Tag: Children

Maumousseau and Washington v France: ECHR 6 Dec 2007

The child’s mother (M) complained that the effective operation of the Hague Convention, in ordering the return of the applicant’s daughter to her habitual residence in the United States, M having taken her to France for the holidays and refused to return her afterwards, was in breach of their article 8 rights.
Held: The claim failed. The positive obligation to reunite parents with their children had to be interpreted in the light of the requirements of the Hague Convention and the UNCRC. In deciding whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the decisive issue was ‘whether a fair balance between the competing interests at stake – those of the child, of the two parents, and of public order – was struck’. Several aspects were involved in the primary consideration of the best interests of the child: for example, ‘to guarantee that the child develops in a sound environment and that a parent cannot take measures that would harm its health and development; secondly, to maintain its ties with its family, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit’. The concept of the child’s ‘best interests’ was also a primary consideration in the context of the Hague Convention procedures. The Court accepted entirely the philosophy underlying the Hague Convention. It did not agree that the domestic courts’ interpretation of article 13b was necessarily incompatible with the notion of the child’s best interests. There was ‘no automatic or mechanical application of a child’s return’ once the Hague Convention was invoked, because of the exceptions ‘based on objective considerations concerning the actual person of the child and its environment’.
39388/05, [2007] ECHR 1204, (2010) 51 EHRR 35
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) SC 10-Jun-2011
Two children were born in Norway to a British mother (M) and Norwegian father (F). Having lived in Norway, M brought them to England to stay, but without F’s knowledge or consent. M replied to his application for their return that the children would . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 October 2021; Ref: scu.440729

Bournemouth Borough Council v PS and Another: CoP 11 Jun 2015

The court was asked to decide (i) whether the package of care provided to BS was in his best interests; (ii) whether that package amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the terms of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950; and (iii) what contact Ben should have to his mother, the first respondent.
Mostyn J
[2015] EWCOP 39
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 5
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.548026

Re A (Minors) (Abduction: Custody Rights) No 2: CA 29 Jul 1992

The mother had wrongfully removed the children from Australia to this country. The father wrote to the mother saying that ‘I think you know that what you have done is illegal, but I’m not going to fight it’ and generally giving the impression that he would regretfully go along with the children’s staying permanently with the mother in this country. However he was making arrangements to begin action here. The obligation on a court to order the return of abducted children to their country of origin, was to be relaxed after the court had made a finding of consent on the part of the parent from whom it was claimed the children had been removed.
Balcombe LJ (dissenting)
Gazette 29-Jul-1992, [1992] Fam 106
Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – H v H (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) CA 14-Aug-1996
The parents were orthodox Jews. The mother brought the children to England, and resisted an order for their return, saying the father had delayed in bringing the proceedings.
Held: A parent must act quickly in cases of child abduction in order . .
Cited – Re H, H v H (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) HL 10-Apr-1997
The mother and father were orthodox Jews. The mother brought the children to England from Israel against the father’s wishes. She said that he had acquiesced in their staying here by asking for them to be returned to Israel temporarily. The father . .
Cited – In Re H and others (Minors) HL 10-Apr-1997
Three young children had been brought to England from Israel by their mother but without the consent of the father, who now sought their return. The mother claimed that the father had subsequently acquiesced in the removal. Both parents were . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 September 2021; Ref: scu.85689

Re D (A Child): CA 31 Oct 2017

The court considered an order effectively depriving child D of his liberty.
Sir James Munby P FD, David Richards, Irwin LJJ
[2017] EWCA Civ 1695, (2018) 160 BMLR 61, [2018] 2 FLR 13, [2018] COPLR 1, [2018] PTSR 1791
Bailii
Mental Capacity Act 2005, European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Birmingham City Council v D CoP 21-Jan-2016
D was a young adult with several disorders presenting challenging behaviour. The Hospital sought arrangements allowing control over him for his care and eucation. . .
Cited – In Re K (A Child) (Secure Accommodation Order: Right to Liberty) CA 29-Nov-2000
An order providing that a child should stay in secure accommodation, was an order which restricted the child’s liberty. A justification for such a restriction had to be brought within the exceptions listed in article 5.
Held: Detention for . .

Cited by:
Appeal From – In re D (A Child) SC 26-Sep-2019
D, a young adult had a mild learning disability and other more serious conditions. He was taken into a hospital providing mental health services. The external door was locked, and a declaration was sought to permit this deprivation of his liberty, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 August 2021; Ref: scu.598462

In re K (Minors) (Wardship: Criminal Proceedings): FD 24 Aug 1987

Children had been interviewed by the police before they became wards of court.
Held: It would be a constitutional impropriety for the wardship court to intervene in the statutory process governing the conduct of a criminal trial and in matters within the jurisdiction of the Crown Court so as to grant or refuse leave for minors to be called as witnesses at a criminal trial.
Waterhouse J said: ‘In many cases, the wardship court is likely to be involved at an early stage because leave will have been sought for the police to interview a ward. In such circumstances it is inevitable that the court will have to perform a balancing exercise, weighing the potential damage to the child against the public interest, as a responsible parent would do. In reaching a decision, the best interests of a child may not be the first and paramount consideration . . ‘ and ‘Mrs Puxon accepts on behalf of the Crown Prosecution Service that, in general, it is the practice of the police to obtain the consent of a parent who has the custody of a child before interviewing the child as a potential witness. Similarly, the police work in close co-operation with social services departments in whose care children have been placed and obtain the consent of the department (as in this case) before interviewing a child in care. It is accepted also that, in the case of a ward of court, leave should be obtained from the wardship court before an interview by the police takes place.’ and ‘Once a prosecution has been instituted however, the statutory procedure must (it is said) take its normal course. The Crown Prosecution Service will, of course, consider any representation that may be made by a parent or a local authority about the potential adverse impact upon a child of having to give evidence. This may be one of the matters to be considered in deciding whether or not to proceed with particular charges, but the discretion is vested in the prosecuting authority rather than the parent or the local authority. In the present case, it is said further, an extraordinary and anomalous situation would arise, if the wardship court were to intervene, because the minors might be ‘protected’ from the operation of the statutory rules governing the compellability of witnesses, whereas the other children involved in the case would have no similar protection.’
He concluded: ‘I have no doubt that I should decline to exercise the wardship jurisdiction by either giving leave for the minors to be called as witnesses or by giving a direction in the matter in another form. In my judgment, it is neither necessary nor appropriate in child abuse cases for the Crown Prosecution Service to seek the leave of the wardship court to call a ward as a witness either before or after committal proceedings.
It is necessary, first of all, to set my conclusion in its proper context. In many cases, the wardship court is likely to be involved at an early stage because leave will have to be sought for the police to interview a ward. In such circumstances it is inevitable that the court will have to perform a balancing exercise, weighing the potential damage to the child against the public interest, as a responsible parent would do. In reaching a decision, the best interests of a child may not be the first and paramount consideration, for reasons that I have sufficiently explained. It is clear also that the court will have in mind that, if leave to interview the child is granted, a prosecution based on the child’s evidence, at least in part, may ensue.’
Waterhouse J
[1988] Fam 1
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Re A Ward of Court FD 4-May-2017
Ward has no extra privilege from Police Interview
The court considered the need to apply to court in respect of the care of a ward of the court when the Security services needed to investigate possible terrorist involvement of her and of her contacts. Application was made for a declaration as to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 August 2021; Ref: scu.588165

In re H (A Child – Breach of Convention Rights – Damages): FC 29 Oct 2014

A new born baby was placed with foster carers on discharge from hospital. Both parents had learning difficulties and agreed to the baby being placed with a particular couple. At that stage the local authority considered this an informal arrangement rather than section 20 accommodation. Only five months later did they decide to seek the parents’ retrospective consent to section 20 accommodation. Care proceedings were not issued until the child was nearly a year old. The local authority accepted that they had breached the rights of both parents under articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR in a variety of ways – mainly by failing to involve them properly in the decision-making process, by seeking consent in the way that they did, by placing insufficient weight on the parents’ clearly expressed wish to care for the child, and by delaying both the assessment of the parents and the issue of proceedings.
Clifford Bellamy HHJ
[2014] EWFC 38
Bailii
Children Act 1989 20
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Williams and Another v London Borough of Hackney SC 18-Jul-2018
On arrest for shoplifting a 12 year old said he had been doing so to get food, and that he had been hit with a belt by his father. Investigation revealed the home to be dangerous, and all eight children were removed to the care of the LA. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.538181

Williams and Another v London Borough of Hackney: SC 18 Jul 2018

On arrest for shoplifting a 12 year old said he had been doing so to get food, and that he had been hit with a belt by his father. Investigation revealed the home to be dangerous, and all eight children were removed to the care of the LA. The parents were allowed to visit the children subject to an agreement. On the expiry of the initial section 20 72-hour period, the family’s solicitors requested their return. The children were only returned after 7 weeks and the family complained of infringement of their right to family life, saying that the agreement signed was uninformed consent. They now appealed from the CA who decided that section 20 did not require active parental consent.
Held: The appeal failed.
‘although it is not a breach of section 20 to keep a child in accommodation for a long period without bringing care proceedings, it may well be a breach of other duties under the Act and Regulations or unreasonable in public law terms to do so. In some cases there may also be breaches of the child’s or the parents’ rights under article 8 of ECHR.’
and ‘ there are circumstances in which a real and voluntary delegation of the exercise of parental responsibility is required for a local authority to accommodate a child under section 20, albeit not in every case (see para 40 above). Parents with parental responsibility always have a qualified right to object and an unqualified right to remove their children at will (subject to any court orders about where the child is to live). Section 20 gives local authorities no compulsory powers over parents or their children and must not be used in such a way as to give the impression that it does. It is obviously good practice in every case that parents should be given clear and accurate information, both orally and in writing, both as to their own rights and as to the responsibilities of the local authority, before a child is accommodated under section 20 or as soon as practicable thereafter.’
Baroness Hale of Richmond PSC, Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Lord Wilson, Lord Carnwath, Lady Black JJSC
[2018] UKSC 37, [2018] WLR(D) 454, [2018] 3 WLR 503, UKSC 2017/0037
Bailii, Bailii Summary, WLRD, SC, Bailii Summary, SC Summary Video, SC 14 Feb 2018 am Video, SC 14 Feb 2018 pm Video, SC 15 Feb 2018 am Video, SC 15 Feb 2018 pm Videos
Children Act 1989 20, Human Rights Act 1998 4, European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Citing:
At CA – London Borough of Hackney v Williams and Another CA 26-Jan-2017
. .
At QBD – Williams and Another v London Borough of Hackney QBD 17-Sep-2015
Children had been removed from their parents under s20 of the 1989 Act, but then not returned after the expiry of the initial 72 hour period.
Held: The court dismissed the claims for negligence, misfeasance in public office and religious . .
Cited – G, Regina (on the Application of) v Nottingham City Council Admn 1-Feb-2008
The respondent authority had removed the child from the mother at birth but without first obtaining any court authority. The court had made a peremptory order for the return of the child. The court explained its actions.
Held: Neither social . .
Cited – Re N (Children : Adoption: Jurisdiction) CA 2-Nov-2015
Appeal against care and placement order proceedings in relation to two Hungarian children, The orders were for the transfer of the case to Hungary.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. As to Article 15, the Court considered: What are the . .
Cited – In re W (Children) CA 25-Jul-2014
Appeal against an order made after an agreement within the family that the children should live with the paternal grandmother.
Orse In re W (Parental Agreement with Local Authority)
The mother had placed her three children with their . .
Cited – Re CA (A Baby) FD 30-Jul-2012
Orse Coventry City Council v C, B, CA and CH
This concerned the removal of a baby from her mother on the day of her birth, but the mother, having at first refused to do so, had given her consent to the baby being accommodated. The local . .
Cited – Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council v Others (Re B) CA 30-Jul-2013
The court was asked as to local authority funding in relation to a child, K, who was born in November 2011.
Black LJ explained: ‘I raised the question during the appeal hearing as to whether a parent who is inadequate is in fact ‘willing and . .
Cited – Herefordshire Council v AB FC 1-Feb-2018
. .
Cited – Medway Council v M and T (By Her Children’s Guardian) FC 13-Oct-2015
A child (aged five) was placed in emergency foster care after his mother was detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act. The mother was then too unwell to discuss section 20. The local authority thought that there was no need to issue care . .
Cited – In re H (A Child – Breach of Convention Rights – Damages) FC 29-Oct-2014
A new born baby was placed with foster carers on discharge from hospital. Both parents had learning difficulties and agreed to the baby being placed with a particular couple. At that stage the local authority considered this an informal arrangement . .
Cited – Northamptonshire County Council v AS and Others FD 30-Jan-2015
The mother agreed to the accommodation of her two-week-old baby and care proceedings were issued nearly four months later. The local authority accepted that they had acted in breach of the rights of both mother and child under article 6 and 8, . .
Cited – Re AS (Unlawful Removal of A Child) FC 7-Aug-2015
The case concerned a boy aged eight at the material time, both of whose parents had severe mental health problems. Very shortly after he had been returned to his mother’s care when she came out of hospital, she suffered a relapse and called an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.620141

Herefordshire Council v AB: FC 1 Feb 2018

Keehan J
[2018] 2 FLR 784, [2018] EWFC 10
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Williams and Another v London Borough of Hackney SC 18-Jul-2018
On arrest for shoplifting a 12 year old said he had been doing so to get food, and that he had been hit with a belt by his father. Investigation revealed the home to be dangerous, and all eight children were removed to the care of the LA. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.606353

A v United Kingdom: ECHR 1 Oct 1998

The beating of a child aged 9, by his father, with a cane repeatedly, and so as to leave bruising, was inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and was not capable of being reasonable chastisement. UK law failed properly to protect the child’s human rights. Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention, together, impose a positive obligation on the state to make provision through the criminal law for the protection of children and other vulnerable people against abuse that amounts to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of the expression ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’.
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 3; Not necessary to examine Art. 8; Not necessary to examine Art. 13; Not necessary to examine Art. 14; Non-pecuniary damage – financial award; Costs and expenses partial award – Convention proceedings
Times 01-Oct-1998, (1999) 27 EHRR 611, [1998] ECHR 85, 25599/94, [2009] ECHR 1690
Bailii, Bailii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights Art 3
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Ashworth Hospital Authority (Now Mersey Care National Health Service Trust) ex parte Munjaz HL 13-Oct-2005
The claimant was detained in a secure Mental Hospital. He complained at the seclusions policy applied by the hospital, saying that it departed from the Guidance issued for such policies by the Secretary of State under the Act.
Held: The House . .
Cited – Adam, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Limbuela v Same; Tesema v Same HL 3-Nov-2005
The applicants had each entered the UK with a view to seeking asylum, but having failed to seek asylum immediately, they had been refused any assistance, were not allowed to work and so had been left destitute. Each had claimed asylum on the day . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 July 2021; Ref: scu.77589

In The Petition of The Christian Institute and Others for Judicial Review of The Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014: SCS 22 Jan 2015

The claimants challenged the 2014 Act saying that in appointing a nominated professional individual for every child, the human rights of the family had been disproportionately interfered with.
[2015] ScotCS CSOH – 7
Bailii
Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014
Scotland
Cited by:
Appeal from – The Christian Institute, Family Education Trust and similar, Mcintosh and Thomas v The Scottish Minister SCS 3-Sep-2015
(Second Division, Inner House) The petitioning charities challenged the validity of the 2014 Act saying that it was an unwarranted intrusion on the private lives of families in Scotland. . .
At Outer House – The Christian Institute and Others v The Lord Advocate SC 28-Jul-2016
(Scotland) By the 2014 Act, the Scottish Parliament had provided that each child should have a named person to monitor that child’s needs, with information about him or her shared as necessary. The Institute objected that the imposed obligation to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 July 2021; Ref: scu.541993

In re D (A Minor); D v Berkshire County Council: HL 1986

A baby was taken into care suffering from drug withdrawal symptoms from birth. On a literal reading of the phrase, ‘baby’s heath is being impaired’, the statutory test could never be met on the particular facts of the case.
Held: The phrase applied to the continuous period from birth and was continuing at the time the Order was made. The Order was valid.
Lord Brandon analysed the statute, which provided for a place of safety order, an interim order and, finally, a full care order, saying: ‘With regard to the second question relating to the expression ‘is being’, it is in my opinion necessary to have in mind the purpose sought to be achieved not only by Section 1 but also by Section 28 of the 1969 Act. The effect of Section 28, when combined with that of Section 1, is to create a process for the protection of children which may often include three separate but connected stages . . Against the background of these three possible stages . . it is, in my view, clear that the Court, in considering whether a continuing situation . . exists, must do so at the point of time immediately before the process of protecting the child concerned is first put into motion. To consider that matter at a point of time when the child has been placed under protection for several weeks . . would . . defeat the purpose of Parliament.’
Lord Brandon
[1987] AC 317, [1987] 1 All ER 20, [1986] 3 WLR 1080, (1986) 151 JP 313, (1986) 85 LGR 169, [1987] Fam Law 202
Children and Young Persons Act 1969
England and Wales
Cited by:
Applied – Re M (A Minor) (Care Orders: Threshold Conditions) HL 7-Jun-1994
The father had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of the child’s mother. Application was made for the child to be made subject to a care order. The father appealed refusal of an order.
Held: When an application was made on the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.182987

Woolfe, Regina (on The Application of) v London Borough of Islington: Admn 15 Jul 2016

The claimant sought judicial review against Islington under three discrete heads of claim that (1) an aspect of Islington’s scheme is unlawful in that it prevents applicants to whom reasonable preference must be given, but who have fewer than 120 points, from bidding at all for available properties; (2) additionally or alternatively, that points threshold for bidding is unlawful, being in breach of section 11 of the Children Act 2004; and (3) in relation to herself, Islington in any event misapplied their own policy and failed to award her the 90 ‘New Generation’ points to which she says she is entitled under Islington’s own policy and scheme.
Holman J
[2016] EWHC 1907 (Admin)
Bailii
Children Act 2004 11
England and Wales

Updated: 24 July 2021; Ref: scu.567657

In re JSB; Chief Executive, Ministry of Social Development v S and B; 4 Nov 2009

References: [2010] 2 NZLR 236, [2009] NZHC 2054
Links: Nzlii
Coram: Heath J
Ratio: (New Zealand High Court) The child was alive but severely brain damaged, having been injured by his mother. There was a dispute between his grandparents, who were caring for him, and his birth parents as to the funeral arrangements if he were to die.
Held: Although on the facts before him an order would be premature, a jurisdiction did exist before a child’s death to decide appropriate funeral arrangements after death. However, the court had no jurisdiction to make guardianship orders which would take effect only on death, as on death guardianship responsibilities end: ‘Parens patriae and administration are two manifestations of the inherent jurisdiction. Together, they demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction applying to a continuum, from the beginning of life until after its end. While the former is directed to the living and the latter to the dead, s.16 of the Judicature Act draws no distinction between aspects of the inherent jurisdiction. The existence of the continuum favours this Court’s ability to do such things as are necessary to protect the interests of the living child, after death.
Viewed as a continuum, the inherent jurisdiction covers the very situation that has arisen in this case. Provided that there is justification for the view that an order is required, while JSB is alive, to protect his best interests after death, I hold that the inherent jurisdiction can be used to make such an order. The fact that any order might deal with a topic at the intersection of the two relevant aspects of the inherent jurisdiction is, in my view, irrelevant. The continuum approach militates against a sharp distinction between different aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction. Power to make an order arises from a single source: the inherent jurisdiction.’
This case is cited by:

  • Applied – RE JS (Disposal of Body) FD (Bailii, [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam), Judiciary)
    JS, a child of 14, anticpating her death from cancer expressed the desire that her body should receive cryonic preservation in the hope that one day a treatment might be available to allow her to be revived, and proceedings were issued. Her parents . .
  • Cited – Takamore v Clarke and others (Nzlii, SC 131/2011, [2012] NZSC 116, [2013] 2 NZLR 733)
    Supreme Court of New Zealand – The deceased was Tuhoe, but had spent the last twenty years of his life in Christchurch with his partner, whom he named his executor in his will. After his death his Tuhoe whanau moved his body to the Bay of Plenty and . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Jurisdiction: New Zealand

Last Update: 19-Nov-16
Ref: 571416

43 Ass Pl 15 10 El Dyer, 269; 2 Jan 1220

References: [1220] EngR 533, (1220-1623) Jenk 48, (1220) 145 ER 36 (B)
Links: Commonlii
Ratio:The King in Parliament grants to the prince, the dutchy of Cornwall, with the wards and marriages of his tenants by knight’s-service thereunto belonging : the King has A. his tenant within the said Dutchy, who holds of him (viz. the King), other lands elsewhere in capite; this tenant dies his heir within age, this A. also held other lands of the dutchy by knight-service : the prince shall not have the wardship of the heir of A. nor of the land in this case ; for A was of integer tenens of the dutchy ; and this is a special case of prerogative, that the King’s charters, without express mention, do not pass any thing, nor are of any effect in such case.

Last Update: 29-Jun-16
Ref: 461445

B -v The United Kingdom; P v The United Kingdom: ECHR 24 Apr 2001

References: Times 15-May-2001, 36337/97, 35974/97, (2002) 34 EHRR 529, [2001] 2 FLR 261, [2001] ECHR 295, [1999] ECHR 179
Links: Bailii, Bailii
Ratio The procedures in English law which provided for privacy for proceedings involving children did not in general infringe the human right to family life, nor the right to a public hearing. Where relatives more distant than immediate parties were affected, the rules allowed application for their admission to the proceedings, and leave could also be sought to disclose the results of the proceedings to named parties. Custody and contact disputes were prime examples of situations where exclusion of the press and public could be justified to protect the interests of the child and parties to the case: ‘such proceedings are prime examples of cases where the exclusion of the press and public may be justified in order to protect the privacy of the child and parties and to avoid prejudicing the interests of justice. To enable the deciding judge to gain as full and accurate a picture as possible of the advantages and disadvantages of the various residence and contact options open to the child, it is essential that the parents and other witnesses feel able to express themselves candidly on highly personal issues without fear of public curiosity or comment . . to pronounce the judgment in public would, to a large extent, frustrate these aims.’ Parties were expected to be candid and open about events, and that would be threatened if proceedings were held in public.
Statutes: European Convention on Human Rights 6.1
This case cites:

  • Appeal from – P-B (a Minor) (child cases: hearings in open court) CA (Bailii, [1996] EWCA Civ 510, (1997) 1 All ER 58, [1996] 2 FLR 765)
    The applicant sought to have his application for a residence order heard in open court: ‘Article 6 (1) provides for the public hearing and the public pronouncement of judgment of cases, but with the proviso of exclusion of the press and the public . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Kent County Council -v- The Mother, The Father, B (By Her Children’s Guardian); Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) FD ([2004] EWHC 411 (Fam), Bailii, [2004] 2 FLR 142, [2004] EWHC Fam 411, [2004] Lloyds Rep Med 303)
    The council had taken the applicant’s children into care alleging that the mother had harmed them. In the light of the subsequent cases casting doubt on such findings, the mother sought the return of her children. She applied now that the hearings . .
  • Appealed to – P-B (a Minor) (child cases: hearings in open court) CA (Bailii, [1996] EWCA Civ 510, (1997) 1 All ER 58, [1996] 2 FLR 765)
    The applicant sought to have his application for a residence order heard in open court: ‘Article 6 (1) provides for the public hearing and the public pronouncement of judgment of cases, but with the proviso of exclusion of the press and the public . .
  • Cited – Pelling -v- Bruce-Williams, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening CA ((2004) 2 FLR 823, Bailii, [2004] EWCA Civ 845, [2004] 3 All ER 875)
    The applicant sought an order that his application for a joint residence order should be held in public.
    Held: Though there was some attractiveness in the applicant’s arguments, the issue had been fully canvassed by the ECHR. The time had come . .
  • Cited – A -v- British Broadcasting Corporation (Scotland) SC ([2015] 1 AC 588, 2014 SC (UKSC) 151, 2014 SCLR 593, Bailii, [2014] UKSC 25, [2014] 2 All ER 1037, 2014 GWD 15-266, [2014] WLR(D) 196, [2014] 2 WLR 1243, [2014] EMLR 25, 2014 SLT 613, WLRD, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2013/0159, SC Summary, SC)
    The BBC challenged an order made by the Court of Session in judicial review proceedings, permitting the applicant review to delete his name and address and substituting letters of the alphabet, in the exercise (or, as the BBC argues, purported . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17-May-16
Ref: 166087

X v Y v St Bartholomew’s Hospital Centre for Reproductive Medicine (Assisted Reproduction: Parent); FC 13 Feb 2015

References: [2015] EWFC 13
Links: Bailii
Coram: Theis J
Ratio The required Form PP was not on the clinic’s file. Theis J set out four issues which accordingly arose: (1) Did X sign the Form PP so that it complied with section 37(1) of the 2008 Act? (2) If X did, was the Form PP subsequently mislaid by the clinic? (3) Was the treatment ‘provided under a licence’ as required by section 37(1)? (4) If the Form PP form was not signed can the court ‘read down’ section 37(1) to enable the court to make the declaration of parentage sought? She summarised her conclusions as follows: ‘I have concluded, on the facts of this case, that it is more likely than not that X did sign the PP form on 26 October 2012, and it has subsequently been mislaid by the clinic. I have also concluded, in the circumstances of this case, the failure by the clinic to maintain records did not amount to a breach of the licence so as to invalidate it, so that the treatment was ‘provided under a licence’ as required by s. 37(1).’
Ratio Theis J summarised the statutory record requirements: ‘Section 12(1)(d) HFEA 1990 provides that one of the conditions of every licence granted is that ‘proper records shall be maintained in such form as the Authority may specify in directions’. Direction 0012 requires licensed centres to maintain for a period of 30 years certain specific records, including ‘all consent forms and any specific instructions relating to the use and/or disposal of gametes and embryos’ (paragraph 1(f)). Licence condition T47 provides ‘All records must be clear and readable, protected from unauthorised amendment and retained and readily retrieved in this condition throughout their specified retention period in compliance with the data protection legislation’. At paragraph 31.2 of the guidance it provides ‘A record is defined as ‘information created or received, and maintained as evidence by a centre or person, in meeting legal obligations or in transacting business. Records can be in any form or medium providing they are readily accessible, legible and indelible’.’
It is clear from the findings I have made about the clinic not keeping the PP form for X that the CRM is in breach of Direction 0012.’
Statutes: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – In the matter of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 ; A and Others FD (Bailii, [2015] EWHC 2602 (Fam), [2016] 1 WLR 1325, (2015) 146 BMLR 123, [2015] 3 FCR 555, [2016] 1 All ER 273, [2015] WLR(D) 387, [2015] Fam Law 1333, WLRD)
    The court was asked: ‘who, in law, is or are the parent(s) of a child born as a result of treatment carried out under this legislation’
    Held: The court pointed again to the failures to keep proper records within several fertility clinics. . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17-May-16
Ref: 542927

Thomas v Gwynne; Thomas v Thomas; 17 Feb 1846

References: [1846] EngR 424 (A), (1845-1846) 9 Beav 275
Links: Commonlii
An infant devisee had been ordered to convey real estate sold for payment of the testator’s debts. He made default, and was not amenable to process. The Court, under the 1 W 4 c 60 s 8, directed a person to convey in his place.
This case cites:

  • See Also – Thomas -v- Gwynne; Thomas -v- Thomas ([1845] EngR 1096 (A), Commonlii, (1845) 8 Beav 312)
    Process by attachment to compel an infant to convey estates sold in a creditor’s suit. It is a contenpt to interfere and prevent an infant obeying the the order of the court to convey. . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 12-Jan-16 Ref: 302319

W v W (Child of the Family); 3 Nov 1984

References: [1984] FLR 796, Times 03-Nov-1984
Coram: Hollings J
M sought to establish that the defendant was the father of her child. Her complaint being out of time, she had to rely upon section 2(1)(b) to establish responsibility. The putative father had not given her money for maintenance but had contributed to the cost of a pram, and had given trousers and a jumper on his first birthday.
Held: The contributions were sufficient under the section to allow the court to find him to be the father.
Statutes: Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957
Last Update: 11-Dec-15 Ref: 556475