Category: Adoption

X (Adopted Child: Access To Court File): FC 9 Sep 2014

The applicant’s father had been adopted. Both he and the adopting parents had since died. The applicant now sought disclosure of the records to reveal her the court record of her father’s adoption order.
Held: The order should be made.

Sir James Munby P FD
[2014] EWFC 33
Bailii, Jud
Adoption and Children Act 2002 79(4)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Re H (Adoption: Disclosure of Information ) 1995
An application was made by the sister of an adopted child for disclosure of the records held in order to allow her to make contact and to warn her of the fact that she might have an inherited genetic disease.
Held: The jurisdiction to grant . .
Cited – D v Registrar General 1997
The court considered the procedure to be followed in applications for disclosure to other family members of information held by the Registrar to allow them to contact the adopted child. . .
Cited – FL v Registrar General FD 24-May-2010
The claimant sought disclosure of information held by the respondent as to the identities of her pre-adoptive natural parents. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, Information, Administrative

Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.536476

Oxfordshire County Council v X and Others: CA 27 May 2010

The LA, the guardian and adoptive parents appealed against an order that they should provide to the parents an annual photograph of the child. They contended that an image should only be made available to be viewed at the authority’s offices annually.
Held: The order was discharged. The judge had erred in law in reaching his decision, which was ex tempore, and the appeal court was free to look at it again.
Lord Neuberger MR said: ‘it will not usually be in the best interests of an adopted child to impose on her adoptive parents an obligation in relation to contact which they are unwilling to agree to. Indeed, the imposition of such an obligation is extremely unusual.’ The judge had not made reference to this in his judgment.
The judge’s task was to apply the 1989 Act checklist against the background of the jurisprudence. The question for him was not whether provision of photographs would create or increase the risk of the natural parents tracing the child. The essential question was whether the adoptive parents’ fear of such a risk was unreasonable in the sense that it had no reasonable basis.
‘The judge was required to consider what was in the best interests of the child, as the paramount consideration, in accordance with section 1 of the 1989 Act. It is beyond argument that the welfare of so young a child in the early stages of her adoption depended upon the stability and security of her new parents, the adoptive parents. To undermine that stability by fuelling or failing to heed their fears that their daughter’s natural parents might seek to trace her is to damage her welfare.’

Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury MR, Moses LJ, Munby LJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 581, [2010] 2 FCR 355, [2010] Fam Law 790
Bailii
Adoption and Children Act 2002 46(2)(a) 67(1), Children Act 1989 193)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Re C (A Minor) (Adoption Order: Conditions) HL 1988
The House considered the question of conditions to be applied to any continued contact with a child after adoption. Lord Ackner said: ‘The cases rightly stress that in normal circumstances it is desirable that there should be a complete break, but . .
Cited – Re J (Adoption: Non-Patrial) CA 1998
The court considered an adoption in Pakistan which was valid in Pakistan but would not be recognised here. The natural father and the adoptive father were from the same family. The adoptive parents were unable to have a children of their own, and . .
Cited – G v G (Minors: Custody appeal) CA 1985
A court should take great care before setting aside a decision of a judge which had involved the exercise of a judicial discretion. The court considered the duty of an appellate court in a children case: ‘What this court should seek to do is to . .
Cited – Piglowska v Piglowski HL 24-Jun-1999
No Presumption of House for both Parties
When looking to the needs of parties in a divorce, there is no presumption that both parties are to be left able to purchase alternative homes. The order of sub-clauses in the Act implies nothing as to their relative importance. Courts should be . .
Cited – In Re T (Minors) (Adopted Children: Contact) CA 8-Aug-1995
A half-sister had been assured that when her half-sister was adopted she would be given annual reports as to her progress. No report was provided. When she enquired and complained, she was told that the adopters had changed their minds and that it . .
Cited – In Re T (A Minor) (Contact Order); In Re T (Adoption: Contact) CA 13-Jan-1995
A contact order which was not strictly necessary should not be made in adoption proceedings. Arrangements for contact should not be ‘imposed’ upon the adoptive parents but should be ‘left to their good sense so that they could be trusted to do what . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.416165

In re D (An Infant) (Adoption: Parent’s Consent): HL 1977

The father opposed adoption of a child by the mother and her new husband. The House was asked whether his opposition was unreasonable.
Held: Lord Wilberforce said: ‘What, in my understanding, is required is for the court to ask whether the decision, actually made by the father in his individual circumstances, is, by an objective standard, reasonable or unreasonable. This involves considering how a father in the circumstances of the actual father, but (hypothetically) endowed with a mind and temperament capable of making reasonable decisions, would approach a complex question involving a judgment as to the present and as to the future and the probable impact of these upon a child.’

Lord Wilberforce
[1977] AC 602
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Re C (a Minor) (Adoption: Parental Agreement: Contact) CA 1993
Where adoption is to be considered against the will of the parent, the court should recognise when asking whether the opposition was unreasonable that the test is objective and supposes that this person is endowed with a mind and temperament capable . .
Cited – Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust and Another v H and Another HL 12-Jul-2006
The House considered when adoption law would allow an adoption without the consent of the birth parent where there had been some continuing contact between that parent and the child.
Held: (Baroness Hale dissenting) The appeal against the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption

Leading Case

Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.243093

Hand and Another v George: ChD 17 Mar 2017

Adopted grandchildren entitled to succession

The court was asked whether the adopted children whose adopting father, the son of the testator, were grandchildren of the testator for the purposes of his will.
Held: The claim succeeded. The defendants, the other beneficiaries were not entitled to inherit the part of their father’s estate that derived from the will. The court had to respect the claimants’ Convention right under article 14 in conjunction with article 8 of the Convention not to be discriminated against by the application of a legislative provision which caused the ambiguous reference in the testator’s will to his grandchildren to be construed as excluding them as his adopted grandchildren: ‘to apply the HRA in combination with the wording of the will is not, in my judgment, truly a retrospective application of the HRA. Following the coming into force of the HRA, if the question of whether a beneficiary in the will has children or not arises for consideration, that question must be addressed having regard to the HRA as well as having regard to the wording of the will. Under domestic legislation, the answer is that the adopted children are not included. But that must now be read in a way which is compliant with the rights that adopted children have not to be discriminated against by domestic legislation because of their adopted status.’

Rose J
[2017] EWHC 533 (Ch), [2017] WLR(D) 198, [2017] 3 WLR 559, [2017] 2 FLR 1565, [2017] WTLR 495, [2017] Ch 449
Bailii, WLRD
European Convention of Human Rights 8 14, Adoption of Children Act 1926, Adoption of Children Act 1949, Adoption Act 1976, Adoption and Children Act 2002
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Marckx v Belgium ECHR 13-Jun-1979
Recognition of illegitimate children
The complaint related to the manner in which parents were required to adopt their own illegitimate child in order to increase his rights. Under Belgian law, no legal bond between an unmarried mother and her child results from the mere fact of birth. . .
Cited – Larkos v Cyprus ECHR 18-Feb-1999
The applicant had rented a house from the government, but was ordered to vacate the house following revocation of his tenancy. Because he had been a tenant of the government he was not, under domestic law, entitled to the security which he would . .
Cited – Mazurek v France ECHR 1-Feb-2000
ECHR Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 14+P1-1; Not necessary to examine Art. 14+8; Pecuniary damage – financial award; Non-pecuniary damage – financial award; Costs and expenses partial . .
Cited – Wilson v First County Trust (2) CA 2-May-2001
Rules under the Act which precluded a party from any recovery for non-compliance with its provisions were disproportionate, and a denial of the human right of the lender to a fair trial, and a declaration of incompatibility was made. A pawnbroker’s . .
Cited – Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) HL 10-Jul-2003
The respondent appealed against a finding that the provision which made a loan agreement completely invalid for lack of compliance with the 1974 Act was itself invalid under the Human Rights Act since it deprived the respondent of its property . .
Cited – Pla and Puncernau v Andorra ECHR 13-Jul-2004
A will made by a widow in 1939, left certain property to her son Francesc-Xavier, as tenant for life, with a stipulation that he was to leave this inheritance to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage, failing which the estate was to . .
Cited – Fabris v France [GC] ECHR 7-Feb-2013
ECHR (Grand Chamber) Article 14
Discrimination
Difference in treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children for succession purposes: violation
Facts – The applicant was born in 1943 of a . .
Cited – Secretary of State for Social Security v Tunnicliffe CA 1991
Staughton LJ explained the presumption against interpretation of a statute to have retrospective effect: ‘the true principle is that Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner . .
Cited – In re McKerr (Northern Ireland) HL 11-Mar-2004
The deceased had been shot by soldiers of the British Army whilst in a car in Northern Ireland. The car was alleged to have ‘run’ a checkpoint. The claimants said the investigation, now 20 years ago, had been inadequate. The claim was brought under . .
Cited – Horsham Properties Group Ltd v Clark and Another ChD 8-Oct-2008
The court was asked whether section 101 of the 1925 Act infringes the Convention rights of residential mortgagors by allowing mortgagees to overreach the mortgagor by selling the property out of court, without first obtaining a court order either . .
Cited – Horncastle and Others, Regina v SC 9-Dec-2009
Each defendant said they had not received a fair trial in that the court had admitted written evidence of a witness he had not been allowed to challenge. The witnesses had been victims, two of whom had died before trial. It was suggested that the . .
Cited – Re Erskine 1948 Trust ChD 29-Mar-2012
The trust was created in 1948, and provided gifts over, which had now failed. The court considered the construction of the term ‘stautory next of kin’. The possible beneficiaries claimed through being adopted, arguing that at the date of the last . .
Cited – Abbott v Minister for Lands PC 30-Mar-1895
(From the Supreme Court for New South Wales) When considering what was a ‘vested right’ for the purposes of applying the presumption against retrospectivity of statutes affecting such rights, to convert a mere right existing in the members of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Wills and Probate, Adoption, Human Rights

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.581328

Warwickshire County Council v M and others: CA 1 Nov 2007

The judge had granted the mother leave to apply for revocation of placement orders. The authority appealed. The mother argued that once a change of circumstances was shown, the court was obliged to give leave to apply.
Held: The judge was not so obliged, but instead had a discretion whether to grant leave to apply. In exercising that discretion, for some reason unknown, parliament had provided that the child’s interests were not paramount. Nevertheless, because of his mistake the judge had not investigated whether to grant leave. The Court now did so, and allowing the authority’s appeal, refused the mother leave.
Wilson LJ said: ‘The judge went on to observe, however, that, were an application for leave to have been issued but not to have been disposed of, it would normally be good practice for a local authority either to agree not to place the child until its disposal or at least to agree to give notice, say of 14 days, to the applicant of any proposed placement. In this regard I also agree with him. Given such notice, the applicant might perhaps be able either to take steps to challenge the lawfulness of the decision to place at that juncture or, probably more easily, to seek an expedited hearing of the application for leave, from which might flow, in the fine, developing tradition of collaboration between local authorities and courts, a short further agreed moratorium on placement until the hearing.’

Thorpe LJ, Dyson LJ, Wilson LJ
[2007] EWCA Civ 1084, Times 21-Dec-2007, [2008] 1 WLR 991, [2008] 1 FLR 1093, [2007] WLR (D) 286
Bailii
Adoption and Children Act 2002 24
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – In re F (A Child) (Placement Order); C v East Sussex County Council (Adoption) CA 1-May-2008
The father sought to revoke a freeing order. He said that the social workers had conspired to exclude him from the process. The child was born of a casual relationship, and at first he was unaware of the proceedings. On learning of them he sought to . .
Cited – In re G (A Child) (Special guardianship order: Application to discharge) CA 10-Feb-2010
The mother had failed in her application to have set aside a special guardianship order made in favour of the child’s grandmother. The judge had held that the change in her circumstances was not significant.
Held: Her appeal succeeded. The . .
Cited – Re A (A Minor), Re TL v Coventry City Council; CC v A, by her Children’s Guardian CA 21-Dec-2007
The foster mother of a baby promptly indicated a wish to adopt her. Following four months of assessment Coventry informed her that, for reasons which she wished to challenge, her adoption of the baby would be unsuitable. Three days prior to so . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.260143

Soderback v Sweden: ECHR 28 Oct 1998

ECHR Sweden – adoption of a child granted to mother’s husband, without the consent of the natural father (Chapter 4, section 6, of the Parental Code)
ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
Not disputed that there existed certain ties between the applicant father and his daughter M. – in the light of this, and bearing in mind that the parties’ arguments centred on issue of compliance with Article 8, the Court proposed to proceed on the basis that it was applicable – on this assumption, the adoption order amounted to an interference with his right to respect for family life under Article 8-1.
Not doubted that adoption ‘in accordance with the law’ and pursued legitimate aim of protecting child’s rights and freedoms – it remained to be considered whether it was ‘necessary in a democratic society’.
While adoption in the present case, like the contested measures in the Johansen v. Norway case, had the legal effect of totally depriving the applicant of family life with his daughter, the context differed significantly – accordingly, it was inappropriate in the present case to apply the approach employed in the Johansen judgment.
Furthermore, during the period under consideration, the contacts between the applicant and the child had been infrequent and limited in character and when the adoption was granted he had not seen her for quite some time.
Moreover, when the adoption was granted by the District Court in December 1989, de facto family ties had existed between the mother and the adoptive father for five and a half years, until they married in January 1989, and between him and M. for six and a half years – the adoption had consolidated and formalised those ties.
Against this background, the decision fell within the margin of appreciation – given the aims sought to be achieved by allowing the adoption to go ahead, it could not be said that adverse effects on applicant’s relations with the child had been disproportionate.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).

24484/94, [1998] ECHR 103, [1999] 1 FLR 250, [1999] Fam LR 104, [1999] Fam Law 87, (2000) 29 EHRR 95, [1998] HRCD 958
Worldlii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8
Human Rights
Cited by:
Approved – In re P (A Child) CA 15-Aug-2014
The court considered the proper approach to a proposed step-parent adoption. The step-father now appealed against refusal of an order.
Held: The application succeeded. When the adoption application was considered, the court had to be satisfied . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Adoption

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.165689

Re D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality): HL 1 Sep 1995

The House considered whether it was right for a tribunal to see and rely upon papers not disclosed to the parties. Lord Mustill said: ‘a first principle of fairness that each party to a judicial process shall have an opportunity to answer by evidence and argument any adverse material which the tribunal may take into account when forming its opinion. This principle is lame if the party does not know the substance of what is said against him (or her), for what he does not know he cannot answer.’ and ‘It is a fundamental principle of fairness that a party is entitled to the disclosure of all materials which may be taken into account by the court when reaching a decision adverse to that party.’

Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
[1996] AC 593, [1995] UKHL 17, [1996] 1 FCR 205, [1995] 3 WLR 483, [1995] 4 All ER 385, [1995] 2 FLR 687, [1996] Fam Law 8
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – In Re D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality) CA 8-Dec-1994
A guardian ad litem’s promise of confidentiality to a child can broken by a court, and the guardian must be careful in making such promises. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Roberts v Parole Board HL 7-Jul-2005
Balancing Rights of Prisoner and Society
The appellant had been convicted of the murder of three police officers in 1966. His tariff of thirty years had now long expired. He complained that material put before the Parole Board reviewing has case had not been disclosed to him.
Held: . .
Cited – Chief Constable and Another v YK and Others FD 6-Oct-2010
cc_ykFD10
The court gave directions in Forced Marriage Protection order applications. An order had been made at the request of the police on behalf of A, and the court had declined to discharge it on A’s own application.
Held: Special advocates were not . .
Cited – In re A (A Child) SC 12-Dec-2012
A woman, X, had made an allegation in confidence she had been sexually assaulted as a child. The court was asked whether that confidence could be overriden to allow an investigation to protect if necessary a child still living with the man. Evidence . .
Cited – Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 1) SC 19-Jun-2013
Closed Material before Supreme Court
Under the 2009 order, the appellant Bank had been effectively shut down as to its operations within the UK. It sought to use the appeal procedure, and now objected to the use of closed material procedure. The Supreme Court asked itself whether it . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, Natural Justice

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.228360

X and Y v United Kingdom: ECHR 1978

(Commission) A boy of 14, X’s nephew, was adopted under Indian law by two Sikhs, who were UK citizens. He was 14 years when adopted. He had been denied entry clearance into the UK on the grounds that, even if the adoption was valid according to Indian law, there had been no genuine transfer of parental responsibility to X, since Y’s natural parents were able to care for him. The Commission rejected the applicants’ complaint under article 8 because: ‘This adoption is neither recognised nor eligible for recognition in English law. The first applicant has apparently since made financial contributions towards the upkeep of the second applicant. However, throughout his life, both before and after the adoption, he has lived with his natural parents in India. It appears that they have been and are fully capable of supporting him. In these circumstances the applicants have not, in the Commission’s opinion, established a relationship between them which amounted at any material time to ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8, notwithstanding their blood relationship and any legal relationship created under Indian law by the adoption. The Commission does not consider that the second applicant’s relationship with the first applicant is at all comparable to that of a new-born child with its parents, where ‘family life’ might be held to exist from the moment of birth.’

(1978) 12 DR 32, [1977] ECHR 3
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – Singh v Entry Clearance Officer New Delhi CA 30-Jul-2004
The applicant, an 8 year old boy, became part of his Indian family who lived in England, through an adoption recognised in Indian Law, but not in English Law. Though the adoption was genuine, his family ties had not been broken in India. The family . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Adoption

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.200258

Webster (the Parents) v Norfolk County Council and others: CA 11 Feb 2009

Four brothers and sisters had been adopted after the parents had been found to have abused them. The parents now had expert evidence that the injuries may have been the result of scurvy, and sought leave to appeal.
Held: Leave was refused. Cases involving the reversal of adoptions in the past had been brought far sooner after the event than this, and arose from procedural errors resulting in an unfairness. Here, though expert opinion now pointed in a different direction, the decisions had been made honestly and responsibly. It was no longer possible to reverse the decisions.

[2009] EWCA Civ 59
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8, Adoption and Children Act 2002 67(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Ladd v Marshall CA 29-Nov-1954
Conditions for new evidence on appeal
At the trial, the wife of the appellant’s opponent said she had forgotten certain events. After the trial she began divorce proceedings, and informed the appellant that she now remembered. He sought either to appeal admitting fresh evidence, or for . .
Cited – In Re F (R) (An Infant) 1970
An adoption order was set aside for an irregularity. . .
Cited – Carson and Others v The United Kingdom ECHR 4-Nov-2008
(Grand Chamber) Pensioners who had moved abroad complained that they had been excluded from the index-linked uprating of pensions given to pensioners living in England.
Held: This was not an infringement of their human rights. Differences in . .
Cited – Norfolk County Council v The Parents and BC (By her Child’s Guardian) FD 29-Jun-2007
. .
Cited – Cases of Pini And Bertani And Manera And Atripaldi v Romania ECHR 22-Jun-2004
The making of an adoption order was sufficient to establish an Article 8 right to respect for family life notwithstanding the fact that the children had never moved to live with the adopters. Protection of the right to family life pre-supposes the . .
Cited – Re RA (Minors) 1974
An adoption order was set aside for a procedural irregularity. . .
Cited – Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd (The ‘Vimeira’) HL 1986
Wide Application of Costs Against Third Party
A claim had been made against charterers by the ship owners, and in turn by the charterers against their sub-charterers. Notice of motion were issued after arbitration awards were not accepted. When heard, costs awards were made, which were now . .
Cited – Re Webster (A Minor) FD 23-Feb-2007
. .
Cited – Re H (Freeing Orders: Publicity) CA 2005
Wall LJ said: ‘Cases involving children are currently heard in private in order to protect the anonymity of the children concerned. However, the exclusion of the public from family courts, and the lack of knowledge about what happens in them, easily . .
Cited – Norfolk County Council v Webster and others FD 17-Nov-2006
There had been care proceedings following allegations of physical child abuse. There had been a residential assessment. The professionals accepted the parents’ commitment to their son, but also found that they were unreliable. It was recommended . .
Cited – Re S (Minors)(Care Order: Appeal); Dyfed County Council v S, Re S (Discharge of Care Order) CA 6-Sep-1995
Discharge of care order is the appropriate procedure not an appeal after very long time. The court considered its approach in admitting new evidence on appeal in family law cases: ‘The willingness of the family jurisdiction to relax the ordinary . .
Cited – In re H and R (Minors) (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) HL 14-Dec-1995
Evidence allowed – Care Application after Abuse
Children had made allegations of serious sexual abuse against their step-father. He was acquitted at trial, but the local authority went ahead with care proceedings. The parents appealed against a finding that a likely risk to the children had still . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, Human Rights

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.282608

Re B-S (Children): CA 17 Sep 2013

The mother had been refused leave to oppose her child’s adoption. She now appealed.
Held: A court facing such an application faced two questions: Has there been a change in circumstances? If not, that is the end of the matter. If yes, then the question is, should leave to oppose be given? As to that, the judge must first consider and evaluate the parent’s ultimate prospects of success if given leave to oppose. Key is whether the prospects of success are more than just fanciful, whether they have solidity.
The court emphasised the need for the court to evaluate all the options for the child’s future where adoption was proposed, analysing the pros and cons of each in the light of the paramount consideration of the child’s future in the long term.
It would be a waste of time and resources, and would give false hope to the parents and cause undue anxiety and concern to the prospective adopted parents. No particular words are needed if the meaning is clear. ‘Once he or she has got to the point of concluding that there has been a change of circumstances and that the parent has solid grounds for seeking leave, the judge must consider very carefully indeed whether the child’s welfare really does necessitate the refusal of leave. The judge must keep at the forefront of his mind the teaching of Re B, in particular that adoption is the ‘last resort’ and only permissible if ‘nothing else will do’.’

Lord Dyson MR, Sir James Munby P, Black LJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2013] WLR(D) 348, [2014] 1 WLR 563, [2014] 1 FLR 1035, [2013] 3 FCR 481, [2013] Fam Law 1515
Bailii, WLRD
Adoption and Children Act 2002 47(5)
England and Wales
Citing:
Leave – Re B-S (Children) CA 14-Jun-2013
Application for leave to appeal – mother had been refused consent to be heard to resist adoption application – leave granted . .

Cited by:
Cited – In re P (A Child) FD 17-Dec-2013
A local authority applied for a reporting restriction order. The Italian mother when pregnant suffered mental illness. She ceased treatment to protect her unborn child and became psychotic and delusional and was detained in a mental hospital. She . .
Cited – Re S (A Child) SC 25-Mar-2015
The Court was asked as to the proper approach to ordering the unsuccessful party to pay the costs of a successful appeal in cases about the care and upbringing of children. It arises in the specific context of a parent’s successful appeal to the . .
Cited – Hesham Ali (Iraq) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 16-Nov-2016
The appellant, an Iraqi national had arrived in 2000 as a child, and stayed unlawfully after failure of his asylum claim. He was convicted twice of drugs offences. On release he was considered a low risk of re-offending. He had been in a serious . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, Human Rights

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.515281

Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales: UTTC 2 Nov 2012

TLC Provision of adoption services by a charity – discrimination against homosexuals and same sex couples who are potential adoptive parents – whether objectively justified under section 193 of the Equality Act 2010 – analogy with approach under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights – whether permission should be granted for amendment of the charity’s Memorandum of Association.

Sales J
[2012] UKUT 395 (TCC)
Bailii
Equality Act 2010 193, European Convention on Hman Rights 14
England and Wales

Charity, Human Rights, Adoption, Discrimination

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.466704

Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales and Another: ChD 17 Mar 2010

The charity appealed against refusal of permission to amend its charitable objects as set out in the memorandum of association. The charity was successful as an adoption agency particularly in placing children who would otherwise have had difficulty finding a home, following the principles of the Roman Catholic Church, and it wanted to restrict its services to married couples, excluding same-sex, unmarried and civil partner couples, taking advantage of the exception in regulation 18 of the 2007 Regulations, by expressly restricting those to whom it might provide a service. The Charity Tribunal had restricted its interpretation of ‘benefits’ in the Regulation to to those derived from a ‘pure charitable activity’. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) argued that the change would deprive the charity of a claim to charity status.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the case was remitted to the Commission for reconsideration in accordance with the principles identified. The 2007 Regulations made provision to protect the Human Rights to freedom of religion, and that must be respected in its interpretation.
Whereas an ordinary trust is valid only if it exists for the benefit of a defined class of beneficiaries, a charitable trust is, by definition, a purpose trust. However ‘although general charity law . . is the primary source for the understanding of the meaning of public benefit, it is no longer to be presumed that any particular type of purpose is for the public benefit. Section 3 [1996 Act] . . contemplates that purposes commonly regarded as charitable, such as the advancement of religion or education, the relief of sickness or poverty, or the care of children in need, may not be for the public benefit, for example if they are sought to be achieved in a particular manner.’ An organisation proposing a purpose for the public benefit will only qualify as a charity if, taking into account any dis-benefit arising from its modus operandi, its activities nonetheless yield a net public benefit.
‘[T]he purpose behind all the relevant exceptions in the [2007] Regulations . . is to exclude from the general prohibition types of differential treatment on grounds of sexual orientation which would, in the view of Parliament (applying for that purpose an appropriate margin of appreciation) be justified in the sense which I have described, so as to fall short of discrimination contrary to Article 14.’
The purpose of Regulation 18 is to afford to charities an exception from the prohibition of differential treatment on grounds of sexual orientation, wherever the public purpose being (or to be) achieved by the charity in question constitutes an Article 14 justification for that differential treatment.

Briggs J
[2010] EWHC 520 (Ch), Times 13-Apr-2010, [2010] PTSR 1074
Bailii
Charities Act 1993 64, Equality Act 2006 81, Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 18, European Convention on Human Rights 13, Charities Act 2006 1(1)(a) 3, Sex Discrimination Act 1975 43(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart HL 26-Nov-1992
Reference to Parliamentary Papers behind Statute
The inspector sought to tax the benefits in kind received by teachers at a private school in having their children educated at the school for free. Having agreed this was a taxable emolument, it was argued as to whether the taxable benefit was the . .
Cited – C v United Kingdom ECHR 15-Dec-1983
(Commission) ‘Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, ie, the area which is sometimes called the forum of the internal. In addition, it protects acts which are intimately linked with these attitudes, such as . .
Cited – Kozak v Poland ECHR 2-Mar-2010
In relation to the justification of differential treatment on grounds of sexual orientation, the State’s margin of appreciation is narrow, and that the principle of proportionality requires that the measure chosen to realise the legitimate aim must . .
Cited – Ladele v London Borough of Islington CA 15-Dec-2009
The appellant was employed as a registrar. She refused to preside at same sex partnership ceremonies, saying that they conflicted with her Christian beliefs.
Held: The council’s decision had clearly disadvantaged the claimant, and the question . .
Cited – EB v France ECHR 14-Mar-2007
A homosexual woman complained that she had not been allowed to adopt a child. Her application was rejected by the French administrative court on grounds based substantially upon her sexual orientation.
Held: The provision was an unlawful . .
Cited – Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v Portugal ECHR 21-Dec-1999
There was a difference in treatment between the applicant and a comparator based on the applicant’s sexual orientation, a concept which is undoubtedly covered by Article 14. The list set out in this provision is of an indicative nature and is not . .
Cited – Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany ECHR 18-Jul-1994
Article 14 of the Convention operates not by way of the conferral of a freestanding right not to be discriminated against, but rather by way of complementing the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, Discrimination, Charity, Human Rights

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.403332

Coventry City Council v PGO and Others: CA 22 Jun 2011

The children had been placed with short term fosterers. On adopters being found, the fosterers themselves applied to adopt the children. The court was asked whether a county court judge had power to injunct the authority not to remove the children and whether the placement for adoption had taken place without the children being physically so placed. It was argued that the foster parents could not meet the requirements of section 44 of the 2002 Act.
Held: The authority’s appeal succeeded. The wording of the duties cast on the local authority by the 2002 Act on receiving a notice from prospective applicants could not be read to negative the possibility of their removal of the child. Indeed section 38 specifically provided a power to the authority to remove the child. Where a placement order had been made in favour of the authority the power of removal was not unders section 20(8) but by a combination of sections 3(1) and 25(2). Nothing in these circumstances operated to remove the authority’s power so to act, though the FPR were perhaps misleading. Though the court had a power to award an injunction even 10 weeks ahead of the time when the correct notice could be given, the court should have asked as to the foster parents’ real prospects of successin establishing that Coventry had acted irrationally. Asking that the prospects were low, and an injunction should not have been granted.
As to placement, a child is placed with prospective adopters only when he begins to live with them: for an adoption agency cannot ‘leave’ a child with persons as prospective adopters before he has begun to live with them: ‘a child is not ‘placed’ for adoption until he begins to live with the proposed adopters or, if he is already living with them in their capacity as foster carers, when the adoption agency formally allows him to continue to live with them in their fresh capacity as prospective adopters.’

Lord Neuberger MR, Wilson L, Dame Janet Smith
[2011] EWCA Civ 729
Bailii
Adoption and Children Act 2002 42 44, Family Procedure (Adoption) Rules 2005, Family Procedure Rules 2010 118 119
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Fourie v Le Roux and others HL 24-Jan-2007
The appellant, liquidator of two South African companies, had made a successful without notice application for an asset freezing order. He believed that the defendants had stripped the companies of substantial assets. The order was set aside for . .
Cited – Re A (A Minor), Re TL v Coventry City Council; CC v A, by her Children’s Guardian CA 21-Dec-2007
The foster mother of a baby promptly indicated a wish to adopt her. Following four months of assessment Coventry informed her that, for reasons which she wished to challenge, her adoption of the baby would be unsuitable. Three days prior to so . .
Cited – In re F (A Child) (Placement Order); C v East Sussex County Council (Adoption) CA 1-May-2008
The father sought to revoke a freeing order. He said that the social workers had conspired to exclude him from the process. The child was born of a casual relationship, and at first he was unaware of the proceedings. On learning of them he sought to . .
Cited – American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd HL 5-Feb-1975
Interim Injunctions in Patents Cases
The plaintiffs brought proceedings for infringement of their patent. The proceedings were defended. The plaintiffs obtained an interim injunction to prevent the defendants infringing their patent, but they now appealed its discharge by the Court of . .
Cited – Smith v Inner London Education Authority CA 1978
Lord Denning MR doubted the applicability of the criteria in American Cynamid to public law proceedings. It is appropriate at the interface of public law and private law for the public interest to be taken into account as one of the factors in the . .
Cited – Regina v Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Environment ex parte Monsanto Plc Admn 31-Jul-1998
The principles which apply generally in claims for interim injunctive relief apply also in judicial review applications. The principle is that the applicant must show an arguable case, The court was not to try the main issues on affidavit. A triable . .
Cited – Re S (Placement Order: Revocation) CA 7-Oct-2008
The circuit judge had been wrong to hold that a child placed with foster parents who were actively considering whether to apply to adopt him had been placed with them for adoption. Thorpe LJ said clearly that a child could not be said to be placed . .
Cited – W, Regina (on The Application of) v London Borough of Brent Admn 9-Feb-2010
Application for judicial review of decision to place child for adoption pursuant to a placement order. The chronology was that: (a) on 3 August 2009 Brent’s adoption and permanency panel approved the match of the child with prospective adopters; (b) . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.441146

Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust and Another v H and Another: HL 12 Jul 2006

The House considered when adoption law would allow an adoption without the consent of the birth parent where there had been some continuing contact between that parent and the child.
Held: (Baroness Hale dissenting) The appeal against the adoption was dismissed. The judge’s opinion had been expressed strongly but he had expressed the law accurately, and applied it. His decision was within the range of proper decisions.
Baroness Hale pointed out that the United Kingdom is unusual in Europe in permitting the total severance of family ties without parental consent.

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell
[2006] UKHL 36
Bailii
Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 18(1)
Northern Ireland
Citing:
Cited – In re W (An Infant) HL 1971
The court considered the reasonability of parental disagreement in applications for adoption: ‘Two reasonable parents can perfectly reasonably come to opposite conclusions on the same set of facts without forfeiting their title to be regarded as . .
Cited – Re C (A Minor) (Adoption Order: Conditions) HL 1988
The House considered the question of conditions to be applied to any continued contact with a child after adoption. Lord Ackner said: ‘The cases rightly stress that in normal circumstances it is desirable that there should be a complete break, but . .
Cited – Yousef v The Netherlands ECHR 5-Nov-2002
In ‘judicial decisions where the rights under article 8 of parents and of a child are at stake, the child’s rights must be the paramount consideration.’ . .
Cited – G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) HL 25-Apr-1985
The House asked when a decision, on the facts, of a first instance court is so wrong as to allow it to be overturned on appeal.
Held: The epithet ‘wrong’ is to be applied to the substance of the decision made by the lower court. ‘Certainly it . .
Cited – Re G (Children) CA 20-May-2002
. .
Cited – Re C (a Minor) (Adoption: Parental Agreement: Contact) CA 1993
Where adoption is to be considered against the will of the parent, the court should recognise when asking whether the opposition was unreasonable that the test is objective and supposes that this person is endowed with a mind and temperament capable . .
Cited – In re E (A Minor) (Care Order: Contract) CA 1994
The court considered the benefits to a child of continuing parental contact while the child remained in care.
Simon Brown LJ said: ‘I recognise of course that the threshold criteria for a care order under section 31 of the 1989 Act require the . .
Cited – P, C and S v United Kingdom ECHR 2002
The local authority had obtained the issue of an Emergency Protection Order under the 1989 Act to remove a child at birth.
Held: Where the possibility of harm arose from the mother introducing something into the child’s system (such as a . .
Cited – K And T v Finland ECHR 27-Apr-2000
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 8; No violation of Art. 13; Non-pecuniary damage – financial award; Costs and expenses partial award – Convention proceedings; Costs and expenses . .
Cited – In re L (An Infant) CA 1962
That a proposed adoption of a child would be in the child’s best interests is not necessarily an indication that the parent’s opposition to the adoption is unreasonable: ‘A reasonable mother surely gives great weight to what is better for the child. . .
Cited – In re D (An Infant) (Adoption: Parent’s Consent) HL 1977
The father opposed adoption of a child by the mother and her new husband. The House was asked whether his opposition was unreasonable.
Held: Lord Wilberforce said: ‘What, in my understanding, is required is for the court to ask whether the . .
Cited – In re E (Minors) (Adoption: Parental Agreement) 1990
Aa application for a freeing order was premature. . .
Cited – In re KLA (An Infant) 2000
Sir John MacDermott considered the purpose of freeing orders. The purpose was: ‘to find out if a child would be available for adoption before prospective adopters were found and their hopes frustrated if the adoption court ruled that consent was not . .
Cited – In re C (Minors) (Adoption) 1992
. .
Cited – In Re P (Minors) (Adoption: Freeing Orders) FD 25-Jul-1994
A judge should not order continued contact after the making of freeing orders which were made without the consent of the mother. . .
Cited – In Re A (A Minor) (Adoption: Contact Order) CA 24-Jun-1993
A contact order had been properly granted with an order freeing the child for adoption. Butler-Sloss LJ: ‘The effect of an order freeing a child for adoption is to extinguish parental responsibility of those previously endowed with it and thus to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.243080

X and Others v Austria (Summary): ECHR 19 Feb 2013

(Grand Chamber) Article 14
Discrimination
Impossibility of second-parent adoption in same-sex couple:
violation
Facts – The first and third applicants are two women living in a stable homosexual relationship. The second applicant is the third applicant’s minor son. He was born out of wedlock. His father had acknowledged paternity but the third applicant had sole custody. The first applicant wished to adopt the second applicant in order to create a legal relationship between them without severing the boy’s relationship with his mother and an adoption agreement was concluded to that end. However, the domestic courts refused to approve the agreement after finding that under domestic law adoption by one person had the effect of severing the family-law relationship with the biological parent of the same sex, so that the boy’s adoption by the first applicant would sever his relationship with his mother, the third applicant, not his father.
Law – Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8
(a) Applicability – The relationship between the three applicants amounted to ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8. Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, was therefore applicable.
(b) Comparison with a married couple in which one spouse wished to adopt the other spouse’s child – The Court saw no reason to deviate from its findings in Gas and Dubois v. France and concluded that the first and third applicants in the instant case were not in a relevantly similar situation to a married couple.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(c) Comparison with an unmarried different-sex couple in which one partner wished to adopt the other partner’s child – The Court accepted that the applicants were in a relevantly similar situation to an unmarried different-sex couple in which one partner wished to adopt the other partner’s child. The Government had not argued that a special legal status existed which would distinguish an unmarried heterosexual couple from a same-sex couple and had conceded that same-sex couples could in principle be as suitable (or unsuitable) for adoption purposes, including second-parent adoption, as different-sex couples. Austrian law allowed second-parent adoption by an unmarried different-sex couple. In contrast, second-parent adoption in a same-sex couple was not legally possible. The relevant regulations of the Civil Code provided that any person who adopted replaced the biological parent of the same sex. As the first applicant was a woman, her adoption of her partner’s child could only sever the child’s legal relationship with his mother. Adoption could therefore not serve to create a parent-child relationship between the first applicant and the child in addition to the relationship with his mother.
The Court was not convinced by the Government’s argument that the applicants’ adoption request had been refused on grounds unrelated to their sexual orientation and that, therefore, the applicants were asking the Court to carry out an abstract review of the law. The domestic courts had made it clear that an adoption producing the effect desired by the applicants was impossible under the Civil Code. They had not carried out any investigation into the circumstances of the case. In particular, they had not dealt with the question whether there were any reasons for overriding the refusal of the child’s father to consent to the adoption. In contrast, the regional court had underlined that the notion of ‘parents’ in Austrian family law meant two persons of the opposite sex and had stressed the interest of the child in maintaining contact with both those parents.
Given that the legal impossibility of the adoption had consistently been at the centre of their considerations, the domestic courts had been prevented from examining in any meaningful manner whether the adoption would be in the child’s interests. In contrast, in the case of an unmarried different-sex couple they would have been required to examine that issue. The applicants had thus been directly affected by the legal situation of which they complained since the adoption request was aimed at obtaining legal recognition of the family life they enjoyed, all three could claim to be victims of the alleged violation.
The difference in treatment between the first and third applicants and an unmarried different-sex couple in which one partner sought to adopt the other partner’s child had been based on their sexual orientation. The case was thus to be distinguished from Gas and Dubois, in which the Court had found that there was no difference of treatment based on sexual orientation between an unmarried different-sex couple and a same-sex couple as, under French law, second-parent adoption was not open to either.
There was no obligation under Article 8 to extend the right to second-parent adoption to unmarried couples. However, given that domestic law did allow second-parent adoption in unmarried different-sex couples, the Court had to examine whether refusing that right to (unmarried) same-sex couples served a legitimate aim and was proportionate to that aim.
The domestic courts and the Government had argued that Austrian adoption law was aimed at recreating the circumstances of a biological family. The protection of the family in the traditional sense was in principle a legitimate reason which could justify a difference in treatment. The same applied to the protection of the child’s interests. However, in cases where a difference in treatment based on sex or sexual orientation was concerned, the Government had to show that the difference in treatment was necessary to achieve the aim. The Government had not provided any evidence to show that it would be detrimental to a child to be brought up by a same-sex couple or to have two mothers and two fathers for legal purposes. Moreover, under domestic law, adoption by one person, including one homosexual, was possible. If he or she had a registered partner, the latter had to consent to the adoption. The legislature therefore accepted that a child might grow up in a family based on a same-sex couple and that this was not detrimental to the child. There was also force in the applicants’ argument that de facto families based on a same-sex couple existed but were refused the possibility of obtaining legal recognition and protection. These considerations cast considerable doubt on the proportionality of the absolute prohibition on second-parent adoption in same-sex couples.
The Government had further argued that there was no consensus among European States regarding second-parent adoption by same-sex couples and that consequently the State had a wide margin of appreciation to regulate that issue. However, the issue before the Court was not the general question of same-sex couples’ access to second-parent adoption, but the difference in treatment between unmarried different-sex couples and same-sex couples in respect of such adoptions. Consequently, only ten Council of Europe member States, which allowed second-parent adoption in unmarried couples, might be regarded as a basis for comparison. Within that group, six States treated heterosexual couples and same-sex couples in the same manner, while four adopted the same position as Austria. The narrowness of that sample did not allow conclusions to be drawn as to a possible consensus among European States.
The instant case did not concern the question whether the applicants’ adoption request should have been granted, but the question whether the applicants had been discriminated against on account of the fact that the courts had had no opportunity to examine in any meaningful manner whether the requested adoption was in the second applicant’s interests, given that it was in any case legally impossible.
The Government had failed to give convincing reasons to show that excluding second-parent adoption in a same-sex couple, while allowing that possibility in an unmarried different-sex couple, was necessary for the protection of the family in the traditional sense or for the protection of the interests of the child. The distinction was therefore discriminatory.
Conclusion: violation (ten votes to seven).
Article 41: EUR 10,000 jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
(See Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07, 15 March 2012, Information Note no. 150)
19010/07 – Legal Summary, [2013] ECHR 425
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8 814
Citing:
Cited – Valerie Gas And Nathalie Dubois v France ECHR 11-Mar-2011
. .
Judgment – X And Others v Austria ECHR 19-Feb-2013
Grand Chamber – The applicants alleged that they had been discriminated against in comparison with different-sex couples, as second-parent adoption was legally impossible for a same-sex couple.
Held: An applicant is entitled to the . .

Cited by:
Cited – SG and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions SC 18-Mar-2015
The court was asked whether it was lawful for the Secretary of State to make subordinate legislation imposing a cap on the amount of welfare benefits which can be received by claimants in non-working households, equivalent to the net median earnings . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.509231

M, In the Matter of: NIHC 10 Sep 2001

Twin girls aged 14 and a half were to be adopted. They had substantial difficulties, and would require continued care throughout their lives. Their elder brother had lived with the same family, but later made allegations of abuse. These were unsubstantiated, but some distrust had developed between the adoptive parents and social services, and in particular the guardian ad litem. An adoption was to be granted, but subject to conditions which would preserve contact between the children and their elder brother and natural mother.
[2001] NIEHC 65
Bailii
Northern Ireland

Updated: 14 September 2021; Ref: scu.166464

Re N (Children : Adoption: Jurisdiction): CA 2 Nov 2015

Appeal against care and placement order proceedings in relation to two Hungarian children, The orders were for the transfer of the case to Hungary.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. As to Article 15, the Court considered: What are the requirements before the English court can make a request for a transfer to another member state? The President observed that ‘there is much English learning on the meaning and application’ of article 15.1. He repeated the guidance he had given in In re M (Brussels II Revised: Article 15) [2014] EWCA Civ 152; [2014] 2 FLR 1372 on which the judge had also relied. He went on to emphasise how important it is that article 15 is considered at the earliest possible opportunity, although it could be considered at any stage of the proceedings; repeated applications were to be deprecated and would usually fail unless there had been a change of circumstances, although they might sometimes be appropriate; that a transfer could be considered after a fact-finding hearing, but only in exceptional circumstances; and the process should be summary, measured in hours not days and not dependent on a profound investigation of the evidence.
Leaving to one side any question arising in relation to article 1.3.b, was the judge justified in deciding as he did? Could it be said that he was wrong to do so? The court concluded that he was justified in deciding to exercise jurisdiction to request transfer under article 15; he undertook a careful examination of all the relevant factors; he did not consider any irrelevant factors; he did not err in the weight he attached to the relevant factors, or misdirect himself in law.
Was the judge’s decision vitiated by his failure to address article 1.3.b? What were the consequences of his omission to do so? The court held that the fact that he did not appreciate the effect of article 1.3.b did not vitiate his decision. His decision in relation to the care proceedings could and should stand and they should be stayed. His decision in relation to the placement order proceedings could not stand, but as they were of their nature consequential on the care proceedings, they too were stayed
Munby P summarised principles applying to choice of jurisdiction in adoption cases:
(i) Does an English court have jurisdiction (a) to make an adoption order in relation to a child who is a foreign national, and (b) to dispense with the consent of a parent who is a foreign national? This was a difficult question, given that the Brussels II revised Regulation does not cover adoption or measures preparatory to adoption, nor is there any other international instrument covering the matter. The Court of Appeal answered both (a) and (b) in the affirmative.
(ii) If the English court does have such jurisdiction, how should that be exercised? The President gave guidance.
(iii) What is the scope of the Brussels II revised Regulation? It is well-established that the Regulation applies to care proceedings, as well as to proceedings between private parties: see In re C (Case C-435/06) [2008] Fam 27. However, by excluding ‘decisions on adoption, measures preparatory to adoption, or the annulment or revocation of adoption’ from the scope of the Regulation, does article 1.3.b also exclude (a) care proceedings where the care plan is adoption, or (b) placement order proceedings? The court concluded that (a) was within the scope of the Regulation, but (b) was not.
Sir James Munby P FD, Black LJ, Sir Richard Aikens
[2015] EWCA Civ 1112, [2015] WLR(D) 436, [2016] 1 FCR 217, [2016] 1 All ER 1086, [2016] 1 FLR 621, [2016] 2 WLR 713, [2015] Fam Law 1444
Bailii, WLRD
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
England and Wales
Citing:
At FC – J and E (Children: Brussels II Revised: Article 15) FC 11-Nov-2014
The local authority applied to the court for care orders and placement orders in respect of two young girls. The parents opposed the local authority’s applications. The mother was Hungarian. The father was Hungarian/Roma. The mother applied under . .
Emphasised – Re M (A Child) CA 21-Feb-2014
The court dealt with points of principle relating to how the courts in England and Wales determine family cases that involve nationals of other countries, in particular Member States of the European Union and for that reason, permission to appeal . .

Cited by:
At CA – In Re N (Children) SC 13-Apr-2016
The Court considered whether the future of two little girls, aged four and two years, should be decided by the courts of this country or by the authorities in Hungary. Both children were born in England and lived all their lives here. But their . .
Cited – Williams and Another v London Borough of Hackney SC 18-Jul-2018
On arrest for shoplifting a 12 year old said he had been doing so to get food, and that he had been hit with a belt by his father. Investigation revealed the home to be dangerous, and all eight children were removed to the care of the LA. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.554267

Re B (Adoption Order: Jurisdiction To Set Aside): CA 17 Mar 1995

The appellant was an adult in his thirties. He had been adopted at 3 months by an orthodox Jewish couple, and brought up as a Jew. His father was a Muslim Arab from Kuwait, and his mother was a Roman Catholic. He wished to settle in Israel, but was suspected of being an Arab spy and was asked to leave. He was also unable to settle in Kuwait. Having discovered his true origins, he applied to have the adoption order set aside. He now appealed against refusal of the order.
Held: The appeal failed. Swinton Thomas LJ said: ‘In my judgment such an application faces insuperable hurdles. An adoption order has a quite different standing to almost every other order made by a court. It provides the status of the adopted child and of the adoptive parents. The effect of an adoption order is to extinguish any parental responsibility of the natural parents. Once an adoption order has been made, the adoptive parents stand to one another and the child in precisely the same relationship as if they were his legitimate parents, and the child stands in the same relationship to them as to legitimate parents. Once an adoption order has been made the adopted child ceases to be the child of his previous parents and becomes the child for all purposes of the adopters as though he were their legitimate child.’
Swinton Thomas LJ
[1995] EWCA Civ 48, [1995] Fam 239, [1995] 3 FCR 671, [1995] Fam Law 469, [1995] 3 WLR 40, [1995] 3 All ER 333, [1995] 2 FLR 1
Bailii
Adoption Act 1976 52
England and Wales

Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.276287

A City Council v DC and Others: FD 11 Jan 2013

Application made by A City Council for the revocation of an order freeing a child, J for adoption.
Eleanor King J
[2013] EWHC 8 (Fam), [2013] BLGR 502, [2013] Fam Law 371, [2013] 1 WLR 3009, [2013] 1 FCR 446, [2013] 2 FLR 16
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 09 July 2021; Ref: scu.470587

W, Regina (on The Application of) v London Borough of Brent: Admn 9 Feb 2010

Application for judicial review of decision to place child for adoption pursuant to a placement order. The chronology was that: (a) on 3 August 2009 Brent’s adoption and permanency panel approved the match of the child with prospective adopters; (b) on or before 17 August 2009 Brent ratified the decision to place the child with them; (c) on 17 August 2009 the child first met the adopters; (d) introductory meetings continued for the next four day (e) on 21 August 2009 the mother’s solicitor notified Brent that she proposed to apply for leave to revoke the placement order; and (f) on 24 August 2009, unaware of the notification, the social workers caused the child to move to live with the adopters.
Held: Review was refused. Placement of a child for adoption is not defined in the Act, but W had been placed with the adopters on 17 August 2009 and so any application for leave to revoke made by the mother on 21 August 2009 would have been too late. The placement had occurred on 17 August because such was the date ‘when all the relevant legal formalities had been concluded and the introductions process began’. He had observed that: ‘the introductions process is not a process that takes place before the child in question has been placed for adoption: it is the first step in the relationship between the child and the prospective adopters after the child has been ‘placed for adoption’ by the authority.’
Coulson J
[2010] EWHC 175 (Admin), [2010] 1 FLR 1914, [2010] PTSR CS31, [2010] Fam Law 454
Bailii
Adoption and Children Act 2002
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Coventry City Council v PGO and Others CA 22-Jun-2011
The children had been placed with short term fosterers. On adopters being found, the fosterers themselves applied to adopt the children. The court was asked whether a county court judge had power to injunct the authority not to remove the children . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 June 2021; Ref: scu.396649

D v Grampian Regional Council: HL 1995

The House discussed the nature of an adoption order: ‘The Act of 1978 provides a comprehensive code for adoption and it is perfectly clear that the whole procedure is intended to produce a permanent result for the adopted child. An adoption order once made is irrevocable only in circumstances which will have no practical effect upon the child’s day to day life in contradistinction to an order for custody or access which is always reviewable by the court when circumstances demand’.
References: 1995 SC (HL) 1
Judges: Jauncey L
Statutes: Adoption Act 1978
Jurisdiction: Scotland
This case is cited by:

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.194030

Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales; UTTC 2 Nov 2012

References: [2012] UKUT 395 (TCC)
Links: Bailii
Coram: Sales J
Ratio: TLC Provision of adoption services by a charity – discrimination against homosexuals and same sex couples who are potential adoptive parents – whether objectively justified under section 193 of the Equality Act 2010 – analogy with approach under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights – whether permission should be granted for amendment of the charity’s Memorandum of Association.
Statutes: Equality Act 2010 193, European Convention on Hman Rights 14

Last Update: 25-Jun-16
Ref: 466704

A Local Authority v XYZ (No 1); FC 1 Jul 2015

References: [2015] EWFC 69
Links: Bailii
Coram: Moor J
Care proceedings and an application for a placement order in relation to a young boy, Y. He is six months old.
This case is cited by:

  • See Also – A Local Authority -v- XYZ (No 2) FC (Bailii, [2015] EWFC 70)
    Care proceedings and an application for a placement order in relation to a young boy, Y. He is coming up to seven months old. . .

A Local Authority v XYZ (No 2); FC 3 Jul 2015

References: [2015] EWFC 70
Links: Bailii
Coram: Moor J
Care proceedings and an application for a placement order in relation to a young boy, Y. He is coming up to seven months old.
This case cites:

  • See Also – A Local Authority -v- XYZ (No 1) FC (Bailii, [2015] EWFC 69)
    Care proceedings and an application for a placement order in relation to a young boy, Y. He is six months old. . .

X (Adopted Child: Access To Court File); FC 9 Sep 2014

References: [2014] EWFC 33
Links: Bailii, Jud
Coram: Sir James Munby P FD
The applicant’s father had been adopted. Both he and the adopting parents had since died. The applicant now sought disclosure of the records to reveal her the court record of her father’s adoption order.
Held: The order should be made.
Statutes: Adoption and Children Act 2002 79(4)
This case cites:

  • Cited – Re H (Adoption: Disclosure of Information ) ([1995] 1 FLR 236)
    An application was made by the sister of an adopted child for disclosure of the records held in order to allow her to make contact and to warn her of the fact that she might have an inherited genetic disease.
    Held: The jurisdiction to grant . .
  • Cited – D -v- Registrar General ([1997] 2 FLR 240)
    The court considered the procedure to be followed in applications for disclosure to other family members of information held by the Registrar to allow them to contact the adopted child. . .
  • Cited – FL -v- Registrar General FD (Bailii, [2010] EWHC 3520 (Fam), [2011] 2 FCR 229, [2011] Fam Law 453, [2011] 2 FLR 630)
    The claimant sought disclosure of information held by the respondent as to the identities of her pre-adoptive natural parents. . .