The court described the peculiarly difficult position of a solicitor sued for the negligence of losing litigation for his client by reason of having his client’s claim struck out: ‘It is true that if the action for professional negligence were fought, the court which tried it would have to assess what those chances were. But on this issue the plaintiff would be in a much more advantageous position than if he had sought, despite the inordinate delay, to establish liability against the defendant in the action which had been dismissed. Not only would there be available to him any advice or material which had been given or obtained by his solicitor in support of his case in the dismissed action, but the principle of Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Stra. 505 would apply and would impose upon the solicitor the onus of satisfying the court that the plaintiff’s claim in the dismissed action would not have succeeded had it been prosecuted with diligence. This would be a heavy onus to sustain after so a great a lapse of time.’ and ‘The probabilities are that in any case in which the plaintiff had been advised to bring the action which had been dismissed and had never been advised to discontinue it, his subsequent action against his solicitor for negligence would be settled. One would hope that, for the good name of the profession, it would be settled promptly.’ As to the breach of the court rules the Court might strike out a claimant’s case where the breach ‘has been intentional and contumelious…’
The court set out the tests for striking out claims for want of prosecution. Lord Denning MR stated: ‘It was urged that we ought not to strike out a man’s action without trial because it meant depriving him of his right to come to the Queen’s Courts. Magna Carta was invoked against us as if we were in some way breaking its provisions. To this there is a short answer. The delay of justice is a denial of justice. Magna Carta will have none of it. ‘To no one will we deny or delay right or justice.’
All through the years men have protested at the law’s delay and counted it as a grievous wrong, hard to bear. Shakespeare ranks it among the whips and scorns of time. Dickens tells how it exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope. To put right this wrong, we will in this court, do all in our power to enforce expedition; and, if need be, we will strike out actions when there has been excessive delay. This is a stern measure. But it is within the inherent jurisdiction of the court. And the Rules of Court expressly permit it. It is the only effective sanction they contain. If a plaintiff fails within the specified time to deliver a statement of claim, or to take out a summons for directions, or to set down the action for trial, the defendant can apply for the action to be dismissed…’
Diplock LJ discussed a strike out: ‘It is then a Draconian order and will not be lightly made. It should not in any event be exercised without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to remedy his default . . The power should be exercised only where the court is satisfied either: (i) that the default has been intentional and contumelious, e.g. disobedience to a pre-emptory order of the court or conduct amounting to an abuse of the process of the court; or (ii) (a) that there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the plaintiff or his lawyers, and (b) that such delay will give rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair trial of the issues in the action or is such as is likely to cause or to have caused serious prejudice to the defendants either as between themselves and plaintiff or between each other or between them and a third party.’
Lord Diplock stated that: ‘But also, if after the plaintiff has been guilty of unreasonable delay the defendant so conducts himself as to induce the plaintiff to incur further costs in the reasonable belief that the defendant intends to exercise his right to proceed to trial notwithstanding the plaintiff’s delay, he cannot obtain dismissal of the action unless the plaintiff has thereafter been guilty of further unreasonable delay.’
A strike out for abuse of process might be available where there had been ‘inordinate and inexcusable delay such that there is a substantial risk that a fair trial of the issues in the litigation will not be possible’
The court should look also to the prejudice to the defendant from the delay: ‘And where the case is one in which at the trial disputed facts will have to be ascertained from oral testimony of witnesses recounting what they then recall of events which happened in the past, memories grow dim, witnesses may die or disappear. The chances of the courts been able to find out what really happened are progressively reduced as time goes on. This puts justice to the hazard’.
‘The underlying principle of civil litigation is that the court takes no action in it of its own motion but only on the application of one or other of the parties to the litigation, the assumption being that each will be regardful of his own interest and take whatever procedural steps are necessary to advance his cause.’
There is a need to ‘temper logic with humanity’.
An ‘amicus curiae’ is a person or organisation, not a party to the proceedings, who offers to assist a court or tribunal by providing representation to an unrepresented person or in some other way assisting by expounding the law impartially.
Salmon LJ explained the meaning of inordinate delay: ‘(1) . . It would be highly undesirable and indeed impossible to attempt to lay down a tariff – so many years or more on one side of the line and a lesser period on the other. What is or is not inordinate delay must depend upon the facts of each particular case. These vary infinitely from case to case, but inordinate delay should not be too difficult to recognise when it occurs.’
Judges:
Lord Denning MR, Diplock LJ, Salmon LJ
Citations:
[1968] 2 QB 229, [1968] 2 WLR 366, [1968] 1 All ER 543
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Armory v Delamirie KBD 1722
A jeweller to whom a chimney sweep had taken a jewel he had found, took the jewel out of the socket and refused to return it. The chimney sweep sued him in trover. On the measure of damages, the court ruled ‘unless the defendant did produce the . .
Cited by:
Cited – Arrow Nominees Inc, Blackledge v Blackledge ChD 2-Nov-1999
The applicants sought to strike out a claim under section 459. The two companies sold toiletries, the one as retail agent for the other. They disputed the relationship of the companies, and the use of a trading name. Documents were disclosed which . .
Cited – Mount v Barker Austin (a Firm) CA 18-Feb-1998
The plaintiff sought damages for professional negligence from his former solicitors in respect of their conduct of a claim on his behalf. He succeeded, but was awarded no damages because the judge had found that his action would be bound to fail. He . .
Cited – Dixon v Clement Jones Solicitors (A Firm) CA 8-Jul-2004
The defendant firm had negligently allowed a claim for damages against a firm of accountants to become statute barred. The defendants said the claim was of no or little value, since the claimant would have proceeded anyway.
Held: The court had . .
Cited – Eagle (By Her Litigation Friend) v Chambers CA 29-Jul-2004
The claimant had been severely injured, and a substantial damages award made. Cross appeals were heard as to the several elements awarded. The claimant sought as part of her award of damages for personal injuries the fees she would have to pay to . .
Cited – In re Jokai Tea Holdings Ltd CA 1989
An ‘unless order’ for the service of particulars of defence was a not obeyed but application was made to amend the defence involving the abandonment of the paragraphs of which particulars had been ordered.
Held: ‘it appears to me that there . .
Cited – Arrow Nominees Inc and Another v Blackledge and Others CA 22-Jun-2000
A petition had been lodged alleging unfair prejudice in the conduct of the company’s affairs. The defendants alleged that when applying for relief under section 459, the claimants had attempted to pervert the course of justice by producing forged or . .
Cited – Birkett v James HL 1977
Exercise of Power to Strike Out
The court has an inherent power to strike out an action for want of prosecution, and the House set down the conditions for its exercise. The power is discretionary and exercisable only where (a) there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Professional Negligence, Litigation Practice
Updated: 05 November 2022; Ref: scu.200642