Category: Housing

Khelassi v London Borough of Brent: CA 7 Dec 2006

The court considered the use of medical expert evidence in applications for emergency housing.

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 1825

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Shala and Another v Birmingham City Council CA 27-Jun-2007
The claimants succeeded in their applications for asylum, and then applied for housing assistance. They now appealed refusal of such assistance. The issue was how the authority had treated their medical evidence in the review process. Mrs Shala was . .
Cited – London Borough of Wandsworth v Allison CA 15-Apr-2008
The claimant had applied for emergency housing, saying that he had suffered a deep vein thrombosis, and was vulnerable under the 1996 Act. The authority said that its finding that the VT would not put him at additional risk if homeless, was one of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 09 July 2022; Ref: scu.249109

Ealing London Borough Council v Race Relations Board: HL 16 Dec 1971

The council operated a housing policy which required applicants for housing tbe British nationals. Mr Zesko, a Polish national, complained that this was race discrimination.
Held: The House declined to interpret ‘national origins’ in the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Race Relations Act 1968 so as to include ‘nationality’: discriminating against the non-British was allowed.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale observed: ‘ . . I think that considerable caution is needed in construing a general statutory provision by reference to its statutory exceptions. ‘Saving clauses’ are often included by way of reassurance, for avoidance of doubt or from abundance of caution.’
Lord Cross said: ‘There is no definition of national origin in the Act and one must interpret the phrase as best one can. To me it suggests a connection subsisting at the time of birth between an individual and one or more groups of people who can be described as ‘a nation’ – whether or not that constitutes a sovereign state. The connection will normally arise because the parents or one of the parents of the individual in question are or is identified by descent with the nation in question; but it may also sometimes arise because the parents have made their home among the people in question.’
Race should be understood in the popular sense rather than an anthropological or biological sense

Judges:

Lord Donovan, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Kilbrandon

Citations:

[1971] UKHL 3, [1972] AC 342, [1972] 2 WLR 71

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Race Relations Act 1968 1(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See Also – Race Relations Board v Applin CA 1973
. .
See Also – Applin v Race Relations Board HL 27-Mar-1974
A couple cared for children without fee who were referred to them by a local authority. The children they cared for included coloured children. Two individuals sought to prevent the couple caring for coloured children. The question for the House of . .
Cited – Rogers, Regina v CACD 10-Nov-2005
The defendant appealed his conviction for racially aggravated abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to cause fear or to provoke violence. He was driving his motorised scooter and came across three Spanish women. In the course of an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Discrimination

Updated: 09 July 2022; Ref: scu.248592

Polarpark Enterprises Inc v Allason: ChD 22 Jan 2007

The defendant occupied the claimant’s property as a residence under a license. The claimant had sought immediate possession. The defendant claimed that he either owned it, had a claim in adverse possession, or a license and the right to protection under the 1977 Act.

Judges:

Briggs J

Citations:

[2007] EWHC 22 (Ch)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Protection from Eviction Act 1977

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See Also – Polar Park Enterprises v Allason ChD 18-Apr-2007
The defendant occupied property belonging to the claimant. An order for immediate possession had been granted in January. The defendant now said that part of the order was been made without jurisdiction.
Held: Though he occupied the property . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 09 July 2022; Ref: scu.247968

Regina v Shropshire County Council, ex parte Bungay: Admn 1991

The court upheld a planning decision that a gypsy family had retained their nomadic way of life notwithstanding that they had not travelled for many years. Fifteen years after the gypsy family had stopped travelling because of the father’s age and ill-health, the court held that they were still of a nomadic habit of life because they had not abandoned their nomadic lifestyle but held it in abeyance to care for the father.

Judges:

Otton J

Citations:

[1991] 23 HLR

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Wrexham County Borough v The National Assembly of Wales, Michael Berry, Florence Berry CA 19-Jun-2003
A traditional gypsy family had settled because of ill health, and sought to establish a caravan site. The authority claimed they were no longer to be treated as Gypsy and having the entitlement under the Act.
Held: The Act defined ‘Gypsies’ as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Planning

Updated: 08 July 2022; Ref: scu.184236

S v United Kingdom: ECHR 1986

The applicant was not entitled in domestic law to succeed to a tenancy on the death of her partner. The aim of the legislation is question was to protect the family, a goal similar to the protection of the right to respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The aim itself is clearly legitimate. The question remains, however, whether it was justified to protect families but not to give similar protection to other stable relationships. The Commission considers that the family (to which the relationship of heterosexual unmarried couples living together as husband and wife can be assimilated) merits special protection in society and it sees no reason why a High Contracting Power should not afford particular assistance to families. The Commission therefore accepted that the difference in treatment between the applicant and somebody in the same position whose partner had been of the opposite sex can be objectively and reasonably justified. And ‘The Commission notes that the applicant was occupying the house, of which her partner had been the tenant, without any legal title whatsoever. Contractual relations were established between the local authority and the deceased partner and that contractual agreement may or may not have permitted long-term visitors. The fact remains, however, that on the death of the partner, under the ordinary law, the applicant was no longer entitled to remain in the house, and the local authority was entitled to possession so that the house could no longer be regarded as ‘home’ for the applicant within the meaning of Article 8.’
A stable homosexual relationship between two men does not fall within the scope of the right to respect for family life, but that such a relationship may be a matter affecting private life

Citations:

[1986] 47 D and R 274, 11716/85, (1986) 47 DR 274

Statutes:

European Convention on Human Rights 8

Jurisdiction:

Human Rights

Cited by:

Cited – Grant v South West Trains Ltd ECJ 17-Feb-1998
A company’s ban on the provision of travel perks to same sex partners of employees did not constitute breach of European sex discrimination law. An employer’s policy was not necessarily to be incorporated into the contract of employment. The court . .
Cited – Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza CA 5-Nov-2002
The applicant sought to succeed to the tenancy of his deceased homosexual partner as his partner rather than as a member of his family.
Held: A court is bound by any decision within the normal hierachy of domestic authority as to the meaning . .
Cited – London Borough of Harrow v Qazi HL 31-Jul-2003
The applicant had held a joint tenancy of the respondent. His partner gave notice and left, and the property was taken into possession. The claimant claimed restoration of his tenancy saying the order did not respect his right to a private life and . .
Superceded – Karner v Austria ECHR 24-Jul-2003
A surviving same-sex partner sought a right of succession to a tenancy (of their previously shared flat). Interveners ‘pointed out that a growing number of national courts in European and other democratic societies require equal treatment of . .
Superceded – Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza HL 21-Jun-2004
Same Sex Partner Entitled to tenancy Succession
The protected tenant had died. His same-sex partner sought a statutory inheritance of the tenancy.
Held: His appeal succeeded. The Fitzpatrick case referred to the position before the 1998 Act: ‘Discriminatory law undermines the rule of law . .
Cited – Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .
Cited – Kay and Another v London Borough of Lambeth and others; Leeds City Council v Price and others and others HL 8-Mar-2006
In each case the local authority sought to recover possession of its own land. In the Lambeth case, they asserted this right as against an overstaying former tenant, and in the Leeds case as against gypsies. In each case the occupiers said that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Discrimination, Housing

Updated: 08 July 2022; Ref: scu.182209

Regina v London Borough of Newham ex parte Bibi, Regina v London Borough of Newham ex parte Al-Nashed: Admn 18 Jan 1996

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 4

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina v London Borough of Newham and Bibi and Al-Nashed CA 26-Apr-2001
The housing authority had mistakenly thought that it was obliged to re-house the applicants under the Act with secure accommodation, and promised them accordingly.
Held: That promise had created a legitimate expectation: ‘In all legitimate . .

Cited by:

Appealed to – Regina v London Borough of Newham and Bibi and Al-Nashed CA 26-Apr-2001
The housing authority had mistakenly thought that it was obliged to re-house the applicants under the Act with secure accommodation, and promised them accordingly.
Held: That promise had created a legitimate expectation: ‘In all legitimate . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Administrative, Local Government, Housing

Updated: 08 July 2022; Ref: scu.136552

Austin v Southwark London Borough Council (499): QBD 29 Jan 2008

Judges:

Flaux J

Citations:

[2008] EWHC 499 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See Also – Austin v Southwark London Borough Council (355) QBD 29-Jan-2008
. .
See Also – Austin v London Borough of Southwark CA 16-Feb-2009
The court considered the right to succeed to a secure tenancy which has terminated during the lifetime of the tenant as a result of a possession order, but with the former tenant remaining in possession as ‘a tolerated trespasser’, and having a . .
At First Instance – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC 23-Jun-2010
The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 08 July 2022; Ref: scu.296305

Austin v Southwark London Borough Council (355): QBD 29 Jan 2008

Judges:

Flaux J

Citations:

[2008] EWHC 355 (QB)

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council HL 31-Oct-1996
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority . .
See Also – Austin v Southwark London Borough Council (499) QBD 29-Jan-2008
. .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Austin v London Borough of Southwark CA 16-Feb-2009
The court considered the right to succeed to a secure tenancy which has terminated during the lifetime of the tenant as a result of a possession order, but with the former tenant remaining in possession as ‘a tolerated trespasser’, and having a . .
At First Instance – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC 23-Jun-2010
The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 08 July 2022; Ref: scu.266523

Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Danesh: CA 5 Oct 2006

The tenant family appealed against a decision that the authority had no duty to rehouse them after they suffered violence. They had been living for a year in Swansea and on being granted indefinite leave to remain they were now eligible under Part VII of the 1996 Act. They applied to Kensington which referred them to Swansea. They complained of trouble from local youths in Swansea, shouting abuse and making insulting gestures, racist abuse on a bus, and two specific incidents of assault outside a community centre and in the city centre. The authority said that the two assaults were random incidents of crime which might happen anywhere to anyone and were not part of a course of harassment against the applicant or his family. The verbal abuse did not amount to a threat of violence and accordingly there was no reason to believe that it was more likely than not that violence would result if they returned to Swansea.
Held: In this context, ‘violence’ involved some sort of physical contact: Neuberger LJ accepted the council’s contention that ‘In section 198 ‘violence’ means physical violence, and the word ‘violence’ on its own does not include threats of violence or acts or gestures, which lead someone to fear physical violence’ The section applies only to physical contact and violence so as to disallow a claim for housing.

Judges:

Neuberger, Mummery, Jacob LJJ

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 1404, [2007] 1 WLR 69

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 198

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Binding – Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow CA 15-Dec-2009
‘The sole but important issue on this appeal is the meaning of ‘violence’ in section 177(1) of the Housing Act 1996 (‘the Act’). The question is whether, for the purposes of that provision, ‘violence’ requires some sort of physical contact or . .
Overruled – Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow SC 26-Jan-2011
The appellant sought housing after leaving her home to escape domestic violence. The violence was short of physical violence, and the authority had denied a duty to rehouse her. She said that the term ‘domestic violence’ in the Act was not intended . .
Cited – Bubb v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 9-Nov-2011
The appellant had sought housing assistance. She had been offered accomodation but refused it as unreasonable. The authority declined further assistance. She now appealed against the refusal of the county court judge to set aside the decision . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 08 July 2022; Ref: scu.245910

Ireneschild, Regina (on the Application Of) v London Borough of Lambeth: Admn 8 Sep 2006

The claimant sought judicial review of the authority’s decision as to her housing requirements saying that the consultation had been inadequate.
Held: Judicial review was granted.

Citations:

[2006] EWHC 2354 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Cited by:

Appeal from – Lambeth London Borough Council v Ireneschild CA 16-Mar-2007
The tenant held a secure tenancy of a first floor flat of the Council. She was severely disabled and argued that the danger of injury meant that she should be allowed to occupy the empty ground floor flat. She complained at the way the authority had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Local Government

Updated: 08 July 2022; Ref: scu.245591

Morgan v Stirling Council: SCS 10 Oct 2006

(Outer House) Lord Glennie pointed out that anyone who is homeless is also vulnerable, and accordingly it follows that section 189(1)(c) must contemplate homeless people who would be more vulnerable than many others in the same position (especially given the words ‘or other special reason’ which show that vulnerability arising from many causes is covered).

Judges:

Lord Glennie

Citations:

[2006] ScotCS CSOH – 154, [2006] Hous LR 95, 2006 SLT 962

Links:

ScotC, Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 189(1)

Cited by:

Cited – Hotak and Others v London Borough of Southwark and Another SC 13-May-2015
The court was asked as to the duty of local housing authorities towards homeless people who claim to be ‘vulnerable’, and therefore to have ‘a priority need’ for the provision of housing accommodation under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Those . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Scotland, Housing

Updated: 08 July 2022; Ref: scu.245477

Griffiths v St Helens Council: CA 7 Mar 2006

The applicant had been agreed to be homeless with priority need, and had been provided with an assured shorthold tenancy.
Held: The Legislation now allowed broadly three classes of accomodation as suitable: (1) accommodation owned by the local authority; (2) accommodation in the hands of registered social landlords; and (3) private rented accommodation. The tenant argued that the effect of the 2002 amendments was entirely to remove assured shorthold tenancies from the ambit of s193(5) of the 1996 Act. This was not correct. The local authority could satisfy its obligations by provision of a series of short term lettings, but a short term letting itself did not discharge the council of its obligations, which were continued or revived as a tenancy came to an end. ‘local housing authorities, who seek to discharge their duty under section 193(2) by securing the offer of an assured shorthold tenancy from a private landlord to which, if the offer is refused, section 193(5) may apply, [should] explain in the offer letter what they are doing. The explanation should include statements to the effect (a) that the authority acknowledges that the accommodation would be temporary if the private landlord lawfully exercises his right to recover possession after the end of the fixed term; and (b) that, if that happens and assuming that the applicant’s circumstances have not materially changed, the authority accepts that it would again become obliged to perform its duty under the section to secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant. ‘
May LJ said: ‘There are now eight circumstances in which section 193 provides that the local housing authority ‘shall cease’ to be subject to the duty under the section. They fall roughly into three groups. The first group – sub-sections (6)(a) and (b) – comprise circumstances in which one of the criteria in section 193(1) ceases to apply. This group may be left to one side. The second group – sub-sections (5), (6)(d) and (7) – comprise circumstances in which the applicant has acted to frustrate the efforts of the local housing authority to overcome their homelessness. The applicant ‘refuses’ or ‘voluntarily ceases to occupy’ suitable temporary or permanent accommodation secured for him. The third group – sub-sections (6)(c) and (cc) and (7B) – comprise circumstances in which the applicant ‘accepts’ an offer of accommodation. The first two of these are offers of secure or permanent accommodation. For reasons which I shall shortly explain, I think that sub-section (7B) is also concerned with what is to be regarded as permanent accommodation. Applicants within the third group, therefore, are no longer to be regarded as homeless.’

Judges:

Lord Justice May Lord Justice Rix Mr Justice Coleridge

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 160, Times 24-Apr-2006, [2006] 1 WLR 2233

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 193, Homelessness Act 2002, Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2003

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Crawley Borough Council v Bliss CA 22-Feb-2000
A local authority refused the applicants application for emergency housing as a homeless person. On the review of that decision the authority concluded that she did have priority need, but then decided that the application should be refused because . .
Cited – London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Deugi CA 7-Mar-2006
The court considered whether a successful appeal against a local authority’s decision on the need for emergency housing should lead to the case being remitted to them for a further review. May LJ defined the question to be: ‘whether there was any . .
Cited – Regina v Brent London Borough Council Ex Parte Awua HL 6-Jul-1995
The term ‘Accommodation’ in the Act was to be read to include short term lettings, and was not to be restricted to secure accommodation, and the loss of such accommodation can be counted as intentional homelessness. If a person who had been provided . .
Cited – Regina v Wandsworth London Borough Council Ex Parte Wingrove; Regina v Same Ex Parte Mansoor CA 7-Jun-1996
Accommodation provided by a local authority need not be permanent in order to satisfy the statutory requirement to assist somebody in need of assistance for homelessness. The full duty might be discharged by securing the offer of an assured . .

Cited by:

Cited – Muse v London Borough of Brent CA 19-Dec-2008
The court was asked whether the section 193 duty to provide housing was lost after the applicant had refused alternative temporary accommodation. The applicant had been granted temporary accommodation, but her family grew and it became too small. . .
Cited – Ravichandran and Another v London Borough of Lewisham CA 2-Jul-2010
The claimant appealed against an order confirming a review of the decision that the local authority owed no futher duty to her under section 193. She had rejected the house offered as unsuitable for medical reasons.
Held: The tenant’s appeal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 07 July 2022; Ref: scu.238888

London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Deugi: CA 7 Mar 2006

The court considered whether a successful appeal against a local authority’s decision on the need for emergency housing should lead to the case being remitted to them for a further review. May LJ defined the question to be: ‘whether there was any real prospect that Tower Hamlets, acting rationally, and with the benefit of further enquiry, might have been satisfied that Mrs Deugi was intentionally homeless.’ to which he answered:
‘I express the question thus, conscious that close analysis of three decisions of this Court could raise something of a debate. I have already set out in paragraph 28 Chadwick LJ’s approach in [Crawley BC v B (2000) 32 HLR 636, 651] – ‘the only decision . . that the council, acting rationally, could reach.’ In Bond v Leicester City Council (2002) HLR 158 at 168, Hale LJ expressed her conclusion as ‘ . . more likely than not that if the authority had asked themselves the right question they would have reached the conclusion . . ‘. The submission made in Bond was in terms of ‘the only possible conclusion’ (see page 167); and it looks as if Hale LJ was influenced by the definition of domestic violence in s. 177 of the 1996 Act. In Ekwuru v Westminster C.C. (2004) HLR 98 at 205, Schiemann LJ held that ‘there is no real prospect of the authority turning up further material which would entitle it to reach the conclusion that . . ‘. My formulation, which may perhaps be seen as an amalgam of Chadwick LJ and Schiemann LJ, is intended to reflect the fact that this appeal process is in the nature of judicial review.’

Judges:

Lord Justice Gage Lord Justice May Lord Justice Rix

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 159

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Griffiths v St Helens Council CA 7-Mar-2006
The applicant had been agreed to be homeless with priority need, and had been provided with an assured shorthold tenancy.
Held: The Legislation now allowed broadly three classes of accomodation as suitable: (1) accommodation owned by the local . .
Cited – Ozbek v Ispwich Borough Council CA 4-May-2006
The claimant applied to be housed as a homeless person. The authority sought to refer him to a different authority under s198. As an asylum seeker, he had been given assistance both in Portsmouth and Southampton before coming to Ipswich. He said . .
Cited – Slater v London Borough of Lewisham CA 12-Apr-2006
The applicant was heavily pregnant when she was offered a first floor one bedroomed flat. She rejected it.
Held: When a housing authority reviewed its decision on the applicant’s decision not to accept the accommodation offered, that review . .
Cited – London Borough of Wandsworth v Allison CA 15-Apr-2008
The claimant had applied for emergency housing, saying that he had suffered a deep vein thrombosis, and was vulnerable under the 1996 Act. The authority said that its finding that the VT would not put him at additional risk if homeless, was one of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Administrative

Updated: 07 July 2022; Ref: scu.238889

Burrows v Brent London Borough Council: HL 31 Oct 1996

The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority appealed.
Held: The agreement had created a new tenancy even after a final possession order had been made, and a A new possession order was required before any warrant could be issued. Had the authority obtained a suspended possession order, no new tenancy might have been created. While a tenant could not sue for breach of a landlord’s covenant while the tenancy was in the state of limbo, if and when the secure tenancy revived, its covenants likewise revived and were to be treated as having been in existence during the limbo period.
An agreement which allowed a tenant to stay on in a house after a possession order had been made, did not itself create a new tenancy, but he might have the status of being a ‘tolerated trespasser’: ‘In the absence of special circumstances, an agreement by a landlord not to enforce strictly an order for possession, whether conditional or unconditional does not create a new secure tenancy or licence.’ However, a tenant who had not been evicted could apply under section 85(2) to postpone the date of possession, and, upon such postponement, the secure tenancy would be revived because ‘the date on which the tenant is to give up possession’ would not have arisen and thus the tenancy would not have ended. Until a possession order was executed, the court could by variation of its order change the date on which possession is to be given and thereby revive a secure tenancy which had already been terminated.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: ‘What, then, is the correct legal analysis? I start from the proposition that where a former tenant is by agreement allowed to remain in possession of the demised property after the termination of the tenancy, the question in each case is quo animo the parties have so acted: depending upon the circumstances, their conduct may give rise to a new tenancy, a licence or some other arrangement. In the present case, on 5 February 1992 the parties plainly did not intend to create a new tenancy or licence but only to defer the execution of the order so long as Miss Burrows complied with the agreed conditions. It cannot be right to impute to the parties an intention to create a legal relationship such as a secure tenancy or licence unless the legal structures within which they made their agreement force that conclusion.
A secure tenancy protected by Part IV of the Act of 1985 is not like an ordinary tenancy. It can only be terminated by an order of the court ordering possession to be given on a particular date or in a particular event. But even determination by order of the court is not final. Until the possession order is executed, the court can by variation of its order change the date on which possession is to be given and thereby revive a secure tenancy which has already been terminated. During the period between the date specified by the order for the giving of possession and the date on which the order is executed there is a period of limbo: the old tenancy has gone but may yet be revived by a further order of the court varying the date for possession. If the parties reach an agreement as to the continued occupation of the premises by the tenant during that limbo period, what intention is to be imputed to them?
In my judgment little guidance is to be obtained from the cases where a tenant holds over after the termination of an ordinary tenancy where there is no possibility that the expired tenancy can revive. The position in relation to secure tenancies is sui generis. In my judgment, the agreement can and should take effect in the way the parties intend, i.e. it is an agreement by the landlords that, upon the tenant complying with the agreed conditions, the landlords will forbear from executing the order, i.e. from taking the step which would finally put an end to the tenant’s right to apply to the court for an order reviving the tenancy. There is no need to impute to the parties an intention to create a new tenancy or licence: the retention of possession and the payment of rent relate to occupation under the old tenancy which is in limbo but which may be revived. In these circumstances I think it is fair to characterise the former tenant as a trespasser whom the landlord has agreed not to evict – a ‘tolerated trespasser’ – pending either the revival of the old tenancy or the breach of the agreed conditions.
Once the effect of section 85 is appreciated, the absurdities which led the Court of Appeal not to accept that Miss Burrows could be a tolerated trespasser disappear. Technically the old secure tenancy is, during the limbo period, no longer in existence and therefore neither the repairing covenants in the tenancy nor the Defective Premises Act 1972 apply. But the tenant can at any time apply to the court for an order varying the date on which possession is to be given and thereby retrospectively revive the old secure tenancy, together with its covenants. If the tenant has complied with the agreed conditions, there can be little doubt that the court would make the required order. Moreover, the tenant will not be a homeless person within section 58(2) of the Act of 1985 because the tenant will be occupying the residence by virtue of any ‘rule of law giving him the right to remain in occupation:’ see section 58(2)(c). If the tenant were in breach of any of the covenants in the old secure tenancy, Brent could apply to vary the order so as retrospectively to revive the old tenancy together with its covenants.
Finally, there is a method (albeit a clumsy one) whereby the order for possession even if an immediate unconditional order, can be discharged or rescinded if so desired under section 85(4). The power in that subsection to discharge or rescind only arises ‘if the conditions are complied with,’ a requirement which cannot be satisfied in the case of an unconditional order. But there is no reason why the order cannot be discharged by consent or, if such consent is not forthcoming, by the court varying the original order so as to impose the agreed conditions and then discharging the varied order.
It was submitted that the fact that the tenancy was granted to Miss Burrows jointly with Mr. Allen whereas the agreement of 5 February 1992 was made with Miss Burrows alone, indicated that the agreement must have given rise to a new tenancy with Miss Burrows alone. Therefore there must be a new tenancy. However, since in my view on its proper analysis the arrangement contained in the agreement of 5 February 1992 gave rise to no new tenancy with anyone, that factor is irrelevant. I therefore reach the conclusion that, in the absence of special circumstances, an agreement by a landlord not to enforce strictly an order for possession, whether conditional or unconditional, does not create a new secure tenancy or licence under Part IV of Act of 1985.
As Brent, by making the agreement of 5 February 1992, did not grant a new tenancy or licence to Miss Burrows as from 12 February 1992. It follows that the possession order of 29 January 1992 was properly enforced. I would therefore reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the trial judge and dismiss Miss Burrows’s action.’
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle said: ‘whereas an order postponing the date of possession necessarily affects the operation of section 82(2), an order staying or suspending the execution of an order for possession on a stated date has no effect on the operation of that subsection but merely postpones execution so long as the conditions of suspension are complied with.’

Judges:

Browne-Wilkinson L

Citations:

Gazette 20-Nov-1996, Times 04-Nov-1996, [1996] 4 All ER 577, [1997] 1 EGLR 32, [1997] 2 FCR 43, [1996] NPC 149, [1997] Fam Law 246, [1996] UKHL 20, (1997) 29 HLR 167, [1997] 11 EG 150, [1997] 1 FLR 178

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 82 85(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Applied – Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan CA 31-Jan-1996
The authority had taken possession proceedings against the secure tenant for non-payment of rent, and obtained an order, suspended on condition as to payments. He again fell into arrears, and the authority made a further agreement. They now sought . .
Cited – Cannan v Hartley 1850
. .
Cited – Gray v Bompas 1862
. .
Cited – Oastler v Henderson 1877
The tenancy was for seven years. Shortly after its creation, the tenant left the keys with the agent and asked him to dispose of it or make the best bargain for surrender he could, and left for America. A tenant not being found, the agent returned . .
Appeal from – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council CA 21-Jul-1995
. .

Cited by:

Cited – Swindon Borough Council v Aston CA 19-Dec-2002
The tenant had fallen into arrears, and a possession order had been made. Having cleared the arrears, the possession order fell, but the landlord purported to issue a new tenancy agreement, with no security of tenure. They now sought possession . .
Distinguished – Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan CA 31-Jan-1996
The authority had taken possession proceedings against the secure tenant for non-payment of rent, and obtained an order, suspended on condition as to payments. He again fell into arrears, and the authority made a further agreement. They now sought . .
Cited – London Borough of Newham v Hawkins and others CA 22-Apr-2005
The landlord had obtained a possession order, but the tenant continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser, claiming entitlement as successors in title. Rent arrears had accrued, but even if the tenant had paid thenm the council would have . .
Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Cited – Richmond v Kensington and Chelsea CA 15-Feb-2006
The borough obtained a possession order of the secure tenancy of a flat occupied by their tenant for nuisance. It was suspended on terms for a certain period. They alleged further breaches shortly before the expiry of the possession order and they . .
Cited – Harlow District Council v Hall CA 28-Feb-2006
The defendant had been subject to a possession order in respect of his secure tenancy. He was later adjudged bankrupt. He asserted that the bankruptcy specifically prevented other action to enforce the debt, and the suspended possession order was . .
Cited – White v Knowsley Housing Trust and Another CA 2-May-2007
The tenant was an assured tenant. She fell into arrears of rent and a possession order was made, but suspended on terms. The court considered whether she continued to be an assured tenant, and could assert a right to buy the property as an assured . .
Cited – Austin v Southwark London Borough Council (355) QBD 29-Jan-2008
. .
Cited – Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington CA 22-Apr-2008
The claimant was a council tenant with the right to buy her property. A possession order was made, but then discharged.
Held: On the revival of the tenancy her right to buy and discount was also revived, and there was no need to serve a fresh . .
Cited – Jones v London Borough of Merton CA 16-Jun-2008
The court was asked ‘If a former secure tenant of a dwelling-house who has become a ‘tolerated trespasser’ in it decides to cease to occupy it, does his liability to pay mesne profits to his former landlord in respect of the dwelling-house cease . .
Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v White; Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington; Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association HL 10-Dec-2008
The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
Held: . .
Cited – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC 23-Jun-2010
The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 07 July 2022; Ref: scu.78761

Evans v Fleri: Misc 18 Apr 2019

(Cardiff County court) The court was asked whether a landlord who is not a licenced landlord under Welsh housing law can serve and rely upon a notice (the section 21 notice) under section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 (the 1988 Act) and so to claim possession of a dwelling located wholly in Wales let under an assured shorthold tenancy.

Citations:

[2019] EW Misc 12 (CC), [2019] EW Misc 13 (CC)

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Jurisdiction:

Wales

Housing

Updated: 07 July 2022; Ref: scu.638245

Walker v Birmingham City Council: CA 22 Jun 2006

Judges:

Mummery LJ, Rix LJ, Peter Smith J

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 815, [2006] 1 WLR 2641

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal from – Birmingham City Council v Walker HL 16-May-2007
The tenant was the son of the former tenant. The tenancy had originally been in the ownership of his father and his mother. The father died in 1969, when the tenancy not yet a secure tenancy. On the mother’s death, the council argued that the first . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 06 July 2022; Ref: scu.242670

Church Commissioners for England v Meya: CA 21 Jun 2006

The commissioners let a flat to the tenant on an assured shorthold tenancy for a year less one day with the rent payable quarterly. The tenancy continued as a statutory periodic tenancy. The court was asked whether the statutory tenancy was an annual or quarterly tenancy. The landlord had given three months’ notice. The tenant said one year was required.
Held: The landlord’s appeal succeeded. ‘Whilst for the sake of consistency one might hope that the new statutory regime would be introduced to reflect the common law, there is no presumption in this case that it should do so. The words have to be given their ordinary meaning.’ The statutory tenancy becomes one ‘under which the periods of the tenancy are the same as [the periods] for which rent was last payable under the fixed term tenancy.’ Though the rent was expressed annually, it was payable quarterly, and therefore the statutory tenancy was quarterly.

Judges:

Lord Justice Ward The Hon Mr Justice Cresswell Lady Justice Smith

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 821, Times 04-Jul-2006

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988 5(3)(d)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Adler v Blackman CA 1953
The agreement granted a tenancy to ‘hold for the term of one year . . at the inclusive weekly rent of andpound;3 payable weekly in advance on Monday in each week during the whole of the tenancy’. The question was whether a week’s notice was adequate . .
Cited – Laine v Cadwallader CA 26-May-2000
The landlord granted an assured shorthold tenancy for six months fixed at andpound;390 ‘per calendar month payable every two months in advance’. Clause 5 allowed the tenant to terminate the agreement with ‘at least one month’s written notice’. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 July 2022; Ref: scu.242654

Laine v Cadwallader: CA 26 May 2000

The landlord granted an assured shorthold tenancy for six months fixed at andpound;390 ‘per calendar month payable every two months in advance’. Clause 5 allowed the tenant to terminate the agreement with ‘at least one month’s written notice’. The tenant left, putting the keys through the landlord’s letterbox. The landlord claimed the arrears of rent, the cost of putting right some damage done to the property and four weeks’ rent in lieu of notice (not a full calendar month’s rent). The claim for rent in lieu of notice was dismissed. The landlord appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The court discussed how the tenancy might be determined. Because of section 5(3)(e) the term in clause 5 allowing the tenant to bring the agreement to an end by giving a month’s notice could not have effect while the agreement remained an assured tenancy. For the tenant to terminate, the length of the notice to quit was to be ‘equal to at least a period of the tenancy and expiring at the end of the period of the tenancy’. That brought section 5(3)(d) into play.
Kennedy LJ said: ‘The periods of the tenancy are defined by section 5(3)(d) as being those ‘for which rent was last payable under the fixed term tenancy’. Stressing the words ‘for which’, it seems to me that the periods were calendar months because the rent was fixed at andpound;390 per calendar month. The fact that it was payable every two months in advance was only a provision as to time of payment which, for present purposes, is not material.’ The judge had erred: ‘In the present case the judge, having rightly concluded that the landlord could not rely on clause 5 of the tenancy agreement, seems to have overlooked the tenant’s obligation to serve notice to quit if he wishes unilaterally to determine a periodic tenancy, an obligation which is not ousted by any statutory provision in the Housing Act 1988.
Of course, a tenant does not have to give notice if his landlord agrees to accept with immediate effect the tenant’s offer to surrender his statutory periodic tenancy, and if the tenant delivers back to the landlord the keys of the dwelling house which was the subject matter of the tenancy; that, dependent on the circumstance, may amount to an offer to surrender which the landlord is then free to accept or reject.’
As to the return of the keys: ‘The dropping-in of the keys cannot have constituted more than an offer to surrender which the landlords were free to accept or reject. It seems clear that there was no express acceptance of the offer so as to terminate the tenancy with immediate effect. The landlords seem to have regarded the dropping-in of the keys as informal notice to quit or an offer to terminate. They seem to have agreed to terminate the tenancy at the end of the minimum period for which a proper notice could have been given (see the contents of the amended particulars of claim). So long as neither they nor the tenant did anything which could be said to have altered the position during the ensuing four weeks and the evidence, so far as it goes, does not suggest that there was any relevant development during that period, I see no reason why the court should not now regard the tenancy as having terminated by agreement when the landlords agreed that it would terminate, namely four weeks after they received the keys. The result is that they are, as claimed, entitled to recover rent for that four-week period which is the issue in this appeal.’

Judges:

Kennedy LJ, David Steel J

Citations:

(2000) 33 HLR 397, (2000) 80 P and CR D44, [2001] L and TR 8, [2000] EWCA Civ 5562, (2001) 33 HLR 36

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1988 5 21

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Javad v Aqil CA 15-May-1990
P in possession – tenancy at will Until Completion
A prospective tenant was allowed into possession and then made periodic payments of rent while negotiations proceeded on the terms of a lease to be granted to him. The negotiations broke down.
Held: The tenant’s appeal failed. It was inferred . .

Cited by:

Cited – Church Commissioners for England v Meya CA 21-Jun-2006
The commissioners let a flat to the tenant on an assured shorthold tenancy for a year less one day with the rent payable quarterly. The tenancy continued as a statutory periodic tenancy. The court was asked whether the statutory tenancy was an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 06 July 2022; Ref: scu.242681

Cramp v Hastings Borough Council: CA 29 Jul 2005

Cases challenged successful appeals by applicants for housing for homelessness, where a county court had ordered a second review of the application.

Judges:

Brooke LJ, Arden LJ, Longmore LJ

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 1005

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 184(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Azimi v Newham London Borough Council 2000
In a case where a claimant appealed to the court of appeal from the county court, and where the hearing at the county court had itself been an appeal, such a case was a second appeal, and a much higher threshold had to be passed before it was . .
Cited – Uphill v BRB (Residuary) Ltd CA 3-Feb-2005
The court considered an application for leave for a second appeal.
Held: Pursuant to the Practice Direction, the court certified that though this was an application for leave, it could be cited: ‘the reference in CPR 52.13(2)(a) to ‘an . .
Cited – Regina v Gravesham Borough Council ex parte Winchester 1986
The court considered the nature of the assessment required of a housing auithority when application was made by a person claiming to be homeless. Simon Brown J said: ‘The duty to make necessary inquiries is not a duty to make all inquiries in fact . .
Cited – Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council Ex parte Puhlhofer HL 2-Jan-1986
Not Homeless Even if Accomodation Inadequate
The applicants, a married couple, lived with a young child and later also a baby in one room of a guest house. They were given breakfast but had no cooking or washing facilities. They succeeded on a judicial review of the housing authority’s . .
Cited – Regina v Nottingham City Council ex parte Costello 1989
The court considered the nature of the duty to make inquiries imposed on a local authority faced with a homelessness application: ‘The duty to make necessary inquiries is not a duty to make all inquiries in fact necessary before the truth can be . .
Cited – Regina v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex p Bayani 1990
The court set out authoritative guidance as to the scope of a reviewing court’s power to interfere on the ground of the insufficiency of inquiry by a local authority to whom a homelessness application had been made. Neill LJ said: ‘(1) The duty to . .
Cited – Ealing London Borough Council v Surdonja etc CA 21-Jan-2000
When a local authority came to make the decision about the extent of the local connection of the homelessness applicant with the area, the assessment was to be made as regards the situation at the date of that decision. Where there was a review, the . .
Cited – Runa Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (First Secretary of State intervening) HL 13-Feb-2003
The appellant challenged the procedure for reviewing a decision made as to the suitability of accomodation offered to her after the respondent had accepted her as being homeless. The procedure involved a review by an officer of the council, with an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 06 July 2022; Ref: scu.229149

Desnousse v London Borough of Newham and others: CA 17 May 2006

The occupier had been granted a temporary licence by the authority under the homelessness provisions whilst it made its assessment. The assessment concluded that she had become homeless intentionally, and therefore terminated the licence and set out to evict her. She claimed that the authority had to get a court authority before so evicting her.
Held: A court order was not required. If there was an interference with the licensee’s article 8 rights, that interference was proportionate and justified. The decision in Hamad was not decided per incuriam. As to the appliacnt’s human rights ‘even though her rights in respect of the Flat were arranged by PCHA on behalf of Newham, the owner, Veni, is not a public authority and any steps taken by it to retake possession could not constitute action taken by a public authority in breach of her Convention rights.’
Lloyd LJ (dissenting) ‘a reading of section 3 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 which does not allow it to extend to the recovery of possession from someone in the position of the Appellant is not compatible with her Convention rights under article 8. I would therefore hold that, although Mohamed v. Manek is otherwise a binding authority on the point, the effect of section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is that, in order to ensure compatibility with an occupier’s right to respect for his or her home under article 8, from 2 October 2000, where a person is in residential occupation of self-contained accommodation under a licence, the application of section 3 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 is not excluded by the fact of the accommodation having been made available in pursuance of a local housing authority’s duties under section 188(1) or section 190(2)(a) of the Housing Act 1996. ‘

Judges:

Lord Justice Tuckey Lord Justice Lloyd Lord Justice Pill

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 547, Times 28-Jun-2006, [2006] QB 831

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 188, Protection from Eviction Act 1977, Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2003 (SI 2003/3326), European Convention on Human Rights 8

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Not per incuriam – Mohamed v Manek and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea CA 28-Apr-1995
The claimant applied to the Council for accommodation, claiming to be homeless and in priority need. The council housed him in a hotel owned by Mr Manek in Tooting Bec . He had a room, a separate bathroom and lavatory, and shared use of a kitchen. . .
Cited – Regina v Newham Borough Council ex parte Ojuri (No 5) Admn 11-Sep-1998
. .
Cited – Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council Ex parte Puhlhofer HL 2-Jan-1986
Not Homeless Even if Accomodation Inadequate
The applicants, a married couple, lived with a young child and later also a baby in one room of a guest house. They were given breakfast but had no cooking or washing facilities. They succeeded on a judicial review of the housing authority’s . .
Cited – Mohram Ali v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council CA 27-May-1992
A challenge to the exercise of homelessness duties by a local authority must be by way of Judicial Review. Nolan LJ: ‘It follows that in my judgment the public law duties of the council were not discharged until they had completed the process of . .
Cited – O’Rourke v Mayor etc of the London Borough of Camden HL 12-Jun-1997
The claimant had been released from prison and sought to be housed as a homeless person. He said that his imprisonment brought him within the category of having special need. He also claimed damages for the breach.
Held: The Act was intended . .
Cited – Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd CA 1975
The court looked at what makes a case decided per incuriam: ‘a case is not decided per incuriam because counsel have not cited all the relevant authorities or referred to this or that rule of court or statutory provision.’ (Lord Denning MR) . .
Cited – Mohamed v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL 1-Nov-2001
Mrs M came to England in 1994 living first in Ealing and then Hammersmith. Mr M came later and lived elsewhere in Hammersmith. Hammersmith gave them jointly temporary accommodation, first in a hotel and then in a flat. They then applied under . .
Cited – Young v The Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd CA 28-Jul-1944
Court of Appeal must follow Own Decisions
The claimant was injured and received compensation. He then sought to recover again, alleging breach of statutory duty by his employers.
Held: The Court of Appeal was in general bound to follow its own previous decisions. The court considered . .
Cited – Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue CA 27-Apr-2001
The defendant resisted accelerated possession proceedings brought for rent arrears under his assured shorthold tenancy, by a private housing association who was a successor to a public authority.
Held: Once the human rights issue was raised, . .
Cited – Morelle Ltd v Wakeling CA 1955
The plaintiff asserted ownership of leasehold land. A similar situation had arisen in an earlier case befoe the Court of appeal, and the court was asked to decide that that case had been decided per incuriam.
Held: The per incuriam principle . .
Cited – Pittalis v Grant CA 1989
A point was raised for the first time on appeal.
Held: Though an appellate court could exclude a pure question of law which had not been raised at first instance from being raised on appeal, the usual practice was to allow it to be taken where . .
Cited – Regina (W) v Lambeth London Borough Council CA 3-May-2002
A family had been found to be voluntarily homeless. The family asked the authority to provide housing to the family under the 1989 Act from its duty to care for the children.
Held: The 1989 Act did not change the law in the 1980 Act. The . .
Cited – Maunsell v Olins HL 1975
The House considered whether a sub-tenant could claim protection under the 1968 Act. This depended on the interpretation of the word ‘premises’ in the context of a sub-tenancy of a cottage on a farm let under an agricultural tenancy.
Held: . .
Cited – Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd HL 1975
The issue was whether an English court was able to award damages in Sterling only.
Held: The House distinguished clearly between the substance of the debtor’s obligations and the effect of English procedural law when a debt in a foreign . .
Cited – Starmark Enterprises Ltd v CPL Distribution Ltd CA 31-Jul-2001
The parties were landlord and tenant. The landlords served a notice to increase the rent, but the tenant failed to serve a counter-notice within the relevant period. The landlord claimed the tenant was bound, and appealed a decision against them. . .
Cited – Wellcome Trust Ltd v Hamad; Ebied and Another v Hopkins and Another; Church Commissioners for England v Baines CA 30-Jul-1997
There was a tenancy for mixed residential and business purposes and, with the landlord’s permission, the tenant sublet one of the residential flats within the premises to the defendant, who enjoyed protection under the Act of 1977.
Held: . .
Cited – Eastleigh Borough Council v Walsh 1985
The court considered the nature of a tenancy created by the local authority when satisfying its duty to provide temporary accomodation pending a homelessness assessment. The agreement was described as a tenancy, and held to be one. . .
Cited – Duke v GEC Reliance Systems Limited CA 16-Feb-1987
The court was said to have failed to have proper regard to a European Directive.
The court discussed the meaning of the phrase ‘per incuriam’: ‘I have always understood that the doctrine of per incuriam only applies where another division of . .
Cited – Esselte Ab and British Sugar Plc v Pearl Assurance Plc CA 8-Nov-1996
The tenant was no longer in occupation of the demised premises when he served a s27 notice.
Held: A business tenancy ceases at end of the lease, if the premises are not actually occupied by the tenant despite any notices given. The occupation . .
Cited – London Borough of Hackney v Lambourne 1992
Ralph Gibson LJ said: ‘The defendants . . have no private law right to remain in occupation of the temporary premises let to them. Their private law right is to the accommodation which the council has, in the exercise of its discretion, judged to be . .
Cited – Family Housing Association v Jones CA 1990
The association as licensee of a local authority granted what was described as a licence to the defendant to occupy premises on a temporary basis.
Held: The court found that a licence granted to satisfy a housing duty was a tenancy.
Slade . .
Cited – Rakhit v Carty 1990
A previous decision of the court was found to be within the normal categories of per incuriam, because the earlier decision was made in ignorance of a vitally relevant statutory provision, which showed it to be wrong. The earlier decision was . .
Cited – Williams v Glasbrook Brothers Ltd CA 1947
It was not open to the Court of Appeal to review a previous decision of the same Court for conformity with an earlier decision of the House of Lords (Lord Greene MR). It was for the House of Lords to correct the previous Court of Appeal’s error, and . .
Cited – Williams v Fawcett CA 1985
The court was asked as to the requirement of a notice to show cause why a person should not be committed to prison for contempt of court.
Held: The court refused to follow its earlier decisions as to committal procedures where they were the . .
Cited – Rickards v Rickards CA 1990
The Court of Appeal considered the circumstances in which it could depart from its own earlier decisions under the residual principle. The court refused to follow a previous decision of the same court because, although the relevant House of Lords . .
Cited – Kay and Another v London Borough of Lambeth and others; Leeds City Council v Price and others and others HL 8-Mar-2006
In each case the local authority sought to recover possession of its own land. In the Lambeth case, they asserted this right as against an overstaying former tenant, and in the Leeds case as against gypsies. In each case the occupiers said that the . .
Cited – Rogerson v Wigan Metropolitan Borough Council 2005
The court considered both whether Mohamed v. Manek was still binding and whether the facts of the case were covered by the prior decision, having regard in particular to the emphasis on transience which emerges from the judgment of Nourse LJ. Heled: . .
Cited – London Borough of Harrow v Qazi HL 31-Jul-2003
The applicant had held a joint tenancy of the respondent. His partner gave notice and left, and the property was taken into possession. The claimant claimed restoration of his tenancy saying the order did not respect his right to a private life and . .
Cited – Uratemp Ventures Limited v Collins HL 11-Oct-2001
Can a single room within a hotel comprise a separate dwelling within the 1988 Act and be subject to an assured tenancy?
Held: A single room can be a dwelling. Each case must be interpreted in its own light as a question of fact, but respecting . .
Cited – Runa Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (First Secretary of State intervening) HL 13-Feb-2003
The appellant challenged the procedure for reviewing a decision made as to the suitability of accomodation offered to her after the respondent had accepted her as being homeless. The procedure involved a review by an officer of the council, with an . .
Cited – Warder v Cooper 1970
The locks were changed during the absence of the former licensee, but while his possessions were still in the property. The former tenant had no continuing right to occupy the property.
Held: The former licensee had not been wrongfully . .
Cited – Billson and Others v Residential Tenancies Ltd CA 11-Feb-1991
As to the exercise of relief in equity outside the limitation period: ‘This is not to say that courts of equity should now grant relief without any regard to the statutory provisions. Equity follows the law, but not slavishly nor always: see Cardozo . .
Cited – McPhail v Persons, Names Unknown CA 1973
The court was asked to make an order against persons unknown in order to recover land. Although an owner of land which was being occupied by squatters was entitled to take the remedy into his own hand, he was encouraged to go to a common law court . .

Cited by:

Cited – RJM, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions HL 22-Oct-2008
The 1987 Regulations provided additional benefits for disabled persons, but excluded from benefit those who had nowhere to sleep. The claimant said this was irrational. He had been receiving the disability premium to his benefits, but this was . .
Cited – Yorkshire Bank Finance Ltd v Mulhall and Another CA 24-Oct-2008
The bank had obtained a judgement against the defendant, and took a charging order. Nothing happened for more than twelve years, and the defendant now argued that the order and debt was discharged.
Held: The enforcement of the charging order . .
Cited – ZH and CN, Regina (on The Applications of) v London Boroughs of Newham and Lewisham SC 12-Nov-2014
The court was asked whether the 1977 Act required a local authorty to obtain a court order before taking possession of interim accommodation it provided to an apparently homeless person while it investigated whether it owed him or her a duty under . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Human Rights

Updated: 06 July 2022; Ref: scu.241721

Knowsley Housing Trust v McMullen: CA 9 May 2006

The defendant tenant appealed an order for possession of her flat. She was disabled and living with her 19 year old son. He had been made subject to an anti-social behaviour order. The court had found that she could have required him to leave. The tenant alleged disability discrimination.
Held: As to the relevance of the fact that the nuisance was caused by somebody else: ‘the fact that the tenant cannot control the nuisance-maker is a factor which would normally assist the tenant in resisting an order for possession in relation to past breaches, especially where she has done her best to stop the nuisance. However, unless the nuisance-maker has vacated, or will shortly vacate, the property, it seems to me to be a factor which may often assist the landlord if he is asking the court to make an outright order for possession or to suspend the order for possession on terms which relate to the behaviour of the nuisance-maker.’ and ‘I would therefore reject, on the basis of principle, practice and authority, the notion that, in a case where the landlord relies on ground 14, the court should not make an order for possession, whether suspended or otherwise, simply because it can be said that the person responsible for the acts of nuisance is subject to an ASBO which is, in effect, directed to preventing the same sort of acts. However, I accept that, as a matter of principle, and, in the light of Ward LJ’s observations, on the basis of authority, the existence of an ASBO can be a relevant matter when the court is deciding whether it is reasonable to make an order for possession, and whether to suspend it. ‘ Whether a suspended order for possession should only be enforced after a further court hearing was a question for each particular case: ‘Normally, a suspended order for possession should not include a term that the landlord should have to apply to the court for permission before applying for a warrant. ‘ In this case such an order was appropriate.

Judges:

Lord Justice Auld Lord Justice Rix Lord Justice Neuberger

Citations:

Times 22-May-2006, [2006] EWCA Civ 539, [2006] HLR 43

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Disability Discrimination Act 1995 22(3)(c)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Portsmouth City Council v Bryant CA 2000
It may be unreasonable to impose a possession order against a person in respect of a failing over which they have no control.
Simon Brown LJ said, having reviewed the existing authorities: ‘Those authorities clearly hold that no personal fault . .
Cited – Clark v TDG Limited (Trading As Novacold) CA 25-Mar-1999
The applicant had soft tissue injuries around the spine as a consequence of a back injury at work. He was absent from work for a long time as a result of his injuries, and he was eventually dismissed when his medical advisers could provide no clear . .
Explained – Newcastle City Council v Morrison CA 2000
The court reviewed the principles applicable when asking whether it is reasonable to make an order for possession against a tenant on grounds of nuisance: a) When considering reasonableness, the Judge must take account of all relevant circumstances . .
Cited – Manchester City Council v Higgins CA 24-Nov-2005
The authority sought an immediate possession order against their council house tenant. Her 13 year old son had been made subject to an ASBO after atrocious and intimidating behaviour towards a neighbour. A possession order had been granted but then . .
Cited – Gallagher v Castle Vale Action Trust Ltd CA 23-Feb-2001
The court emphasised the need not merely to identify the relevant factors that weigh in each direction when considering whether to make an order for possession in a nuisance case, but to explain clearly why it is or is not proportionate to interfere . .
Cited – Lambeth London Borough Council v Howard CA 6-Mar-2001
Any attempt to evict a person, whether directly or indirectly or by process of law, from his or her home is on the face of it a derogation from the respect to which the home is prima facie entitled. Courts should be careful fully to explain any . .
Cited – London and Quadrant Housing Trust v Root CA 12-Jan-2005
The tenant had a partner whom she could not control, and who had terrorised her to the nuisance also of her neighbours. The landlord sought possession, and until that was granted an anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) against the partner. Before the . .
Cited – North Devon Homes Housing Association v Brazier QBD 2003
The tenant was guilty of nuisance, but her misbehaviour was attributable to her psychotic state – her ‘disability’ within the 1995 Act.
Held: Though a very pertinent factor to be taken into account may be a housing authority’s obligations to . .
Cited – Manchester City Council v Higgins CA 24-Nov-2005
The authority sought an immediate possession order against their council house tenant. Her 13 year old son had been made subject to an ASBO after atrocious and intimidating behaviour towards a neighbour. A possession order had been granted but then . .
Cited – Council of the City of Manchester v Romano, Samariz CA 1-Jul-2004
The authority sought to evict their tenant on the ground that he was behaving in a way which was a nuisance to neighbours. The tenant was disabled, and claimed discrimination.
Held: In secure tenancies, the authority had to consider the . .
Cited – St Brice and Another v Southwark London Borough Council CA 17-Jul-2001
The council having obtained a possession order, suspended on terms, through court proceedings, later sought to enforce the order by a warrant for possession issued without first giving notice to the tenant. The tenant alleged that the grant of the . .
Cited – St Brice and Another v Southwark London Borough Council CA 17-Jul-2001
The council having obtained a possession order, suspended on terms, through court proceedings, later sought to enforce the order by a warrant for possession issued without first giving notice to the tenant. The tenant alleged that the grant of the . .

Cited by:

Cited – Royal Borough of Greenwich v Tuitt CA 25-Nov-2014
The Defendant appealed against the order for possession made against her in respect of her secure tenancy of a flat, made on the grounds that her son, now 18 years old and living with her and her partner, had committed repeated acts of nuisance and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 06 July 2022; Ref: scu.241604

Steven We Ping Wall v Sheffield City Council: CA 23 Mar 2006

The appellant had been fostered by the deceased, and on her death continued to live in her house held under a secure tenancy of the respondent. The council sought possession, saying that he was not a member of the deceased’s family within section 113, and that in any event he had not occupied the property for twelve months as required. The court found an estoppel against the council which had given written re-assurance to the deceased that the son would take over the tenancy. The court ordered possession saying the claimant had not met the residency qualification. He had been asked by his firm to work at their London offices.
Held: The claimant’s appeal succeeded. The judge had in his judgment failed properly to address the law and the evidence. There was no evidence to contradict the claimant’s asserted history which established the residency period. He had said that despite the secondment he always intended to return to the house.

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 495

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 85 113

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Crawley Borough Council v Sawyer CA 1987
The court considered whether a tenancy had ceased to be secure by reason of the tenant’s failure to continue to fulfil the condition set by section 81 of the Act of 1985, namely occupation of the property ‘as his only or principal home’. For about a . .
Cited – Brickfield Ltd v Hughes CA 1988
In considering whether a secure tenancy was lost by the tenant abandoning his residence there, the court set out the applicable principles. Where absence is more prolonged than is to be explained by holiday or ordinary business reasons and is . .
Cited – Camden London Borough Council v Goldenberg and Another CA 1-Apr-1996
The appellant had lived for a number of years with his grandmother; had then married; had thereupon moved with his bride for three months into a house owned by friends who were abroad; had, throughout that time, left the bulk of his belongings at . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Estoppel

Updated: 06 July 2022; Ref: scu.241402

London Borough of Barnet v Ismail and Another: CA 6 Apr 2006

The court considered the entitlement to housing support of nationals of other EEA states receiving Income Support here despite their being still subject to immigration control.
Held: Such EEA nationals were eligible for housing benefit. The 2000 regulations were in conflict with guidance given by the Secretary of State.

Judges:

Buxton, Lloyd, Richards LJJ

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 383, Times 25-Apr-2006, [2006] 1 WLR 2771, [2007] 1 All ER 922

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 185(2), Homelessness (England) Regulations 2000, Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 13(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council ex parte Streeting CA 1980
The court duscussed the extent of the housing duty of an authority toward a person ‘not lawfully here’.
Held: Outstayers should not be qualified for assistance. . .
Cited – Regina v Westminster City Council Ex Parte Castelli; Regina v Same Ex Parte Tristan Garcia CA 23-Feb-1996
A Local Authority has a duty to house European Union migrants even without leave to stay as long as they are looking for work. EU nationals who were properly entering the UK were owed the Housing Act duties until they were told that they were . .
Cited – Chief Adjudication Officer v Wolke; Remelien v Secretary of State for Social Security HL 13-Nov-1997
The claimant was an EC national who had become resident here but was not seeking work, since she cared for her children. The Secretary of State said that since she was not seeking work, she was not entitled to remain and should make arrangements to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Immigration, Benefits

Updated: 05 July 2022; Ref: scu.240104

Harlow District Council v Hall: CA 28 Feb 2006

The defendant had been subject to a possession order in respect of his secure tenancy. He was later adjudged bankrupt. He asserted that the bankruptcy specifically prevented other action to enforce the debt, and the suspended possession order was such an enforcement.
Held: Where the terms of suspension were expressed so as to indicate that the order for possession took effect on a specified date, but execution was suspended on terms, the secure tenancy ended on the specified date, even if the terms of suspension were complied with. The secure tenancy had already come to an end by the time of the bankruptcy. The 1985 Act made a specific distinction between suspending execution of a possession order, and postponing the date for possession. The maintenance of the possession order was not an action against the property of the defendant. The possession order was not vitiated by the bankruptcy.

Judges:

Lord Justice Chadwick, Chancellor, The Right Hon Sir Paul Kennedy

Citations:

[2006] 1 WLR 2116, [2006] EWCA Civ 156, Times 15-Mar-2006, [2006] BPIR 712, [2006] HLR 27, [2006] 2 P and CR 16

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 79, Insolvency Act 1986 285

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Smith (a bankrupt) v Braintree District Council HL 1989
The House considered the effects of bankruptcy on the imposition of a committal to imprisonment in default of paying rates.
The purpose of section 285 is to preserve the estate of the bankrupt for the benefit of his unsecured creditors.
Cited – Ezekiel v Orakpo CA 1977
A lease had been forfeited for non payment of rent. The lessor then took proceedings for possession. The tenant claimed that the action was invalid because a receiving order had been made against him in the meantime.
Held: The Court rejected . .
Cited – Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council CA 1987
The wife was the secure tenant of the premises, against whom the local authority landlord obtained a possession order on grounds of arrears of rent, not to be enforced on payment of a weekly sum off the arrears in addition to what the order . .
Cited – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council HL 31-Oct-1996
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority . .

Cited by:

Cited – Bristol City Council v Hassan and Glastonbury CA 23-May-2006
The council had obtained possession orders for two properties from secure tenants, but the orders were suspended for so long as rent arrears were being discharged. The judges had understood that a date must appear on the possession order.
Cited – White v Knowsley Housing Trust and Another CA 2-May-2007
The tenant was an assured tenant. She fell into arrears of rent and a possession order was made, but suspended on terms. The court considered whether she continued to be an assured tenant, and could assert a right to buy the property as an assured . .
Cited – Jones v London Borough of Merton CA 16-Jun-2008
The court was asked ‘If a former secure tenant of a dwelling-house who has become a ‘tolerated trespasser’ in it decides to cease to occupy it, does his liability to pay mesne profits to his former landlord in respect of the dwelling-house cease . .
Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v White; Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington; Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association HL 10-Dec-2008
The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
Held: . .
Cited – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC 23-Jun-2010
The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Insolvency

Updated: 05 July 2022; Ref: scu.239849

London Borough of Lambeth v Vandra and others: CA 19 Dec 2005

The council had taken possession proceedings to evict their secure tenant for unlawful subletting. They appealed overturning of their possession order. The judge had found that two visits from a housing officer were inadequate to establish proof of subletting, or to move the burden of proof to the tenant in the absence of direct evidence.
Held: The council’s appeal succeeded. The district judge had made various findings of fact, including that there was nothing to show any occupation by the tenant, rooms were being used as individual occupations, with no central living room, and those present claimed to be paying rent to a third party: ‘the district judge was entitled to conclude that there was in this case an unlawful subletting. The fact that the explanations were not credible does not mean that there was a complete vacuum in relation to a subletting of the whole. As I mentioned earlier, a possible view of the evidence was that there was subletting of only part. But the fact that that was a possible inference does not make impossible the inference by the district judge that, taking all of the facts together and the lack of a credible explanation from Miss Vandra, it was reasonable to infer that there was a subletting of the whole. ‘

Judges:

Mummery, Latham, Carnwath LJJ

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 1801

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 05 July 2022; Ref: scu.238642

Richmond v Kensington and Chelsea: CA 15 Feb 2006

The borough obtained a possession order of the secure tenancy of a flat occupied by their tenant for nuisance. It was suspended on terms for a certain period. They alleged further breaches shortly before the expiry of the possession order and they asked the period to be extended. The tenant did not appear at the first hearing, and the judge extended the term and made other provisions. The tenant now argued that the moving of the date revived his secure tenancy under the rule in Burrows.
Held: The tenant’s appeal was dismissed. It was impossible to see the judge’s order as being intended to revive the tenancy with Burrows type consequences: ‘ the combination of the two orders had exactly the reverse effect. That the judge kept in place the application to enforce the sanction imposed for the original breaches of the tenancy showed quite clearly that the last thing that he saw himself as doing was to relieve the tenant from the consequences of those breaches.’

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Civ 68, Times 27-Feb-2006

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 Sch2 Gr2

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council HL 31-Oct-1996
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority . .
Cited – Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council CA 1987
The wife was the secure tenant of the premises, against whom the local authority landlord obtained a possession order on grounds of arrears of rent, not to be enforced on payment of a weekly sum off the arrears in addition to what the order . .
Cited – Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan CA 31-Jan-1996
The authority had taken possession proceedings against the secure tenant for non-payment of rent, and obtained an order, suspended on condition as to payments. He again fell into arrears, and the authority made a further agreement. They now sought . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 05 July 2022; Ref: scu.238524

Regina v Rent Officer of Nottinghamshire Registration Area, ex parte Allen: 1985

The officer had entered a fair rent for a caravan. The site owner sought the vacation of the entry. The caravan was fully mobile, but was also connected to mains water and electric and sewage. The connections were easily removed, and the caravan was from time to time moved.
Held: Whether a caravan counted as a house within the section depended upon the circumstances. The fact that the caravans were sometimes moved, and the impermanence of the connections to the mains utilities took them outside the section. A county court judge can make a declaration as to whether a tenancy is protected under the Act (s 141(1)(a)), but cannot order an alteration in the register. A landlord wanting to challenge a proposed registration should do so quickly, so that the Officer could delay making the entry.

Judges:

Farquharson J

Citations:

(1985) 275 EG 251, (1985) 17 HLR 481, [1985] 2 EGLR 153

Statutes:

Rent Act 1977 1 141(1)(a)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 05 July 2022; Ref: scu.221534

National Trust for Places of Historic Interest Or Natural Beauty v Knipe and Knipe: CA 15 May 1997

The tenancy was of an agricultural holding, with protection under the 1986 Act. It had 350 acres of pasture, and two farmhouses. The tenants covenanted not to use the holding for any purpose other than agriculture, to farm it in accordance with the rules of good husbandry and personally to reside in the farmhouses. They fell into arrears of rent; and, having complied with the pre-requisites set by the Act of 1986, the landlords served a notice to quit.
Held: A notice to quit an agricultural holding did not need to include the notice of eviction rights required for a domestic tenancy, even though the holding consisted in part of a dwelling. ‘Premises let as an agricultural holding, even if there is a dwelling upon the holding, do not constitute premises let as a dwelling for the purposes of s 5 of the Act. I accept the submission that the ‘premises’ are the subject matter of the letting, that is the entire acreage, but they are let as an agricultural holding and not as a dwelling. The subject matter of the letting includes a dwelling but I cannot read the section as if it used the expression ‘premises which include a dwelling’ or ‘any dwelling house let as a part of premises’.However that did not mean that such tenancies had the protection given by the 1977 Act.

Judges:

Pill LJ, Judge LJ

Citations:

Gazette 11-Jun-1997, [1997] EWCA Civ 1707, [1998] 1 WLR 230

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, Protection from Eviction Act 1977 5

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Maunsell v Olins HL 1975
The House considered whether a sub-tenant could claim protection under the 1968 Act. This depended on the interpretation of the word ‘premises’ in the context of a sub-tenancy of a cottage on a farm let under an agricultural tenancy.
Held: . .
Cited – Dellhold Estates (UK) Pty Ltd v Lindsey Trading Properties Inc 1994
The word ‘premises’ in s 46(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 means the subject matter of the letting and the section applied to an agricultural holding which included a dwelling house. S 48 of the Act was governed by s 46(1) which applied it . .
Cited – Regina v Yuthiwattana CACD 1984
The defendant appealed against his convictions under the 1977 Act.
Held: Under section 1(2) the deprivation of occupation for one day was insufficient. To constitute an offence, the deprivation had to take the character of an eviction. . .
Cited – Russell v Booker CA 1982
The leased premises consisted of a dwelling house and agricultural land which had constituted an agricultural holding. The tenant alleged that the original agreement had been superceded by a subsequent contract which had the effect of moving the . .
Distinguished – Holford Investments Ltd v Lambert 1982
. .

Cited by:

Cited – Pirabakaran v Patel and Another CA 26-May-2006
The landlord had wanted possession. The tenant said that the landlord had been harassing him. The landlord said that the tenancy was a mixed residential and business tenancy and that the 1977 Act did not apply.
Held: The 1977 Act applied. A . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Agriculture, Housing

Updated: 05 July 2022; Ref: scu.142103

Elmdene Ltd v White: HL 1 Feb 1960

The landlord’s appeal failed. A payment can include a payment in kind.

Judges:

Lord Evershed MR

Citations:

[1960] AC 528, [1959] 2 All ER 605, [1960] 1 QB 1

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – White v Elmdene Estates Ltd CA 1960
The relative legislation prohibited the requirement of ‘payment of any premium’ on the grant, renewal or continuance of any tenancy. Mr and Mrs White owned and lived in a house, but it was subject to a mortgage which was in arrears, and they decided . .

Cited by:

Cited – Superstrike Ltd v Rodrigues CA 14-Jun-2013
The Defendant took an assured shorthold tenancy of premises from the Claimant for a fixed term of one year less one day, paying a deposit of a month’s rent under the terms of the tenancy agreement at that time. At the expiry of the fixed term, by . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.545136

White v Elmdene Estates Ltd: CA 1960

The relative legislation prohibited the requirement of ‘payment of any premium’ on the grant, renewal or continuance of any tenancy. Mr and Mrs White owned and lived in a house, but it was subject to a mortgage which was in arrears, and they decided that they had to sell, repay the mortgage and then rent a flat. They found a suitable flat, but the estate agents acting on the letting required them to sell their house through them, and to sell it for andpound;500 less than the fair market value, which they agreed to do, and did. The Court was asked inter alia whether this amounted to the payment to a premium, defined in part as ‘any fine or other like sum and any other pecuniary consideration in addition to rent’, and was unlawful.
Held: The imposition of the obligation to sell the house at andpound;500 less than the proper price was the requirement of a premium. Lord Evershed MR said: ‘If I am right it must follow that the exaction of such a deduction must amount to a ‘payment’; and I find, indeed, no difficulty in so concluding: for the word ‘payment’ in itself is one which, in an appropriate context, may cover many ways of discharging obligations.’
Willmer LJ said: ‘Again, in my judgment, there can be no doubt that the defendants required a ‘payment’ to be made. It is true that no actual money passed, but I venture to point out that a taxpayer is none the less a taxpayer because income tax which he owes is deducted at source. Similarly, the plaintiff and his wife in this case none the less ‘paid’ andpound;500 because it was deducted from the purchase price of the house that they had for sale.’

Judges:

Lord Evershed MR, Wilmer, Ormrod LJJ

Citations:

[1960] 1 QB 1

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Hanoman v London Borough of Southwark HL 10-Jun-2009
The claimant sought a discount on the purchase of his flat from the appellant. The discount was to be increased because of the authority’s delay in responding to his application. The respondent now appealed against a finding that it must repay the . .
Appeal from – Elmdene Ltd v White HL 1-Feb-1960
The landlord’s appeal failed. A payment can include a payment in kind. . .
Cited – Superstrike Ltd v Rodrigues CA 14-Jun-2013
The Defendant took an assured shorthold tenancy of premises from the Claimant for a fixed term of one year less one day, paying a deposit of a month’s rent under the terms of the tenancy agreement at that time. At the expiry of the fixed term, by . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contract, Housing

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.374692

Richardson v Ealing London Borough Council: CA 22 Nov 2005

The tenant had a bad record of payment of rent. The local authority sought possession. The district judge suspended the possession warrant. The authority appealed to the county court judge on the basis that the district judge had made his order without seeing the court file which in turn showed the many attempts by the authority to secure payment. The county court judge reheard the case and allowed the authority’s appeal. The tenant appealed saying that the county court judge should not have reheard the case.
Held: A rehearing should only have been allowed where an injustice had been shown. It was a requirement of the rule that the judge had to consider it to be in the interests of justice to allow a rehearing. No injustice had been shown in the way the district judge had handled the case.
A failure to put a case is not a reason to order a re-hearing. Ward LJ said: ‘It is, in the end, very difficult to see precisely what injustice the judge did find had occurred or what interests of justice actually required this re-hearing. It is, after all, to be firmly accepted that a re-hearing is an exception to the general rule; that some injustice must have occurred, and a simple failure to put one’s case before the first court is not ordinarily to be cured by a re-hearing.’

Judges:

Ward LJ, Arden LJ

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 1798, Times 14-Dec-2005

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Civil Procedure Rules 52.11

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – McKeown v British Horseracing Authority QBD 12-Mar-2010
The jockey claimant challenged disciplinary proceedings brought against him by the defendant authority.
Held: The findings were upheld in part but remitted for consideration of giving the claimant opportunity to challenge certain evidence. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Civil Procedure Rules, Housing, Housing, Litigation Practice

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.237549

Nadine Delson v London Borough of Lambeth: CA 19 Nov 2002

Application for permission to appeal against refusal of second application for permission to apply for judicial review.
Held: It was not sustainable to suggest that the section was incompatible with the cliamant’s human rights. Leave to appeal was refused.

Citations:

[2002] EWCA Civ 1894

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 93(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Smart v Sheffield City Council: Central Sunderland Housing Company Limited v Wilson CA 25-Jan-2002
Each tenant had become unintentionally homeless, and was granted a non-secure tenancy of accommodation under section 193. Complaints of nuisance were received from neighbours. Possession orders were obtained and now challenged under the Human Rights . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Human Rights

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.217808

Regina (A) v Lambeth London Borough Council: CA 5 Nov 2001

The provisions requiring local authorities to look to the welfare of children within their area was a general one, and was not enforceable to secure the interests of individual children. It was not the case that a ‘target’ duty crystallised into an enforceable one, once a child’s needs had been assessed. If that had been the intention, parliament would have had to have expressed such a process in the Act.

Judges:

Lord Justice Chadwick, Lord Justice Laws and Sir Philip Otton

Citations:

Times 20-Nov-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 1624, (2001) 4 CCL Rep 486, [2002] Fam Law 179, [2001] 3 FCR 673, [2002] BLGR 163, [2002] HLR 13, (2002) 64 BMLR 88, [2002] 1 FLR 353, [2002] ACD 18

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Children Act 1989 17(1), Housing Act 1996 176 189(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina (A) v Lambeth London Borough Council QBD 25-May-2001
The duty imposed by section 17 of the Act on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children is a general duty only, and is not capable of being enforced for the benefit of a particular child by way of judicial review. As a so . .

Cited by:

Applied – Regina (on the Application of J) v London Borough of Enfield and Another Admn 4-Mar-2002
The mother and child were destitute, and sought to oblige the local authority to provide accommodation and support.
Held: The duty to a child under the section could not be extended to include a duty to accommodate and support the child and . .
Cited – Regina (W) v Lambeth London Borough Council CA 3-May-2002
A family had been found to be voluntarily homeless. The family asked the authority to provide housing to the family under the 1989 Act from its duty to care for the children.
Held: The 1989 Act did not change the law in the 1980 Act. The . .
Appealed to – Regina (A) v Lambeth London Borough Council QBD 25-May-2001
The duty imposed by section 17 of the Act on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children is a general duty only, and is not capable of being enforced for the benefit of a particular child by way of judicial review. As a so . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Children

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.166833

Black v Pastouna and Another: CA 31 Oct 2005

The appellant occupied a property now belonging to the two respondents who had had it transferred to them by their father. The appellant had been in a relationship with him. The respondent daughters had asserted that she occupied it it under a documented assured shorthold tanancy in respect of which she was in arrears of rent. The appellant sought to appeal against rejection of her claim to a trust in the property saying that the tenancy agreement had been a sham. She had however paid him andpound;20k.
Held: Leave to appeal was refused. It would be wrong to overturn a judgment based so firmly in the view taken by the judge of the evidence and parties appearing before him.
The court noted that the representatives had travelled from Liverpool to attend when a video conference may have been equally effective, and drew attention to the need for such matters to be considered.

Judges:

Brooke LJ VP, Carnwath LJ

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 1389

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing, Trusts

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.235334

Brent London Borough Council v Knightly: 1997

Where there is a joint tenancy which goes into ‘limbo’ and then one of the joint tenants dies, the surviving former joint tenant cannot apply for a revival of the joint-tenancy under section 85(4). All the deceased joint tenant had was a personal and non-transmissible right to apply for revival.

Citations:

(1997) 29 HLR 857

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.231656

London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Ayinde: CA 1994

The tenant had gone out of possession, moving permanently back to Nigeria and at the same time writing to the landlord to say that he and his family had moved and had agreed that the defendant (a cousin who had lived with him prior to his return to Nigeria) should take over the tenancy.
Held: There had been an unequivocal surrender by operation of law. Thereafter, by various actions and steps of apparent acceptance of the resident cousin as tenant, the landlord was deemed both to have granted a new tenancy and to have accepted the former tenant’s offer of surrender. Nourse LJ: ‘The judge would have concluded that a new tenancy had been granted from the following facts: first, the plaintiffs had had express notice that the [former tenant] had permanently vacated the flat in the summer of 1985 and had expressed an unequivocal intention to terminate the tenancy; secondly, the plaintiffs well knew that the defendant and her family had exclusive occupation of the flat from that date; thirdly, the plaintiffs knew that the defendant and her husband were paying rent on their own behalf from that date.
Mr Rutledge submits that there was never an unequivocal offer by the (former tenant) to surrender their tenancy to the plaintiffs; only an offer to assign it to (the defendants) which, by section 91 of the 1985 Act, was prohibited. I rejected that submission. I agree with Mr. Salter, for the defendant, that it is a distinction without a difference. In their letters of June 17 and July 21, 1985 the (former tenants) had made it very clear, to the plaintiffs as well as to the defendants, first, that they did not want their tenancy to continue; secondly, that they wanted the (defendants) to be the tenants. They cannot be credited with a lawyer’s intention to use a term like ‘transfer’ as a term of art. Section 91 does not assist the plaintiffs. Indeed, if an assignment or transfer was prohibited, all the more reason for treating the offer as an offer to surrender.’ There was a deemed acceptance of the surrender of the former tenant by the various acts which had been apt also to create the new tenancy.

Judges:

Nourse LJ

Citations:

(1994) 26 HLR 631

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA 28-Jul-2005
In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
Distinguished – Community Housing Association Limited v Masri and Masri CA 15-May-1997
The second tenant sought leave to appeal an order for possession of a flat. He had been joint tenant with his brother. The brother’s solicitors had written on the basis that the first brother alone was tenant.
Held: The case of Ayinde could . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.231655

Westminster City Council and Another v Morris; Regina (Badu) v Lambeth London Borough Council: CA 14 Oct 2005

The claimant sought housing assistance. She had a child. She was subject to immigration control. She complained that when considering her application, the Act required the authority to disregard her responsibiltes to her children.
Held: The Act was inconsistent with her right to family life. The declaration of incompatibility was upheld. The section was an interference in the right, but no sufficient justification for the interference was established: ‘a policy objective of driving a British parent out of the country because of the immigration status of her child was not one his Lordhsip was prepared to attribute to Parliament.’

Judges:

Auld, Sedley, Jonathan Parker LJJ

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 1184

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 185(40, European Convention on Human Rights 8 14

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Morris, Regina (on the Application of) v Westminster City Council and Another Admn 7-Oct-2004
The applicant questioned the compatibility of s185 of the 1996 Act with Human Rights law. The family sought emergency housing. The child of the family, found to be in priority housing need, was subject also to immigration control. Though the matter . .

Cited by:

Cited – Wilson v Wychavon District Council and Another Admn 20-Dec-2005
The claimant complained that the law which protected an occupier of a dwelling house from a temporary stop notice did not apply to those living in caravans, and that this was discriminatory.
Held: The claim failed. ‘usually a change of use of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Housing, Human Rights

Updated: 04 July 2022; Ref: scu.231234

Bond v Leicester City Council: CA 23 Oct 2001

The applicant had been the victim of domestic violence. She applied to be rehoused, but the authority considered her to be intentionally homeless, since she could have applied to court for an injunction excluding the violent partner.
Held: That approach was incorrect. Although remedies might be available, these could be uncertain, and difficult for some people to achieve, and particularly so where there were children, and the courts would otherwise encourage attempts by the parties to avoid bitterness so as to encourage contact. There is still no presumption that contact with a violent parent was wrong.

Judges:

Lady Justice Hale and Mr Justice David Steel

Citations:

Times 23-Nov-2001, Gazette 06-Dec-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 1544, [2002] 1 FCR 566, [2002] HLR 6

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow SC 26-Jan-2011
The appellant sought housing after leaving her home to escape domestic violence. The violence was short of physical violence, and the authority had denied a duty to rehouse her. She said that the term ‘domestic violence’ in the Act was not intended . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Housing, Family

Updated: 03 July 2022; Ref: scu.166859

Calgin, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Enfield: Admn 29 Jul 2005

The claimant complained that having applied for housing in the borough they had in fact housed him outside the borough.
Held: The authority had a duty to house the applicant so far it was reasonably practicable within its borders. The policy had been adopted after an acute shortage of affordable housing. That policy was not Wednesbury unreasonable. It was not applied to more than a small percentage of applicants, and secured a proper saving for the Borough.

Judges:

Elias J

Citations:

[2005] EWHC 1716 (Admin), Times 27-Sep-2005, [2006] BLGR 1, [2006] HLR 4, [2006] ACD 28, [2006] 1 FCR 58, [2006] 1 All ER 112

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 208, Homelessness Act 2002 1(1) 1(3)

Citing:

Cited – Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation CA 10-Nov-1947
Administrative Discretion to be Used Reasonably
The applicant challenged the manner of decision making as to the conditions which had been attached to its licence to open the cinema on Sundays. It had not been allowed to admit children under 15 years of age. The statute provided no appeal . .
Cited – Regina v Newham London Borough Council, ex parte Sacupima and others CA 1-Dec-2000
Where a local authority had to decide whether temporary housing was suitable for a family who had applied under the homelessness provisions, the location of the short-term housing was relevant. In this case, a London authority, placing a family in . .
Cited – Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council Ex parte Puhlhofer HL 2-Jan-1986
Not Homeless Even if Accomodation Inadequate
The applicants, a married couple, lived with a young child and later also a baby in one room of a guest house. They were given breakfast but had no cooking or washing facilities. They succeeded on a judicial review of the housing authority’s . .
Cited – Jordan v Norfolk County Council ChD 25-May-1994
An order to replace trees ‘as reasonably practical’ was to include cost considerations, and it could be varied where the costs exceeded those expected. The mandatory order was varied. When considering what was meant by ‘reasonably practical’ ‘. . . .
Cited – Regina v Lambeth London Borough Council ex parte Eckpo-Wedderman 1998
The court considered the matters to be taken into account by a local authority when setting its housing policy: ‘I do not believe that a local housing authority, considering (as it is right that it should) whether to meet a particular and perhaps . .
Cited – Mohamed v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council HL 1-Nov-2001
Mrs M came to England in 1994 living first in Ealing and then Hammersmith. Mr M came later and lived elsewhere in Hammersmith. Hammersmith gave them jointly temporary accommodation, first in a hotel and then in a flat. They then applied under . .
Cited – Yumsak v London Borough of Enfield Admn 2002
The court will not readily interfere with the approach of a housing authority to the question of suitability, although in an appropriate case it plainly will. . .

Cited by:

Cited – Nzolameso v City of Westminster SC 2-Apr-2015
The court was asked ‘When is it lawful for a local housing authority to accommodate a homeless person a long way away from the authority’s own area where the homeless person was previously living? ‘ The claimant said that on applying for housing she . .
Cited – Nzolameso v City of Westminster SC 2-Apr-2015
The court was asked ‘When is it lawful for a local housing authority to accommodate a homeless person a long way away from the authority’s own area where the homeless person was previously living? ‘ The claimant said that on applying for housing she . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 01 July 2022; Ref: scu.229303

London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd: CA 28 Jul 2005

In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become secure tenants, having been allowed to continue in possession after breach of the terms of the suspension.
Held: A tolerated trespasser could not become a secure tenant by virtue only of having continued in occupation. It was vital to look at the actions of the parties to see whether they intended new contractual relations.

Judges:

Arden LJ, Auld LJ, Sir Martin Nourse

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 1010, Times 22-Sep-2005, [2006] HLR 2

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council CA 1987
The wife was the secure tenant of the premises, against whom the local authority landlord obtained a possession order on grounds of arrears of rent, not to be enforced on payment of a weekly sum off the arrears in addition to what the order . .
Cited – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council HL 31-Oct-1996
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority . .
Cited – Worcestershire County Council v Tongue and others ChD 6-Aug-2003
The defendants had been convicted of offences involving mistreatment of animals, and debarred from having custody of animals. They were now in breach of that order, and the council sought a civil order allowing it access to their land to remove any . .
Cited – Street v Mountford HL 6-Mar-1985
When a licence is really a tenancy
The document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts. Exclusive occupation was in fact granted.
Held: . .
Cited – Swindon Borough Council v Aston CA 19-Dec-2002
The tenant had fallen into arrears, and a possession order had been made. Having cleared the arrears, the possession order fell, but the landlord purported to issue a new tenancy agreement, with no security of tenure. They now sought possession . .
Cited – William Watson Stirling v Leadenhall Residential 2 Ltd CA 29-Jun-2001
Held. A tenant who continued to stay in property after a possession order was granted, but who paid a sum equivalent to rent as it fell due, and something off the arrears, did not necessarily thereby become a tenant again, but could be viewed as a . .
Cited – Marshall v Bradford Metropolitan District Council CA 27-Apr-2001
There were three issues; (1) whether it was proper for the judge to have struck out disrepair proceedings when it could be seen that an application to discharge or rescind a suspended possession order would be likely to succeed (2) whether the . .
Cited – Westminster Borough Council v Basson CA 1990
The council sought possession of the premises. The defendant had been an unlawful occupier. He said that in the course of the proceedings, the Council had made reference to a tenancy and to the payment of rent and had issued a rent book.
Held: . .
Cited – Pemberton v Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Southwark CA 13-Apr-2000
A tenant had continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser after a possession order. She made regular payments but failed to comply with the order setting terms for suspension. She sought damages from the landlord for nuisance for not dealing . .
Cited – London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Ayinde CA 1994
The tenant had gone out of possession, moving permanently back to Nigeria and at the same time writing to the landlord to say that he and his family had moved and had agreed that the defendant (a cousin who had lived with him prior to his return to . .
Cited – Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan CA 31-Jan-1996
The authority had taken possession proceedings against the secure tenant for non-payment of rent, and obtained an order, suspended on condition as to payments. He again fell into arrears, and the authority made a further agreement. They now sought . .
Cited – Rogers v Lambeth London Borough Council CA 10-Nov-1999
A local authority landlord had obtained a possession order against the tenant, for arrears of rent, but allowed the tenant to continue in possession, and eventually agreed to the order for possession being revoked. At that time the tenant became a . .
Cited – Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk HL 5-Dec-1991
One tenant of two joint tenants of a house left and was granted a new tenancy on condition that the existing one of the house, still occupied by her former partner, was determined. She gave a notice to quit as requested, the council claimed . .
Cited – Brent London Borough Council v Knightly 1997
Where there is a joint tenancy which goes into ‘limbo’ and then one of the joint tenants dies, the surviving former joint tenant cannot apply for a revival of the joint-tenancy under section 85(4). All the deceased joint tenant had was a personal . .
Cited – Williams v Glasbrook Brothers Ltd CA 1947
It was not open to the Court of Appeal to review a previous decision of the same Court for conformity with an earlier decision of the House of Lords (Lord Greene MR). It was for the House of Lords to correct the previous Court of Appeal’s error, and . .

Cited by:

Cited – Bristol City Council v Hassan and Glastonbury CA 23-May-2006
The council had obtained possession orders for two properties from secure tenants, but the orders were suspended for so long as rent arrears were being discharged. The judges had understood that a date must appear on the possession order.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 01 July 2022; Ref: scu.229205

Solon South West Housing Association Limited v Lisa James Eran James: CA 20 Dec 2004

Hearsay evidence is available on an application for an ASBO or the trial of a possession action.

Citations:

[2004] EWCA Civ 1847

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Moat Housing Group-South Ltd v Harris and Another CA 16-Mar-2005
The defendant family was served without notice with an anti-social behaviour order ordering them to leave their home immediately, and making other very substantial restrictions. The evidence in large part related to other people entirely.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Evidence

Updated: 01 July 2022; Ref: scu.223663

Eston Bernard v London Borough of Enfield: CA 4 Dec 2001

The applicant sought review of a decision by the local authority that he was intentionally homeless through a failure to pay his rent. He appealed a rejection of leave to appeal, and his appeal was with regard to the adequacy of the reasons given by the local authority for its decision. The claimant said he had insufficient to pay the rent, and the authority failed in its decision to explain in any detail how his budget could meet the sum required.
Held: The obligation to give reasons is imposed to ensure that the person affected knows what decision has been made and is put in a position to know whether there is any defect in the decision. In this case that object had been met.

Judges:

Lord Justice Mummery, Lord Justice Buxton, And, Mr Justice Harrison

Citations:

[2001] EWCA Civ 1831, [2002] HLR 46, [2001] NPC 178

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 204, Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) Order 1996 (SI 1996 No. 3204)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v Wandsworth London Borough Council Ex Parte Hawthorne CA 14-Jul-1994
A failure to pay rent and loss of a home which was caused by the tenant’s own poverty is not necessarily to be treated as intentional homelessness. . .
Cited – Regina v Westminster City Council Ex Parte Ermakov CA 14-Nov-1995
The applicant, having moved here from Greece, applied for emergency housing. The Council received no reply to its requests for corroboration sent to Greece. Housing was refused, but the officer later suggested that the real reason was that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 30 June 2022; Ref: scu.166947

Goodwill Sip Ltd and Others v London Borough of Newham: QBD 14 Apr 2011

The various claimants each sought payment of sums due under invoices rendered to the Council for accommodation provided to assist the Council in the performance of its statutory obligations towards persons in its area who are or may be homeless.

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 980 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 30 June 2022; Ref: scu.432861

Gary White, Ellen White v Riverside Housing Association Ltd: CA 6 Dec 2005

The Association’s tenants said that a clause in their tenancy agreement would allow for an increase in the rent only once a year, and then only in June and if 28 days notice was given before the first Monday in June.
Held: The notices were ineffective. Sir Peter Gibson: ‘All that [clause 2 (7)] has done is to identify the rent variation date. It contains no obligation on Riverside to do something by a particular time and there is therefore no failure against which equity would relieve on the basis that the time provision was non-essential.’

Judges:

Sir Peter Gibson

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 1385

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – United Scientific Holdings v Burnley Borough Council HL 1978
The House was asked whether a failure by a lessor to keep strictly to the timetable laid down in a rent review clause in a lease necessarily deprived the lessor of the benefit of the rent review.
Held: A stipulation as to time in an option . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Riverside Housing Association Ltd v White and Another HL 25-Apr-2007
The claimant housing association had raised its rents. The tenants objected that they were unlawful not having complied with the tenancy agreements. They said the clause allowed only one increase in each June of a year, and then only if 28 days . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 30 June 2022; Ref: scu.235725

Hammia, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Wandsworth: Admn 17 May 2005

The applicant’s partner had left the matrimonial home, tenanted in joint names with the applicant of the authority, and went to the authority saying she had been beaten. Before the authority would agree to treat her as homeless they required her to terminate the joint tenancy thus leaving the applicant homeless.
Held: It was to be noted that the authority had made no approach to the applicant to ask his version of events. The letter from the authority made it clear that the statutory criteria had been met. It had a duty to rehouse te partner. The authority had no power to then make an additional requirement of the partner that she surrender the tenancy. That policy was unlawful. However, the claimant was not entitled to the declaration sought. This was a private law matter. Though there might be some injustice this flowed from the law of joint tenancies.

Judges:

Wilkie J

Citations:

[2005] EWHC 1127 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 193(3)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing, Local Government

Updated: 30 June 2022; Ref: scu.226108

Dewa, Regina (on the Application of) v Westminster City Council: CA 4 May 2005

The tenant had sought an order requiring the respondent to oblige his landlord to carry out repairs at the house of which he occupied a bed-sit. The judge decided that the council had the power to issue such a notice and should consider it within three months, but that he had no power to order the authority to serve a notice.

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 600

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 30 June 2022; Ref: scu.226055

London Borough of Newham v Hawkins and others: CA 22 Apr 2005

The landlord had obtained a possession order, but the tenant continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser, claiming entitlement as successors in title. Rent arrears had accrued, but even if the tenant had paid thenm the council would have sought possession.
Held: The use of the word ‘rent’ in a letter from Newham was insufficient to create a new tenancy. ‘the appellants cannot succeed unless they can show that at the date of her death Mrs Hawkins had been granted a tenancy in her own right by Newham. the rights of succession on which the appellants rely do not arise if Mrs Hawkins was then in occupation either as a tolerated trespasser or as a successor to the tenancy previously vested in Mr Hawkins. ‘ and ‘all that happened in the present case was that Newham, by accepting Mrs Hawkins’ continued occupation in the way it did, agreed to forbear from enforcing the possession order so long as Mrs Hawkins’ occupation was satisfactory to it and thereby precluded itself from objecting if she chose to apply to the court for a variation of the suspended possession order. There was no offer of new terms or demand for an increased rent which might have shown that the intention of the parties was to create a new tenancy.’ There was no basis for saying that a new tenancy had arisen.

Judges:

Auld, Arden LJJ, Bennett J

Citations:

[2005] EWHC 451 (Admin), [2005] EWCA Civ 451, Times 03-May-2005

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 87

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council HL 31-Oct-1996
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority . .
Cited – Marshall v Bradford Metropolitan District Council CA 27-Apr-2001
There were three issues; (1) whether it was proper for the judge to have struck out disrepair proceedings when it could be seen that an application to discharge or rescind a suspended possession order would be likely to succeed (2) whether the . .
Cited – Rogers v Lambeth London Borough Council CA 10-Nov-1999
A local authority landlord had obtained a possession order against the tenant, for arrears of rent, but allowed the tenant to continue in possession, and eventually agreed to the order for possession being revoked. At that time the tenant became a . .
Cited – Street v Mountford HL 6-Mar-1985
When a licence is really a tenancy
The document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts. Exclusive occupation was in fact granted.
Held: . .
Cited – Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council CA 1987
The wife was the secure tenant of the premises, against whom the local authority landlord obtained a possession order on grounds of arrears of rent, not to be enforced on payment of a weekly sum off the arrears in addition to what the order . .
Cited – Swindon Borough Council v Aston CA 19-Dec-2002
The tenant had fallen into arrears, and a possession order had been made. Having cleared the arrears, the possession order fell, but the landlord purported to issue a new tenancy agreement, with no security of tenure. They now sought possession . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Housing

Updated: 30 June 2022; Ref: scu.224784

Sheffield City Council v Hopkins: CA 28 Mar 2001

Citations:

[2001] EWCA Civ 831

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See Also – Sheffield City Council v Hopkins CA 19-Jun-2001
A possession order was granted against a secure tenant by the court for arrears of rent. The tenant then applied to suspend the order, and the landlord opposed that application wishing to put before the court additional allegations.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 29 June 2022; Ref: scu.218077

Long v Southwark London Borough Council: CA 27 Mar 2001

The Council outsourced the collection of refuse from the block of council flats where the tenant applicant lived. He asserted that the Council were in breach of their covenants as landlords in failing to ensure that the refuse was collected properly. The tenancy agreement required the landlord to take ‘reasonable steps’ to ensure that the common parts were kept clean and tidy
Held: That duty could be satisfied by delegation, but only if there was in addition an adequate system for monitoring the contractors’ performance. It had been also a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.

Judges:

Lord Justice Ward, Lord Justice Chadwick and Lady Justice Arden

Citations:

Times 16-Apr-2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 403

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Applied – Southwark London Borough Council v Mills/Tanner; Baxter v Camden London Borough Council HL 21-Oct-1999
Tenants of council flats with ineffective sound insulation argued that the landlord council was in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment in their tenancy agreements.
Held: A landlord’s duty to allow quiet enjoyment does not extend to a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Local Government, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 29 June 2022; Ref: scu.168746

Regina (Saadat) v The Rent Service: CA 26 Oct 2001

When choosing an area over which comparisons of rents are to be made, the Service had to look at a locality which was no larger than was necessary to establish such a comparison. The choice of too wide an area resulted in the inclusion within the comparison of areas and localities of a different character. The result of that approach was to achieve the opposite of the purpose of the order. The area was so large that the poorer dwellings in it would bring the median down to a point which would drive out or pauperise otherwise eligible claimants. locality’ did not necessarily refer to a particular geographical or administrative area. It signified an area no greater than would enable rent officers reliably to make the specified calculations and judgments, and could not be a larger area chosen arbitrarily such as an entire town (in this case Stockport).

Judges:

Lord Justice Kennedy, Lord Justice Mummery and Lord Justice Sedley

Citations:

Times 06-Nov-2001, Gazette 15-Nov-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 1559, [2002] HLR 613, [2002] HLR 32

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Rent Officers (Housing Benefit Functions) Order 1997 (1997 No 1984)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina (Catherine Dinsdale, Caloline Wilson, Barbara Shaw, and Safina Saadat) v The Rent Service Admn 2-Feb-2001
. .

Cited by:

Cited – Heffernan, Regina (on the Application of) v the Rent Service Admn 10-Oct-2006
The claimant sought judicial review of the redetermination of housing benefits payable in respect of two flats rented out by him. The rent office said that the regulations were merely intended to put in statute form the previous practice used when . .
Cited – Heffernan, Regina (on the Application of) v The Rent Service HL 30-Jul-2008
The appellant challenged the decision of the respondent to redetermine the rents for two properties, saying that the officer had wrongly interpreted the meaning of locality when looking for comparable properties.
Held: The determinations were . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 29 June 2022; Ref: scu.166729

Tower Hamlets v Begum (Rikha): CA 23 Mar 2005

Neuberger LJ said: ‘ I turn to the text of the letter of 25 January 2002. It referred to the Council ‘making a reasonable and suitable offer of permanent accommodation’, but it made no reference to the opinion that it was or would be reasonable for the respondent to accept the accommodation
On a fair reading, the letter of 25 January 2002 was a proleptic communication as to the Council’s conclusion if 3 Brimsdown House was rejected again …. Further, the section requires the communication to state both that ‘the accommodation was suitable’ for the person concerned, and that ‘it was reasonable for him to accept it’. While I do not suggest that the wording of the communication must slavishly follow those forms of words, it must, in my view, convey both points. I do not think that the 25 January letter quite achieves that: it merely refers to 3 Brimsdown House as amounting to a ‘reasonable and suitable offer of permanent accommodation . . There is an alternative analysis, which was that adopted by the Council, and it is an analysis which is arguably correct, although (for reasons already given) I do not think that it is. That analysis is that the letter of 25 January 2002 was an appropriate notification under section 193(7)(b).’

Judges:

Pill LJ, Keene LJ, Neuberger LJ

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 340, [2006] HLR 9, [2005] 1 WLR 2103

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Ravichandran and Another v London Borough of Lewisham CA 2-Jul-2010
The claimant appealed against an order confirming a review of the decision that the local authority owed no futher duty to her under section 193. She had rejected the house offered as unsuitable for medical reasons.
Held: The tenant’s appeal . .
Cited – Hotak and Others v London Borough of Southwark and Another SC 13-May-2015
The court was asked as to the duty of local housing authorities towards homeless people who claim to be ‘vulnerable’, and therefore to have ‘a priority need’ for the provision of housing accommodation under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Those . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 29 June 2022; Ref: scu.223806

Moat Housing Group-South Ltd v Harris and Another: CA 16 Mar 2005

The defendant family was served without notice with an anti-social behaviour order ordering them to leave their home immediately, and making other very substantial restrictions. The evidence in large part related to other people entirely.
Held: To grant an injunction without notice is to grant an exceptional remedy. As to hearsay evidence: ‘ the experience of this case should provide a salutary warning for the future that more attention should be paid by claimants in this type of case to the need to state by convincing direct evidence why it was not reasonable and practicable to produce the original maker of the statement as a witness. If the statement involves multiple hearsay, the route by which the original statement came to the attention of the person attesting to it should be identified as far as practicable.’ It would be right to suspend the possession order on terms as to further breaches of the tenancy agreement and nuisance. The ASBO’s were not established to be necessary, and undertakings should be required instead.

Judges:

Lord Justice Brooke Vice-President Of The Court Of Appeal (Civil Division) And Lord Justice Judge And Lord Justice Dyson

Citations:

Times 23-Mar-2005, [2005] EWCA Civ 287

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 153A 153C 153D, Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, County Courts Act 1984 77(6)(ee)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina (M) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor CA 18-Mar-2004
The making of an interim Anti-Social Behaviour Order not on notice was not an infringement of the subject’s human rights, since the order was limited in time and subject to review by the courts. However, ‘The more intrusive the order the more the . .
Cited – Medina Housing Association v Case CA 16-Dec-2002
The claimant had obtained an order for possession against the defendant for her repeated anti-social behaviour. The court granted in addition to the possession order an injunction restraining the defendant from coming near the premises for a further . .
Cited – Masich v Masich CA 1977
A husband was served at 3.30 pm with an ex parte order requiring him to vacate the matrimonial home at 6 pm the same day.
Held: There was nothing to justify turning the husband out of his home without hearing his side: ‘Such a course should be . .
Cited – Ansah v Ansah CA 1977
Ormrod LJ: ‘Orders made ex parte are anomalies in our system of justice which generally demands service or notice of the proposed proceedings on the opposite party: see Craig v Karssen [1943] KB 256, 262. Nevertheless, the power of the court to . .
Cited – Practice Note (Matrimonial Cause: Injunction) FD 1978
‘The President is greatly concerned by the increasing number of applications being made ex parte in the Royal Courts of Justice for injunctions, which could and should have been made (if at all) on two clear days’ notice to the other side, as . .
Cited – G v G (Ouster: Ex parte Application) CA 1990
An ex parte order was made requiring a wife to vacate the family home immediately and was served on her when she was bringing two of the children of the family home from school.
Held: Lord Donaldson MR: there was no reason why the judge could . .
Cited – Thomas A Edison Ltd v Bock 1912
(High Court of Australia) ‘There is a primary precept governing the administration of justice, that no man is to be condemned unheard; and therefore, as a general rule, no order should be made to the prejudice of a party unless he has the . .
Cited – Solon South West Housing Association Limited v Lisa James Eran James CA 20-Dec-2004
Hearsay evidence is available on an application for an ASBO or the trial of a possession action. . .
Cited – Connors v The United Kingdom ECHR 27-May-2004
The applicant gypsies had initially been permitted to locate their caravan on a piece of land owned by a local authority, but their right of occupation was brought to an end because the local authority considered that they were committing a . .
Cited – Cumming v Danson CA 1942
The court considered what amounted to reasonable alternative accomodation.
Held: it was the judge’s duty to take into account all relevant circumstances as they exist at the date of the hearing. There is a fundamental difference in the Rent . .
Cited – Cresswell v Hodgson CA 1951
The landlord sought possession. The tenant had a controlled tenancy. L offered the tenant another house (one he had built) as alternative accommodation. The rent was higher. The landlord was under pressure from his bank and wanted capital to pay off . .
Cited – Clingham (formerly C (a minor)) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Regina v Crown Court at Manchester Ex parte McCann and Others HL 17-Oct-2002
The applicants had been made subject of anti-social behaviour orders. They challenged the basis upon which the orders had been made.
Held: The orders had no identifiable consequences which would make the process a criminal one. Civil standards . .
Cited – Council of City of Manchester v McCann CA 16-Nov-1998
A threat made against a witness is clearly an insult within the Act, and a threat made as a witness returns home after court is also a contempt even though not strictly in the face of the Court.
Section 118 of the 1984 Act now provides an . .
Cited – Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council v Simmonds CA 15-Jul-1996
A possession order was properly made against a tenant for the misbehaviour of a family member. . .
Cited – West Kent Housing Association Limited v Davies CA 4-Feb-1998
The court should recognise the seriousness of the case where the Housing Association was doing its best to improve the quality of life for those living on a housing estate, when its efforts included obtaining witnesses as to the tenant’s behaviour . .
Cited – Regina v Parkin (Shane Tony) CACD 3-Feb-2004
The defendant had admitted assault with intent to rob, four attempted robberies, and four false imprisonments. He appealed his sentence of four years detention in a Young Offenders Institution to be followed by a two year anti-social behaviour order . .
Cited – Canterbury City Council v Lowe CA 2001
The defendants had made the lives of a neighbour and his daughter (and his mentally ill mother, who sometimes visited them) ‘a completely misery’. The trial judge had received graphic evidence about the very serious nature of the defendants’ . .
See Also – Moat Housing Group South Ltd v Harris and Another CA 17-Dec-2004
The Housing Association had obtained a possession order against the appellant family, who now sought a stay of execution pending their appeal.
Held: The presence of children in the house meant that the balance had to include consideration of . .

Cited by:

Cited – Lawer, Regina (on the Application of) v Restormel Borough Council Admn 12-Oct-2007
The applicant was joint tenant of a council property. She suffered domestic violence, and said she was advised by the local authority to surrender her tenancy on the basis that they would rehouse her. She did so. The authority refused to provide a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 29 June 2022; Ref: scu.223581

Regina ex parte Spink and Another v The London Borough of Wandsworth: CA 18 Mar 2005

The applicants had two severely disabled children. They sought assistance from the local authority in carrying out the necessary adaptations to their home. The authority asked first as to their financial circumstances. They declined, saying that any such consideration was not relevant to the decision.
Held: The statutes were unclear, but the result was that the authority’s decision to provide th alterations was dependent upon finidng first that the family could not afford it themselves. That required the family to provide financial information. The judicial review was refused.

Judges:

Lord Justice May, Lord Justice Rix, Lord Philips Of Worth Matravers, Mr

Citations:

(2005) 84 BMLR 169, [2005] 1 WLR 2884, (2005) 8 CCL Rep 272, [2005] HLR 41, [2005] 1 FCR 608, [2005] 2 All ER 954, [2005] BLGR 561, Times 05-Apr-2005, [2005] EWCA Civ 302

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Children Act 1989, Chronically Sick and Disabled Persona Act 1970 2 28A

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Local Government, Housing

Updated: 29 June 2022; Ref: scu.223678

The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Rahanara Begum: CA 11 Feb 2005

The applicant sought housing as a homeless person. Temporary accommodation was provided, and an offer of permanent accommodation was made but rejected. The council then sought possession of the temporary accommodation. The applicant responded that she had not been given notice as required of the authority’s decision as to the consequences of her refusal. The authority appealed.
Held: The authority’s letter had not stated that it was the authority’s opinion that the offer had been reasonable, nor that the authority would consider this an end to their duty to house her. However the letter did say that the authority’s duty would end if she did not accept the offer, and the authority did then give notice to say so directly. Appeal allowed.

Judges:

Lord Justice Ward, Lord Justice Tuckey

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 116, Times 22-Feb-2005

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 193

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Warsame and Warsame v London Borough of Hounslow CA 25-Jun-1999
The appellants refused the authority’s offer of accommodation under Part VI of the 1996 Act, saying it was not suitable. After the authority had informed them that if they did not accept the offer, the authority’s duty to house them would cease, . .

Cited by:

Cited – Slater v London Borough of Lewisham CA 12-Apr-2006
The applicant was heavily pregnant when she was offered a first floor one bedroomed flat. She rejected it.
Held: When a housing authority reviewed its decision on the applicant’s decision not to accept the accommodation offered, that review . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 29 June 2022; Ref: scu.222956

Norwich City Council v Famuyiwa: CA 21 Dec 2004

When considering making an order for possession for breach of tenancy conditions in that the tenant had behaved in an anti-social way, the judge had ruled out the possibility that she might improve her behaviour.
Held: The court should have considered the possibility that he might adjourn the application subject to conditions to give the tenant an opportunity to demonstrate her intention to comply with the tenancy terms.

Judges:

Chadwick LJ, Jacob LJ

Citations:

Times 24-Jan-2005, [2004] EWCA Civ 1770

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing

Updated: 28 June 2022; Ref: scu.221716

Hall v London Borough of Wandsworth: CA 17 Dec 2004

The applicants appealed refusal of their applications for housing having priority housing need being vulnerable because of their mental illness. They said that the original decisions had been reviewed, and that on review deficiencies had been identified in the decisions, but they had not been given opportunity themselves to make representations about the decisions.
Held: The scheme required the reviewing officer to give advance notice of an adverse decision and to allow representations. There was no reason to limit that duty to situations which might give rise to a legal challenge to the decision. The duty arose whenever, looking at the matter broadly, it seemed that an important issue had not been addressed.
Carnwath LJ said: ‘Thus, the requirement for advance notice of the intended decision in certain cases does not derive directly from the statute itself. The thinking behind such a requirement seems to be that a bare right to make representations on the first decision will not be sufficient, if that decision was itself flawed in some respect, so that it does not represent a full and reliable consideration of the material issues. In that event the applicant’s rights are reinforced in two ways: first, by requiring the reviewing officer to give advance notice of a proposed adverse decision and the reasons for it; and, secondly, by allowing the applicant to make both written and oral representations on it.’
As to the meaning of ‘deficiency’, Carnwath LJ said: ‘The word ‘deficiency’ does not have any particular legal connotation. It simply means ‘something lacking’. There is nothing in the words of the rule to limit it to failings which would give grounds for legal challenge. If that were the intention, one would have expected it to have been stated expressly. Furthermore, since the judgment is that of the reviewing officer, who is unlikely to be a lawyer, it would be surprising if the criterion were one depending solely on legal judgment. On the other hand, the ‘something lacking’ must be of sufficient importance to the fairness of the procedure to justify an extra procedural safeguard. Whether that is so involves an exercise of ‘evaluative judgment’ . . on which the officer’s conclusion will only be challengeable on Wednesbury grounds.
To summarise, the reviewing officer should treat reg.8(2) as applicable, not merely when he finds some significant legal or procedural error in the decision, but whenever (looking at the matter broadly and untechnically) he considers that an important aspect of the case was either not addressed, or not addressed adequately, by the original decision-maker. In such a case, if he intends to confirm the decision, he must give notice of the grounds on which he intends to do so, and provide an opportunity for written and (if requested) oral representations.’

Judges:

Lord Justice Waller Lord Justice Aldous Lord Justice Carnwath

Citations:

[2005] 2 All ER 192, Times 07-Jan-2005, [2004] EWCA Civ 1740, [2005] HLR 23

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1996 189(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira CA 20-May-1998
When considering whether a person was vulnerable so as to be treated more favourably in applying for rehousing: ‘The Council should consider such application afresh applying the statutory criterion: The Ortiz test should not be used; the dictum of . .
Cited – Runa Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (First Secretary of State intervening) HL 13-Feb-2003
The appellant challenged the procedure for reviewing a decision made as to the suitability of accomodation offered to her after the respondent had accepted her as being homeless. The procedure involved a review by an officer of the council, with an . .
Cited – Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation CA 10-Nov-1947
Administrative Discretion to be Used Reasonably
The applicant challenged the manner of decision making as to the conditions which had been attached to its licence to open the cinema on Sundays. It had not been allowed to admit children under 15 years of age. The statute provided no appeal . .

Cited by:

Cited – Shala and Another v Birmingham City Council CA 27-Jun-2007
The claimants succeeded in their applications for asylum, and then applied for housing assistance. They now appealed refusal of such assistance. The issue was how the authority had treated their medical evidence in the review process. Mrs Shala was . .
Cited – Mitu v London Borough of Camden CA 1-Nov-2011
The claimant had applied for housing under homelessness provisions saying that he was in priority need and was not homeless intentionally. The first decision had been that he was intentionally homeless and not in priority need. After review, it was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing

Updated: 28 June 2022; Ref: scu.220953