a state he must be deemed to have agreed to be bound by the jurisdiction of that state as accounting for money due from him to that state in respect of that office. In any case, where an office is accepted in that way, and the whole cause of action arises in that state, there is jurisdiction which is obligatory on the acceptor’Held: The Board rejected the argument.
Lord Selborne LC, speaking for the Privy Council, said of an agreement or consent to the jurisdiction of a foreign court being implied or inferred, that ‘such obligation, unless expressed, could not be implied’
Lord Selborne LC
[1894] UKPC 44, [1894] AC 670
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedSchibsby v Westenholz CA 1980
The parties were both Danish, the plaintiffs resident in France and the defendants in London. The plaintiffs now sought to enforce a judgment obtained against the defendangt in France in default of their appearance. The defendants had no property in . .

Cited by:
CitedVizcaya Partners Ltd v Picard and Another PC 3-Feb-2016
No Contractual Obligation to Try Case in New York
(Gibraltar) The appellant had invested in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff. They were repaid sums before the fund collapsed, and the trustees now sought repayment by way of enforcement of an order obtained in New York.
Held: The . .
CitedEmanuel v Symon CA 1908
Kennedy LJ confirmedtaht the Faridkote case had decided of a suggested obligation to submit to a foreign jurisdiction that it: ‘was not to be implied from the mere fact of entering into a contract in a foreign country’. . .
CitedMattar and Saba v Public Trustee 1952
Alberta Appellate Division – The court denied enforcement of a Quebec judgment on promissory notes, and held that an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court is not to be implied from the fact that the defendant has entered into a . .
CitedAdams v Cape Industries plc ChD 1990
The piercing of the veil argument was used to attempt to bring an English public company, which was the parent company of a group which included subsidiaries in the United States, within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Where a . .
CitedVizcaya Partners Ltd v Picard and Another PC 3-Feb-2016
No Contractual Obligation to Try Case in New York
(Gibraltar) The appellant had invested in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff. They were repaid sums before the fund collapsed, and the trustees now sought repayment by way of enforcement of an order obtained in New York.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 August 2021; Ref: scu.417560

The Director General, Mauritius Revenue Authority v Paradis Brabant Hotel (Mauritius) (Rev 1): PC 23 Jul 2013

The issue before the Committee concerned the appropriate rate of Hotel and Restaurant Tax (‘HRT’) applicable to taxable receipts in respect of supplies made by each of the fifteen or sixteen respondents, in connection with its hotel and/or restaurant business.
Lord Neuberger, Lord Wilson, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson, Sir Paul Girvan
[2013] UKPC 24
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.514150

Geyer v Downs and another: 1977

(High Court of Australia) A pupil suffered injuries when hit by a softball bat by a fellow pupil at playing the game in the school playground before school. There was no supervision. The jury awarded the appellant damages. The verdict was set aside by the court of appeal.
Held: The appeal to the High Court was allowed: ‘It was urged for the respondent that there was no duty of supervision owed to the children before ‘school hours’. That expression was taken in the present case to mean the period of time beginning at 9.00 am, at which the ‘Daily Routine’ stated that the playgrounds were to be supervised. Reliance was also placed upon the departmental instruction 5.2.4.1 as set out, supra, which it was said produced the result that the headmaster had no power or authority to require teachers to supervise the playground otherwise than during the hours 9.00 am to 3.30 pm as set out in that instruction. It was said therefore that the headmaster could not be regarded as negligent by failing to take measures to provide supervision of the playground prior to 9.00 am when he had no authority to direct any teacher to be present to perform that function. So to regard the case is to take an unduly restricted view of the relevant circumstances. There is no case which lays down that there is no duty of supervision prior to ‘school hours’, however that expression may be understood. The point seems to have been seldom referred to. In Ward v Hertfordshire County Council [1970] 1 All ER 535 at 538; [1970] 1 WLR 356 at 361, Salmon LJ expressly reserved the question whether lack of supervision could give rise to a cause of action in a case where the injury occurs at 8.50 am but ‘the school does not start until 8.55 am’. There seems no basis for treating it as a rule that there can be no duty of supervision outside ‘ordinary school hours’ or ‘before school started’. The question must depend upon the nature of the general duty to take reasonable care in all the circumstances. It is not enough to look only at the departmental instructions and to say that the duty of supervision arises only during the periods referred to in those instructions.’
Murphy and Aickin JJ
[1977] 17 ALR 408
Australia
Cited by:
CitedKearn-Price v Kent County Council CA 30-Oct-2002
The claimant was injured, being hit in the face by a football in a school playground. It was before school started. There had been accidents, and there were rules which had not been enforced. The school appealed a finding of negligence.
Held: . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 06 August 2021; Ref: scu.214302

The Queen v Walter Watson Hughes And Edward Stirling: PC 22 Dec 1865

Leases granted by the Governor of South Australia under powers conferred on him by the Colonial Act, 21st Vict. No. 5, sec. 13, for regulating the sale and other disposal of waste lands belonging to the Crown, sealed with the public seal of the Province, but not enrolled or recorded in any court, are not in themselves Records; and, though bad on the face of them, being for a larger quantity of land than allowed by that Act, cannot be annulled or quashed by a writ of Scire facias
[1865] EngR 794, (1865) 3 Moo PC NS 439, (1865) 16 ER 166, [1866] UKPC 3, LR 1 PC 81
Commonlii, Bailii
Australia

Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.281706

Ali v Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago): PC 13 Feb 2017

(Trinidad and Tobago) The Board considered the test for when the implication of a contractual term was necessary.
Held: The defendant would not have chosen the claimant for redundancy if he had not accepted voluntary redundancy. The term properly to be implied into the contract was that the defendant would not act to prevent the claimant from completing five years of service, unless the claimant was in repudiatory breach of contract. They had done nothing to prevent the claimant from completing his five year period and they were not in breach of contract.
Lord Sumption JSC in argument in set the test as ”being that a term can only be implied if, without the term, the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence’
Lord Hughes said: ‘The concept of necessity must not be watered down. Necessity is not established by showing that the contract would be improved by the addition. The fairness or equity of a suggested implied term is a essential but not a sufficient pre-condition for inclusion.’
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC, Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes JJSC
[2017] UKPC 2, [2017] IRLR 432, [2017] ICR 531, [2017] WLR(D) 110, [2017] Bus LR 784
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedLehman Brothers International (Europe) v Exotix Partners Llp ChD 9-Sep-2019
The parties had contracted to trade global depository notes issued by the Peruvian government. Each made mistakes as to their true value, thinking them scraps worth a few thousand dollars, whereas their true value was over $8m. On the defendant . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 June 2021; Ref: scu.575376

Jamaica Flour Mills Ltd v The Industrial Disputes Tribunal and Another: PC 23 Mar 2005

(Jamaica) The company having been taken over summarily dismissed three employees who complained to their union, and the remaining workforce were called out on strike. There was a disagreement as to whether there was a genuine redundancy situation. The tribunal ordered the strike to cease, and for the employees to be re-instated.
Held: No estoppel was established against the employees by having cashed their redundancy cheques. The section allowed a mandatory re-instatement, although ‘Reinstatement does not necessarily require that the employee be placed at the same desk or machine or be given the same work in all respects as he or she had been given prior to the unjustifiable dismissal. If, moreover, in a particular case, there really is no suitable job into which the employee can be re-instated, the employer can immediately embark upon the process of dismissing the employee on the ground of redundancy, this time properly fulfilling his obligations of communication and consultation under the Code.’
References: [2005] UKPC 16
Links: Bailii, PC
Judges: Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
This case cites:

  • Cited – Scarf v Jardine HL 13-Jun-1882 ([1882] 7 AC 345, [1882] UKLawRpAC 17, )
    If there has been a conclusive election by the plaintiffs to adopt the liability of one of two persons, alternatively liable, they cannot afterwards make the other liable. The two claims are mutually exclusive or impossible in law. To establish an . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.223878

Bhola v The State: PC 30 Jan 2006

References: [2006] UKPC 10
Links: Bailii
Ratio: Trinidad and Tobago
Jurisdiction: Commonwealth
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Simmons and Another v Regina PC (Bailii, [2006] UKPC 19)
    (Bahamas) The appellants challenged admission of confession statements at their trial. A statement was not to be admitted without proof hat it had not been obtained by oppression.
    Held: The defendant would have failed in a submission of no . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 18 June 2019
Ref: 238917

Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dredge Willemstad”: 9 Dec 1976″

References: [1976] HCA 65, (1976) 136 CLR 529
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ.
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) Negligence – Duty of care – Foreseeability of harm – Economic loss not consequential upon damage to person or property – Damage to property of one person – Economic loss suffered by person as a result – Pipeline carrying oil to plaintiff’s depot – Damaged by defendant’s negligence – Supply interrupted – Pipeline and depot owned by different persons – Expense incurred by plaintiff in arranging alternative means of delivery – Whether recoverable – Remoteness of loss or damage.
Shipping and Navigation – Action in rem – Action against ship – Negligence – Master not sued as defendant – Appearance entered by master – No proprietary interest in ship – Whether master liable to judgment.
A pipeline was damaged and the owner of the terminal (who was not the owner of the pipeline) incurred expense in transporting refined oil to the terminal while the pipeline was out of use.
Held: The plaintiff was entitled to recover that expense from the dredger which had damaged the pipeline. Jacobs J said that the duty of care owed to the owner of the pipeline was also owed to ‘a person whose property was in such physical propinquity to the place where the acts of omissions of the dredge . . had their physical effect that a physical effect on the property of that person was foreseeable as the result of such acts or omissions’.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Jurisdiction: Australia

Last Update: 13-Jul-18
Ref: 331084

Banfai v Formula Fun Centre Inc; 13 Dec 1984

References: 1984 CanLII 2198, 34 CCLT 171(HCJ), [1984] OJ No 3444
Links: Canlii
Coram: O’Leary J
Ratio: Canlii Ontario › Superior Court of Justice – The defendants operated an automobile-racing amusement ride on land adjacent to the plaintiffs’ motels. The plaintiffs and their customers complained of the noise emanating from the defendants’ ride. The plaintiffs brought an action in nuisance against the defendants seeking damages and an injunction.
Held, there should be judgment for the plaintiffs.
The noise created by the racing cars was not in keeping with the other noises in the vicinity. Generally speaking it was considerably louder and sharper than those noises, and was pervasive, intrusive, and annoying, while the other sounds of the area generally were not. In addition, the fumes and smoke from the track were completely out of keeping with such air pollution as otherwise existed in the area. The noise from the track by itself constituted an unreasonable, undue and material interference with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their property. The complaints of the plaintiffs did not arise from any abnormal sensitivity or delicacies on their part. The noise from the track was such that a high percentage of normal persons would find the noise disturbing and unacceptable. It was a noise that the plaintiffs should not have to put up with, given the character of the area in which they conduct their business.
An owner of land who leases it knowing the tenant is going to use it for an automobile-racing amusement ride is liable for the nuisance created by the tenant. Although normally an owner is not liable for the nuisance committed by a tenant, where the nuisance arises ‘from the natural and necessary result of what the landlord authorized’ or ‘the use from which the damage or nuisance necessarily arises was plainly contemplated by the lease’, then the owner-landlord is liable.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Coventry and Others v Lawrence and Another (No 2) SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 46, [2014] WLR(D) 332, UKSC 2012/0076, SC Summary, SC, WLRD, [2014] PTSR 1014, [2014] 4 All ER 517, [2015] 1 AC 106, [2014] 3 WLR 555, [2014] HLR 42, [2014] 5 Costs LO 759, [2014] 2 P &CR 19, SC Summary Video)
    Consequential judgment. Mr Coventry had been found liable in the principle judgment in nuisance to the appellant neighbours. The Court was now asked as to several matters arising. First, to what extent were the defendants’ landlords liable to the . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 06-Sep-16
Ref: 551696

Turner v Bladin; 20 Apr 1951

References: (1951) 82 CLR 463, [1951] HCA 13
Links: Austlii
Coram: Williams, Fullagar, and Kitto JJ
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) Contract – Specific performance – Outstanding obligations on either side – Contract of sale completely performed by vendor – Decree of specific performance against purchaser to enforce payment of purchase price.
Statute of Frauds – Action – Debt – Sale of interest in land – Contract not evidenced by writing – Consideration fully executed by vendor – Action by vendor in indebitatus assumpsit to recover purchase price or instalments thereof – Instruments Act 1928-1936 (No. 3706 – No. 4370) (Vict.), s. 128.

Last Update: 29-Aug-16
Ref: 395052

Alati v Kruger; 29 Nov 1955

References: (1955) 94 CLR 216, [1955] HCA 64, [1955] ALR 1047
Links: Austlii
Coram: Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ
Ratio: (High Court of Australia) The remedy of rescission is only available if the parties can be returned to their respective positions before the contract was made. Dixon CJ said: ‘It is not that equity asserts a power by its decree to avoid a contract which the defrauded party himself has no right to disaffirm, and to revest property the title to which the party cannot affect. Rescission from misrepresentation is always the act of the party himself . . The function of a court in which proceedings for rescission are taken is to adjudicate upon the validity of a purported disaffirmance as an act avoiding the transaction ab inito, and, if it is valid, to give effect to it and make appropriate consequential orders . . The difference between the legal and the equitable rules on the subject simply was that equity, having means which the common law lacked to ascertain and provide for the adjustments necessary to be made between the parties in cases where a simple handing back of property or repayment of money would not put them in as good a position as before they entered into their transaction, was able to see the possibility of restitutio in integrum, and therefore to concede the right of a defrauded party to rescind, in a much wider variety of cases than those which the common law could recognize as admitting of rescission.’ and
‘When a contract is rescinded by reason of a recognised vitiating factor, the contract, as just noted, is set aside from the beginning. In such a case there can be no claim for damages for breach of contract, because in such situations there is no contract. Equally, if a claim is made by the victim for damages for breach of contract, there can be no rescission of the contract as the victim has by suing for breach clearly elected not to rescind.’
This case is cited by:

  • Approved – O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Limited CA ([1985] QB 428, (1984) 2 IPR 499, [1984] 3 WLR 448, [1985] 3 All ER 351)
    The claimant alleged undue influence. As a young singer he had entered into a management agreement with the defendant which he said were prejudicial and unfair. The defendant argued that the ‘doctrine of restitutio in integrum applied only to the . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 29-Aug-16
Ref: 470685

Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd; 7 Sep 2010

References: [2010] FCA 984
Links: Austlii
Coram: Bennett J
Ratio: Austlii (Federal Court of Australia)
COPYRIGHT – respondent reproduces headlines and creates abstracts of articles in the applicant’s newspaper – whether reproduction of headlines constitutes copyright infringement – whether copyright subsists in individual newspaper headlines, in an article with its headline, in the compilation of all the articles and headlines in a newspaper edition and in the compilation of the edition as a whole – literary work – copyright protection for titles – use of headline as citation to article – policy considerations – originality – authorship – whether presumption of originality for anonymous works available – whether work of joint authorship – whether the headlines constitute a substantial part of each compilation – whether the work of writing headlines is part of the work of compilation – whether fair dealing for the purpose of or associated with reporting news
ESTOPPEL – whether applicant estopped from asserting copyright infringement by respondent – applicant has known for many years that headlines of the applicant’s newspaper are reproduced in the abstracting service – applicant had subscribed to and resupplied the abstracting service – whether respondent relied on an assumption that the applicant will not assert copyright infringement by reproduction by headlines – whether applicant created or encouraged the assumption – detriment – whether unconscionable to depart from assumption
Bennett J said: ‘In my view, the headline of each article functions as the title of the article . . It may be a clever title. That is not sufficient. Headlines are, like titles, simply too insubstantial and too short to qualify for copyright protection as literary works. The function of the headline is as a title to the article as well as a brief statement of its subject, in a compressed form comparable in length to a book title or the like. It is, generally, too trivial to be a literary work, much as a logo was held to be too trivial to be an artistic work . . It may be that evidence directed to a particular headline, or a title of so extensive and of such a significant character, could be sufficient to warrant a finding of copyright protection . . but that is not the case here . . Fairfax claims copyright in the headlines as a class of work, based on the evidence of a general practice that headlines are determined by staff and settled at meetings of staff to provide a title to a story which also fits into the format of the page . . That is insufficient to overcome the reasoning for the established practice of denying copyright protection to titles which is the apt characterisation for headlines as a class . . The need to identify a work by its name is a reason for the exclusion of titles from copyright protection in the public interest. A proper citation of a newspaper article requires not only reference to the name of the newspaper but also reproduction of the headline . . If titles were subject to copyright protection, conventional bibliographic references to an article would infringe. Such considerations may well be a reason for the fact that headlines and ‘short phrases’ are excluded from copyright in the United States . . In my view, to afford published headlines, as a class, copyright protection as literary works would tip the balance too far against the interest of the public in the freedom to refer or be referred to articles by their headlines.’
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 29-Aug-16
Ref: 470926

Taunoa v Attorney General for New Zealand; 31 Aug 2007

References: [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429, [2007] 5 LRC 680
Links: Nzlii
Coram: Elias CJ, Blanchard J, Tipping J, McGrath J
Ratio: Supreme Court of New Zealand – The claimants sought damages after their treatment in prison. They challenged the legality of a behaviour modification regime which five prisoners had been subjected to. The regime had been operated at Auckland Prison by the Department of Corrections over the period 1998-2004, to deal with extremely disruptive prisoners. There was a distinctly punitive element to the regime. The point of the regime was to change the prisoners’ behaviour. The regime involved a highly controlled environment and severe restrictions on association and maximum security conditions, which could become progressively less restrictive depending on a prisoner’s behaviour.
Held: (majority) Sections 9 and 23(5) establish a hierarchy of proscribed conduct:
(a) Blanchard J considered that there are ‘degrees of reprehensibility’ evident in sections 9 and 23(5). He considered that section 9 is concerned with conduct on the part of the state and its officials which is to be utterly condemned as outrageous and unacceptable in any circumstances; section 23(5) is confined in its application to persons deprived of their liberty. It proscribes conduct which is unacceptable in our society, but is of a lesser order, not rising to a level deserving to be called outrageous.
(b) Tipping J considered that s 9 can be seen as prohibiting inhumane treatment, whereas s 23(5) requires prisoners to be treated with humanity. He warned that there is a danger of these concepts being conflated in a way which reduces the degree of seriousness required for a section 9 breach. He considered that s 9 is reserved for truly egregious cases which call for a level of denunciation of the same order as that appropriate to torture.
(c) McGrath J considered that s 9 affirms the rights of all not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment, while s 23(5) focuses on the rights of those deprived of their liberty to be treated with respect for human dignity. He considered that there is a hierarchy between the two sections, and that they are separate, though complementary, affirmations of rights. That hierarchal relationship reflects the graduated standards of the two provisions in the relative gravity of breaches of the rights they respectively affirm. There is a high threshold to be met before the Court can find that there has been a breach of the prohibition in s 9. (d) Henry J agreed with Tipping J.
Tipping J noted that conduct breaching s 9 will usually involve intention to harm or at least consciously reckless indifference as to the causing of harm, as well as significant physical or mental suffering. It seems that s 9 could extend to: (a) torture involving the deliberate infliction of severe physical or mental suffering for a prescribed purpose, such as the obtaining of information; (b) cruel treatment which inflicts suffering, or results in severe or substantial suffering or distress. Views differed on whether or not this needs to be deliberate.
Elias CJ (dissenting) said that ss 9 and 23(5) are not simply different points of seriousness on a continuum, but that they involve distinct, though overlapping rights. She considered that s 9 is concerned with the prevention of treatment properly characterised as inhuman, amounting to a denial of humanity; s 23(5) is directed to an additional, but complementary requirement that prisoners be treated humanely. She considered that denial of humanity could occur through deprivation of basic human needs, including personal dignity and physical and mental integrity. In contrast, inhumane treatment was treatment that was not fitting for human beings, ‘even those behaving badly in prison.’
Statutes: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 9 23(5)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Takitota v The Attorney General and Others PC (Bailii, [2009] UKPC 11, 26 BHRC 578)
    Bahamas – The claimant appeald as to the amount of compensation awarded to him for his unlawful detention for over eight years, in appalling prison conditions. The Court of Appeal categorised his treatment not only as ‘less than humane’ but as a . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 29-Aug-16
Ref: 471045

Birmingham v Renfrew; 11 Jun 1937

References: (1937) 57 CLR 666, [1937] HCA 52
Links: Austlii
Coram: Dixon J, Latham CJ
Ratio: (High Court of Australia) Cases of mutual wills are only one example of a wider category of cases, for example secret trusts, in which a court of equity will intervene to impose a constructive trust. Latham CJ described a mutual will arrangement as ‘a trust which is declared by the law to affect the conscience of [the survivor’s] executor and of the volunteers who are devisees or legatees under his will.’
Dixon J set down the principles for mutual wills: ‘It has long been established that a contract between persons to make corresponding wills gives rise to equitable obligations when one acts on the faith of such an agreement and dies leaving his will unrevoked so that the other takes property under its dispositions. It operates to impose upon the survivor an obligation regarded as specifically enforceable. It is true that he cannot be compelled to make and leave unrevoked a testamentary document and if he dies leaving a last will containing provisions inconsistent with his agreement it is nevertheless valid as a testamentary act. But the doctrines of equity attach the obligation to the property. The effect is, I think, that the survivor becomes a constructive trustee and the terms of the trust are those of the will he undertook would be his last will . . The purpose of an arrangement for corresponding wills must often be, as in this case, to enable the survivor during his life to deal as absolute owner with the property passing under the will of the party first dying. That is to say, the object of the transaction is to put the survivor in a position to enjoy for his own benefit the full ownership so that, for instance, he may convert it and expend the proceeds if he choose. But when he dies he is to bequeath what is left in the manner agreed upon. It is only by the special doctrines of equity that such a floating obligation, suspended, so to speak, during the lifetime of the survivor can descend upon the assets at his death and crystallize into a trust. No doubt gifts and settlements, inter vivos, if calculated to defeat the intention of the compact, could not be made by the survivor and his right of disposition, inter vivos, is, therefore, not unqualified. But, substantially, the purpose of the arrangement will often be to allow full enjoyment for the survivor’s own benefit and advantage upon condition that at his death the residue shall pass as arranged.’
This case cites:

  • Cited – Dufour v Pereira ((1769) 1 Dick 419, (1769) 2 Harg Jurid Arg 304, Commonlii, [1769] EngR 63, (1769) Dick 419, (1769) 21 ER 332)
    The court was asked as to the validity and effect of a single joint will.
    Held: Lord Camden considered the nature of joint or mutual wills. Lord Camden LC said: ‘The parties by mutual will do each of them devise, upon the engagement of the . .
  • Cited – Re Oldham ([1925] Ch 75)
    The court was asked whether an agreement for mutual wills should be inferred. . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Goodchild and Another v Goodchild CA (Times 12-May-97, Bailii, [1997] EWCA Civ 1611, [1997] 3 All ER 63, [1997] 1 WLR 1216)
    The deceased and his wife made wills in virtually identical form. The husband changed his will after their divorce, but his son and other wife claimed that the couple had intended the wills to be part of a larger arrangement of their affairs, . .
  • Cited – In re Cleaver dec’d, Cleaver v Insley ChD ([1981] 1 WLR 939, [1981] 2 All ER 1018)
    Cases of mutual wills are only one example of a wider category of cases, for example secret trusts, in which a court of equity will intervene to impose a constructive trust.
    Nourse J said: ‘The principle of all these cases is that a court of . .
  • Cited – Goodchild v Goodchild ChD (Times 22-Dec-95, Ind Summary 08-Jan-96, [1996] 1 WLR 694)
    The husband and wife had made mirror wills. They divorced, and the husband made a new will. After his death, the child and the third wife of the deceased made a claim against the second wife.
    Held: The wills were in identical terms, but . .
  • Cited – The Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation v Carvel and Another ChD (Bailii, [2007] EWHC 1314 (Ch), [2007] 4 All ER 81)
    The husband and wife had made mutual wills in the US with an express agreement not to make later alterations or dispositions without the agreement of the other or at all after the first death. The wife survived, but having lost the first will made a . .
  • Cited – Walters v Olins CA (Bailii, [2008] EWCA Civ 782, [2009] Ch 212, [2009] 2 WLR 1, [2008] WTLR 1449)
    The claimant appealed against a finding that he had entered into a mutual will contract with the deceased.
    Held: It is a legally necessary condition of mutual wills that there is clear and satisfactory evidence of a contract between two . .
  • Cited – Healey v Brown ChD ([2002] 19 EG 147, Bailii, [2002] EWHC Ch 1405)
    The two deceased had made mutual wills bequeathing the family home. The survivor transferred the property during his life to defeat the agreement. It was now said that the arrangement fell foul of the 1989 Act and was unenforceable.
    Held: . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 28-Aug-16
Ref: 183791

Perre v Apand Pty Ltd; 12 Aug 1999

References: (1999) 198 CLR 180, [1999] HCA 36, [1999] 64 ALR 606, [1999] 64 73 ALJR 1190
Links: Austlii
Coram: Kirby J
Ratio: (High Court of Australia) The plaintiff farmers sought damages for financial losses incurred after the defendant negligently introduced a disease. Although the disease was not shown to have spread, neighbouring farm owners suffered economic loss by the imposition of a potato marketing ban in Western Australia attributable to the proximity of their farms to the outbreak of the disease, and sued the defendant for what was therefore pure economic loss (the absence of any escape of the disease preventing a claim under Rylands v. Fletcher).
Held: An important criterion for the imposition of liability for economic loss lay in ascertaining the extent to which the plaintiff was vulnerable to incurring loss by reason of the defendant’s conduct, and the extent to which that was or should have been apparent to the defendant.
Kirby J: ‘As against the approach which I favour, it has been said that the three identified elements are mere ‘labels’. So indeed they are. . . Labels are commonly used by lawyers. They help steer the mind through the task in hand.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – HM Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank Plc HL (Bailii, [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181, [2006] 4 All ER 256, [2006] 2 LLR 327, [2006] 3 WLR 1, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 327, [2006] 1 CLC 1096)
    The claimant had served an asset freezing order on the bank in respect of one of its customers. The bank paid out on a cheque inadvertently as to the order. The Commissioners claimed against the bank in negligence. The bank denied any duty of care. . .
  • Cited – Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd ChD (Bailii, [2008] EWHC 454 (Ch))
    The claimant said that the defendant bookmakers had been negligent in allowing him to continue betting when they should have known that he was acting under an addiction. The defendant company had a policy for achieving responsible gambling, . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 28-Aug-16
Ref: 242687

Ten-Ichi Co Ltd v Jancar Ltd; 19 Jul 1989

References: [1989] 2 HKC 330
Links: HKLii
Coram: Sears J
Ratio: (High Court of Hong Kong) – Tort – Passing off – whether action lies when no active business in Hong Kong – International reputation and goodwill – Damages whether recoverable if sustained outside the jurisdiction.
Sears J ihearing an application for an interlocutory injunction held that mere reputation was enough to found a passing off claim.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 22-Aug-16
Ref: 566015

Owendale Pty Ltd v Anthony; 24 Aug 1967

References: [1967] HCA 52, (1967) 117 CLR 539
Links: Austlii
Coram: Windeyer J, Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor, Owen JJ
Ratio: Austlii High Court of Australia – Landlord and Tenant – Lease – Determination – Forfeiture – Covenant to commence erection of building within specified time – Clearing operations commenced – Whether breach – Acceptance of rent after notice of breach – Conduct of lessor and lessee – Waiver – Crown lease – Statutory procedure for determination upon breach of covenant – Effect of conduct upon statutory right to determine – Notice – Requirement that conditions for failure to comply with &which lease may be determined be fully set out – Reference to terms of lease – Whether sufficient – Signature on notice – Delegation of function by Minister – Delegate designated by office held – City Area Leases Ordinance 1936-1964 (A.C.T.), ss. 6,22.*
Windeyer J set out the pronciples behind the waiver of a right to forfeit a lease: ‘A waiver in this sense is more properly understood as an election. The essence of the doctrine, in cases between landlord and tenant, is that where a Lease contains a provision for forfeiture and a right of re-entry upon breach of a covenant by the lessee, then, upon a breach occurring, the lessor can either take advantage of his right of forfeiture and re-entry or waive this and treat the Lease as still subsisting. If, with knowledge of a breach, giving him a right of re-entry, he does an act inconsistent with his avoiding the Lease, he is deemed to have elected not to avoid it. Anything which a landlord does or says which is an unequivocal recognition of the continued existence of the Lease when he is aware of facts which would have given him a right of re-entry will amount to a waiver of that right. One act which, by the common law, is always regarded as unequivocal, and therefore necessarily a waiver of a right of re-entry on account of a breach of covenant by the lessee, is the lessor’s acceptance, with knowledge of the fact of the breach, of rent accrued due after the breach. Apart from any special term in the Lease . . or any statutory modification of the common law, acceptance of rent due in respect of a current period is an obvious recognition of a tenancy then subsisting.’

Last Update: 18-Aug-16
Ref: 568017

International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd; 6 Feb 2008

References: [2008] HCA 3, (2008) 234 CLR 151, (2008) 242 ALR 47, (2008) 82 ALJR 419, (2008) 65 ACSR 1, (2008) 26 ACLC 38
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gleeson CJ
Ratio: (High Court of Australia) The rules of the clearing house scheme had been modified following the British Eagle decision so as to exclude any liability or right of action for payment between member airlines.
Held: (by a majority, Kirby J dissenting) The rule changes were effective to make the IATA the sole creditor of Ansett, and that the revised system did not have the effect of administering debts due to an insolvent company otherwise than in accordance with the mandatory pari passu rule. The court referred to Ex p Mackay and suggested that Lord Cross’ speech in British Eagle was based in part on the anti-deprivation principle; and that there was no need for recourse to the rule that a contract which is contrary to public policy is void, because the statute was an overriding one which applied according to its terms.
This case cites:

  • Cited – British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Compagnie National Air France HL ([1975] 1 WLR 758, [1975] 2 All ER 390)
    British Eagle, which had gone into liquidation. The parties disputed a contract attempting to reset the ranking of debts. The House was asked whether there was a debt due to the insolvent company at the commencement of its winding-up, to which the . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 10-Aug-16
Ref: 442611

Cabassi v Vila; 12 Dec 1940

References: (1940) 64 CLR 130, [1940] HCA 41
Links: Austlii
Coram: Rich ACJ, Starke, McTiernan and Williams JJ
Ratio: High Court of Australia – The claim sought to sidestep the rule giving immuity to witnesses before a court by alleging a conspiracy to give false evidence.
Held: Starke J said: ‘But it does not matter whether the action is framed as an action for defamation or as an action analogous to an action for malicious prosecution or for deceit or, as in this instance, for combining or conspiring together for the purpose of injuring another: the rule of law is that no action lies against witnesses in respect of evidence prepared . . , given, adduced or procured by them in the course of legal proceedings. The law protects witnesses and others, not for their benefit, but for a higher interest, namely, the advancement of public justice.’
This case cites:

  • Cited – Dawkins v Lord Rokeby ((1873) LR 8 QB 255)
    Police officers (among others) are immune from any action that may be brought against them on the ground that things said or done by them in the ordinary course of the proceedings were said or done falsely and maliciously and without reasonable and . .
  • Cited – Munster v Lamb CA ((1883) 11 QBD 588)
    Judges and witness, including police officers are given immunity from suit in defamation in court proceedings.
    Fry LJ said: ‘Why should a witness be able to avail himself of his position in the box and to make without fear of civil consequences . .
  • Cited – Watson v M’Ewan HL ([1905] AC 480, [1905] UKHL 1, Bailii, (1905) 13 SLT 340, (1905) 7 F (HL) 109)
    A claim was brought against a medical witness in respect of statements made in preparation of a witness statement and similar statements subsequently made in court. The appellant was a doctor of medicine who had been retained by the respondent in . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Approved – Marrinan v Vibert CA ([1963] 1 QB 528)
    A tortious conspiracy was alleged in the conduct of a civil action. The plaintiff appealed against rejection of his claim.
    Held: The appeal failed as an attempt to circumvent the immunity of a wirness in defamation by framing a claim in . .
  • Cited – Singh v Moorlands Primary School and Another CA (Bailii, [2013] EWCA Civ 909, [2013] IRLR 820, [2013] WLR(D) 306, [2013] 1 WLR 3052, [2013] ICR 1158, [2013] CP Rep 46)
    The claimant was a non-wite head teacher, alleging that her school governors and local authority had undermined and had ‘deliberately endorsed a targeted campaign of discrimination, bullying, harassment and victimisation’ against her as an Asian . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 05-Aug-16
Ref: 567938

Taylor v Attorney General of Queensland; 29 Jun 1917

References: (1917) 23 CLR 457, [1917] HCA 31
Links: Austlii
Coram: Barton J, Isaacs, Gavan Duffy, Rich and Powers JJ
Ratio: (High Court of Australia) The 1908 Act provided that, when a bill passed by the Legislative Assembly in two successive sessions had in the same two sessions been rejected by the Legislative Council, it might be submitted by referendum to the electors, and, if affirmed by them, should be presented to the Governor for His Majesty’s assent. Upon receiving such assent, the Bill was to become an Act of Parliament in the same manner as if passed by both Houses of Parliament, and notwithstanding any law to the contrary.
Held: This was a valid and effective Act of Parliament by virtue of the power conferred upon the Legislature of Queensland by S.5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865. It was further held that there was power to abolish the Legislative Council of Queensland by an Act passed by the Legislative Assembly and affirmed by the electors in accordance with the provisions of the 1908 Act. Barton J ‘The Constitution Act of 1867 provided for all laws passed under it to be enacted ‘by Her Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly in Parliament assembled’, and that the constitution did not recognise the making of laws by any other authority: ‘It is also true that in general the legislation of a body created by and acting under a written charter or constitution is valid only so far as it conforms to the authority conferred by that instrument of government, and that therefore attempted legislation, merely at variance with the charter or constitution, cannot be held an effective law on the ground that the authority conferred by that instrument includes a power to alter or repeal any part of it, if the legislation questioned has to be preceded by a good exercise of such power; that is, if the charter or constitution has not antecedently been so altered within the authority given by that document itself. . . Normally, therefore, in the absence of such a provision as s.5 of the Imperial Act, I should have been prepared to hold that the [1908 Act], which, though it professed to be an amendment of the Constitution Act of 1867, was merely, in view of its provisions, an Act at variance with the constitution, not preceded by a valid extension of the constitutional power, was therefore itself, as it stood, invalid. But in the present case the Imperial provision seems to me to take away the application of the principle I have stated to legislation of the kind which it authorises.’
Statutes: Queensland Parliamentary Bills Referendum Act of 1908
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina on the Application of Jackson and others v HM Attorney General CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 126, Times 17-Feb-05)
    The applicant asserted that the 2004 Act was invalid having been passed under the procedure in the 1949 Act, reducing the period by which the House of Lords could delay legislation; the 1949 Act was invalid, being delegated legislation, had used the . .
  • Cited – Jackson and others v Attorney General HL (House of Lords, [2005] UKHL 56, Times 14-Oct-05, Bailii, [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 2 WLR 87, [2005] 4 All ER 1253)
    The applicant sought to challenge the 2004 Hunting Act, saying that it had been passed under the provisions of the 1949 Parliament Act which was itself an unlawful extension of the powers given by the 1911 Parliament Act to allow the House of . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 04-Aug-16
Ref: 222718

Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd; 12 Dec 2002

References: [2002] 212 CLR 411, [2002] HCA 59, (2002) 194 ALR 485, (2002) 77 ALJR 398, [2003] AIPC 91-838, (2002) 56 IPR 129
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gaudron, Mchugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) Patents – Revocation – Obviousness or lack of inventive step – Patent for an oral pharmaceutical preparation – Whether invention obvious and did not involve an inventive step having regard to what was known or used in Australia on or before priority date – Combination of integers – Preparation arrived at by group of pharmaceutical chemists after period of experimental research – Whether hypothetical non-inventive worker in the field would have been led directly as a matter of course to pursue one avenue in expectation that it might well produce claimed invention – Relevance of publications discoverable by ‘routine literature search’ but not found to have been part of the common general knowledge in Australia at the priority date – Whether invention obvious if it was apparent to a non-inventive skilled worker that it would be ‘worthwhile to try’ each of the integers that was ultimately successfully used – Relevance of attempts to replicate the process of invention by a skilled person aware of the desired result – Whether attempts futile.
Appeal – Whether decision of primary judge in respect of obviousness affected by legal error – Where conclusions of primary judge affirmed by Full Court of the Federal Court.
Kirby J said: ‘The conclusions on obviousness in the proceedings below represented the outcome of a judicial evaluation of a mass of evidence. In the assessment of that evidence, and in the conclusion to be derived from it, the primary judge and the Full Court were better placed to perform the function of fact-finding than this Court is. Unless some error is shown in the application of the relevant law, it would be a rare step for this Court to condescend to re-evaluate such a factual conclusion, reached by concurrent decisions at two levels of the judicial hierarchy.’
After quoting from Biogen, he said: ‘Any exposition of judicial reasons explaining such factual findings is ‘inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon [the judge] by the primary evidence.’ Judges having replaced juries in such matters in Australia, and having entangled themselves in a web of horrible verbal formulae, must do their best to explain their conclusions where, in the past, juries simply announced their verdicts.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly and Company SC (Bailii, [2011] UKSC 51, Bailii Summary, , )
    The court considered an appeal against the declaration of invalidity of a biomedical patent for a new human protein on the grounds that it was not susceptible of industrial application.
    Held: The patentee’s appeal succeeded. The court had to . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 02-Aug-16
Ref: 450170

Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Khoshaba; 20 Mar 2006

References: [2006] NSWCA 41, (2006) 14 BPR 26 639
Links: Austlii
Coram: Spigelman CJ Handley JA Basten JA
Ratio: Austlii (Supreme Court of New South Wales – Court of Appeal) CONTRACTS – Unjust contracts – Determination that a contract ‘unjust’ – Appellate review – Nature of decision appealed from – Conclusion that ‘unjust’ – Whether discretionary – Whether reviewable – Discussion – Contracts Review Act 1980, s7.
CONTRACTS – Unjust contracts – When contract ‘unjust’ – Courts to apply contemporary standards of what is ‘unjust’ – Court cannot be constrained by other decisions as if they were rules – Relevant circumstances – Where money borrowed for investment – Purpose of the loan – Lender’s indifference to purpose of loan – Lender’s failure to adhere to its own lending guidelines.
This case cites:

  • Cited – Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank HL (House of Lords, Times 01-Nov-01, Bailii, [2002] 1 AC 481, [2001] UKHL 52, [2001] 3 WLR 1297, [2002] 1 LLR 489, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 1000, [2002] 1 All ER 97, [2002] ECC 22, [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 489)
    The House was asked whether a contractual provision for interest to run after judgment as well as before in a consumer credit contract led to an unfair relationship.
    Held: The term was not covered by the Act, and was not unfair under the . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 02-Aug-16
Ref: 450175

Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills; 16 Nov 1949

References: (1949) 79 CLR 389
Links: Austlii
Coram: Latham CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ
Ratio: High Court of Australia – The Court was asked whether a contract was one of employment. For a number of years the owner had taken his truck at about the same time each day to the respondents’ factory where he had been given goods to deliver to their customers. He carried on delivering goods until about the same time each evening when he knocked off. He maintained the truck and supplied the fuel at his own expense, and was paid for goods carried at a rate per car-mile.
Held: There was a continuing contract between the respondents and the owner which was not a contract of service.
Dixon J said: ‘The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done subject to a direction and control exercised by any actual supervision or whether any actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s order and directions. . In the present case the contract by the deceased was to provide not merely his own labour but the use of heavy mechanical transport, driven by power, which he maintained and fuelled for the purpose. The most important part of the work to be performed by his own labour consisted in the operation of his own motor truck and the essential part of the service for which the respondents contracted was the transportation of their goods by the mechanical means he thus supplied. The essence of a contract of service is the supply of the work and skill of a man. But the emphasis in the case of the present contract is upon mechanical traction. This was to be done by his own property in his own possession and control. There is no ground for imputing to the parties a common intention that in all the management and control of his own vehicle, in all the ways in which he used it for the purpose of carrying their goods, he should be subject to the commands of the respondents.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd CA (Times 16-Mar-01, Gazette 17-May-01, Bailii, [2001] EWCA Civ 318, [2001] ICR 819, [2001] IRLR 269, [2001] Emp LR 405)
    A worker who had strictly been employed by an agency but on a long term placement at a customer, claimed to have been unfairly dismissed by the customer when that placement ended.
    Held: To see whether she was an employee the tribunal should . .
  • Cited – Ready Mixed Concrete Southeast Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance QBD ([1968] 2 QB 497, [1968] 1 All ER 433, [1968] 2 WLR 775, Bailii, [1967] EWHC QB 3)
    In three cases appeals were heard against a finding as to whether a worker was entitled to have his employer pay National Insurance contributions on his behalf which would apply if he were an employee. He worked as an ‘owner-driver’
    Held: The . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 01-Aug-16
Ref: 194303

Queensland Stations Proprietary Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation; 3 Aug 1945

References: [1945] HCA 13, (1945) 70 CLR 539
Links: Austlii
Coram: Latham CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ
Ratio: High Court of Australia – The Court was aksed whether a payment made by the company to a drover was ‘wages’ within the meaning of a Pay-roll Tax Assessment Act, which depended on whether the relation between the company and the drover was that of master and servant. The drover was employed under a written contract to drove 317 cattle to a destination. The contract provided that he should obey and carry out all lawful instructions and use the whole of his time, energy and ability in the careful droving of the stock, that he should provide at his own expense all men, plant, horses and rations required for the operation, and that he should be paid at a rate per head for each of the cattle safely delivered at the destination.
Held: He was an independent contractor.
Dixon J said: ‘There is, of course, nothing to prevent a drover and his client forming the relation of employee and employer . . But whether they do so must depend on the facts. In considering the facts it is a mistake to treat as decisive a reservation of control over the manner in which the droving is performed and the cattle are handled. For instance, in the present case the circumstance that the drover agrees to obey and carry out all lawful instructions cannot outweigh the countervailing considerations which are found in the employment by him of servants of his own, the provision of horses, equipment, plant, rations, and a remuneration at a rate per head delivered. That a reservation of a right to direct or superintend the performance of the task cannot transform into a contract of service what in essence is an independent contract appears from . . ‘ (authorities cited)

Last Update: 01-Aug-16
Ref: 567822

Green v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand; 22 Sep 1988

References: [1988] NZCA 180, CA40/84, [1988] 2 NZLR 490, (1988) 2 TCLR 701
Links: Nzlii
Coram: Somers, Casey, Gallen JJ
Ratio: (Court of Appeal of New Zealand) The plaintiff had created a hugely sucessful TV programme in the UK, called Opportunity Knocks. He now appealed against rejection of his claim in copyright alleging that the defendant had copied the format, and also in passing off.
Held: Courts have a discretion whether or not to order a new trial where fresh evidence is sought to be introduced and, in exercise of that discretion, they should apply the tests in Ladd v Marshall
Ongley J considered the claim to copyright in the words ‘Opportunity Knocks’ and held that copyright did not subsist in the title. His Honour noted that it is a difficult but not an impossible task to establish copyright in a title. He referred to the Privy Council decision in Francis
This case cites:

  • Applied – Ladd v Marshall CA ([1954] 1 WLR 1489, [1954] 3 All ER 745, Bailii, [1954] EWCA Civ 1)
    At the trial, the wife of the appellant’s opponent said she had forgotten certain events. After the trial she began divorce proceedings, and informed the appellant that she now remembered. He sought either to appeal admitting fresh evidence or for a . .
  • Cited – Francis Day & Hunter Limited v 20th Century Fox Corporation Limited PC ([1940] AC 112, Bailii, [1939] UKPC 68, [1939] 4 All ER 192)
    (Ontario) Copyright protection was asserted on in connection with the title to a film (‘The Man Who Broke the Bank at Monte Carlo’).
    Held: It was not a literary work capable of attracting copyright protection. As a rule, such titles do not . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Appeal from – Green v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand PC ([1989] RPC 700, Bailii, [1989] UKPC 26)
    Court of Appeal of New Zealand – The plaintiff had developed the program ‘Opportunity Knocks’ on British television. He claimed copyright in the general structure or format of a similar television programme in New Zealand. By ‘dramatic format’ the . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 29-Jul-16
Ref: 567719

Munro v Southern Dairies; 18 Apr 1955

References: [1955] VLR 332, [1955] ALR 793, [1955] VicLawRp 60
Links: Austlii
Coram: Sholl J
Ratio: (Victoria) Nuisance – Horses kept on dairy premises without proper stabling – Interference with use and enjoyment of neighbouring premises – Loss of sleep by neighbouring occupier as a result thereof – Whether reasonable’ use of the premises or public benefit are defences – Whether a trade essential to the locality can be complained of – Extent to which evidence of economic necessity for delivery of milk by horse – drawn vehicles is relevant – Jurisdiction to refuse injunction – on undertaking by defendant to erect proper stables.
Sholl J said: ‘If a man chooses to make his home in the heart of a coalfield or in a manufacturing district, he can expect no more freedom from the discomfort usually associated with such a place than any other resident can.’ but granted an injunction: ‘To restrain the defendant, by its directors, servants and agents, from causing or permitting on the premises at Grenville Street and Whylis Street, Hampton, on which it now conducts its business, any nuisance (whether by way of smell, noise or flies . . )’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Coventry and Others v Lawrence and Another SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 P &CR 2, [2014] 2 All ER 622, [2014] BLR 271, [2014] HLR 21, [2014] Env LR 25, [2014] 1 AC 822, 152 Con LR 1, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [2014] PTSR 384, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2012/0076, SC Summary, SC)
    C operated a motor racing circuit as tenant. The neighbour L objected that the noise emitted by the operations were a nuisance. C replied that the fact of his having planning consent meant that it was not a nuisance.
    Held: The neighbour’s . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 28-Jul-16
Ref: 536799

Regina v Salisbury; 9 Oct 1972

References: [1976] VR 452, [1976] VicRp 45
Coram: Young CJ, Nelson, Harris JJ
Ratio:Australia – Victoria The court considered the nature of the act required to found an allegation of assault: ‘It may be that the somewhat different wording of section 20 of the English Act has played a part in bringing about the existence of the two lines of authority in England, but, be that as it may, we have come to the conclusion that, although the word ‘inflicts’ . . does not have as wide a meaning as the word ’causes’ . . the word ‘inflicts’ does have a wider meaning than it would have if it were construed so that inflicting grievous bodily harm always involved assaulting the victim. In our opinion, grievous bodily harm may be inflicted . . either where the accused has directly and violently ‘inflicted’ it by assaulting the victim, or where the accused has ‘inflicted’ it by doing something, intentionally, which, though it is not itself a direct application of force to the body of the victim, does directly result in force being applied violently to the body of the victim, so that he suffers grievous bodily harm. Hence, the lesser misdemeanours of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and common assault . . are not necessarily included in the misdemeanour of inflicting grievous bodily harm . .’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Haystead v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD (Times 02-Jun-00, Bailii, [2000] EWHC QB 181, [2000] COD 288, (2000) 164 JP 396, [2000] 2 Cr App Rep 339, [2000] Crim LR 758, [2000] 3 All ER 890)
    The defendant had hit a mother in the face as she held the child. The force was sufficient to cause her to drop the child causing injury to the child. He appealed against a conviction for beating the child.
    Held: The appeal failed. A battery . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 20-Jul-16
Ref: 547668

Fox et al v Royal Bank of Canada et al; 7 Oct 1975

References: [1976] 2 SCR 2, 1975 CanLII 150 (SCC)
Links: Canlii
Coram: Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence and Dickson JJ
Ratio: Canlii Supreme Court of Canada – Guarantee -Surety and sub-surety – Co-sureties – Sub-surety guaranteeing liability of surety – Surety paying creditor-Right of sub-surety to indemnity from the co-sureties.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Day v Shaw and Another ChD (Bailii, [2014] EWHC 36 (Ch))
    Claim for equity of exoneration as to proceeds of sale of a house.
    Held: The sub-sureties (Mr and Mrs Shaw) are entitled to be indemnified by the sureties (Mr Shaw and Mrs Shergold) in just the same way as a surety is entitled to be . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 20-Jul-16
Ref: 567254

Kioa v West; 18 Dec 1985

References: (1985) 60 ALJR 113, (1985) 159 CLR 550, [1985] HCA 81
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane JJ
Ratio:(High Court of Australia) Immigration and Aliens – Deportation – Power of Minister – Principles of natural justice – Whether applicable – Standing as Australian citizen of infant daughter of aliens – Intended deportation order – Whether notice required – Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss. 6, 6A, 7, 18.
Administrative Law – Decision – Natural justice – Procedural fairness – Order for deportation of aliens – Review of decision – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss. 5, 13.
The court described the essence of procedural fairness. Mason J said: ‘In this respect the expression ‘procedural fairness’ more aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case. The statutory power must be exercised fairly, that is, in accordance with procedures that are fair to the individual considered in the light of the statutory requirements, the interests of the individual and the interests and purposes, whether public or private, which the statute seeks to advance or protect or permits to be taken into account as legitimate considerations . .’
Brennan J stated: ‘a person whose interests are likely to be affected by an exercise of power must be given an opportunity to deal with relevant matters adverse to his interests which the repository of the power proposes to take into account in deciding upon its exercise; . . the person whose interests are likely to be affected does not have to given an opportunity to comment on every adverse piece of information, irrespective of its credibility, relevance or significance . . nevertheless in the ordinary case where no problem of confidentiality arises an opportunity should be given to deal with adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant to the decision to be made. It is not sufficient for the repository of the power to endeavour to shut information of that kind out of his mind and to reach a decision without reference to it. Information of that kind creates a real risk of prejudice, albeit unconscious, and it is unfair to deny a person whose interests are likely to be affected by the decision an opportunity to deal with the information . .’
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 13-Jul-16
Ref: 222098

Walsh (as executrix of the estate of David G Walsh) and Others v Deloitte and Touche Inc , Trustee of the estate of Bre-X Minerals Limited , a bankrupt: PC 17 Dec 2001

References: No 37 of 2000, [2001] UKPC 58
Links: PC, PC, PC, Bailii
Coram: Lord Slynn of Hadley Lord Hoffmann Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Sir Martin Nourse Sir Kenneth Keith
Ratio:(Bahamas) Shares were sold in a mining company whose prices had been buoyed by rumour, but where disclosure of difficulties had not been made, and eventually it became clear that samples had bee fraudulently salted. The company became insolvent, and the respondents appointed. They obtained a continuing Mareva injunction against the appellant as executor of her husband’s estate in the Bahamas.
Held: An officer of a company owes a fiduciary duty to the company not to use his knowledge of its affairs by making a profit from dealing in what he knows to be a false market in its shares. Interlocutory jurisdiction is ordinarily ancillary to substantive jurisdiction. There was evidence that the appellants had tried move assets beyond the jurisdiction. The judge’s discretion had been exercised properly. An appeal on the ground of delay had not been pleaded.
This case cites:

  • Cited – Reading -v- Attorney General HL ([1951] AC 507, [1951] 1 All ER 617, [1951] 1 TLR 480, 95 Sol Jo 155, Bailii, [1951] UKHL 1)
    The applicant had been a sergeant in the army. He had misused army property and his uniform to assist in smuggling operations. After serving his sentence he now sought repayment of the money he had earned.
    Held: His claim failed. The money had . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 10-Jul-16
Ref: 167223

Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd v Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd; 2 Feb 1981

References: (1981) 145 CLR 625, [1981] HCA 3
Links: Austlii
Coram: Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin, Wilson JJ
Ratio: Austlii High Court of Australia – Damages – Calculation – Failure by insurance broker to arrange workers’ compensation insurance – Employer liable to make periodic payments of compensation to injured employee – Payments adjusted by reference to average weekly wage – Assessment of damages – Rate of discount for present payment – Significance of monetary inflation – Workers’ Compensation Act, 1926(N.S.W.),s. 9A.
Workers’ Compensation – Domestic assistance to injured worker – Whether ‘nursing’ – Workers’ Compensation Act, 1914 (N.S.W.),s. 10 (1), (2).

Last Update: 05-Jul-16
Ref: 566287

Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd; 18 Apr 2002

References: 187 ALR 612, [2002] HCA 17
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gaudron ACJ, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan JJ
Ratio:(High Court of Australia) Trade and commerce – Damages – Equitable contribution – Liability to pay damages under ss 75B, 82, 87 of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) for breach of s 52 of the Act – Whether solicitor who gave negligent advice should contribute to the loss suffered by his client as a consequence of another’s misrepresentation which loss could have been avoided by careful advice by the solicitor – Whether equitable maxims prevent requirement of contribution.
Equity – Equitable contribution – Scope of – Requirement of co-ordinate liability – Whether solicitor who gave negligent advice should contribute to loss suffered by client as a consequence of another’s representation where the loss could have been avoided by careful advice by the solicitor.
Contribution – Equitable contribution – Scope of and availability – Co-ordinate liability – Requirements of – Whether compatible with the obligations imposed by Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) for breach of s 52 of the Act.
Words and phrases – ‘co-ordinate liability’, ‘natural justice’.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 01-Jul-16
Ref: 566220

Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Limited; 5 Sep 2002

References: [2002] HCA 35, [2002] 211 CLR 317, [2002] 191 ALR 449, [2002] 76 ALJR 1348
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan JJ
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) Tame v New South Wales
Negligence – Duty of care – Psychiatric injury – Motor accident – Clerical error by police constable in recording driver’s blood alcohol content – Psychotic depressive illness caused by driver learning of mistake – Whether duty of care owed by police constable to driver – Whether psychiatric injury reasonably foreseeable – Whether sole determinant of duty – Other control mechanisms for imposition of duty – Normal fortitude – Sudden shock – Direct perception – Immediate aftermath.
Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Limited
Negligence – Duty of care – Psychiatric injury – Death of child – Assurances of constant supervision of child made by employer to parents – Whether duty of care owed by employer of child to parents – Whether psychiatric injury reasonably foreseeable – Whether sole determinant of duty – Other control mechanisms for imposition of duty – Normal fortitude – Sudden shock – Direct perception – Immediate aftermath.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 01-Jul-16
Ref: 566221

Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v GIO General Ltd; 10 Mar 2011

References: [2011] NSWCA 47
Links: Austlii
Coram: Allsop P, Giles JA, Young JA
Ratio: Austlii (Supreme Court of New South Wales – Court of Appeal) INSURANCE – Double insurance principle – two different insureds entitled to indemnity from two different insurers with respect to separate liabilities for the same injury – contribution between insurers – extended contribution principle in AMP Workers Compensation Services (NSW) Ltd v QBE Insurance Ltd [2001] NSWCA 267; (2001) 53 NSWLR 35 – uncrystallised liability sufficient for purposes of double insurance – second insurer concurred in first insurer indemnifying its insured in the injury – proof of liability of second insurer’s insured – first insurer’s indemnity discharged that liability – second insurer required to share burden of indemnity – sufficient to declare entitlement to contribution
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 01-Jul-16
Ref: 566219

A v New South Wales; 21 Mar 2007

References: [2008] Aust Contract Reports 90-280, [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-878, (2007) 81 ALJR 763, (2007) 233 ALR 584, (2007) 230 CLR 500, [2007] HCA 10
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon, Crennan JJ
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) Torts – Malicious prosecution – Whether prosecutor acted without reasonable and probable cause – Public rather than private prosecution – Applicant acquitted of offence charged – Prosecutor had no personal knowledge of the facts underlying the charge – Whether prosecutor did not honestly form the view that there was a proper case for prosecution or whether the prosecutor formed that view on an insufficient basis.
Torts – Malicious prosecution – Whether prosecutor acted maliciously – Whether the sole or dominant purpose of the prosecutor was other than the proper invocation of the criminal law.
Words and phrases – ‘malicious prosecution’, ‘malice’, ‘absence of reasonable and probable cause’.
‘For a plaintiff to succeed in an action for damages for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must establish:
(1) that proceedings of the kind to which the tort applies (generally, as in this case, criminal proceedings) were initiated against the plaintiff by the defendant;
(2) that the proceedings terminated in favour of the plaintiff;
(3) that the defendant, in initiating or maintaining the proceedings acted maliciously; and
(4) that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause’. And ‘What is clear is that, to constitute malice, the dominant purpose of the prosecutor must be a purpose other than the proper invocation of the criminal law – an ‘illegitimate or oblique motive’. That improper purpose must be the sole or dominant purpose actuating the prosecutor’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Williamson -v- The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago PC (Bailii, [2014] UKPC 29)
    (Trinidad and Tobago) The claimant had been held after arrest on suspicion of theft. He was held for several months before the case was dismissed, the posecution having made no apparent attempt to further the prosecution. He appealed against refusal . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 30-Jun-16
Ref: 536417

Bunyan v Jordan; 1 Mar 1937

References: (1937) 57 CLR 1, [1937] HCA 5, [1937] ALR 204
Links: Austlii
Coram: Latham C.J., Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ
Ratio:(High Court of Australia) The plaintiff sought damages having been put to severe fright by a short fired by her employer, the defendant.
This case cites:

  • Cited – Wilkinson -v- Downton ([1897] 2 QB 57)
    Thomas Wilkinson, the landlord of a public house, went off by train, leaving his wife Lavinia behind the bar. A customer of the pub, Downton played a practical joke on her. He told her, falsely, that her husband had been involved in an accident and . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Rhodes -v- OPO and Another SC ([2015] 2 WLR 137, Bailii, [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219, [2015] EMLR 20, [2015] HRLR 11, [2015] WLR(D) 227, [2015] 4 All ER 1, WLRD, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2014/0251, SC, SC Summary, SC Video Summary)
    The mother sought to prevent a father from publishing a book about his life. It was to contain passages she said may cause psychological harm to their 12 year old son. Mother and son lived in the USA and the family court here had no jurisdiction to . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 30-Jun-16
Ref: 566202

Kuru v State of New South Wales; 12 Jun 2008

References: [2008] HCA 26
Links: Austlii
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) Torts – Trespass to land – Power of police to enter private premises – Police officers went to suburban flat after receiving report of male and female arguing – Police treated report as ‘violent domestic’ – Occupier invited police to ‘look around the flat’ – Occupier later asked police to leave premises – Police did not leave and remained on premises for longer than it would reasonably have taken them to leave – Whether statutory justification for police to remain on premises – Proper construction of Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 357F and 357H – Whether express refusal by occupier immediately terminated authority of police ‘to so enter or remain’ on premises, irrespective of fulfilment of purposes for which entry effected.
Torts – Trespass to land – Power of police to enter private premises – Whether common law justification for police to remain on premises – Whether entry could be justified as directed to preventing a breach of the peace.
Words and phrases – ‘enter or remain’, ‘expressly refused’, ‘breach of the peace’.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Gillies -v- Procurator Fiscal, Elgin HCJ (Bailii, [2008] ScotHC HCJAC_55, 2008 GWD 31-476, 2008 SCCR 887, 2008 SCL 1316, 2008 SLT 978, 2009 JC 25, [2008] HCJAC 55)
    The police went to the defendant’s flat to find her boyfriend. She refused them access, but when they saw him, the police officers called out that he was under arrest under the 1995 Act, and forced their way past the door and the defendant. The . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 30-Jun-16
Ref: 276522

AMP Workers Compensation v QBE; 19 Sep 2001

References: [2001] NSWCA 267, (2001) 53 NSWLR 35
Links: Austlii
Coram: Mason P, Handley, Beazley JJA
Ratio: Austlii (Supreme Court of New South Wales – Court of Appeal) FACTS
The appeal involved a question of double insurance. The employer held a compulsory third party policy with QBE Insurance Limited in respect of a motor vehicle and a current workers’ compensation policy with AMP Workers’ Compensation Services (NSW) Limited. An employee in the course of his employment was injured by another employee negligently driving in the course of his employment with the same employer.
The first employee commenced proceedings against the second employee but did not seek to join the employer although it would have been vicariously liable. Those proceedings were settled. QBE satisfied the judgment debt as the compulsory third party policy covered the employee as the driver of the vehicle. QBE then claimed contribution from AMP. AMP argued that there was no relevant double insurance because its workers’ compensation policy did not cover the negligent employee who was liable and entitled to indemnity from QBE, and the employer it did insure was never liable and never entitled to indemnity under either policy.
The dispute turned on the relevant date for the purposes of determining the question of double insurance. AMP contended that this had to be determined after the event when the claim for contribution was made. QBE contended that the question must be determined at the date of casualty. In the latter case there would clearly be double insurance in this case.
HELD (per Handley JA, Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing)
(i) The right of contribution only exists in respect of insurances which are contracts of indemnity, where two or more insurers are on risk in respect of the same loss or liability. The right arises when and because one of the insurers has paid more than his proper share of the common demand. Where one insurer has paid in full the indemnity is satisfied and the insured has no right of indemnity against any other insurer. The right of contribution therefore cannot depend on the continued existence of coordinate liabilities for the same demand because the very payment by one which calls the right into existence will have put an end to the liability of the other insurance.
(ii) The judgments in Albion Insurance Co Limited v Government Insurance Office (NSW) [1969] HCA 55; (1969) 121 CLR 342 require the question of double insurance to be determined at the time of the casualty. Although the present question did not arise in Albion Insurance, the focus in both judgments was on the contractual position at the time of the casualty when the loss in the one case, or the liability in the other, accrued.
(iii) There is no reason in precedent or principle why the right of contribution should be defeated by the existence of a second layer of choice available to another party. It should not rest with either of the persons who had available choices to exercise those choices in a way which would leave the ultimate burden on one of the insurers without any right of contribution from the other.
ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 30-Jun-16
Ref: 566218

New South Wales v Lepore; 6 Feb 2003

References: [2003] HCA 4, (2003) 212 CLR 511, (2003) 195 ALR 412, (2003) 77 ALJR 558, (2003) 24 Leg Rep 2
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Mchugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) 1. Appeal allowed in part
2. Paragraph 2 of the order of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales made on 23 April 2001 set aside, and in its place, order that the judgment entered in the District Court on 16 April 1999 be wholly set aside and that there be a new trial.
3. Appellant to pay the costs of the appeal to this Court.
4. Costs of the new trial to abide its outcome.
Callian J (majority) said: ‘Education authorities do not owe to children for whose education they are responsible (absent relevant contractual provision to the contrary) a particular or unique non-delegable duty of care, in practical terms, giving rise to absolute liability. There is no doubt that the ordinary standard of care in the case of such authorities is a very high one. Their duties include the engagement of reliable, and carefully screened, properly trained employees, and the provision: of suitable premises; an adequate system for the monitoring of employees; and, I would think, because, regrettably, the incidence of sexual abuse seems to have been more common than had previously been thought, an efficient system for the prevention and detection of misconduct of that kind. In saying what I have, I do not intend to state comprehensively a catalogue of the duties to which the relationship of education authority and pupil may give rise. But I do agree with the Chief Justice that absent fault on the part of an education authority, it will not be personally liable in situations of the kind with which these cases are concerned’.
McHugh J. (minority: he alone would have found non-delegable duties in the particular circumstances) said: ‘a State education authority owes a duty to a pupil to take reasonable care to prevent harm to the pupil. The duty cannot be delegated. If, as is invariably the case, the State delegates the performance of the duty to a teacher, the State is liable if the teacher fails to take reasonable care to prevent harm to the pupil . . The duty arises on the enrolment of the child. It is not confined to school hours or to the commencement of the teachers’ hours of employment at the school. If the authority permits a pupil to be in the school grounds before the hours during which teachers are on duty, the authority will be liable if the pupil is injured through lack of reasonable supervision. In Geyer v Downs this Court held that the education authority was liable for injuries suffered by a pupil playing in the school grounds at about 8.45am although teachers at the school were not required to be on duty at that time . . The duty extends to protecting the pupil from the conduct of other pupils or strangers and from the pupil’s own conduct The measure of the duty is not that which could be expected of a careful parent.
Murphy and Aickin JJ rejected the parent analogy in Geyer v Downs saying that it was unreal to apply that standard to ‘a schoolmaster who has the charge of a school with some 400 children, or of a master who takes a class of thirty or more children’.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Woodland -v- The Swimming Teachers’ Association and Others QBD (Bailii, [2011] EWHC 2631 (QB), [2012] PIQR P3, [2012] ELR 76)
    The court was asked as to the vicarious or other liability of a school where a pupil suffered injury at a swimming lesson with a non-employee during school time, and in particular whether it had a non-delegable duty to ensure the welfare of children . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 30-Jun-16
Ref: 445625

Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW); 31 Oct 1969

References: [1969] HCA 55, (1969) 121 CLR 342
Links: Austlii
Coram: Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer J.
Ratio:(High Court of Australia) Insurance – Contribution between insurers – Identity of risk insured – Loss covered by two policies – General nature and purpose of policies different – Extent of rights and liabilities created under policies different – Workers’ compensation policy with indemnity extended to include employer’s common law liability – Motor vehicle third party policy covering employer’s liability to employee arising out of use of motor vehicle.
Kitto J said: ‘ ‘a principle applicable at law no less than in equity, is that persons who are under co-ordinate liabilities to make good one loss (eg sureties liable to make good a failure to pay the one debt) must share the burden pro rata’: the object being, as Hamilton J stated in American Surety Co of New York v Wrightson (1910) 103 LT 663: ‘to put people who have commonly guaranteed or commonly insured in the same position as if the principal creditor or the assured had pursued his remedies rateably among them instead of doing as he is entitled to do, exhausting them to suit himself against one or other of them.”
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 30-Jun-16
Ref: 566217

High Parklane Consulting Inc v Lewis; 16 Jan 2007

References: 2007 CanLII 410
Links: Canlii
Coram: Perell J
Ratio:(Ontario – Superior Court of Justice)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Rhodes -v- OPO and Another SC ([2015] 2 WLR 137, Bailii, [2015] UKSC 32, [2016] AC 219, [2015] EMLR 20, [2015] HRLR 11, [2015] WLR(D) 227, [2015] 4 All ER 1, WLRD, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2014/0251, SC, SC Summary, SC Video Summary)
    The mother sought to prevent a father from publishing a book about his life. It was to contain passages she said may cause psychological harm to their 12 year old son. Mother and son lived in the USA and the family court here had no jurisdiction to . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 30-Jun-16
Ref: 566207

Orkin Exterminating Co Inc v Pestco Co of Canada Ltd; 10 Jun 1985

References: (1985) 19 DLR (4th) 90, 50 OR (2d) 726, 30 BLR 152, 34 CCLT 1, 5 CPR (3d) 433, 1985] OJ No 2526 (QL), 10 OAC 14
Links: Canlii
Coram: Morden, Zuber, Robins JJA
Ratio: Canlii (Court of Appeal, Ontario) Torts — Passing off — Goodwill — Pest control company carrying on business in United States but not in Canada — Company having reputation among Canadian customers for services performed for them in United States — Company intending to expand its business into Ontario — Company having goodwill which Canadian court will protect in passing-off action.
The plaintiff was an American company which did not carry on business in Canada. The defendant was a Canadian company, carrying on business in Metropolitan Toronto. The defendant started using the plaintiff ‘s name in its business and later it began using the plaintiff ‘s logo on invoices it sent to customers under its own name. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for damages for passing off and an injunction. The trial judge gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
Held, the appeal should be dismissed. The trial judge was right in concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to relief on the basis that it had a reputation (built up in several different ways including having customers) in Ontario and intended to expand its business into Ontario. A plaintiff does not have to be in direct competition with the defendant to suffer injury from the use of its trade name by the defendant. If the plaintiff ‘s trade name had a reputation in the defendant’s jurisdiction, so that the public associated it with services provided by the plaintiff, then the defendant’s use of it would mean that the plaintiff had lost control over the impact of its trade name in the defendant’s jurisdiction. The practical consequence of this would be that the plaintiff would then be vulnerable to losing the Ontario customers it had as well as prospective Ontario customers, with respect to services provided in the United States. Also, it could result in the plaintiff being prevented from using its trade name in Ontario when it expanded its business into Ontario. Bearing in mind that the defendant had a virtually infinite range of names and symbols from which to choose, it is difficult to see the enjoining of it from using the name and logo of a well- established company in the same business as an unreasonable restraint on its freedom to carry on business as it sees fit. The public are entitled to be protected from such deliberate deception and the plaintiff, which had laboured long and hard and made substantial expenditures to create its reputation which had spread to Ontario, was entitled to the protection of its name from misappropriation. The spectre of the plaintiff having a monopoly in Ontario in its name and distinctive logo, even though it did not carry on business here, was considerably less troubling than the deceptive use of its name and symbol by another. As far as freedom of trade and the reasonable expectations of business people are concerned, the interests of a dishonest defendant are entitled to less weight than those of a defendant who has acted in good faith. That is not to say that the defendant’s bad faith alone will confer a cause of action on a foreign plaintiff, but it is a relevant factor to take into account in adjusting competing interests. The plaintiff ‘s goodwill existed outside the area where it carried on business. In this kind of case the main consideration should be the likelihood of confusion with consequential injury to the plaintiff. Generally, where there is such confusion there is goodwill deserving of protection. In any event, the applicable principles could be framed without using the word ‘goodwill’.
The competing rights of the parties had to be determined as of the date when the defendant started using the plaintiff ‘s name in Ontario. At the time the plaintiff ‘s reputation in Ontario, based on its customers in Ontario and advertising of various kinds, was of sufficient strength to make its rights superior to those of the defendant. Its reputation had grown steadily since. The defendant’s decision to use the plaintiff ‘s name in Ontario was evidence that the plaintiff ‘s name had commercial value at that time in Ontario and was an important indication of goodwill in a ‘foreign’ territory. The defendant argued that no damage to the plaintiff ‘s goodwill had occurred in Canada because the defendant and the plaintiff were not competitors. Without damage there can be no passing off. However, the plaintiff had suffered damage, sufficient to support a cause of action against the defendant, by virtue of its loss of control over the impact of its trade name in Ontario and the creation of a potential impediment to its using its trade mark upon entering the Ontario market — both arising from the defendant’s use of the plaintiff ‘s name in Ontario.
Although the plaintiff’s business was conducted in the USA, it enjoyed thousands of Canadian clients who used its pest control services for their properties in Canada. It sought an injunction in passing off.
Held: Morden JA granted the order, specifically relying on the fact that the plaintiff had goodwill ‘including having customers’ in Canada, although he did express disquiet about Lord Diplock’s notion in Star Industrial that goodwill had to be divided up nationally.
This case cites:

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 28-Jun-16
Ref: 566011

Caterham Car Sales and Coachworks Ltd v Birkin Cars (Pty) Ltd and Another; 27 May 1998

References: [1998] ZASCA 44, 1998 (3) SA 938 (SCA), [1998] 3 All SA 175 (A)
Links: Saflii
Coram: Smalberger, Harms, Marais, Schutz, Plewman JJA
Ratio:(South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal) the plaintiff sought to prevent the defendant, as it claimed, passing off their cars as its own.
Held: On the facts, the case failed. However, the only component of goodwill of a business that can be damaged by means of a passing-off is its reputation and it is for this reason that the first requirement for a successful passing-off action is proof of the relevant reputation.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 28-Jun-16
Ref: 566014

Dominion Rent A Car Ltd v Budget Rent A Car Systems (1970) Ltd; 27 Mar 1987

References: [1987] NZCA 13, [1987] 2 TCLR 91, [1987] 2 NZLR 395, (1987) 9 NZIPR 367, (1988) 2 NZBLC 102
Links: NZLII
Coram: Somers J
Ratio:(Court of Appeal of New Zealand) The court considered looked at the degree of activity required to justify a finding that an international company had sufficient business connection in New Zealand to which goodwill could attach.
Held: Somers J said: ‘One important limitation on the right of a trader to restrain another is that he must show an invasion of that tangible right of property compendiously described as goodwill . . The existence of a trading reputation is not by itself sufficient – there can be no damage other than to a right of property . . ‘
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 27-Jun-16
Ref: 566012

Conagra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd; 14 Apr 1992

References: [1992] FCA 159, (1992) 23 IPR 193, (1992) Aipc 90-892 (Extract), (1992) 106 ALR 465, (1992) 33 FCR 302
Links: Austlii
Coram: Lockhart(1), Gummow(2) and French(3) JJ.
Ratio: Austlii Intellectual Property – passing off – bases and elements of passing off action – whether carrying on business within jurisdiction or place of business within jurisdiction – sufficiency of nexus with the jurisdiction – necessity and method of establishing reputation within jurisdiction – requirement of goodwill – whether fraud is a necessary element of passing off – relevance of establishing fraud. Trade Practices – misleading and deceptive conduct – relationship between reputation in passing off action and establishing misleading and deceptive conduct.
Although the claim in passing off failed, and after a very full review of the common law authorities Lockhart J said that it was ‘no longer valid, if it ever was, to speak of a business having goodwill or reputation only where the business is carried on’, relying on ‘[m]odern mass advertising . . [which] reaches people in many countries of the world’, ‘[t]he international mobility of the world population’ and the fact that ‘[t]his is an age of enormous commercial enterprises’. ‘it is not necessary . . that a plaintiff, in order to maintain a passing off action, must have a place of business or a business presence in Australia; nor is it necessary that his goods are sold here’, saying that it would be ‘sufficient if his goods have a reputation in this country among persons here, whether residents or otherwise’.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 27-Jun-16
Ref: 566013

Nelson v Nelson; 9 Nov 1995

References: (1995) 184 CLR 538, [1995] HCA 25, (1995) 132 ALR 133, (1995) 70 ALJR 47, [1996] ANZ Conv R 280, (1995) 19 Leg Rep 14
Links: Austlii
Coram: Deane, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh, Gummoww JJ
Ratio:High Court of Australia McHugh J spoke of the so called ‘reliance rule’: ‘The [reliance] rule has no regard to the legal and equitable rights of the parties, the merits of the case, the effect of the transaction in undermining the policy of the relevant legislation or the question whether the sanctions imposed by the legislation sufficiently protect the purpose of the legislation. Regard is had only to the procedural issue; and it is that issue and not the policy of the legislation or the merits of the parties which determines the outcome. Basing the grant of legal remedies on an essentially procedural criterion which has nothing to do with the equitable positions of the parties or the policy of the legislation is unsatisfactory, particularly when implementing a doctrine which is founded on public policy.’

Last Update: 26-Jun-16
Ref: 566001

Hall v Hebert; 29 Apr 1993

References: [1993] 2 SCR 159, (1993) 101 DLR (4th) 129, 1993 CanLII 141
Links: Canlii
Coram: McLachlin J
Ratio:(Canadian Supreme Court) After they had been drinking heavily together, Mr Hebert, who owned a car, allowed Mr Hall to drive it, including initially to give it a rolling start down a road on one side of which there was a steep slope. The car careered down the slope and Mr Hall was seriously injured.
Held: The illegality of his driving did not bar his claim against Mr Hebert but that he was contributorily negligent as to 50%.
McLachlin J discussed the need for a consistent and defensible principle for the operation of the doctrine ex turpi causa: ‘a need in the law of tort for a principle which permits judges to deny recovery to a plaintiff on the ground that to do so would undermine the integrity of the justice system. The power is a limited one. Its use is justified where allowing the plaintiff’s claim would introduce inconsistency into the fabric of the law, either by permitting the plaintiff to profit from an illegal or wrongful act, or to evade a penalty prescribed by criminal law. Its use is not justified where the plaintiff’s claim is merely for compensation for personal injuries sustained as a consequence of the negligence of the defendant.’ He explained the principle, saying that: ‘to allow recovery in these cases would be to allow recovery for what is illegal. It would put the courts in the position of saying that the same conduct is both legal, in the sense of being capable of rectification by the court, and illegal. It would, in short, introduce an inconsistency in the law. It is particularly important in this context that we bear in mind that the law must aspire to be a unified institution, the parts of which – contract, tort, the criminal law – must be in essential harmony. For the courts to punish conduct with the one hand while rewarding it with the other, would be to ‘create an intolerable fissure in the law’s conceptually seamless web’: Weinrib – ‘Illegality as a Tort Defence’ (1976) 26 U.T.L.J. 28 at p. 42. We thus see that the concern, put at its most fundamental, is with the integrity of the legal system.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Vellino -v- Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police CA (Times 09-Aug-01, Bailii, [2001] EWCA Civ 1249, [2002] 1 WLR 218, [2002] PIQR P10, [2002] 3 All ER 78)
    The police were not under any duty to protect someone who had been arrested from injuring himself in an attempt to escape. The claimant had a history of seeking to avoid capture by jumping from his flat window. On this occasion he injured himself in . .
  • Cited – Moore Stephens (A Firm) -v- Stone Rolls Ltd (in liquidation) HL (Bailii, [2009] UKHL 39, Times, [2009] 1 AC 1391, [2009] Bus LR 1356, [2009] PNLR 36, [2009] 3 WLR 455)
    The appellants had audited the books of the respondent company, but had failed to identify substantial frauds by an employee of the respondent. The auditors appealed a finding of professional negligence, relying on the maxim ex turpi causa non . .
  • Cited – Les Laboratoires Servier and Another -v- Apotex Inc and Others SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 55, [2015] 1 AC 430, [2014] WLR(D) 452, [2014] BUS LR 1217, [2015] 1 AC 430, [2014] 3 WLR 1257, Bailii Summary, WLRD, UKSC 2012/0158, SC, SC Summary, SC Video)
    The parties had disputed the validity a patent and the production of infringing preparations. The english patent had failed and damages were to be awarded, but a Canadian patent remained the defendant now challenged the calculation of damages for . .
  • Cited – Hounga -v- Allen and Another SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] ICR 847, [2014] Eq LR 559, [2014] 4 All ER 595, [2014] 1 WLR 2889, [2014] IRLR 811, [2014] WLR(D) 353, Bailii Summary, WLRD, UKSC 2012/0188, SC Summary, SC)
    The appellant, of Nigerian origin had been brought here at the age of 14 with false identity papers, and was put to work caring for the respondent’s children. In 2008 she was dismissed and ejected from the house. She brought proceedings alleging . .
  • Cited – Jetivia Sa and Another -v- Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others SC (Bailii, [2015] UKSC 23, [2015] WLR(D) 182, Bailii Summary, WLRD, UKSC 2013/0206, SC Summary, SC, [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61, [2015] 1 BCLC 443, [2015] 2 All ER (Comm) 281, [2015] BVC 20, [2015] 2 WLR 1168, [2015] BCC 343, [2015] 2 All ER 1083)
    The liquidators of Bilta had brought proceedings against former directors and the appellant alleging that they were party to an unlawful means conspiracy which had damaged the company by engaging in a carousel fraud with carbon credits. On the . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 25-Jun-16
Ref: 258466

Gamer’s Motor Centre (Newcastle) Proprietary Limited v Natwest Wholesale Australia Proprietary Limited; 24 Jul 1987

References: (1987) 163 CLR 236, [1987] HCA 30
Links: Austlii
Coram: Mason CJ
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) Sale of Goods – Sale by buyer obtaining possession with sellers consent – Delivery under sale, pledge or other disposition to third party receiving goods or documents of title in good faith – Delivery – Whether physical delivery required – Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), ss. 5(1) ‘delivery’,28 – Factors (Mercantile Agents) Act 1923 (N.S.W.), s. 5(1).
This case is cited by:

  • Applied – Forsythe International (UK) Limited -v- Silver Shipping Co Limited and Others ([1994] 1 WLR 1334, [1993] 2 Lloyds Rep 268, [1994] 1 All ER 851)
    Delivery under section 24 requires a voluntary act by the person in possession because by section 61(1) of the 1979 Act, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires, `delivery’ means `voluntary transfer from one person to another’. . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 19-Jun-16
Ref: 470091

Hydro-Electric Power Commission (Ontario) v Albright; 2 May 1922

References: 1922 CanLII 8 (SCC)
Links: Canlii
Coram: Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ
Ratio:Supreme Court of Canada – Contract – Purchase of shares in company – Mortgage on company property – Security for bonds – Covenant to provide sinking fund – Earnings for calendar year-Payments at fixed date – Payments ‘accrued but not yet due’
This case cites:

  • Cited – In re Howell KBD ([1895] 1 QB 844)
    The court considered whether, a tenant having become bankrupt during the currency of a quarter, that part of the quarter’s rent apportionable to the part of the quarter before the order of adjudication should be held to be rent ‘accrued due’, within . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17-Jun-16
Ref: 564964

Regina v Oakes; 28 Feb 1986

References: [1986] 1 SCR 103, 1986 CanLII 46 (SCC), 53 OR (2d) 719, 24 CCC (3d) 321, 50 CR (3d) 1, 65 NR 87, [1986] CarswellOnt 95, EYB 1986-67556, [1986] SCJ No 7 (QL), 14 OAC 335, 16 WCB 73, [1986] ACS no 7, 19 CRR 308
Links: Canlii
Coram: Dickson C.J. and Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ.
Ratio:Supreme Court of Canada – Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Presumption of innocence (s. 11(d)) — Reverse onus clause — Accused presumed to be trafficker on finding of possession of illicit drug — Onus on accused to rebut presumption — Whether or not reverse onus in violation of s. 11(d) of the Charter — Whether or not reverse onus a reasonable limit to s. 11(d) and justified in a free and democratic society — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 11(d) — Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, ss. 3(1), (2), 4(1), (2), (3), 8.
Criminal law — Presumption of innocence — Reverse onus — Accused presumed to be trafficker on finding of possession of illicit drug — Onus on accused to rebut presumption — Whether or not constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence (s. 11(d) of the Charter) violated.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 10-Jun-16
Ref: 564962

Evans v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd; 12 Feb 1993

References: [1993] ACTSC 7
Links: Austlii
Coram: Higgins J
Ratio:(Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory) It was not defamatory to say of a career civil servant that his career had been aided by patronage of senior politicians, since it did not impute any active or improper seeking of favours on the plaintiff’s part: The question is, however, whether to say of a person that he has been the beneficiary of such a system, with the capacity to be used to favour the less well qualified candidates, defames the candidate . . In Renouf [(1977) 17 ACTR 35] (supra), Blackburn CJ accepted that it was defamatory of a senior public servant . . ‘to say that he publicly demonstrated his sympathy with a political party with a view to receiving a higher appointment from the Government formed by that party’. . That imputation was accepted as defamatory by reason of the implication that the plaintiff had attempted to openly demonstrate his political acceptability to the Government. That allegation assumed, of course, that the Government in question made such appointments on the ground of political acceptability . . In the present case, the article depicts the plaintiff as a favoured recipient of preferment. It is not suggested he improperly sought it, as was the defamatory allegation in Fairbairn v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1977) 21 ACTR 1 . . The article did not over-state the role of the Prime Minister in the plaintiff’s career advancement, but it did not impute any unfair or improper conuct to him nor suggest he did not merit such advancement. It did not convey the imputation pleaded. That would require the article to assert that the plaintiff’s qualifications and experience were less important than the favour of the Pdrime Minister. It clearly does not do that.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Miller -v- Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD (Bailii, [2010] EWHC 700 (QB))
    The claimant sought damages in defamation, saying that the defendant newspaper (Daily Mail) had implied abuse of his friendship with a Police Commissioner to obtain contracts. The defendant denied any meaning defamatory of the claimant.
    Held: . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 09-Jun-16
Ref: 406675

Regina v Mentuck; 15 Nov 2001

References: [2001] 3 SCR 442, 2001 SCC 76
Links: anlii
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.
Canlii Ratio Supreme Court of Canada – Courts – Supreme Court of Canada – Jurisdiction – Publication bans – Criminal proceedings – Trial judge granting one-year ban as to identity of undercover police officers and refusing ban as to operational methods used in investigating accused – Whether Supreme Court of Canada has jurisdiction to hear Crown appeal from trial judge’s order – Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 40(1), (3).
Criminal law – Publication bans – Appropriate scope of publication ban – Undercover police investigation – Crown seeking publication ban protecting identity of police officers and operational methods used in investigating accused – Trial judge granting one-year ban as to identity of officers and refusing ban as to operational methods – Whether trial judge erred in ordering ban.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – A -v- British Broadcasting Corporation (Scotland) SC ([2015] 1 AC 588, 2014 SC (UKSC) 151, 2014 SCLR 593, Bailii, [2014] UKSC 25, [2014] 2 All ER 1037, 2014 GWD 15-266, [2014] WLR(D) 196, [2014] 2 WLR 1243, [2014] EMLR 25, 2014 SLT 613, WLRD, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2013/0159, SC Summary, SC)
    The BBC challenged an order made by the Court of Session in judicial review proceedings, permitting the applicant review to delete his name and address and substituting letters of the alphabet, in the exercise (or, as the BBC argues, purported . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17-May-16
Ref: 564189

Meyers v Casey; 13 Oct 1913

References: [1913] HCA 50, (1913) 17 CLR 90
Links: Austlii
Coram: Barton ACJ, Isaacs, Powers and Rich JJ
Ratio (High Court of Australia) The Court considered a decision of the committee of the Victoria Racing Club. Isaac J said of objections considered by the committee: ‘They are, by reason of the committee’s decision, res judicatae, as much as if instead of the committee it had been the Supreme Court unappealed from, that has so held. That rests on the well known rule that a competent court or other tribunal has jurisdiction to give a wrong judgment, and if there is no appeal in the strict sense, then its decision, whether right or wrong, must stand, and cannot be questioned in any subsequent proceedings elsewhere.’
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 16-May-16
Ref: 428358

Gutnick v Dow Jones; 28 Aug 2001

References: [2002] HCA 56, [2001] VSC 305
Links: Austlii
Coram: Callinan J
Ratio (High Court of Victoria) Callinan J said: ‘A publisher, particularly one carrying on the business of publishing, does not act to put matter on the Internet in order for it to reach a small target. It is its ubiquity which is one of the main attractions to users of it. And any person who gains access to the Internet does so by taking an initiative to gain access to it in a manner analogous to the purchase or other acquisition of a newspaper, in order to read it. . . If a publisher publishes in a multiplicity of jurisdictions it should understand, and must accept, that it runs the risk of liability in those jurisdictions in which the publication is not lawful and inflicts damage.’
This case cites:

  • Appealed to – Gutnick -v- Dow Jones (Austlii, [2002] HCA 56)
    (High Court of Australia) The Court rejected a challenge, in the context of Internet libel, to the applicability of such established principles as that vouchsafed in Duke of Brunswick: ‘It was suggested that the World Wide Web was different from . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Appeal from – Gutnick -v- Dow Jones (Austlii, [2002] HCA 56)
    (High Court of Australia) The Court rejected a challenge, in the context of Internet libel, to the applicability of such established principles as that vouchsafed in Duke of Brunswick: ‘It was suggested that the World Wide Web was different from . .
  • Cited – Mardas -v- New York Times Company and Another QBD (Bailii, [2008] EWHC 3135 (QB))
    The claimant sought damages in defamation. The US publisher defendants denied that there had been any sufficient publication in the UK and that the court did not have jurisdiction. The claimant appealed the strike out of the claims.
    Held: The . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 26-Apr-16
Ref: 220027

Gutnick v Dow Jones; 10 Dec 2002

References: [2002] HCA 56
Links: Austlii
Ratio (High Court of Australia) The Court rejected a challenge, in the context of Internet libel, to the applicability of such established principles as that vouchsafed in Duke of Brunswick: ‘It was suggested that the World Wide Web was different from radio and television because the radio or television broadcaster could decide how far the signal was to be broadcast. It must be recognised, however, that satellite broadcasting now permits very wide dissemination of radio and television and it may, therefore, be doubted that it is right to say that the World Wide Web has a uniquely broad reach. It is no more or less ubiquitous than some television services. In the end, pointing to the breadth or depth of reach of particular forms of communication may tend to obscure one basic fact. However broad may be the reach of any particular means of communication, those who post information on the World Wide Web do so knowing that the information they make available is available to all and sundry without any geographic restriction. . . . A publisher, particularly one carrying on the business of publishing, does not act to put matter on the Internet in order for it to reach a small target. It is its ubiquity which is one of the main attractions to users of it. And any person who gains access to the Internet does so by taking an initiative to gain access to it in a manner analogous to the purchase or other acquisition of a newspaper, in order to read it. . . Comparisons can, as I have already exemplified, readily be made. If a publisher publishes in a multiplicity of jurisdictions it should understand, and must accept, that it runs the risk of liability in those jurisdictions in which the publication is not lawful and inflicts damage.’
This case cites:

  • Appeal from – Gutnick -v- Dow Jones ([2002] HCA 56, Austlii, [2001] VSC 305)
    (High Court of Victoria) Callinan J said: ‘A publisher, particularly one carrying on the business of publishing, does not act to put matter on the Internet in order for it to reach a small target. It is its ubiquity which is one of the main . .
  • Cited – Duke of Brunswick -v- Harmer QBD ((1849) 14 QB 185, [1849] EngR 915, Commonlii, (1849) 117 ER 75)
    On 19 September 1830 an article was published in the Weekly Dispatch. The limitation period for libel was six years. The article defamed the Duke of Brunswick. Seventeen years after its publication an agent of the Duke purchased a back number . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Appealed to – Gutnick -v- Dow Jones ([2002] HCA 56, Austlii, [2001] VSC 305)
    (High Court of Victoria) Callinan J said: ‘A publisher, particularly one carrying on the business of publishing, does not act to put matter on the Internet in order for it to reach a small target. It is its ubiquity which is one of the main . .
  • Cited – Lewis and others -v- King CA (Bailii, [2004] EWCA Civ 1329, Times 26-Oct-04)
    The claimant sought damages for defamation for an article published on the Internet. The claimant Don King sued in London even though he lived in the US as did the defendants.
    Held: A publication via the internet occurred when the material was . .
  • Cited – Metropolitan International Schools Ltd. (T/A Skillstrain And/Or Train2Game) -v- Designtechnica Corp (T/A Digital Trends) and Others QBD ([2011] 1 WLR 1743, Bailii, [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB), Times, [2009] EMLR 27)
    The claimant complained that the defendant had published on its internet forums comments by posters which were defamatory of it, and which were then made available by the second defendant search engine. The court was asked what responsibility a . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 26-Apr-16
Ref: 220028

Weiss v Regina; 15 Dec 2005

References: [2005] 223 ALR 662, [2005] 158 A Crim R 133, [2005] 80 ALJR 444, [2005] 224 CLR 300, [2005] HCA 81
Coram: Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan & Heydon JJ
Ratio (High Court of Australia) The Hight Court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice actually occurred. What is involved in assessing that question in the context of a trial by jury.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Noye, Kenneth, Regina -v- CACD ((2011) 119 BMLR 151, Bailii, [2011] EWCA Crim 650)
    The prisoner appealed against his conviction for murder on reference from the CCRC. There were new doubts about the reliabiity of the expert forensic expert.
    Held: The appeal was dismissed. Dr Heath’s evidence did not impinge on the essential . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17-Apr-16
Ref: 430821

The Queen v Johns (TS); 7 Feb 1980

References: (1980) 143 CLR 108, [1980] HCA 3
Links: Austlii
Coram: Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ
High Court of Australia – Criminal Law (N.S.W.) – Accessory before the fact – Liability – Possible consequences of venture planned with principal in first degree – Sentence of accessory – Whether judge may impose sentence of less duration than life – Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.), ss. 19, 346, 442 (1).
The appellant had been convicted of murder and assault with intent to rob. His role was to drive the principal offender, W, to a rendezvous with a third man, D. The appellant was to wait at the rendezvous while the other two men robbed a known receiver of stolen jewellery. Afterwards the appellant was to take possession of the proceeds and hide them in return for a share. The appellant knew that W was carrying a pistol, and W told him that he would not stand for any nonsense if he met any obstacle during the robbery. In the event the victim resisted and W shot him dead.
The judge had directed the jury that the appellant and D would be guilty if the act constituting the offence committed was within the contemplation of the parties as an act done in the course of the venture on which they had embarked. It was argued on the appellant’s behalf that while this was an appropriate direction in the case of D, who was present and therefore a principal in the second degree, it was a misdirection in the case of the appellant, who was an accessory before the fact. It was submitted that in his case it was necessary for the jury to conclude that it was a likely or probable consequence of the way in which the crime was to be committed that the gun would be discharged so as to kill the deceased.
Held: The High Court unanimously rejected the argument that any distinction was to be drawn between the liability of a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact. There was no reason as a matter of legal principle why such a distinction should be drawn. They also said: ‘The narrow test of criminality proposed by the applicant is plainly unacceptable for the reason that it stakes everything on the probability or improbability of the act, admittedly contemplated, occurring. Suppose a plan made by A, the principal offender, and B, the accessory before the fact, to rob premises, according to which A is to carry out the robbery. It is agreed that A is to carry a revolver and use it to overcome resistance in the unlikely event that the premises are attended, previous surveillance having established that the premises are invariably unattended at the time when the robbery is to be carried out. As it happens, a security officer is in attendance when A enters the premises and is shot by A. It would make nonsense to say that B is not guilty merely because it was an unlikely or improbable contingency that the premises would be attended at the time of the robbery, when we know that B assented to the shooting in the event that occurred.
In the present case there was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the applicant gave his assent to a criminal enterprise which involved the use, that is the discharge, of a loaded gun, in the event that [the victim] resisted or sought to summon assistance. We need not recapitulate the evidence to which we have already referred. The jury could therefore conclude that the common purpose involved resorting to violence of this kind, should the occasion arise, and that the violence contemplated amounted to grievous bodily harm or homicide.’
Last Update: 29-Feb-16 Ref: 560305

Webb and Hay v The Queen: 1994

References: (1994) 181 CLR 41, (1994) 122 ALR 41, (1994) 68 ALJR 582
Links: Austlii
Coram: Mason C.J. and McHugh J
(Australia) The test of whether a bias was found in a member of court because of personal links is whether such links give rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion on the part of a fair minded and informed member of the public that there might have been such a bias. As to the test laid down in Gough: ‘In considering the merits of the test to be applied in a case where a juror is alleged to be biased, it is important to keep in mind that the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality is necessary to retain confidence in the administration of justice. Both the parties to the case and the general public must be satisfied that justice has not only been done but that it has been seen to be done. Of the various tests used to determine an allegation of bias, the reasonable apprehension test of bias is by far the most appropriate for protecting the appearance of impartiality. The test of `reasonable likelihood’ or `real danger’ of bias tends to emphasise the court’s view of the facts. In that context, the trial judge’s acceptance of explanations becomes of primary importance. Those two tests tend to place inadequate emphasis on the public perception of the irregular incident.

We do not think that it is possible to reconcile the decision in Gough with the decisions of this Court. In Gough, the House of Lords specifically rejected the reasonable suspicion test and the cases and judgments which had applied it in favour of a modified version of the reasonable likelihood test. In Watson, faced with the same conflict in the cases between the two tests, this Court preferred the reasonable suspicion or apprehension test. That test has been applied in this Court on no less than eight subsequent occasions. In the light of the decisions of this Court which hold that the reasonable apprehension or suspicion test is the correct test for determining a case of alleged bias against a judge, it is not possible to use the `real danger’ test as the general test for bias without rejecting the authority of those decisions.
‘Moreover, nothing in the two speeches in the House of Lords in Gough contains any new insight that makes us think that we should re-examine a principle and a line of cases to which this Court has consistently adhered for the last eighteen years. On the contrary, there is a strong reason why we should continue to prefer the reasoning in our own cases to that of the House of Lords. In Gough, the House of Lords rejected the need to take account of the public perception of an incident which raises an issue of bias except in the case of a pecuniary interest. Behind this reasoning is the assumption that public confidence in the administration of justice will be maintained because the public will accept the conclusions of the judge. But the premise on which the decisions in this Court are based is that public confidence in the administration of justice is more likely to be maintained if the Court adopts a test that reflects the reaction of the ordinary reasonable member of the public to the irregularity in question. References to the reasonable apprehension of the `lay observer’, the `fair-minded observer’, the `fair-minded, informed lay observer’, `fair-minded people’, the `reasonable or fair-minded observer’, the `parties or the public’, and the `reasonable person’ abound in the decisions of this Court and other courts in this country. They indicate that it is the court’s view of the public’s view, not the court’s own view, which is determinative. If public confidence in the administration of justice is to be maintained, the approach that is taken by fair-minded and informed members of the public cannot be ignored. Indeed, as Toohey J. pointed out in Vakauta (1989) 167 C.L.R. at p.585 in considering whether an allegation of bias on the part of a judge has been made out, the public perception of the judiciary is not advanced by attributing to a fair-minded member of the public a knowledge of the law and the judicial process which ordinary experience suggests is not the case. That does not mean that the trial judge’s opinions and findings are irrelevant. The fair-minded and informed observer would place great weight on the judge’s view of the facts. Indeed, in many cases the fair-minded observer would be bound to evaluate the incident in terms of the judge’s findings.’
This case cites:

  • Cited – Regina -v- Gough (Robert) HL (Independent 26-May-93, Times 24-May-93, [1993] AC 646, [1993] 2 All ER 727, Bailii, [1993] UKHL 1, [1993] 97 Cr App R 188, [1993] 2 WLR 883)
    The defendant had been convicted of robbery. He appealed, saying that a member of the jury was a neighbour to his brother, and there was therefore a risk of bias. This was of particular significance as the defendant was charged with conspiracy with . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 29-Feb-16 Ref: 183297

Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan; 9 Aug 2000

References: (2002) 211 CLR 540, [2000] FCA 1099
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gaudron J
Austlii (Federal Court of Australia) TORT – Negligence – non-feasance by public authorities – non-exercise by local government council and State government to minimise faecal contamination of lake where oysters grown commercially – oysters carrying hepatitis A virus – consumer of oysters contracting hepatitis A – whether duty of care owed to be discharged by exercise of statutory powers – causation – whether local government council and State government required to carry out sanitary survey of shore of lake.
TORT – Negligence – whether duty of care owed by commercial farmer of oysters to consumers of them breached where oysters carrying hepatitis A virus due to faecal contamination of lake in which oysters grown – oyster farmer’s depuration plant not shown to be working unsatisfactorily – whether discharge of oyster farmer’s duty required it to carry out sanitary survey of shore of lake or to urge public authorities to do so – causation of oysters contaminated with hepatitis A virus as a result of faecal contamination of lake where oysters grown – whether circumstances show it was unreasonable for consumer to rely on skills or judgment of grower – whether oysters were as fit for purpose as reasonable to expect.
Gaudron J: ‘Although different concepts inform the law of negligence, ordinarily there is a duty to warn only if there is a foreseeable risk that a person will be led to believe that something is safe when it is not.’
McHugh J: ‘The duty of care owed by a manufacturer or producer to a consumer is a duty to take reasonable care to avoid injury to the consumer. To formulate the duty in more specific terms invites error because it is likely to mix a question of law (whether a duty existed) with a question of fact (whether a breach occurred). If the duty is formulated in specific terms, the issue on breach is whether the duty has been performed in accordance with the terms of the duty as formulated. But, as Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [footnote reference to (1980) 146 C.L.R. 40 at 47-48, per Mason J., Stephen and Aickin J.J. agreeing] shows, the question of breach is far more complex than an affirmative or negative answer to the question whether the defendant carried out the duty as formulated. It involves evaluating and weighing a number of competing considerations.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – McTear -v- Imperial Tobacco Ltd OHCS (Bailii, [2005] ScotCS CSOH_69, Times 14-Jun-05, Scottish CS)
    The pursuer sought damages after her husband’s death from lung cancer. She said that the defenders were negligent in having continued to sell him cigarettes knowing that they would cause this.
    Held: The action failed. The plaintiff had not . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 29-Feb-16 Ref: 226698

Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton; 26 Sep 2003

References: [2003] ZASCA 98, [2003] 4 All SA 117 (SCA)
Links: Saflii
Coram: Howie P, Mthiyane, Conradie, Heher JJA and Van Heerden AJA
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal – Subject: Delict – police – legal duty to exercise reasonable care in considering, investigating & recommending application for firearm licence – liability for shooting by unfit person to whom firearm licence issued
The police were held liable to the victim of a shooting for negligently issuing a firearm licence to the attacker, who had a history of psychosis, personality disorder and alcohol abuse. The agreed statement of facts did not suggest that the victim was at higher risk than any other member of the public.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 21-Dec-15 Ref: 556823

Doe v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police; 30 Aug 1990

References: 74 OR (2d) 225, 72 DLR (4th) 580, 5 CCLT (2d) 77, [1990] OJ No 1584 (QL), 10 WCB (2d) 577, 1 CRR (2d) 211, 50 CPC (2d) 92, 40 OAC 161, 22 ACWS (3d) 869
Links: Canlii
Coram: O’Leary, Saunders and Moldaver JJ
Ontario – High Court of Justice, Divisional Court – Negligence — Duty of care — Police not warning potential victim of serial rapist due to stereotypical belief that her hysterical response to warning would scare off rapist and make apprehension more difficult.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to life, liberty and security — Police not warning potential victim of serial rapist due to stereotypical belief that her hysterical response to warning would scare off rapist and make apprehension more difficult — Charter rights violated — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Equality rights — Police not warning potential victim of serial rapist due to stereotypical belief that her hysterical response to warning would scare off rapist and make apprehension more difficult — Charter rights violated — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15(1).
On August 24, 1986, the plaintiff was raped by a serial rapist who subsequently pleaded guilty to a number of sexual assaults including the attack on the plaintiff. All of the attacks occurred within a one-year period in the same vicinity and involved single white women living in second or third floor apartments to which the rapist gained entry through a balcony door. In this action, the plaintiff sued the Chief of Police at the time of the assault, the investigating officers in charge of the case and the Board of Commissioners of Police for damages. The plaintiff alleged a cause of action in tort and a cause of action for violating her rights to security of the person and her right to equal protection under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The defendants moved to have the action dismissed as not disclosing a cause of action. The motion was dismissed. Leave having been granted, the defendants appealed.
Held, the appeal should be dismissed and the plaintiff’s action allowed to proceed.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 21-Dec-15 Ref: 556824

Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board; 4 Oct 2007

References: [2007] 3 SCR 129, 2007 SCC 41 (CanLII), 40 MPLR (4th) 1, 230 OAC 260, 160 ACWS (3d) 573, [2007] SCJ No 41 (QL), JE 2007-1867, [2007] CarswellOnt 6265, 64 Admin LR (4th) 163, 50 CCLT (3d) 1, 368 NR 1, 50 CR (6th) 279, 285 DLR (4th) 620, 87 OR (3d) 397, [2007] 3 SCR 129, 2007 SCC 41 (CanLII)
Links: Canlii, Canlii
Coram: McLachlin CJ and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ
Canlii Supreme Court of Canada – Torts – Negligence – Duty of care – Police investigation – Whether police owe duty of care to suspects in criminal investigations – If so, standard of care required by police investigating a suspect – Whether police officers’ conduct in investigating suspect was negligent.
Police – Investigation – Negligence – Whether Canadian law recognizes tort of negligent investigation.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 21-Dec-15 Ref: 556825

Couch v Attorney-General; 13 Jun 2008

References: [2008] 3 NZLR 725, [2008] NZSC 45
Links: Nzlii
Coram: Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath and Anderson JJ
Nzlii Supreme Court of New Zealand – [1] The victim of a criminal assault claims exemplary damages from the Attorney-General for claimed failures of the Probation Service to exercise reasonable care in the supervision of the parolee who seriously injured her. Her claim has been struck out in the Court of Appeal on the basis that it discloses no cause of action because no duty of care was owed by the Probation Service to her. A further argument that the claim should be struck out on the basis that exemplary damages are not available for negligently causing personal injury did not have to be addressed in the Court of Appeal, because it took the view that no duty of care arose. Whether exemplary damages can be claimed, if a duty of care cannot be excluded, remains a live preliminary issue but is not disposed of in this judgment because the parties did not have time at the hearing to address the point. The question for determination now is whether the Probation Service may owe a duty of care in law to the victim. As the Court is unanimous in resolving this question in favour of the plaintiff, so that the basis on which the claim was struck out in the Court of Appeal falls away, it will be necessary to hold a further hearing on the availability of exemplary damages, if the parties require that matter to be determined before trial. Because the parties may wish to reconsider whether the availability of exemplary damages is suitable for determination before trial, in the light of the discussion in the reasons of the Court about the principles upon which strike-out is appropriate, the appeal is formally adjourned so that memoranda can be filed within one month on that point. If further hearing is required, a fixture will then be made. If further hearing is not necessary, formal orders reinstating the proceedings will be made.
[2] Whether the Probation Service may owe a duty of care to the victim of a criminal assault by a parolee under its supervision is not resolved by New Zealand authority. It falls to be determined in this Court on a strike-out basis, ahead of determination of the facts and before completion of pre-trial processes, including finalisation of the pleadings. Whether the circumstances relied on by the plaintiff are capable of giving rise to a duty of care is the question for the Court. If a duty of care cannot confidently be excluded, the claim must be allowed to proceed. It is only if it is clear that the claim cannot succeed as a matter of law that it can be struck out.
[3] We are of the view that the claim is not so clearly untenable as to be suitable for peremptory determination on untested facts. We are unable to agree with the majority in the Court of Appeal that it should be struck out. We consider that strike-out is premature for reasons similar to those that persuaded Hammond J to dissent in the Court of Appeal.
[4] Although we agree with Tipping J that the claim should not be struck out as disclosing no duty of care, we differ from him in the approach to be taken in ascertaining whether a duty of care can arise in these circumstances. Tipping J suggests that a duty of care to prevent harm inflicted by a third party arises only where the plaintiff, either as an individual or as a member of an ‘identifiable and sufficiently delineated class’, is known to the defendant to be ‘the subject of a distinct and special risk’ of the harm suffered because of particular vulnerability. [1] Requiring such test to be satisfied in all cases where harm results from third party intervention seems to us to introduce undesirable relational rigidity into the general organising principles for the tort of negligence applied in New Zealand in such cases as Bowen v Paramount Builders (Hamilton) Ltd [2] and South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd, [3] in application of Donoghue v Stevenson [4] and Anns v London Borough of Merton. [5] Whether there is sufficient relationship of proximity between the person injured by a parolee and the Probation Service supervising the parolee turns on a broad inquiry without controlling emphasis on the plaintiff’s membership of an ‘identifiable and sufficiently delineated class’.
[5] Two factors are likely to be key at trial. The first is the background of the Probation Service’s statutory obligations of supervision and control over the parolee, which included the power to control where he worked. The statutory obligations and powers are imposed in substantial part for the protection of the public. We do not think it can be confidently said at this preliminary stage that in carrying out its statutory responsibilities the Probation Service cannot owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, whether as fellow employee of the parolee (the basis upon which her counsel puts it) or indeed as a member of the public. The second factor is the knowledge held as to the risk the parolee presented and the means reasonably available to the Probation Service for avoiding harm through realisation of such risk. Cardozo CJ famously said of duty of care in negligence that ‘risk imports relation’.[6] Because the facts bearing on risk and its avoidance are not yet known, and in the absence of any other clear impediment to the existence of a duty of care (such as might be found if such a duty was inconsistent with the statutory functions of the Probation Service), we consider that to strike out the proceedings would be premature.
This case cites:

  • Cited – Smith -v- Leurs ((1945) 70 CLR 256, [1945] HCA 27, Austlii)
    High Court of Australia – The parents of a child denied liability for harm caused by their son using a shanghai.
    Held: Dixon J said that: ‘It is, however, exceptional to find in the law a duty to control another’s actions to prevent harm to . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 20-Dec-15 Ref: 556829

Smith v Leurs; 22 Oct 1945

References: (1945) 70 CLR 256, [1945] HCA 27
Links: Austlii
Coram: Latham CJ, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ
High Court of Australia – The parents of a child denied liability for harm caused by their son using a shanghai.
Held: Dixon J said that: ‘It is, however, exceptional to find in the law a duty to control another’s actions to prevent harm to strangers. The general rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third. There are, however, special relations which are the source of a duty of this nature.’
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Last Update: 16-Dec-15 Ref: 556830