Mr Chadwick tried to bring relief and comfort to the victims of the Lewisham train disaster in December 1967. His widow claimed in nervous shock, saying that it had eventually led to his own death.
Held: Where an accident is of a particular horrifying kind and the rescuer is involved with the victims in the immediate aftermath it may be reasonably foreseeable that the rescuer will suffer psychiatric injury. Mr Chadwick suffered his injury because of the terrible impact on his mind of the suffering he witnessed in his rescue attempt, and not because of any fear for his own safety: ‘although there was clearly an element of personal danger in what Mr Chadwick was doing, I think that I must deal with this case on the basis that it was the horror of the whole experience which caused his reaction.’ His widow was entitled to damages.
Waller J said: ‘The community is not formed of normal citizens, with all those who are less susceptible or more susceptible to stress to be regarded as extraordinary. There is an infinite variety of creatures, all with varying susceptibilities.’

Judges:

Waller J

Citations:

[1967] 1 WLR 912, [1967] 2 All ER 945

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters CA 6-Dec-2002
A new mother woke in hospital to see her baby (E) fitting. E suffered a major epileptic seizure leading to coma and irreparable brain damage. E was transferred to a London hospital and the following day the claimant was told by a consultant that E’s . .
Cited – White, Frost and others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire and others HL 3-Dec-1998
No damages for Psychiatric Harm Alone
The House considered claims by police officers who had suffered psychiatric injury after tending the victims of the Hillsborough tragedy.
Held: The general rules restricting the recovery of damages for pure psychiatric harm applied to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Damages

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.183347

Then plaintiff saw her husband killed and her children injured by a runaway motor car. At trial she was awarded damages for nervous shock. The question was whether, having regard to the fact that she had suffered sorrow and grief it would not be to overcompensate her by failing to make a deduction for the sorrow and grief which was otherwise not compensable.
Held: A plaintiff who suffered from extreme grief, including a case where the condition of the sufferer was debilitating, but which fell short of a recognised psychiatric illness was not able to recover damages. Personal injury at law connotes serious trauma or illness.
Lord Denning said: ‘The law at one time said that there could not be damages for nervous shock; but for these last twenty-five years, it has been settled that damages can be given for nervous shock caused by the sight of an accident, at any rate to a close relative.’ and ‘In English law no damages are awarded for grief and sorrow caused by a person’s death. No damages are to be given for the worry about the children, or for the financial strain or stress, or the difficulties of adjusting to a new life. Damages are however recoverable for nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognisable psychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant.’ Also he said: ‘It happened on April 19, 1964. It was bluebell time in Kent’
Sir Gordon Wilmer discussed setting damages for this kind of injury: ‘It is practically impossible to find any signposts on the road; there is no tariff or pattern of awards in this class of case; and this makes it difficult for any one judge to criticize another’s estimate of what the damages ought to be.’
Lord Pearson said: ‘The first factor was her own inevitable grief and sorrow at losing her husband, a good husband who was also a good father to her family. That would have caused much sorrow and mourning in any event. Secondly, there was her anxiety about the welfare of her children who were injured in the accident. Thirdly, there was the financial stress resulting from the removal of this very hard-working breadwinner who took extra work in addition to his normal work. She may well have been in considerable financial difficulties. The fourth factor was the need for adjusting herself to a new life, which may well have been quite unusually severe in this case. Now, all those four factors are not compensatible, that is to say that they are not proper subjects to be taken into account in assessing damages according to English law.’ and ‘It should not be for the whole of the mental anguish and suffering which she has been enduring during the last five or six years. It should be only for that additional element which has been contributed by the shock of witnessing the accident, and which would not have occurred if she had not suffered that shock. It is a difficult distinction to draw, but I think the judge has laid a proper foundation and has found a right ground of decision, namely, that where there is an extra element which has been added by the shock of witnessing the accident, that is a proper subject of compensation. On his findings in this case that that element in itself was the sole cause of the added morbidity, the recognisable psychiatric element in her present condition, that is a proper ground for a substantial sum of money to be awarded.’

Judges:

Lord Denning, Sir Gordon Wilmer, Lord Pearson

Citations:

[1970] 2 QB 40

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Alcock and Others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police HL 28-Nov-1991
The plaintiffs sought damages for nervous shock. They had watched on television, as their relatives and friends, 96 in all, died at a football match, for the safety of which the defendants were responsible. The defendant police service had not . .
Cited – Tranmore v T E Scudder Limited CA 28-Apr-1998
Psychiatric damage following the death of a son after alleged negligence by defendant. . .
Cited – White, Frost and others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire and others HL 3-Dec-1998
No damages for Psychiatric Harm Alone
The House considered claims by police officers who had suffered psychiatric injury after tending the victims of the Hillsborough tragedy.
Held: The general rules restricting the recovery of damages for pure psychiatric harm applied to the . .
Cited – McLoughlin v O’Brian HL 6-May-1982
The plaintiff was the mother of a child who died in an horrific accident, in which her husband and two other children were also injured. She was at home at the time of the accident, but went to the hospital immediately when she had heard what had . .
Cited – Reilly and Another v Merseyside Regional Health Authority CA 28-Apr-1994
. .
Cited – Vernon v Bosley (2) CA 29-Mar-1996
The defendant had been driving the plaintiff’s daughters, but negligently caused an accident from which they died. The plaintiff was called to the accident, and claimed to have suffered post traumatic stress. The defendant said that the effect was . .
Cited – Zurich Insurance Plc UK Branch v International Energy Group Ltd SC 20-May-2015
A claim had been made for mesothelioma following exposure to asbestos, but the claim arose in Guernsey. Acknowledging the acute difficultis particular to the evidence in such cases, the House of Lords, in Fairchild. had introduced the Special Rule . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Damages

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.180107

The claimant was father to a new-born child. At the birth he was told that his baby son was dead before seeing his son and understanding that an error had been made. He sought damages asserting that he had suffered nervous shock. The Hospital said that he was not able to recover for psychiatric injury where no possibility of a physical injury was forseeable.
Held: He succeeded. As a primary victim a claim for psychiatric injury was possible even where no physical injury was risked. A real risk of suffering a recognised psychiatric disorder was sufficient.

Judges:

Judge Bursell QC

Citations:

[2001] All ER (D) 17

Personal Injury, Damages

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.536640

The young plaintiff, under a disability, had asked for an interim payment of andpound;100,000 to adapt a house already bought. McCullough J upheld the refusal of the district judge to make that interim payment, taking the view that the plans for the conversion of the house were over-elaborate and might leave the plaintiff insufficiently provided for by way of future care.
Held: In order to obtain an interim payment, the plaintiff was not to be required to demonstrate any particular need beyond the general need to be paid damages as soon as reasonably possible. The court should not, when considering whether to order such a payment, investigate how the money was going to be used. The court was confident that the claimant was going to recover damages at trial which would substantially exceed the aggregate of the sums sought by way of an interim payment and those sums already paid. Any expenditure would be subject to the control of the Court of Protection.
Stuart-Smith LJ said: ‘The error into which the judge fell in this case was, in my opinion, when he concerned himself with what was to be done with the damages in the hands of the plaintiff or those responsible for her care. Once the threshold conditions in RSC Ord.29, r.11(1), sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) are satisfied, what the court has to do, if it thinks fit, is to make an interim payment of such amount as it thinks just not exceeding a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff after taking into account contributory negligence and any set-off or counterclaim. It should be noted that the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate any particular need over and above the general need that a plaintiff has to be paid his or her damages as soon as reasonably may be done. It will generally be appropriate and just to make an order where there will be some delay until the final disposal of the case. Therefore what the court is concerned with in fixing the quantum is that it does not exceed a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court are likely to be recovered. It is quite clear here that the amount will on any basis substantially exceed the sum of andpound;187,000, which is the sum awarded by way of interim payment to date plus the andpound;100,000 which is now sought. That is all the judge should have been concerned with. In the case of an adult of sound mind, the court making an order under RSC Ord.29, r.11 is not concerned in any way with what the plaintiff does with his damages. In the case of an infant, the money will normally be paid into court and then the next friend will apply to the district judge for payment out as and when the money is required. Where the Court of Protection is concerned, it is for that court to decide how and when the money is to be spent.’

Judges:

Stuart-Smith LJ

Citations:

[1994] 1 WLR 1653

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Brown ( A Minor) v Emery QBD 4-Mar-2010
The court considered an application for an interim payment to fund the purchase of suitable accommodation in which the child claimant might spend periods of time with her parents and sibling and ultimately reside on discharge, at a cost of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Damages

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.402546

The plaintiff sought damages after work related exposure to asbestos. Though asbestosis had not yet occurred, he had developed calcified pleural plaques which indicated a risk of the disease.
Held: He was entitled to choose to take a final award in damages calculated according to the statistical risk identified as best the court could.

Judges:

J Crowley QC

Citations:

[1992] PIQR Q19

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Horsley v Cascade Insulation Services Ltd and Others QBD 18-Nov-2009
The claimant sought damages after contracting asbestosis through employment exposure with the defendants. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Damages, Personal Injury

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.380322

The court was asked: ‘whether the current approach to assessing the financial losses suffered by the dependant of a person who is wrongfully killed properly reflects the fundamental principle of full compensation, and if it does not whether we should depart from previous decisions of the House of Lords.’
Held: The correct date as at which to assess the multiplier when fixing damages for future loss in claims under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 should be the date of trial and not the date of death. The court could not follow the Cookson and Graham cases.
It was emphasised that, because of the importance of the role of precedent and the need for certainty and consistency in the law, the Supreme Court ‘should be very circumspect before accepting an invitation to invoke the 1966 Practice Statement’.

Judges:

Lord Neuberger, President, Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke
Lord Reed
Lord Toulson, Lord Hodge

Citations:

[2016] UKSC 9, [2016] 4 All ER 897, [2016] 2 WLR 672, [2016] WLR(D) 103, (2016) 150 BMLR 16, [2016] PIQR P10

Links:

Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Taylor v O’Connor HL 1970
The appellant driver had caused a car accident in 1965, in which the respondent’s husband died. The respondent sought damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts for herself then aged 52 and for her 18 year old daughter. The husband died aged 53 and a . .
Appeal from – Knauer v Ministry of Justice QBD 24-Jul-2014
The deceased died of mesothelioma after working for the defendant as an administrative assistant in buildings constructed using asbestos. . .
Cited – A Train and Sons Ltd v Fletcher CA 24-Apr-2008
Appeal re award of interest on claim under Fatal Accidents Act.
Hooper LJ confessed: ‘I do not understand why chronological years are deducted from the multiplier’. . .
Cited – A v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008
Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .
Not followed – Cookson v Knowles HL 24-May-1978
The House described the approach to the calculation of damages for a dependency under the Fatal Accidents Acts.
Held: The multipliers in Fatal Accidents Act cases should be calculated from the date of death.
Sections 3 and 4 mark a . .
Cited – Gammell v Wilson; Furness v Massey HL 1982
In each case, the deceased, died as a result of the defendants’ negligence. The parents claimed damages for themselves as dependants under the 1976 Act, and for the estate under the 1934 Act. The claims under the 1976 Act were held to have been . .
Not Followed – Graham v Dodds HL 1983
A court dealing with personal injury claims normally makes a discount in respect of damages for the future loss of earnings
Lord Bridge said ‘The only issue arising in this appeal which is strictly one of law is whether, in assessing damages . .
Cited – Corbett v Barking Havering and Brentwood Health Authority CA 1991
The Claimant was a child who would have been dependant on his deceased young mother only until adulthood. When the trial took place the infant Plaintiff was 11.5 with a dependency until the age of 18. As the multiplier calculated as at the date of . .
Cited – Wells v Wells; Thomas v Brighton Health Authority; etc HL 16-Jul-1998
In each of three cases, the plaintiffs had suffered serious injury. They complained that the court had made a substantial reduction of their damages award for loss of future earnings and the costs of future care.
Held: The appeals succeeded. . .
Cited – Horton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
Cited – White (Widow and Administratrix of the Estate of David Charles White Deceased) v Esab Group (UK) Ltd QBD 11-Oct-2001
. .
Cited – ATH and another (Executors of the Estate of M, decd) v MS CA 11-Jun-2002
The claimants were the children of the deceased, seeking damages following the death of their mother. At the time of the death they were not living with their father but moved to live with him after the death. They claimed damages for the services . .

Cited by:

Cited – Willers v Joyce and Another (Re: Gubay (Deceased) No 2) SC 20-Jul-2016
The Court was asked whether and in what circumstances a lower court may follow a decision of the Privy Council which has reached a different conclusion from that of the House of Lords (or the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal) on an earlier occasion. . .
Cited – Patel v Mirza SC 20-Jul-2016
The claimant advanced funds to the respondent for him to invest in a bank of which the claimant had insider knowledge. In fact the defendant did not invest the funds, the knowledge was incorrect. The defendant however did not return the sums . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Damages

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.560236

A plaintiff, injured in a motor accident, was seeking to recover damages for loss of profit.
Held: The court commented adversely on the evidence and stated that no figures were given, and that counsel for the defendant had force in his observation that ‘as no other man was engaged (that is to replace the plaintiff in his job when he was unable to do it) it is irrelevant to consider what would have happened if he had been, for, so far from producing a drop in profitability, his engagement might equally well have led to a realisation of that 10 per cent increase which Mr Boulter assumed would have enured but for the accident.’ In other words, it might well have been that he would not have suffered any loss at all . . . ‘So approaching the matter, the unsatisfactory conclusion to which I have felt myself driven is that, while the probability is that some loss of profitability resulted from the plaintiff’s accident it is quite impossible to quantify it.’

Judges:

Davies, Edmund Davies and Stamp LJJ

Citations:

[1971] 1 WLR 1731, [1971] 3 All ER 1208

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Alger, Brownless and Court Copyservices Limited v Thakrar Trading As Thakrar and Co (a Firm) CA 15-Jan-1999
The defendant firm of solicitors signed a lease of a photocopier, but claimed to have agreed oral terms which contradicted those set out in the document they signed.
Held: The judge was entitled to make his assessment of the witnesses as he . .
Cited – Moeliker v Reyrolle and Co Ltd CA 1976
The court considered the principles for the award of damages for future loss of earning capacity.
Held: The court distinguished between an award for loss of earnings and compensation for loss of earning capacity. The latter head of damage . .
Cited – Phillips v Holliday and Another CA 6-Jul-2001
The claimant was injured when scaffolding on which he was working collapsed. The defendants appealed the awards for loss of future earnings. The claimant was self-employed working through a limited company controlled by his wife. His past earnings . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Damages, Personal Injury

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.199277

The plaintiff was injured in an accident at work. His employer was partly responsible. For 13 weeks he received full sick pay in accordance with his contract. He then received half his pre-accident earnings under the permanent health insurance scheme for which his employer paid. The injuries prevented him from resuming his pre-accident work as a machine operator. The employers offered alternative, less well-paid employment as a weighbridge operator.
Held: His claim for damages in respect of loss of earnings fell to be reduced by the amounts of the payments from his employer through the schemes. The payments were indistinguishable in character from the uninsured sick pay in lieu of wages: ‘They are payable under a term of the employee’s contract by the defendants to the employee qua employee as a partial substitute for earnings and are the very antithesis of a pension which is payable only after employment ceases. The fact that the defendants happen to have insured their liability to meet these contractual commitments as they arise cannot affect the issue in any way.’ The general rule was that: ‘prima facie the only recoverable loss is the net loss. Financial gains accruing to the plaintiff which he would not have received but for the event which constitutes the plaintiff’s cause of action are prima facie to be taken into account in mitigation of losses which that event occasions to him. In many, perhaps most cases, both losses and gains will come into the calculation.’ Lord Reid’s dichotomy in Parry ‘must not be allowed to obscure the rule that prima facie the only recoverable loss is the net loss’. Describing the benevolence exception: ‘Secondly, when the plaintiff receives money from the benevolence of third parties prompted by sympathy for his misfortune, as in the case of a beneficiary from a disaster fund, the amount received is again to be disregarded’. ‘There are however, a variety of borderline situations where a plaintiff may receive money which, but for the wrong done to him by the defendant, he would not have received and where there may be no obvious answer to the question whether the rule against double recovery or some principle derived by analogy from one of the two classic exceptions to that rule should prevail. Some of these problems have been resolved by legislation, sometimes in the form of a compromise solution providing that a proportion only of certain statutory benefits is to be taken into account when assessing damages. But where there is no statute applicable the common law must solve the problem unaided and the possibility of a compromise solution is not available. Many eminent common law judges, I think it is fair to say, have been baffled by the problem of how to articulate a single guiding rule to distinguish receipts by a plaintiff which are to be taken into account in mitigation of damage from those which are not.’

Judges:

Lord Bridge of Harwich

Citations:

[1988] AC 514

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Parry v Cleaver HL 5-Feb-1969
PI Damages not Reduced for Own Pension
The plaintiff policeman was disabled by the negligence of the defendant and received a disablement pension. Part had been contributed by himself and part by his employer.
Held: The plaintiff’s appeal succeeded. Damages for personal injury were . .
Appeal from – Hussain v New Taplow Paper Mills Ltd CA 1987
The worker had been injured at work. His employer was partly at fault. The employer had a compensation scheme for which it paid, and sought to deduct the payments to the worker from the damages it was to pay. The Court was also invited by the . .

Cited by:

Cited – Longden v British Coal Corporation HL 13-Mar-1997
The plaintiff was injured whilst at work in one of the defendant’s collieries. The House considered the deductibility from damages awarded for personal injury of a collateral benefit.
Held: The issue of deductibility where the claim is for . .
Cited – Dimond v Lovell CA 29-Apr-1999
Mrs Dimond had a car accident as a result of Mr Lovell’s negligence and sought to recover from him the cost of the hire of a replacement vehicle while her car was being repaired. Under clause 5 of the hire agreement the hire company had the conduct . .
Cited – Pirelli General Plc and others v Gaca CA 26-Mar-2004
The claimant was awarded damages from his employers, who claimed that the benefits received by the claimant from an insurance policy to which the defendants had contributed should be set off against the claim.
Held: McCamley was no longer good . .
Cited – McCamley v Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Limited CA 1990
The plaintiff suffered injury at work and claimed damages. He had received a lump sum under insurance provided by the defendant’s parent company for the benefit of employees injured at work. Did the lump sum payment fall to be deducted from the . .
Cited – O’Brien and others v Independent Assessor HL 14-Mar-2007
The claimants had been wrongly imprisoned for a murder they did not commit. The assessor had deducted from their compensation a sum to represent the living costs they would have incurred if living freely. They also appealed differences from a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Damages

Updated: 29 April 2022; Ref: scu.183063

No aspect of the law of damages has been found in practice to be more dependent on the facts of each particular case than the assessment of loss of pecuniary benefit to dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act

Judges:

Beldam LJ

Citations:

[1992] PIQR 332

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Cape Distribution Ltd v Aine O’Loughlin CA 8-Feb-2001
The company appealed the calculation of an award of damages to the respondent following the death of her husband, a former employee. The deceased had operated a company in Ireland as a property developer. The company alleged that the earnings were . .
Cited – Harland and Wolff Plc Husbands Ltd v Patricia Lillian Mcintyre CA 28-Mar-2006
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Personal Injury, Damages

Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.181792

Current changes in interest rates did not justify a departure from the guidelines set down of two per cent on damages for general pain and suffering and loss of amenity. There is no essential or necessary reason why the rate for such a claim should be the same as was to be used when calculating future losses. The two awards of interest are fundamentally. One is an actuarial assessment of future losses, and the other is a discretionary award.

Citations:

Times 25-Jul-2000

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Damages, Personal Injury

Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.82970