Category: Constitutional

Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners: ChD 1979

The case concerned section 478, which had monstrous and unintended results, if applied in accordance with its natural meaning. The Commissioners did not seek to apply the section in a manner which produced such results. The court held: ‘One should be taxed by law, and not be untaxed by concession’
Walton J
[1979] Ch 177
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 478
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Bates v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 1968
Section 402, on its plain meaning, produced results in some cases which were ‘monstrous’ and which Parliament can never have intended. The Commissioners had not sought to amend the legislation, but realising the monstrous result of giving effect to . .

Cited by:
Cited – Regina on the Application of Wilkinson v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue CA 18-Jun-2003
The claimant had not received the same tax allowance following his wife’s death as would have been received by a woman surviving her husband. That law had been declared incompatible with Human Rtights law as discriminatory, but the respondent . .
Appeal from – Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 1979
Taxes are imposed upon subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer and the amount of his liability is clearly defined. A proposition that whether a subject is to be taxed or . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 July 2021; Ref: scu.184328

Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2): ChD 1979

The Commissioners of Inland Revenue do not have, any more than does any other emanation of the Crown, any power to suspend or dispense with laws. ‘It is at this point that there arises what Mr Potter, for the taxpayers, has denominated as a serious constitutional question; namely what rights the Inland Revenue Commissioners have to pick and choose when recovering tax. The Solicitor-General said, and doubtless rightly said, that the commissioners are under no duty to recover every halfpenny of tax which may be due. One may say ‘Amen’ to that very readily, because the costs of recovery of extremely small amounts of tax would far outweigh the tax recovered. One expects the tax authorities to behave sensibly. In this connection I was referred to section 1 of the Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890 and to section 1 of the Taxes Management Act 1970, but I do not think that either of these provisions has any real bearing on the matter. What the revenue authorities, through the Solicitor-General, are here claiming is a general dispensing power, no more and no less. He submitted that the system of extra-statutory concessions was well known and well recognised, and that what was happening in the present case was no more than the grant of an additional extra-statutory concession. In the first place, I, in company with many judges before me, am totally unable to understand upon what basis the Inland Revenue Commissioners are entitled to make extra-statutory concessions. To take a very simple example (since example is clearly called for), upon what basis have the commissioners taken it upon themselves to provide that income tax is not to be charged upon a miner’s free coal and allowances in lieu thereof? That this should be the law is doubtless quite correct; I am not arguing the merits, or even suggesting that some other result, as a matter of equity, should be reached. But this, surely, ought to be a matter for Parliament, and not the commissioners. If this kind of concession can be made, where does it stop; and why are some groups favoured as against others?’
Walton J
[1979] Ch 198
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina on the Application of Wilkinson v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue CA 18-Jun-2003
The claimant had not received the same tax allowance following his wife’s death as would have been received by a woman surviving her husband. That law had been declared incompatible with Human Rtights law as discriminatory, but the respondent . .
Appeal from – Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 1979
Taxes are imposed upon subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer and the amount of his liability is clearly defined. A proposition that whether a subject is to be taxed or . .
Cited – Churchhouse, Regina (on the Application of) v Inland Revenue Admn 4-Apr-2003
The taxpayer was a revenue informer one whose trade is described by Coke as ‘viperous vermin [who] under the reverend mantle of law and justice instituted for protection of the innocent, and the good of the Commonwealth, did vexe and depauperize the . .
Cited – Futter and Another v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Same SC 9-May-2013
Application of Hastings-Bass Rule
F had created two settlements. Distributions were made, but overlooking the effect of section 2(4) of the 2002 Act, creating a large tax liability. P had taken advice on the investment of the proceeds of a damages claim and created a discretionary . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 July 2021; Ref: scu.184329

Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners: HL 1979

Taxes are imposed upon subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer and the amount of his liability is clearly defined. A proposition that whether a subject is to be taxed or not, or, if he is, the amount of his liability, is to be decided (even though within a limit) by an administrative body represents a radical departure from constitutional principle. It may be that the revenue could persuade Parliament to enact such a proposition in such terms that the courts would have to give effect to it: but, unless it has done so, the courts, acting on constitutional principles, not only should not, but cannot, validate it. When Parliament imposes a tax, it is the duty of the commissioners to assess and levy it upon and from those who are liable by law. Of course they may, indeed should, act with administrative commonsense. To expend a large amount of taxpayer’s money in collecting, or attempting to collect, small sums would be an exercise in futility: and no one is going to complain if they bring humanity to bear in hard cases. I accept also that they cannot, in the absence of clear power, tax any given income more than once. But all of this falls far short of saying that so long as they do not exceed a maximum they can decide that beneficiary A is to bear so much tax and no more, or that beneficiary B is to bear no tax. This would be taxation by self-asserted administrative discretion and not by law. The fact in the present case is that Parliament has laid down no basis on which tax can be apportioned where there are numerous discretionary beneficiaries. The Commissioners had no power to mitigate the gross injustice that would result from the strict application of the section, as interpreted by them. The devices resorted to by the Commissioners were unconstitutional.
HL Income tax – Avoidance of tax – Transfer of assets – Income payable to trustees of settlement resident abroad – Income accumulated and invested – Income from such investments also accumulated and invested in two funds – Investments including shares in wholly-owned overseas companies – Capital sums paid out of each fund to discretionary beneficiaries (other than the transferors) ordinarily resident in the U.K. – Capital sum paid to mother of infant beneficiary – Whether infant ‘received’ or ‘entitled to receive’ such capital sum – Whether each of such beneficiaries had ‘power to enjoy’ income of (a) the trustees, (b) the overseas companies – Whether such income deemed to be income of each of such beneficiaries in years prior to, including, and subsequent to, year of receipt – Power of Board of Inland Revenue to apportion such income between selected beneficiaries – Income Tax Act 1952, s 412 (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6) – Finance Act 1969, s 33 – Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890, s 1 – Taxes Management Act 1970, s 1.
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Dilhorne, Lord Salmon, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Edmund-Davies
[1980] AC 1148, (1979) 54 Tax Cas 503, [1979] 3 WLR 915, [1979] UKHL TC – 54 – 503
Bailii
Taxes Management Act 1970 1, Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890 1, Finance Act 1969 33, Income Tax Act 1952 412(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Absolom v Talbot 1943
Scott LJ said: ‘No judicial countenance can or ought to be given in matters of taxation to any system of extra-legal concessions.’ . .
Appeal from – Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2) ChD 1979
The Commissioners of Inland Revenue do not have, any more than does any other emanation of the Crown, any power to suspend or dispense with laws. ‘It is at this point that there arises what Mr Potter, for the taxpayers, has denominated as a serious . .
Appeal from – Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners ChD 1979
The case concerned section 478, which had monstrous and unintended results, if applied in accordance with its natural meaning. The Commissioners did not seek to apply the section in a manner which produced such results. The court held: ‘One should . .
Cited – Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) HL 1966
The House gave guidance how it would treat an invitation to depart from a previous decision of the House. Such a course was possible, but the direction was not an ‘open sesame’ for a differently constituted committee to prefer their views to those . .

Cited by:
Cited – Scottish Widows Plc v Revenue and Customs SC 6-Jul-2011
The taxpayer insurance company had transferred sums from accounts designated as Capital Reserves. The Revenue said that these were properly part of the profit and loss accounts for the respective tax years, and chargeable receipts.
Held: The . .
Cited – Project Blue Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 13-Jun-2018
The purchaser of land created a sub-sale and leaseback with bank so as to fund the purchase in a manner which would comply with Islamic finance principles. The Court was now asked whether purchaser or the bank were liable for stamp duty land tax on . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 July 2021; Ref: scu.184331

Henry Boot Construction (UK) Limited v Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Limited: CA 25 May 2000

Where a party appealed against an arbitration to the County or High Court, the court which gave judgment was the sole body able to give permission to enter an appeal under the Act. An appellate court did not have jurisdiction to give leave to appeal.
The courts presume that Parliament does not intend an implied repeal.
Swinton Thomas, Waller, Arden LJJ
Times 31-Aug-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 175, [2001] QB 388
Bailii
Arbitration Act 1996 69(8)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Henry Boot Construction v Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd TCC 1999
. .
Cited – Geogas SA v Trammo Gas Ltd (The Baleares) HL 1991
Charterers had appealed an arbitration award. The judge set it aside. The CA gave leave and allowed the appeal saying that as a question of mixed fact and law sought leave to appeal against an arbitration award.
Held: The House had no . .

Cited by:
Cited – North Range Shipping Ltd v Seatrans Shipping Corporation CA 14-Mar-2002
The parties had been involved in an arbitration. The claimant sought leave to appeal. The judge refused to give leave, but did not say exactly why.
Held: Human Rights law required a right of appeal. That right could only be exercised properly . .
Cited – Athletic Union of Constantinople v National Basketball Association and Others CA 28-May-2002
A party had been refused leave to appeal against an arbitration under the Act by the judge, but later obtained leave to appeal.
Held: Such leave could only be granted by the trial judge, and the Court of Appeal could set aside the leave . .
Cited – Cetelem Sa v Roust Holdings Ltd CA 24-May-2005
The parties were engaged in arbitration proceedings. The claimant had sought and obtained an interim mandatory order intended to prevent the defendant dissipating its assets in anticipation of an adverse ruling. The defendant sought leave to appeal. . .
Cited – Sumukan Ltd v The Commonwealth Secretariat CA 21-Mar-2007
The appellants sought to challenge a finding that they had by their contract with the defendants excluded the right to appeal to a court on a point of law. The defendants replied that the appeal court had no jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.
Cited – BH and Another v The Lord Advocate and Another SC 20-Jun-2012
The appellants wished to resist their extradition to the US to face criminal charges for drugs. As a married couple that said that the extraditions would interfere with their children’s rights to family life.
Held: The appeals against . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.147208

Inco Europe Ltd and Others v First Choice Distributors (A Firm) and Others: HL 10 Mar 2000

Although the plain words of the Act would not allow an appeal to the Court of Appeal under the circumstances presently applying, it was clear that the parliamentary draftsman had failed to achieve what he had wanted to, that the omission was in error, and words could be and would be read into the Act to allow an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the High Court.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said: ‘I freely acknowledge that this interpretation of section 18(1)(g) [of the SCA 1981] involves reading words into the paragraph. It has long been established that the role of the courts in construing legislation is not confined to resolving ambiguities in statutory language. The court must be able to correct obvious drafting errors. In suitable cases, in discharging its interpretative function the court will add words, or omit words or substitute words.’
and ‘This power is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes. The courts are ever mindful that their constitutional role in this field is interpretative. They must abstain from any course which might have the appearance of judicial legislation. A statute is expressed in language approved and enacted by the legislature. So the courts exercise considerable caution before adding or omitting or substituting words. Before interpreting a statute in this way the court must be abundantly sure of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed.’
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
Times 10-Mar-2000, Gazette 23-Mar-2000, [2000] UKHL 15, [2000] 1 WLR 586, [2000] CLC 1015, (2000) 2 TCLR 487, [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 674, [2000] 2 All ER 109, [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 467, 74 Con LR 55, [2000] BLR 259
House of Lords, Bailii
Supreme Court Act 1981 18(1)(g), Arbitration Act 1996 sch 3 para 37
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Inco Europe Ltd and Others v First Choice Distribution (A Firm) and Others CA 10-Sep-1998
The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a judge’s grant or refusal of an order staying court proceedings where arbitration was sought by one party under an agreement. . .
Cited – Western Bank Ltd v Schindler CA 1977
The mortgagee sought possession in circumstances in which the mortgagor had allowed a life policy, taken as collateral security, to lapse, but where there had been no default under the mortgage itself. The question arose whether the court could . .

Cited by:
Cited – SD, Re Application for Judicial Review OHCS 2-Oct-2003
Parents sought judicial review of a decision not to open a Record of Needs for their child. A report said that the child was dyslexic. The applicants said his condition had not improved after an earlier request to open a record had been refused.
Cited – Crown Prosecution Service, Regina (on the Application of) v Bow Street Magistrates Court and others Admn 18-Jul-2006
The defendants were said to have been found in possession of false passports. They successfully argued that the offence charged under the 1981 Act had been repealed by the 2006 Act. The prosecutor argued that a Schedule only came into effect when . .
Cited – Haw and Another v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court Admn 12-Dec-2007
The defendants appealed convictions for contempt of court, on the basis of having wilfully interrupted the court. The respondent said that no appeal lay.
Held: The statute was ambiguous, and ‘there can be no good reason why a person convicted . .
Cited – Hughes v Borodex Ltd Admn 25-Mar-2009
hughes_borodexAdmn2009
The tenant under a long lease appealed against a rent assessment which increased the amount payable to a level where she lost her security of tenure. She said that 17 year old improvements she had made should not have been taken into account.
Cited – Hughes v Borodex Ltd CA 27-Apr-2010
The court considered the determination of a new rent on the conversion of a long tenancy protected under Part I of the 1954 Act to an assured periodic tenancy under the 1988 Act. The tenant had carried out improvements which she now wanted to be . .
Cited – Noone, Regina (on The Application of) v Governor of HMP Drake Hall and Another SC 30-Jun-2010
The prisoner had been sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment, one for less, and one for more than 12 months. She disputed the date on which she should be released to home detention under curfew under the Guidance issued by the Secretary of . .
Cited – Farstad Supply As v Enviroco Ltd SC 6-Apr-2011
The court was asked by the parties to a charterparty whether one of them is an ‘Affiliate’ of the charterer for the purposes of provisions in a charterparty by which both the owner and the charterer agreed to indemnify and hold each other harmless . .
Cited – Davies and Another (T/A All Stars Nursery) v The Scottish Commission for The Regulation of Care SC 27-Feb-2013
The appellants ran a day care nursery regulated under the 2001 Act. The Commission, being concerned at the care provided, sought to revoke the registration in proceedings before the Sherriff’s Court. Before they were concluded, the Commission was . .
Applied – OB v The Director of The Serious Fraud Office CACD 2-May-2012
The court considered an application by the defendant for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, noting that section 13 of the 1960 Act did not provide for such a right after the 2006 Act.
Held: The words could not themselves be construed to . .
Cited – Bogdanic v The Secretary of State for The Home Department QBD 29-Aug-2014
The claimant challenged fines imposed on him after three illegal immigrants were found to have hidden in his lorry in the immigration control zone at Dunkirk. The 1999 At was to have been amended by the 2002 Act, and the implementation was by the . .
Cited – Crown Prosecution Service v Inegbu Admn 26-Nov-2008
The CPS appealed aganst a decision on a charge under the railway byelaws, that the charge be dismissed, the prosecution not having formally proved in accordance with any applicable statutory provision. The byelaws had in fact been properly . .
Cited – Shahid v Scottish Ministers (Scotland) SC 14-Oct-2015
The appellant convicted of a racially-aggravated vicious murder. Since conviction he had spent almost five years in segregation from other prisoners. The appellant now alleged that some very substantial periods of segregation had been in breach of . .
Cited – LB Holdings Intermediate 2 Ltd, The Joint Administrators of v Lehman Brothers International (Europe), The Joint Administrators of and Others SC 17-May-2017
In the course of the insolvent administration of the bank, substantial additional sums were received. Parties appealed against some orders made on the application to court for directions as to what was to be done with the surplus.
Held: The . .
Cited – McCool, Regina v SC 2-May-2018
The appellants complained that the recovery order made against them in part under the transitional provisions were unlawful. They had claimed benefits as single people but were married to each other and for a house not occupied. The difficulty was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.82313

Regina v National Insurance Commissioner, Ex parte Hudson: HL 1972

The House considered whether it would have power to make a ruling with prospective effect only. Lord Diplock said the matter deserved further consideration; Lord Simon said that the possibility of prospective overruling should be seriously considered, but that he would prefer legislation, saying that ‘informed professional opinion’ was probably to the effect that the House had no power to overrule decisions with prospective effect only.
Viscount Dilhorne discussed the freedom if any to overturn a recent case: ‘[I]f the view be that the decision is clearly wrong, it is, I think, easier to decide that a recent case should not be followed than if it is one that has stood for a long time, for if it is in the latter category many may have acted in reliance on it.’
Lord Reid said that the power given to the House by the Practice Statement was to be applied only in a small number of cases in which previous decisions of the House were ‘thought to be impeding the proper development of the law or to have led to results which were unjust or contrary to public policy.’
Lord Diplock said: ‘Section 5 (1946 Act), which contains the general description of and conditions of entitlement to each of the three benefits, avoids the use of the compound phrase ‘personal injury by accident’ which had appeared in successive Workmen’s Compensation Acts since 1897. It is reasonable to suppose that the change in phraseology was deliberate – though there is an isolated lapse into the expression ‘personal injury by accident’ in section 48(2) of the statute.’
Lord Diplock, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Reid
[1972] AC 944
Workmen’s Compensation Act 1946 5
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) HL 1966
The House gave guidance how it would treat an invitation to depart from a previous decision of the House. Such a course was possible, but the direction was not an ‘open sesame’ for a differently constituted committee to prefer their views to those . .

Cited by:
Cited – National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Limited and others HL 30-Jun-2005
Former HL decision in Siebe Gorman overruled
The company had become insolvent. The bank had a debenture and claimed that its charge over the book debts had become a fixed charge. The preferential creditors said that the charge was a floating charge and that they took priority.
Held: The . .
Cited – Horton v Sadler and Another HL 14-Jun-2006
The claimant had been injured in a road traffic accident for which the defendant was responsible in negligence. The defendant was not insured, and so a claim was to be made against the MIB. The plaintiff issued proceedings just before the expiry of . .
Cited – Gibson v United States of America PC 23-Jul-2007
(The Bahamas) The US government sought the extradition of the appellant from the Bahamas on drugs charges. The warrants were found to be void, and the defendant released unconditionally, when the nmagistrate rejected evidence from an admitted . .
Cited – Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd and Others HL 1-Jul-2009
Mutual Knowledge admissible to construe contract
The parties had entered into a development contract in respect of a site in Wandsworth, under which balancing compensation was to be paid. They disagreed as to its calculation. Persimmon sought rectification to reflect the negotiations.
Held: . .
Cited – Regina v Kansal (2) HL 29-Nov-2001
The prosecutor had lead and relied at trial on evidence obtained by compulsory questioning under the 1986 Act.
Held: In doing so the prosecutor was acting to give effect to section 433.
The decision in Lambert to disallow retrospective . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.228279

Brophy v Attorney-General of Manitoba: PC 1895

The purpose of granting to Roman Catholics the right to funding for separate schools and the right to elect trustees to manage their own schools was to enable the teachings of the Roman Catholic faith to be transmitted to the children of Roman Catholics while educating them in secular subjects: ”It was not doubted that the object of the 1st sub-section of sec. 22 was to afford protection to denominational schools.”
Lord Herschell LC
[1895] AC 202
British North America Act, 1867
Canada
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Z (Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference) HL 19-May-2005
The defendants appealed their convictions for being members of proscribed organisations. They were members of the ‘Real IRA’, but only the IRA was actually proscribed.
Held: The appeals failed. In construing an Act of Parliament it may be of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.225198

The Queen v Walter Watson Hughes And Edward Stirling: PC 22 Dec 1865

Leases granted by the Governor of South Australia under powers conferred on him by the Colonial Act, 21st Vict. No. 5, sec. 13, for regulating the sale and other disposal of waste lands belonging to the Crown, sealed with the public seal of the Province, but not enrolled or recorded in any court, are not in themselves Records; and, though bad on the face of them, being for a larger quantity of land than allowed by that Act, cannot be annulled or quashed by a writ of Scire facias
[1865] EngR 794, (1865) 3 Moo PC NS 439, (1865) 16 ER 166, [1866] UKPC 3, LR 1 PC 81
Commonlii, Bailii
Australia

Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.281706

River Wear Commissioners v Adamson: HL 1877

It was not necessary for there to be an ambiguity in a statutory provision for a court to be allowed to look at the surrounding circumstances.
As to the Golden Rule of interpretation: ‘It is to be borne in mind that the office of the judge is not to legislate, but to declare the expressed intention of the legislature even if that expressed intention appeared to the court to be injudicious; and I believe that it is not disputed that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the Golden rule is right viz. that we are to take the whole statute together and construe it all together, giving the words their ordinary significance unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification and to justify the court in putting on them some other significance which though less proper is one which the court thinks the words will bear.’
Lord Blackburn said: ‘I shall . . state, as precisely as I can, what I understand from the decided cases to be the principles on which the courts of law act in construing instruments in writing; and a statute is an instrument in writing. In all cases the object is to see what is the intention expressed by the words used. But, from the imperfection of language, it is impossible to know what that intention is without inquiring farther, and seeing what the circumstances were with reference to which the words were used, and what was the object, appearing from those circumstances, which the person using them had in view; for the meaning of words varies according to the circumstances with respect to which they were used.’ and
‘But it is to be borne in mind that the office of Judges is not to legislate, but to declare the expressed intention of the Legislature, even if that intention appears to the Court injudicious; and I believe that it is not disputed that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the golden rule is right, viz., that we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together, giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification, and to justify the Court in putting on them some other signification which, though less proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear.’
Lord Blackburn
(1877) 2 App Cas 743
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Westminster City Council v National Asylum Support Service HL 17-Oct-2002
The applicant sought assistance from the local authority. He suffered from spinal myeloma, was destitute and an asylum seeker.
Held: Although the Act had withdrawn the obligation to provide assistance for many asylum seekers, those who were . .
Cited – Regina v Z (Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference) HL 19-May-2005
The defendants appealed their convictions for being members of proscribed organisations. They were members of the ‘Real IRA’, but only the IRA was actually proscribed.
Held: The appeals failed. In construing an Act of Parliament it may be of . .
Cited – Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd and Others HL 1-Jul-2009
Mutual Knowledge admissible to construe contract
The parties had entered into a development contract in respect of a site in Wandsworth, under which balancing compensation was to be paid. They disagreed as to its calculation. Persimmon sought rectification to reflect the negotiations.
Held: . .
Cited – Power v Provincial Insurance CA 18-Feb-1997
The insured had failed to disclose an earlier drink driving conviction on applying for insurance over five years later. The insurers refused cover on an accident. The plaintiff said that the conviction was spent under the 1974 Act. The endorsement . .
Cited – Yarl’s Wood Immigration Ltd and Others v Bedfordshire Police Authority CA 23-Oct-2009
The claimant sought to recover the costs of damage to their centre following a riot, saying that under the 1886 Act, they were liable. It appealed against a ruling that they were unable to claim as a public authority, saying that the 1886 Act was . .
Examined – Great Western Railway Co v Mostyn (Owners) HL 1928
The House considered the application of a case precedent where they had been uunable to extract a binding ratio decidendi.
Held: A ratio decidendi cannot be created by aggregating views of minority judges and views of majority judges to secure . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.187446

Stradling v Morgan: 1560

There is a wide common sense principle of the construction of statutes by which courts will imply qualifications into the literal meaning of wide and general words in order to prevent them from having some unreasonable consequence which it is considered that Parliament could not have intended.
(1560) 1 Plow 199
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Central Valuation Officer and another ex parte Edison First Power Limited HL 10-Apr-2003
Powergen sold a property to Edison. Powergen paid rates under a separate statutory rating regime, and paid an additional thirteen million pounds under an apportionment. Edison later complained that in being rated itself, the authorities had . .
Cited – Jackson and others v Attorney General HL 13-Oct-2005
The applicant sought to challenge the 2004 Hunting Act, saying that it had been passed under the provisions of the 1949 Parliament Act which was itself an unlawful extension of the powers given by the 1911 Parliament Act to allow the House of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.182561

Stellato, Regina (on the Application of)v Secretary of State for the Home Department: HL 28 Feb 2007

The prisoner had served part of his ten year sentence, been released on licence and then recalled. He complained that the new parole system under which he had then to apply was invalid, having been made Parliament by negative resolution.
Held: The Secretary of State’s appeal failed. ‘Although these provisions are, indeed, somewhat opaque and ill-drafted, their intended effect is in the last analysis quite clear. The new scheme for recalling and re-releasing prisoners was to come into immediate effect for everyone: no longer was the Parole Board to be primarily responsible for initiating a prisoner’s recall by making a recommendation under section 39(1), the Secretary of State’s power being limited by section 39(2) to urgent cases where it was impracticable to await a recommendation. Henceforth recall was to be solely for the Secretary of State. Pre-Act offenders were not, however, to be disadvantaged by the new parole regime, in particular with regard to the effective length of their sentences and the period for which they were to be at risk of recall after release on licence.’
The opportunity for scrutiny of delegated legislation by Parliament is determined by the provisions of the enabling Act. Four procedures are available: affirmative resolution procedure; negative resolution procedure; simply laying; and no parliamentary stage at all.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Carswell, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
[2007] UKHL 5, [2007] 2 AC 70, [2007] 2 All ER 737, [2007] 2 WLR 531
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No 8 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2005
England and Wales
Citing:
At First Instance – Stellato, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Admn 31-Mar-2006
The prisoner sought judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to recall him to prison for breach of licence after December 27, 2005, when three quarters of his prison sentence had expired.
Held: The . .
See Also – Stellato, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 1-Dec-2006
. .
Appeal from – Stellato v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 1-Dec-2006
In 1998, the prisoner had been sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He had been released on licence after serving two thirds of that sentence, but then recalled on three occasions. He now sought unconditional release after serving three quarters of . .
Cited – Buddington v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 27-Mar-2006
The court considered the validity of of the claimant’s recall to prison. The words ‘falls to be released’ in paragraph 23 mean ‘is entitled to be released’ or ‘is released’. The author of the Order may have been suffering from ‘Homeric exhaustion’. . .
Cited – Practice Direction (Custodial Sentences: Explanations) LCJ 24-Jan-1998
Courts sentencing offenders to imprisonment are now to explain the effect of remission etc in open court when sentencing; the exact form of words was set out. . .

Cited by:
Cited – HM Treasury v Ahmed and Others SC 27-Jan-2010
The claimants objected to orders made freezing their assets under the 2006 Order, after being included in the Consolidated List of suspected members of terrorist organisations.
Held: The orders could not stand. Such orders were made by the . .
Cited – HM Treasury v Ahmed and Others SC 27-Jan-2010
The claimants objected to orders made freezing their assets under the 2006 Order, after being included in the Consolidated List of suspected members of terrorist organisations.
Held: The orders could not stand. Such orders were made by the . .
Cited – Noone, Regina (on The Application of) v Governor of HMP Drake Hall and Another SC 30-Jun-2010
The prisoner had been sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment, one for less, and one for more than 12 months. She disputed the date on which she should be released to home detention under curfew under the Guidance issued by the Secretary of . .
See Also – Stellato v The Ministry of Justice CA 14-Dec-2010
The claimant having been released on licence from a prison sentence refused to comply with the conditions of his licence on the ground that he was entitled to be released unconditionally. He was returned to prison. The Divisional Court dismissed his . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 June 2021; Ref: scu.250027

John Wilkes, Esq v The King: HL 1768

Mr Wilkes had been accused of making a seditious libel against the King. He had peaded not guilty, but then absconded after his conviction, but before his sentence.
[1768] EngR 2, (1768) Wilm 322, (1768) 97 ER 123
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Wilkes v Wood CCP 6-Dec-1763
Entry by Force was Unconstitutional
The plaintiff challenged a warrant of commitment to the Tower of London addressed to John Wilkes by name. The plaintiff sought damages after his property was entered by force on behalf of the Secretary of State.
Held: The case was decided on a . .

Cited by:
See Also – Rex v John Wilkes, Esq 7-Feb-1770
The law must be applied even if the heavens fell
An information for a misdemeanor may be amended the day before trial by a single Judge at chambers on hearing both sides and without the consent of the defendant.
On setting aside John Wilkes’ outlawry for publishing The North Briton, Lord . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.374591

Mirehouse v Rennell: 1833

Parke B described how the elements of a common law offence are to be distilled from the cases in which the relevant principles have been set out: ‘Our common-law system consists in the applying to new combinations of circumstances those rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedent; and for the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty, we must apply those rules, where they are not plainly unreasonable and inconvenient, to all cases which arise; and we are not at liberty to reject them, and to abandon all analogy to them, in those to which they have not been judicially applied, because we think that the rules are not as convenient and reasonable as we ourselves could have devised.’
References: (1833) 1 Cl and F 527
Judges: Parke J
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Simpson v Regina CACD 23-May-2003 ([2003] EWCA Crim 1499, Times 26-May-03, Gazette 10-Jul-03, [2004] QB 118, [2003] 3 WLR 337, [2003] Cr App R 36, , [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 24, [2003] 2 Cr App R 36, [2003] 3 All ER 531)
    The appellant challenged a confiscation order. It was argued that one could not be made unless a proper notice had been given, and none of the offences occurred before 1995. On the assumption that section 1 of the 1995 Act was not in force, did the . .
  • Cited – Hamilton, Regina v CACD 16-Aug-2007 (, [2007] EWCA Crim 2062, Times 16-Oct-07, [2008] 2 WLR 107, [2008] QB 224)
    The defendant appealed his conviction for outraging public decency. He had surreptitously filmed up the skirts of women in a supermarket. The offence was only discovered after the films were found on a search of his home for other material. The . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.182381

Society Promoting Environmental Conservation v Canada (Attorney-General): 2003

(Canada – Federal Court of Appeal) The court considered the exercise of its ability to declare a statute invalid: ‘the more serious the public inconvenience and injustice likely to be caused by invalidating the resulting administrative action, including the frustration of the purposes of the legislation, public expense and hardship to third parties, the less likely it is that a court will conclude that legislative intent is best implemented by a declaration of invalidity.’
References: (2003) 228 DLR (4th) 693
Judges: Evans JA
Jurisdiction: Canada
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005 (, [2005] UKHL 49, , Times 22-Jul-05, [2005] 3 WLR 303, [2006] 1 AC 340, [2006] 1 Cr App R(S) 79, [2006] Crim LR 167, [2005] 4 All ER 321, [2006] 2 Cr App R 20)
    The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .
  • Cited – TTM v London Borough of Hackney and Others CA 14-Jan-2011 (, [2011] EWCA Civ 4, [2011] HRLR 14, [2011] PTSR 1419, [2011] Med LR 38, [2011] 1 WLR 2873)
    The claimant had been found to have been wrongfully detained under section 3. He appealed against rejection of his claim for judicial review and for damages. The court found that his detention was lawful until declared otherwise. He argued that the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.228960

Rex v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co (1920) Ltd: 1924

An objection was made that an inquiry was ultra vires.
Held: Since the cost of the inquiry would have been wholly wasted if, thereafter, the Minister and Parliament had approved the scheme only to be told at that late stage that the scheme was ultra vires, the courts could examine the issue. Where some administrative order or regulation is required by statute to be approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament, the court can in an appropriate case intervene by way of judicial review before the Houses have given their approval.
Younger LJ said: ‘the interference of the Court in such a case as this, and at this stage, so far from being even in the most diluted sense of the words a challenge to its supremacy, will be an assistance to Parliament.’
Lord Atkin observed at a very early stage in the development of public law that he knew of ‘no authority which compels me to hold that a proceeding cannot be a judicial proceeding subject to prohibition or certiorari because it is subject to confirmation or approval, even where the approval has to be that of the Houses of Parliament.’
References: [1924] 1 KB 171
Judges: Younger LJ, Lord Atkin
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 09 August 2020; Ref: scu.258760

Adegbenro v Chief S L Akintola and Sir Adesoji Aderemi (Nigeria): PC 27 May 1963

References: [1963] UKPC 15, [1963] AC 614
Links: Bailii
Ratio:
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17 September 2019
Ref: 445253

McCawley v The King: PC 1920

References: [1920] AC 691
Coram: Lord Birkenhead
Ratio: The Board was asked whether a Queensland statute authorising the Governor in Council to appoint a judge of the Court of Industrial Arbitration to hold office for seven years, was in fatal conflict with a provision of the 1859 Order in Council and a section of the Constitution Act 1867.
Held: It was not, since the legislature of Queensland had power to enact the Queensland statute both under s.5 of the 1865 Act and under clause 22 of the Order in Council. Lord Birkenhead compared and contrasted controlled and uncontrolled constitutions: ‘ . . a constitution [is not] debarred from being reckoned as an uncontrolled constitution because it is not, like the British constitution, constituted by historic development, but finds its genesis in an originating document which may contain some conditions which cannot be altered except by the power which gave it birth. It is of the greatest importance to notice that where the constitution is uncontrolled the consequences of its freedom admit of no qualification whatever.’
Statutes: Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 5
Jurisdiction: Australia
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina on the Application of Jackson and others v HM Attorney General CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 126, Times 17-Feb-05)
    The applicant asserted that the 2004 Act was invalid having been passed under the procedure in the 1949 Act, reducing the period by which the House of Lords could delay legislation; the 1949 Act was invalid, being delegated legislation, had used the . .
  • Cited – Jackson and Others, Regina (on the Application of) v Her Majesty’s Attorney General Admn (Bailii, [2005] EWHC 94 (Admin), Times 31-Jan-05)
    The 2004 Act had been passed without the approval of the House of Lords and under the provisions of the 1911 Act as amended by the 1949 Act. The 1949 Act had used the provisions of the 1911 Act to amend the 1911 Act. The claimant said this meant . .
  • Cited – Jackson and others v Attorney General HL (House of Lords, [2005] UKHL 56, Times 14-Oct-05, Bailii, [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 2 WLR 87, [2005] 4 All ER 1253)
    The applicant sought to challenge the 2004 Hunting Act, saying that it had been passed under the provisions of the 1949 Parliament Act which was itself an unlawful extension of the powers given by the 1911 Parliament Act to allow the House of . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 15 March 2019
Ref: 222715

Clayton v Heffron: 17 Oct 1960

References: (1960) 105 CLR 214
Links: Austilii
Coram: Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer JJ
Ratio: (High Court of Australia) An Act was proposed to be introduced by the legislature to amend the constitution of New South Wales by abolishing the Legislative Council. There would be required first a vote in favour of that in a referendum. The proposed Act was to be passed under a procedure in s.5B of the New South Wales Constitution Act 1902-1956, whereby legislation could be enacted ultimately without the consent of the Legislative Council. S.5B had been introduced into the New South Wales Constitution by an enactment of the New South Wales legislature under s.5 of the Constitution Act which went: ‘The Legislature shall, subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, have power to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales in all cases whatsoever.’
Held: The Act was effective.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina on the Application of Jackson and others v HM Attorney General CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 126, Times 17-Feb-05)
    The applicant asserted that the 2004 Act was invalid having been passed under the procedure in the 1949 Act, reducing the period by which the House of Lords could delay legislation; the 1949 Act was invalid, being delegated legislation, had used the . .
  • Cited – Jackson and others v Attorney General HL (House of Lords, [2005] UKHL 56, Times 14-Oct-05, Bailii, [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 2 WLR 87, [2005] 4 All ER 1253)
    The applicant sought to challenge the 2004 Hunting Act, saying that it had been passed under the provisions of the 1949 Parliament Act which was itself an unlawful extension of the powers given by the 1911 Parliament Act to allow the House of . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 21 February 2017
Ref: 222726

Taylor v Attorney General of Queensland; 29 Jun 1917

References: (1917) 23 CLR 457, [1917] HCA 31
Links: Austlii
Coram: Barton J, Isaacs, Gavan Duffy, Rich and Powers JJ
Ratio: (High Court of Australia) The 1908 Act provided that, when a bill passed by the Legislative Assembly in two successive sessions had in the same two sessions been rejected by the Legislative Council, it might be submitted by referendum to the electors, and, if affirmed by them, should be presented to the Governor for His Majesty’s assent. Upon receiving such assent, the Bill was to become an Act of Parliament in the same manner as if passed by both Houses of Parliament, and notwithstanding any law to the contrary.
Held: This was a valid and effective Act of Parliament by virtue of the power conferred upon the Legislature of Queensland by S.5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865. It was further held that there was power to abolish the Legislative Council of Queensland by an Act passed by the Legislative Assembly and affirmed by the electors in accordance with the provisions of the 1908 Act. Barton J ‘The Constitution Act of 1867 provided for all laws passed under it to be enacted ‘by Her Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly in Parliament assembled’, and that the constitution did not recognise the making of laws by any other authority: ‘It is also true that in general the legislation of a body created by and acting under a written charter or constitution is valid only so far as it conforms to the authority conferred by that instrument of government, and that therefore attempted legislation, merely at variance with the charter or constitution, cannot be held an effective law on the ground that the authority conferred by that instrument includes a power to alter or repeal any part of it, if the legislation questioned has to be preceded by a good exercise of such power; that is, if the charter or constitution has not antecedently been so altered within the authority given by that document itself. . . Normally, therefore, in the absence of such a provision as s.5 of the Imperial Act, I should have been prepared to hold that the [1908 Act], which, though it professed to be an amendment of the Constitution Act of 1867, was merely, in view of its provisions, an Act at variance with the constitution, not preceded by a valid extension of the constitutional power, was therefore itself, as it stood, invalid. But in the present case the Imperial provision seems to me to take away the application of the principle I have stated to legislation of the kind which it authorises.’
Statutes: Queensland Parliamentary Bills Referendum Act of 1908
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina on the Application of Jackson and others v HM Attorney General CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 126, Times 17-Feb-05)
    The applicant asserted that the 2004 Act was invalid having been passed under the procedure in the 1949 Act, reducing the period by which the House of Lords could delay legislation; the 1949 Act was invalid, being delegated legislation, had used the . .
  • Cited – Jackson and others v Attorney General HL (House of Lords, [2005] UKHL 56, Times 14-Oct-05, Bailii, [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 2 WLR 87, [2005] 4 All ER 1253)
    The applicant sought to challenge the 2004 Hunting Act, saying that it had been passed under the provisions of the 1949 Parliament Act which was itself an unlawful extension of the powers given by the 1911 Parliament Act to allow the House of . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 04-Aug-16
Ref: 222718

Hutchinson v Proxmire; 26 Jun 1979

References: [1979] USSC 139, [1979] 443 US 111
Links: Worldlii
Ratio: (United States Supreme Court) The petitioner had been funded by the state to carry out research on aggression in certain animals, particularly monkeys. He complained of criticism of his work decsribing it as wasteful
Held: Efforts to influence executive agencies are not privileged acts. Not every public employee is a public official.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Chaytor and Others, Regina v SC (Bailii, [2010] UKSC 52, Bailli Summary, [2010] WLR (D) 311, WLRD, UKSC 2010/0195, SC Summary, SC, [2011] 1 Cr App R 22, [2010] 3 WLR 1707, [2011] 1 All ER 805)
    The defendants faced trial on charges of false accounting in connection in different ways with their expenses claims whilst serving as members of the House of Commons. They appealed against rejection of their assertion that the court had no . .
  • Cited – Makudi v Baron Triesman of Tottenham CA (Bailii, [2014] EWCA Civ 179, [2014] EMLR 17, [2014] 3 All ER 36, [2014] 1 QB 839, [2014] WLR(D) 98, [2014] QB 839, [2014] 2 WLR 1228, WLRD)
    Appeal against strike out of claims for defamation and malicious falsehood. The defendant had given evidence to the Culture Media and Sport Select Committee of the House of Commons with material highly critical of the claimant, a member of FIFA’s . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 31-Jul-16
Ref: 427748

Bradlaugh v Gossett; 9 Feb 1884

References: (1884) 12 QBD 271, 32 WR 552, 53 LJQB 209, 50 LT 620, [1884] EWHC 1 (QB)
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Coleridge, Stephen J
Ratio:Bradlaugh, though duly elected Member for a Borough, was refused by the Speaker to administer oath and was excluded from the House by the serjeant at arms. B challenged the action.
Held: The matter related to the internal management of the House of Commons and the Court had no power to interfere.
Lord Coleridge said: ‘There is another proposition equally true, equally well established, which seems to me decisive of the case before us. What is said or done within the walls of Parliament cannot be inquired into a Court of law. On this point all the judges in the two great cases which exhaust the learning on the subject – Burdott v Abbott (1811) 14 East 1 and Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 9 Ad & E 1 – are agreed, and are emphatic. The jurisdiction of the Houses over their own members, their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive.’
Stephen J said: ‘I think that the House of Commons is not subject to the control of Her Majesty’s Courts in its administration of that part of the statute law which has relation to its own internal proceedings, and that the use of such actual force as may be necessary to carry into effect such a resolution as the one before us is justifiable’ and ‘The only force which comes in question in this case is such force as any private man might employ to prevent a trespass on his own land. I know of no authority for the proposition that an ordinary crime committed in the House of Commons would be withdrawn from the ordinary course of criminal justice. One of the leading authorities on the privilege of Parliament contains matter on the point and shows how careful Parliament has been to avoid even the appearance of countenancing such a doctrine.’
This case cites:

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Jennings v Buchanan PC (Bailii, [2004] UKPC 36, Times 19-Jul-04, PC, PC, [2004] EMLR 22, [2005] 1 AC 115, [2005] 2 All ER 273)
    (New Zealand) (Attorney General of New Zealand intervening) The defendant MP had made a statement in Parliament which attracted parliamentary privilege. In a subsequent newspaper interview, he said ‘he did not resile from his claim’. He defended the . .
  • Cited – Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd PC (Times 13-Jul-94, Gazette 26-Oct-94, [1995] 1 AC 321, [1994] 3 NZLR 1, Bailii, [1994] 3 WLR 970)
    (New Zealand) The plaintiff, an MP, pursued a defamation case. The defendant wished to argue for the truth of what was said, and sought to base his argument on things said in Parliament. The plaintiff responded that this would be a breach of . .
  • Cited – Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd PC (Times 13-Jul-94, Gazette 26-Oct-94, [1995] 1 AC 321, [1994] 3 NZLR 1, Bailii, [1994] 3 WLR 970)
    (New Zealand) The plaintiff, an MP, pursued a defamation case. The defendant wished to argue for the truth of what was said, and sought to base his argument on things said in Parliament. The plaintiff responded that this would be a breach of . .
  • Cited – Regina v Morley; Regina v Chaytor; Regina v Devine; Regina v Lord Hanningfield CC ([2010] EW Misc 9 (EWCC), Bailii, Judiciary)
    (Southwark Crown Court) The defendants faced charges of false accounting in connection with expense claims as members of parliament, three of the House of Commons and one of the Lords. Each claimed that the matter was covered by Parliamentary . .
  • Cited – Chaytor and Others, Regina v CACD (Bailii, [2010] EWCA Crim 1910, [2010] WLR (D) 214, WLRD)
    The defendants had been members of the Houses of Commons and of Lords. They faced charges of dishonesty in respect of their expenses claims. They now appealed a finding that they were not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament under . .
  • Cited – Chaytor and Others, Regina v SC (Bailii, [2010] UKSC 52, Bailli Summary, [2010] WLR (D) 311, WLRD, UKSC 2010/0195, SC Summary, SC, [2011] 1 Cr App R 22, [2010] 3 WLR 1707, [2011] 1 All ER 805)
    The defendants faced trial on charges of false accounting in connection in different ways with their expenses claims whilst serving as members of the House of Commons. They appealed against rejection of their assertion that the court had no . .
  • Cited – Mereworth v Ministry of Justice ChD (Bailii, [2011] EWHC 1589 (Ch))
    The claimant’s father had been granted the hereditary title of Baron of Mereworth. The claimant having inherited th etitle objected to the refusal to issue to him a writ of summons to sit in the House of Lords.
    Held: The claim was struck out . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 25-Jul-16
Ref: 199237

The Grand Junction Canal Company v Dimes; 1 May 1849

References: [1849] EngR 576, (1849) 12 Beav 63, (1849) 50 ER 984
Links: Commonlii
Ratio:In a suit in which an incorporated company were Plaintiffs, a decree was pronounced by the Vice-Chancellor for England, and was affirmed, on appeal, by the Lord Chancellor. It was afterwards discovered that the Lord Chancellor was a shareholder in the company, and a motion was made to discharge the order of the Lord Chancellor on the ground of his interest in the matter rendering it void.
Held: The Master of the Rolls was of opinion that the motion ought to be refused with costs.
When the Lord Chancellor is a party to a suit, the bill is addressed to the King, and the cause is heard by the Master of the Rolls; but the decree is formally and technically completed, made final, and enrolled as the decree of the King. But where a public company, in which the Lord Chancellor has shares, are suitors, the bill cannot properly be addressed to the Queen in Chancery.
It is a general rule that no one ought to be a judge in his own cause, and no Judge ought, by himself or his deputy, to hear and determine a cause, or make an order, or do any judicial act, in a cause in which he has a personal interest ; but even in a case of disputed interest, a Judge is not incapacitated from making an order, if, by refusing to do so, justice would be denied.
There is not, and cannot, in any case, be an incapacity to make any orderor do any act in a matter within the proper, peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction of a Judge’s office, if such order or act be necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Whatever a Judge’s interest may be, if justice cannot be had, without an act or order of his, he cannot lawfully refuse to do the act, or make the order required. In cases where questions of this kind arise, the Judge must have a certain degree of diseretion, and, having the capacity, his duty does not extend further than the necessity of the case requires ; if there are other Judges having co-ordinate jurisdiction, he may and ought to refuse to act ; but if he, like the Lord Chancellor, should be the sole Judge having jurisdiction in the case it is otherwise.
The signing of a decree of a subordinate Judge by the Lord Chancellor is a judicial act.
This case cites:

  • Appeal from – Dimes -v- The Company of Proprietors of The Grand Junction Canal CExC ([1846] EngR 55, Commonlii, (1846) 9 QB 469, (1846) 115 ER 1353, [1846] EngR 1072, Commonlii, (1846) 15 Sim 402, (1846) 60 ER 675)
    By a local Act of Parliament a company was incorporated and empowered to purchase certain lands ; and all persons seised, possessed of or interested in those lands were empowered to conveyed their right and interest therein to the company, in the . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • See Also – The Grand Junction Canal Company -v- Dimes ([1850] EngR 243, Commonlii, (1850) 2 H & Tw 92, (1850) 47 ER 1610, [1849] EngR 682, Commonlii, (1849) 17 Sim 38, (1849) 60 ER 1041)
    The defendant disputed the right of the plaintiff to use the canal constructed across his land. After he had been ordered to allow the boats to pass, the defendant brought 15 actions in trespass. The company now sought an injunction to restrain . .
  • See Also – The Grand Junction Canal Company -v- Dimes CA ([1850] EngR 242, Commonlii, (1850) 2 Mac & G 285, (1850) 42 ER 110)
    The defendant had been committed for the breach of an injunction which he believed had been unlawfully granted in that the Lord Chancellor, on appeal, had decided in favour of the plaintiff company in which he held shares. The defendant again . .
  • See Also – Dimes -v- Lord Cottenham ([1850] EngR 499 (A), Commonlii, (1850) 5 Exch 311)
    The Court will not, on the application of the plaintiff, grant a trial at bar merely because the defendant is Lord Chancellor and the plaintiff an attorney of the Court. . .
  • See Also – In Re Dimes ([1850] EngR 769, Commonlii, (1850) 3 Mac & G 4, (1850) 42 ER 162)
    The claimant challenged his committal to prison saying that the order was invalid in that although made under an order of the Vice-Chancellor, the warrant had been endorsed with the letters CC.
    Held: Such an endorsement did not mean that the . .
  • See Also – Dimes -v- Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal and others HL ((1852) 3 HL Cas 759, [1852] EngR 789, Commonlii, (1852) 3 HLC 759, (1852) 10 ER 301)
    The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, owned a substantial shareholding in the defendant canal which was an incorporated body. He sat on appeal from the Vice-Chancellor, whose judgment in favour of the company he affirmed. There was an appeal on the . .
  • See Also – Dimes -v- The Proprietors Of The Grand Junction Canal and Others ([1852] EngR 793, Commonlii, (1852) 3 HLC 794, (1852) 10 ER 315)
    The plaintiff had brought an action to recover land. His appeal failed, but the House later decided that the Lord Chancellor who heard the appeal should have disqualified himself, because he held shareholdings in the defendant company, and his . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17-Jun-16
Ref: 298881

Regina v Oakes; 28 Feb 1986

References: [1986] 1 SCR 103, 1986 CanLII 46 (SCC), 53 OR (2d) 719, 24 CCC (3d) 321, 50 CR (3d) 1, 65 NR 87, [1986] CarswellOnt 95, EYB 1986-67556, [1986] SCJ No 7 (QL), 14 OAC 335, 16 WCB 73, [1986] ACS no 7, 19 CRR 308
Links: Canlii
Coram: Dickson C.J. and Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ.
Ratio:Supreme Court of Canada – Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Presumption of innocence (s. 11(d)) — Reverse onus clause — Accused presumed to be trafficker on finding of possession of illicit drug — Onus on accused to rebut presumption — Whether or not reverse onus in violation of s. 11(d) of the Charter — Whether or not reverse onus a reasonable limit to s. 11(d) and justified in a free and democratic society — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 11(d) — Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, ss. 3(1), (2), 4(1), (2), (3), 8.
Criminal law — Presumption of innocence — Reverse onus — Accused presumed to be trafficker on finding of possession of illicit drug — Onus on accused to rebut presumption — Whether or not constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence (s. 11(d) of the Charter) violated.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 10-Jun-16
Ref: 564962

Rex v John Wilkes, Esq; 7 Feb 1770

References: [1770] EngR 34, (1770) 4 Burr 2527, (1770) 98 ER 327 (B)
Links: Commonlii
Ratio An information for a misdemearior may be amended the day before trial by a single Judge at chambers on hearing both sides aiid without the consent of the defendant.
On setting aside John Wilkes’ outlawry for publishing The North Briton, Lord Mansfield said that the law must be applied even if the heavens fell
This case cites:

  • See Also – John Wilkes, Esq -v- The King HL (Commonlii, [1768] EngR 2, (1768) Wilm 322, (1768) 97 ER 123)
    Mr Wilkes had been accused of making a seditious libel against the King. He had peaded not guilty, but then absconded after his conviction, but before his sentence. . .
  • See Also – John Wilkes -v- The King PC (Commonlii, [1769] EngR 25, (1769) 4 Bro PC 360, (1769) 2 ER 244)
    An information for an offence, is a surmise or suggestion upon record, on behalf of the King, to a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, and is to all intents and purposes the King’s suit; and may be filed by tbe Solicitor General, during a vacancy of the . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – PJS -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd SC (Bailii, [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] WLR(D) 272, WLRD, Bailii Summary)
    The appellants, had applied for restrictions on the publication of stories about extra marital affairs.The Court of Appeal had removed the restrictions on the basis that the story had been widely spread outside the jurisdiction both on the internet . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 29-May-16
Ref: 374207

Reference re : Amendment to the Canadian Constitution; 9 Feb 1982

References: [1982] 2 SCR 791, 1982 CanLII 218 (SCC)
Links: Canlii
Supreme Court of Canada – APPLICATION for leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of Quebec dismissing applicant’s application to intervene relating to a reference ordered by the Government of Quebec. Application dismisse
Last Update: 20-Nov-15 Ref: 554758

Dimes v Lord Cottenham; 2 May 1850

References: [1850] EngR 499 (A), (1850) 5 Exch 311
Links: Commonlii
The Court will not, on the application of the plaintiff, grant a trial at bar merely because the defendant is Lord Chancellor and the plaintiff an attorney of the Court.
This case cites:

  • See Also – Dimes -v- The Company of Proprietors of The Grand Junction Canal CExC ([1846] EngR 55, Commonlii, (1846) 9 QB 469, (1846) 115 ER 1353, [1846] EngR 1072, Commonlii, (1846) 15 Sim 402, (1846) 60 ER 675)
    By a local Act of Parliament a company was incorporated and empowered to purchase certain lands ; and all persons seised, possessed of or interested in those lands were empowered to conveyed their right and interest therein to the company, in the . .
  • See Also – The Grand Junction Canal Company -v- Dimes ([1849] EngR 576, Commonlii, (1849) 12 Beav 63, (1849) 50 ER 984)
    In a suit in which an incorporated company were Plaintiffs, a decree was pronounced by the Vice-Chancellor for England, and was affirmed, on appeal, by the Lord Chancellor. It was afterwards discovered that the Lord Chancellor was a shareholder in . .
  • See Also – The Grand Junction Canal Company -v- Dimes CA ([1850] EngR 242, Commonlii, (1850) 2 Mac & G 285, (1850) 42 ER 110)
    The defendant had been committed for the breach of an injunction which he believed had been unlawfully granted in that the Lord Chancellor, on appeal, had decided in favour of the plaintiff company in which he held shares. The defendant again . .

This case is cited by:

  • See Also – In Re Dimes ([1850] EngR 769, Commonlii, (1850) 3 Mac & G 4, (1850) 42 ER 162)
    The claimant challenged his committal to prison saying that the order was invalid in that although made under an order of the Vice-Chancellor, the warrant had been endorsed with the letters CC.
    Held: Such an endorsement did not mean that the . .
  • See Also – Dimes -v- Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal and others HL ((1852) 3 HL Cas 759, [1852] EngR 789, Commonlii, (1852) 3 HLC 759, (1852) 10 ER 301)
    The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, owned a substantial shareholding in the defendant canal which was an incorporated body. He sat on appeal from the Vice-Chancellor, whose judgment in favour of the company he affirmed. There was an appeal on the . .
  • See Also – Dimes -v- The Proprietors Of The Grand Junction Canal and Others ([1852] EngR 793, Commonlii, (1852) 3 HLC 794, (1852) 10 ER 315)
    The plaintiff had brought an action to recover land. His appeal failed, but the House later decided that the Lord Chancellor who heard the appeal should have disqualified himself, because he held shareholdings in the defendant company, and his . .

Tynes v Barr; 28 Mar 1994

References: (1994) 45 WIR 7, [1994] ICHRL 5
Links: Worldlii
(Supreme Court of the Bahamas) The plaintiff had been wrongfully arrested and humiliated publicly at an airport. He claimed exemplary damages. In assessing the exemplary damages in a court should take account of the injury the plaintiff has endured to his dignity and pride, mental suffering and loss of reputation: ‘Exemplary damages should be awarded in view of the arrogant, abusive and outrageous disregard shown by the police for the law, in particular, their delay in producing documents; the manner in which the defence was conducted; and the fact that liability was not conceded until the sixth and ninth days of the trial and even then with no appropriate apology being offered to the plaintiff. The police should be made aware of the need to observe the requirements as to when they may arrest and detain a person without a warrant and the way in which a person so detained must be humanely treated.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Takitota -v- The Attorney General and Others PC (Bailii, [2009] UKPC 11, 26 BHRC 578)
    Bahamas – The claimant appeald as to the amount of compensation awarded to him for his unlawful detention for over eight years, in appalling prison conditions. The Court of Appeal categorised his treatment not only as ‘less than humane’ but as a . .

Skelton v Collins; 7 Mar 1966

References: (1966) 115 CLR 94, [1966] HCA 14
Links: Austlii
Coram: Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ
(High Court of Australia) Damages – Personal Injuries – Loss of earning capacity – Loss of expectation of life – Loss of amenities during reduced life span – Pain and suffering – Plaintiff rendered permanently unconscious by injuries – Basis of assessment.
Precedent – Decisions of House of Lords – Applicability – High Court – Other Australian courts.
This case is cited by:

  • Followed – Pickett -v- British Rail Engineering HL ([1980] AC 136, Bailii, [1978] UKHL 4)
    The claimant, suffering from mesothelioma, had claimed against his employers and won, but his claim for loss of earnings consequent upon his anticipated premature death was not allowed. He began an appeal, but then died. His personal representatives . .

Regina v Grant; 17 Jul 2009

References: 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 SCR 353, 309 DLR (4th) 1, 245 CCC (3d) 1, 66 CR (6th) 1, 253 OAC 124
Links: Canlii
Coram: McLachlin CJ and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ
Canlii (Supreme Court of Canada) Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Arbitrary detention – Right to counsel – Encounter between accused and police going from general neighbourhood policing to situation where police effectively took control over accused and attempted to elicit incriminating information – Whether police conduct would cause a reasonable person in accused’s position to conclude that he or she was not free to go and had to comply with police demand – Whether accused arbitrarily detained – Whether accused’s right to counsel infringed – Meaning of ‘detention’ in ss. 9 and 10 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Enforcement – Exclusion of evidence – Firearm discovered as result of accused’s statements taken in breach of his right against arbitrary detention and right to counsel – Firearm admitted into evidence at trial and accused convicted of five firearms offences – Whether admission of firearm bringing administration of justice into disrepute – Revised framework for determining whether evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights must be excluded – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 24(2).
Criminal law – Firearms – Possession of firearm for purposes of weapons trafficking – Whether simple movement of firearm from one place to another without changing hands amounts to weapons trafficking – Meaning of ‘transfer’ of weapon for purposes of ss. 84, 99 and 100 of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ambrose -v- Harris, Procurator Fiscal, Oban, etc SC (Bailii, [2011] UKSC 43, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, UKSC 2011/0101, 2011 SLT 1005, [2011] 1 WLR 2435)
    (Scotland) The appellant had variously been convicted in reliance on evidence gathered at different stages before arrest, but in each case without being informed of any right to see a solicitor. The court was asked, as a devolution issue, at what . .

Novello v Toogood; 29 Apr 1823

References: (1823) 1 B and C 554, [1823] EngR 492, (1823) 1 B & C 554, (1823) 107 ER 204
Links: Commonlii
The defendant a British born subject was a music master and teacher of Italian, but was also employed in part as a chorister in the chapel of a foreign ambassador. He rented a large house, subletting parts. He resisted distraint on the premises for non-payment of poor rates.
Held: The appointment as a servant of the foreign ambassador was not sufficient to to protect him from such distraint, at least so far goods were not associated with hs appointment.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina -v- Jones (Margaret), Regina -v- Milling and others HL (Bailii, [2006] UKHL 16, Times 30-Mar-06, [2006] 2 WLR 772, [2006] 2 CAR 9, [2007] 1 AC 136)
    Each defendant sought to raise by way of defence of their various criminal actions, the fact that they were attempting to prevent the commission by the government of the crime of waging an aggressive war in Iraq, and that their acts were accordingly . .
  • Cited – Aziz -v- Aziz and others Rev 1 CA (Bailii, [2007] EWCA Civ 712, Times 17-Jul-07)
    The claimant sought return of recordings and of money paid to the defendant through an alleged fraud or threats. She was the former wife of the Sultan of Brunei and head of state, who now sought an order requiring the court to protect his identity . .

University of Wollongong v Merwally; 22 Nov 1984

References: (1984) 158 CLR 447
Links: Austlii
Coram: Deane J
(High Court of Australia) Deane J said: ‘A parliament may legislate that, for the purposes of the law which it controls, past facts or past laws are to be deemed and treated as having been different to what they were. It cannot however objectively expunge the past or alter the facts of history.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Kleinwort Benson Ltd -v- Lincoln City Council etc HL (Gazette 18-Nov-98, Gazette 10-Feb-99, Times 30-Oct-98, House of Lords, Bailii, [1998] UKHL 38, [1999] 2 AC 349, [1998] 4 All ER 513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095, [1998] Lloyds Rep Bank 387)
    Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap agreements were . .
  • Cited – Hazell -v- Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL ([1992] 2 AC 1, [1991] 2 WLR 372, [1991] 1 All ER 545)
    The authority entered into interest rate swap deals to protect itself against adverse money market movements. They began to lose substantial amounts when interest rates rose, and the district auditor sought a declaration that the contracts were . .

P V Narashimo Rao v State; 17 Apr 1998

References: [1998] INSC 229
Links: LII of India
(Supreme Court of India) Members of Parliament were protected by privilege from prosecution for bribery in respect of voting in parliamentary proceedings.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Chaytor and Others, Regina -v- SC (Bailii, [2010] UKSC 52, Bailli Summary, [2010] WLR (D) 311, WLRD, UKSC 2010/0195, SC Summary, SC, [2011] 1 Cr App R 22, [2010] 3 WLR 1707, [2011] 1 All ER 805)
    The defendants faced trial on charges of false accounting in connection in different ways with their expenses claims whilst serving as members of the House of Commons. They appealed against rejection of their assertion that the court had no . .

Breavington v Godleman; 18 Aug 1988

References: [1988] HCA 40, (1988) 169 CLR 41, (1988) 80 ALR 362, (1988) 62 ALJR 447, (1988) 7 MVR 289
Links: Austlii
Coram: Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ
Austlii (High Court of Australia) – Private International Law – Tort – Negligence – Act committed in Territory – Personal injury – Territory statute imposing limit on amount of damages – Action in State court – No limit on amount of damages under State law – Choice of law – Whether law of place of tortious act or of forum – The Constitution (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12), ss. 118, 122 – Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (N.T.), ss. 4,5 – State and Territorial Laws and Records Recognition Act 1901 (Cth), s. 18.
Federal Jurisdiction – Conflict of laws – Full faith and credit – Whether State court required to give full faith and credit to Territory statute – Whether law of Territory a law of the Commonwealth – Inconsistency – The Constitution (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12), ss. 109, 118 – State and Territorial Laws and Recognition Act 1901 (Cth), s. 18.
Federal Jurisdiction – Action in State court against Commonwealth – Submission to jurisdiction – Whether federal jurisdiction – Whether State choice of law rules apply – The Constitution (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12), ss. 75(iii), 78 – Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss. 39(2), 56, 64, 79.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Roerig -v- Valiant Trawlers Ltd CA ([2002] All ER (D) 234, Bailii, [2002] EWCA Civ 21, [2002] 1 WLR 2304)
    The claimant who was Dutch, was a widow of a fisherman who had died at sea. The question on appeal was ‘in assessing damages for loss of dependency should benefits resulting from the loss be deducted from the damages?’ The claimant’s position under . .
  • Cited – Roerig -v- Valiant Trawlers Ltd CA ([2002] All ER (D) 234, Bailii, [2002] EWCA Civ 21, [2002] 1 WLR 2304)
    The claimant who was Dutch, was a widow of a fisherman who had died at sea. The question on appeal was ‘in assessing damages for loss of dependency should benefits resulting from the loss be deducted from the damages?’ The claimant’s position under . .

Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony; 24 Jul 2009

References: 9 Alta LR (5th) 1, 310 DLR (4th) 193, 2009 SCC 37 (CanLII)
Links: Canlii
Coram: McLachlin CJ and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Rothstein J
Canlii Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Freedom of religion – New regulation requiring photo for all Alberta driver’s licences – Members of Hutterian Brethren sincerely believing that Second Commandment prohibits them from having their photograph willingly taken – Whether regulation infringed freedom of religion – If so, whether infringement justified – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(a) – Operator Licensing and Vehicle Control Regulation, Alta. Reg. 320/2002, s. 14(1)(b) (am. Alta. Reg. 137/2003, s. 3).
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Right to equality – Discrimination based on religion – New regulation requiring photo for all Alberta driver’s licences – Members of Hutterian Brethren sincerely believing that Second Commandment prohibits them from having their photograph willingly taken – Whether regulation infringed right to equality – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15 – Operator Licensing and Vehicle Control Regulation, Alta. Reg. 320/2002, s. 14(1)(b) (am. Alta. Reg. 137/2003, s. 3).
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Bank Mellat -v- Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) SC (Bailii Summary, WLRD, Bailii, [2013] UKSC 39, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep FC 580, [2013] 3 WLR 179, [2013] HRLR 30, [2013] 4 All ER 533, [2013] WLR(D) 244, WLRD, UKSC 2011/0040, SC Sumary, SC)
    The bank challenged measures taken by HM Treasury to restrict access to the United Kingdom’s financial markets by a major Iranian commercial bank, Bank Mellat, on the account of its alleged connection with Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic . .

Tse Wai Chun Paul v Albert Cheng; 13 Nov 2000

References: [2001] EMLR 777, [2000] 3 HKLRD 418, [2000] HKCFA 35
Links: hklii
Coram: Chief Justice Li, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Sir Denys Roberts NPJ and Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead NPJ
(Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong) For the purposes of the defence to defamation of fair comment: ‘The comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, what are the facts on which the comment is being made. The reader or hearer should be in a position to judge for himself how far the comment was well founded’ and
‘The purpose for which the defence of fair comment exists is to facilitate freedom of expression by commenting upon matters of public interest. This accords with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. And it is in the public interest that everyone should be free to express his own, honestly held views on such matters, subject always to the safeguards provided by the objective limits mentioned above. These safeguards ensure that defamatory comments can be seen for what they are, namely, comments as distinct from statements of fact. They also ensure that those reading the comments have the material enabling them to make up their own minds on whether they agree or disagree’.
The defence of honest comment is available even if the comment was made with intent to injure, as where a politician seeks to damage his political opponent.
The comment must be on a matter of public interest, recognisable as comment, be based on true or privileged facts, indicate the facts on which the comment is based, and ‘must be one which could have been made by an honest person, however prejudiced he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views.’
This case cites:

  • Cited – Myerson -v- Smith’s Weekly ((1923) 24 SR (NSW) 20)
    (New South Wales) The court considered the distinction between fact and comment. Ferguson J said: ‘To say that a man’s conduct was dishonourable is not comment, it is a statement of fact. To say that he did certain specific things and that his . .
  • Cited – Gardiner -v- Fairfax ((1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171)
    Complaint was made that the plaintiff had been libelled in the defendant’s book review.
    Held: A publication is defamatory in nature if it ‘is likely to cause ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in general, to think the less of [the . .
  • Cited – London Artists Ltd -v- Littler CA ([1969] 2 QB 375, [1968] 1 WLR 607, Bailii, [1968] EWCA Civ 3, [1969] 2 All ER 193)
    The defence of fair comment on matters of public interest is not to be defined too closely. Lord Denning MR said: ‘Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going . .
  • Cited – Kemsley -v- Foot HL ([1952] AC 345)
    The plaintiff alleged that the headline to an article written by the defendant which criticised the behaviour of the Beaverbrook Press, and which read ‘Lower than Hemsley’ was defamatory. The defendant pleaded fair comment.
    Held: The article . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Keays -v- Guardian Newspapers Limited, Alton, Sarler QBD (Bailii, [2003] EWHC 1565 (QB))
    The claimant asserted defamation by the defendant. The parties sought a decision on whether the article at issue was a comment piece, in which case the defendant could plead fair comment, or one asserting fact, in which case that defence would not . .
  • Cited – Panday -v- Gordon PC (Bailii, [2005] UKPC 36, PC)
    (Trinidad and Tobago) A senior politician had accused an opponent of pseudo-racism. The defendant asserted that he had a defence under the constitution, allowing freedom of political speech.
    Held: The appeal failed. The statements were . .
  • Cited – Lowe -v- Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD ([2006] 3 All ER 357, Bailii, [2006] EWHC 320 (QB), Times 29-Mar-06, [2007] QB 580)
    The defendant sought to defend the claim for defamation by claiming fair comment. The claimant said that the relevant facts were not known to the defendant at the time of the publication.
    Held: To claim facts in aid of a defence of fair . .
  • Cited – Associated Newspapers Ltd -v- Burstein CA (Bailii, [2007] EWCA Civ 600, [2007] EMLR 21, [2007] EMLR 571, [2007] 4 All ER 319, [2001] 1 WLR 579)
    The newspaper appealed an award of damages for defamation after its theatre critic’s review of an opera written by the claimant. The author said the article made him appear to sympathise with terrorism.
    Held: The appeal succeeded. Keene LJ . .
  • Cited – Blackwell -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd and others QBD (Bailii, [2007] EWHC 3098 (QB))
    The claimant sought damages saying that a newspaper article published by the defendant was defamatory. He was the manager of Leeds United Football club, and was said to have lost the dressing room.
    Held: The claimant was entitled to summary . .
  • Cited – CC -v- AB QBD (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB), [2007] EMLR 11, [2007] Fam Law 591, [2007] 2 FLR 301)
    The claimant sought an order to prevent the defendant and others from making it known that the claimant had had an adulterous relationship with the defendant’s wife. . .
  • Cited – Thornton -v- Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD (Bailii, [2009] EWHC 2863 (QB))
    The claimant sought damages for an article in the defendant’s newspaper, a review of her book which said she had falsely claimed to have interviewed artists including the review author and that the claimant allowed interviewees control over what was . .
  • Limited – Spiller and Another -v- Joseph and Others SC (Bailii, [2010] UKSC 53, UKSC 2009/0210, SC Summary, SC, [2010] WLR (D) 310, WLRD, [2010] 3 WLR 1791, Bailii Summary, [2011] 1 All ER 947, [2011] ICR 1, [2011] EMLR 11)
    The defendants had published remarks on its website about the reliability of the claimant. When sued in defamation, they pleaded fair comment, but that was rejected by the Court of Appeal.
    Held: The defendants’ appeal succeeded, and the fair . .

President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union; 4 Jun 1999

References: [1999] ZACC 9, [1999] 4 SA 147
Links: SAFLii
Constitutional Court of South Africa – The court considered an allegation of bias in the judge, it being said that they should have recused themselves: ‘The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the judges to administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath by reason of their training ad experience. It must be assumed that they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions. They must take into account the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they are not obliged to recuse themselves. At the same time it must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are reasonable grounds on the part of a litigant for apprehending that the judicial officer, for whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – O’Neill -v- Her Majesty’s Advocate No 2 SC (Bailii, [2013] UKSC 36, [2013] 2 Cr App R 34, [2013] HRLR 25, [2013] 1 WLR 1992, 2013 SCL 678, 2013 SLT 888, 2013 GWD 21-410, [2013] WLR(D) 231, 2013 SCCR 401, WLRD, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2012/0149, SC Summary, SC)
    The appellants had been convicted of murder, it being said that they had disposed of her body at sea. They now said that the delay between being first questioned and being charged infringed their rights to a trial within a reasonable time, and . .

Chamberlains v Lai; 11 Sep 2006

References: [2006] NZSC 70
Links: Nzlii
Coram: Elias CJ
NZLII Supreme Court of New Zealand) [1] Access to the courts for vindication of legal right is part of the rule of law. Immunity from legal suit where there is otherwise a cause of action is exceptional. Immunity may be given by statute, as in New Zealand in respect of personal injuries where other, exclusive, redress is provided. An immunity may attach to status, such as of diplomats or heads of state. All cases of immunity require justification in some public policy sufficient to outweigh the public policy in vindication of legal right.
[2] Public policy is not static. So, for example, the immunities of the Crown have been progressively rolled back in response to changing attitudes as to where the public interest lies. And the wide immunity at common law for states and heads of state has been restricted and modified by modern legislation and judicial decisions, often under the influence of developing international law.
[3] The present appeal raises the question whether public policy justifies retention of a limited common law immunity for legal practitioners from claims by their clients for professional negligence. In principle, all who undertake to give skilled advice are under a duty to use reasonable care and skill. An immunity which shields legal practitioners from liability for breach of that duty is anomalous. No other professional group is immune from liability for breach of duties of care they owe to those they advise, treat or represent.
[4] The existing immunity, which attaches to court representation and work ‘intimately connected’ with it, was not clearly established as a matter of New Zealand law until the 1973 Court of Appeal decision in Rees v Sinclair. Rees v Sinclair applied the 1967 decision of the House of Lords in Rondel v Worsley. The immunity recognised in Rondel v Worsley was also adopted in the same form in Australia. No such sweeping immunity is known in Canada or in the United States federal jurisdiction.
[5] Rondel v Worsley has been controversial. Eleven years after it was decided, Lord Diplock in Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co expressed regret that the argument in that case had not extended to:
. . a more radical submission that the immunity of the advocate, whether barrister or solicitor, for liability for negligence even for what he says or does in court ought no longer to be upheld.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Jones -v- Kaney SC (135 Con LR 1, [2011] 2 WLR 823, [2011] BLR 283, [2011] 2 AC 398, [2011] 14 EG 95, [2011] 2 All ER 671, Bailii, [2011] UKSC 13, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, UKSC 2010/0034)
    An expert witness admitted signing a joint report but without agreeing to it. The claimant who had lost his case now pursued her in negligence. The claimant appealed against a finding that the expert witness was immune from action.
    Held: The . .

RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General); 21 Sep 1995

References: [1995] 3 SCR 199, 1995 CanLII 64 (SCC), 127 DLR (4th) 1, 100 CCC (3d) 449, 62 CPR (3d) 417, 31 CRR (2d) 189
Links: Canlii
Coram: Lamer CJ and La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ
Supreme Court of Canada – Constitutional law — Division of powers — Charter of Rights — Freedom of expression — Commercial advertising — Cigarette advertising banned — Whether or not legislation validly enacted under criminal law power or under peace, order and good government clause — If so, whether or not Act’s provisions infringing s. 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression — If so, whether or not infringements justifiable under s. 1 — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(b) –Constitution Act, 1867, Preamble, s. 91(27) — Tobacco Products Control Act, S.C. 1988, c. 20, ss. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Bank Mellat -v- Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) SC (Bailii Summary, WLRD, Bailii, [2013] UKSC 39, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep FC 580, [2013] 3 WLR 179, [2013] HRLR 30, [2013] 4 All ER 533, [2013] WLR(D) 244, WLRD, UKSC 2011/0040, SC Sumary, SC)
    The bank challenged measures taken by HM Treasury to restrict access to the United Kingdom’s financial markets by a major Iranian commercial bank, Bank Mellat, on the account of its alleged connection with Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic . .

Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students – British Columbia Component; 10 Jul 2009

References: [2009] 2 SCR 295, 309 DLR (4th) 277, 2009 SCC 31, [2009] 8 WWR 385, 272 BCAC 29, 389 NR 98, 93 BCLR (4th) 1, EYB 2009-161351, JE 2009-1320, [2009] SCJ No 31 (QL), 179 ACWS (3d) 98, 192 CRR (2d) 336
Links: Canlii
Coram: McLachlin CJ and Bastarache,* Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ
Canlii Supreme Court of Canada – Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Application of Charter – Transit authorities’ advertising policies permitting commercial but not political advertising on public transit vehicles – Actions brought alleging that transit authorities’ policies violated freedom of expression – Whether entities which operate public transit systems ‘government’ within meaning of s. 32 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Freedom of expression – Advertisements on buses – Transit authorities’ advertising policies permitting commercial but not political advertising on public transit vehicles – Whether advertising policies infringing freedom of expression – If so, whether infringement can be justified – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(b).
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Reasonable limits prescribed by law – Transit authorities’ advertising policies permitting commercial but not political advertising on public transit vehicles – Policies infringing freedom of expression -Whether policies are ‘law’ within meaning of s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Remedy – Transit authorities’ advertising policies permitting commercial but not political advertising on public transit vehicles – Policies unjustifiably infringing freedom of expression – Declaration that policies are of ‘no force or effect’ sought – Whether declaration ought to be based on s. 52 of Constitution Act, 1982 or s. 24(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Whether policies are ‘law’ within meaning of s. 52 of Constitution Act, 1982.

Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union; 27 Jun 1991

References: [1991] 2 SCR 211, 1991 CanLII 68 (SCC)
Links: Canlii
Coram: Wilson, La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin JJ
Canlii Supreme Court of Canada – Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Application – Union entering into collective agreement with community college containing mandatory dues check-off clause – Employee objecting to expenditure of union dues on causes unrelated to collective bargaining – Whether Charter applies – Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 74, s. 53 – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 32(1).
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Freedom of association – Union entering into collective agreement with community college containing mandatory dues check-off clause – Employee objecting to expenditure of union dues on causes unrelated to collective bargaining – Whether s. 2(d) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms infringed – If so, whether infringement justifiable under s. 1 of Charter – Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 74, ss. 51, 52, 53.
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Freedom of expression – Union entering into collective agreement with community college containing mandatory dues check-off clause – Employee objecting to expenditure of union dues on causes unrelated to collective bargaining – Whether s. 2(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms infringed – If so, whether infringement justifiable under s. 1 of Charter – Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 74, ss. 51, 52, 53.
Wilson J observed: ‘The Oakes inquiry into ‘rational connection’ between objectives and means to attain them requires nothing more than showing that the legitimate and important goals of the legislature are logically furthered by the means government has chosen to adopt.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Bank Mellat -v- Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) SC (Bailii Summary, WLRD, Bailii, [2013] UKSC 39, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep FC 580, [2013] 3 WLR 179, [2013] HRLR 30, [2013] 4 All ER 533, [2013] WLR(D) 244, WLRD, UKSC 2011/0040, SC Sumary, SC)
    The bank challenged measures taken by HM Treasury to restrict access to the United Kingdom’s financial markets by a major Iranian commercial bank, Bank Mellat, on the account of its alleged connection with Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic . .

Clayton v Heffron; 17 Oct 1960

References: (1960) 105 CLR 214
Links: Austilii
Coram: Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer JJ
(High Court of Australia) An Act was proposed to be introduced by the legislature to amend the constitution of New South Wales by abolishing the Legislative Council. There would be required first a vote in favour of that in a referendum. The proposed Act was to be passed under a procedure in s.5B of the New South Wales Constitution Act 1902-1956, whereby legislation could be enacted ultimately without the consent of the Legislative Council. S.5B had been introduced into the New South Wales Constitution by an enactment of the New South Wales legislature under s.5 of the Constitution Act which went: ‘The Legislature shall, subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, have power to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales in all cases whatsoever.’
Held: The Act was effective.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina on the Application of Jackson and others -v- HM Attorney General CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 126, Times 17-Feb-05)
    The applicant asserted that the 2004 Act was invalid having been passed under the procedure in the 1949 Act, reducing the period by which the House of Lords could delay legislation; the 1949 Act was invalid, being delegated legislation, had used the . .
  • Cited – Jackson and others -v- Attorney General HL (House of Lords, [2005] UKHL 56, Times 14-Oct-05, Bailii, [2006] 1 AC 262, [2005] 2 WLR 87)
    The applicant sought to challenge the 2004 Hunting Act, saying that it had been passed under the provisions of the 1949 Parliament Act which was itself an unlawful extension of the powers given by the 1911 Parliament Act to allow the House of . .

Davis v Beason, Sheriff; 3 Feb 1890

References: 133 US 333 (1890), 33 L Ed 637, 10 SCt 299
Links: Worldlii
Coram: Field J
United States Supreme Court. The defendant claimed that the First Amendment insulated from civil punishment certain practices inspired or motivated by religious beliefs.
Held: The assetion failed: ‘It was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society.’ The Court adopted a strictly theistic definition of religion.
This case is cited by:

Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem; 30 Jun 2004

References: (2004) 241 DLR (4th) 1, [2004] 2 SCR 551
Links: Canlii
Coram: McLachlin CJ and Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel, Deschamps and Fish JJ
Canlii (Supreme Court of Canada) Civil rights – Freedom of religion — Definition of freedom of religion — Exercise of religious freedoms — Orthodox Jews setting up succahs in pursuit of their religious beliefs on balconies of their co-owned property — Syndicate of co-owners requesting removal of succahs because declaration of co-ownership prohibits decorations, alterations and constructions on balconies — Whether freedom of religion infringed by declaration of co-ownership — If so, whether refusal to permit setting up of succahs justified by reliance on right to enjoy property and right to personal security — Whether Orthodox Jewish residents waived their right to freedom of religion by signing declaration of co-ownership — Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, ss. 1, 3, 6. Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of religion — Definition of freedom of religion — Proper approach for freedom of religion analyses — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(a).
The court is concerned to ensure that an assertion of religious belief before it is made in good faith: ‘neither fictitious, nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina -v- Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson and others HL (House of Lords, [2005] UKHL 15, Bailii, Times 25-Feb-05, [2005] 2 WLR 590, [2005] 2 AC 246, [2005] 2 All ER 1, [2005] ELR 291, [2005] 2 FLR 374, [2005] 1 FCR 498)
    The appellants were teachers in Christian schools who said that the blanket ban on corporal punishment interfered with their religious freedom. They saw moderate physical discipline as an essential part of educating children in a Christian manner. . .
  • Cited – Shergill and Others -v- Khaira and Others SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 33, [2014] 3 WLR 1, [2014] WLR(D) 263, Bailii Summary, WLRD, UKSC 2012/0234, SC Summary, SC, [2014] PTSR 907, [2014] WTLR 1729, [2014] 3 All ER 243)
    The parties disputed the trusts upon which three Gurdwaras (Sikh Temples) were held. The Court of Appeal had held that the issues underlying the dispute were to be found in matters of the faith of the Sikh parties, and had ordered a permanent stay. . .

Sauve v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer); 31 Oct 2002

References: 218 DLR (4th) 577, 168 CCC (3d) 449, 5 CR (6th) 203, 294 NR 1, JE 2002-1974, [2002] SCJ No 66 (QL), 117 ACWS (3d) 553, [2002] ACS no 66, 55 WCB (2d) 21, 98 CRR (2d) 1, [2002] 3 SCR 519, 2002 SCC 68 (CanLII)
Links: Canlii
Coram: McLachlin CJ and L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.
Canlii Supreme Court of Canada – Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Right to vote – Prisoners – Canada Elections Act provision disqualifying persons imprisoned in correctional institution serving sentences of two years or more from voting in federal elections – Crown conceding that provision infringes right to vote – Whether infringement justified – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 3 – Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e).
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Equality rights – Prisoners – Canada Elections Act provision disqualifying persons imprisoned in correctional institution serving sentences of two years or more from voting in federal elections – Whether provision infringes equality rights – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15(1) – Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e).
Elections – Disqualifications of electors – Prisoners – Canada Elections Act provision disqualifying persons imprisoned in correctional institution serving sentences of two years or more from voting in federal elections – Whether provision constitutional – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 3, 15(1) – Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e).
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Chester, Regina (on The Application of) -v- Secretary of State for Justice SC (Bailii, [2013] UKSC 63, [2014] 1 AC 271, [2014] HRLR 3, [2013] 3 WLR 1076, [2014] 1 All ER 683, [2013] WLR(D) 392, [2014] 1 CMLR 45, 2014 SC (UKSC) 25, 2014 SLT 143, 2013 GWD 34-676, WLRD, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2012/0151, SC Summary, SC)
    The two applicants were serving life sentences for murder. Each sought damages for the unlawful withdrawal of their rights to vote in elections, and the failure of the British parliament to take steps to comply with the judgment.
    Held: The . .

Steele, Ford, and Newton v Crown Prosecution Service and Another Etc (Consolidated Appeals): HL 28 May 1993

References: Independent 10-Jun-1993, Times 28-May-1993, [1994] 1 AC 22, [1993] 2 All ER 769
The Court of Appeal Civil Division has no power to make an award of costs out of central funds. The court referred to: ‘the special constitutional convention which jealously safeguards the exclusive control exercised by Parliament over the levying and the expenditure of the public revenue’.

Regina (Javed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another etc: CA 24 May 2001

References: Times 24-May-2001, Gazette 21-Jun-2001, [2002] QB 129
The fact that subordinate legislation had been enacted by affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament, did not make a decision made under that regulation immune from challenge in the courts. The question of whether a country was in general safe, was a matter of fact and for rational judgement. The Secretary made the decision, and a challenge was to that decision, and not to Parliament. It was possible that the applicants might bring sufficient evidence to show that a large part of the general population of Pakistan was not safe. If that was established then the court would have power to set aside a designation made by the Secretary under the Act.
Statutes: Asylum (Designated Countries of Destination and Designated Safe Countries) Order 1996 No 2671
This case is cited by: