Category: Criminal Practice

Bielecki v The Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 23 Aug 2011

The court had delivered a draft judgment which counsel said was based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the case she had presented. Counsel now suggested that the matter should be referred to a two judge divisional court. That was refused. The appellangt contended that he had not understood the request to provide a specimen of breath for analysis, since he spoke Polish and not English.
Held: The test procedure had been undertaken with a competent interpreter. However the court had refused to require the attendance of the blood analyst before proceeding. For that reason the conviction was quashed.
The court spoke of the twelve hearings on the matter, saying: ‘it is abundantly clear that it is utterly unacceptable: the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Rules have been more honoured in the breach than in their observance. Both sides have a duty to the court to ensure that only the minimum time is taken in the resolution of criminal trials and, to such extent as they or either of them fail to do so, the court should not be slow to impose sanctions in the form of adverse orders for costs, if necessary against legal representatives.’
Foskett J
[2011] EWHC 2245 (Admin), (2011) 175 JP 369
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 7(6)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Owen v Chesters 1985
The court considered the means of proving the reading from a breath test meter: ‘It was clearly the intention of the legislature, in enacting subsection (5), that the defendant should be provided in advance of the hearing with the information . .
Cited – Sneyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 24-Feb-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that though the officers suspected him of having consumed alcohol, they asked him whether he had been drinking without cautioning him, and that no print out . .
Cited – Sneyd, Regina (on the Application Of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Jul-2005
The defendant wished to argue a point to overturn the decision in Chesters. Accordingly the matter was adjourned for hearing by a two judge court. . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions, Regina (on the Application of) v Chorley Justices and Forrest Admn 8-Jun-2006
The prosecutor applied for an order to require the magistrates to state a case. He faced a charge of driving with excess alcohol. He pleaded not guilty. There were several adjournments, and a considerable delay. At the trial, and with no . .
Cited – Brett v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 16-Mar-2009
The defendant faced trial for driving whilst over the prescribed alcohol limit. On a pre-trial review, the prosecution had applied for the evidence of the analyst to be given under the hearsay provisions, on the basis that she was living abroad. She . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 July 2021; Ref: scu.443278

W (A Minor), Regina (on The Application of) v Leeds Crown Court: Admn 28 Jul 2011

The Claimant aged 14 appeared before the Magistrates’ Court with a 20 year old Co-Defendant. The Magistrates declined jurisdiction in his case and the Claimant indicated Not Guilty pleas. The Magistrates concluded that it was in the interest of justice for the Claimant to be committed alongside the adult under Section 24(1)(b) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1990 and both Defendants were therefore committed under Section 6 (2) of the 1980 Act to the Crown Court. In the Crown Court the adult Defendant pleaded guilty and his case was accordingly adjourned for sentence. The Claimant pleaded not guilty and it was submitted on his behalf that as the effective link with the adult had been broken, his case should be remitted to the Youth Court for trial. The Crown Court Judge concluded he had no power to do so. He now sought judicial review.
Held: Youth Courts are a specialist subset of the Magistrates Court and a Court of Summary Jurisdiction constituted in accordance with section 4 of The Children and Young Persons Act 1933, as subsequently amended. They sit for the purpose of hearing any charge against a child or a young person or for the purpose of exercising any other jurisdiction conferred on the Youth Courts by or under any Act.
Sir Anthony May P said: ‘There are, I think in theory at least, two possible approaches. The first would be to identify a plain legislative oversight and read the legislation so as to supply an omitted provision which Parliament must have intended but failed by mistake to provide. The second possibility might be to resort to Section 3 of the The Human Rights Act 1998 so as to read the legislation in a way that is compatible with the convention. There is no suggestion in the present case that there might be a declaration of incompatibility, but for my part I think the Claimant’s advisors were right not to press the Human Rights Act route. An over ingenious human rights lawyer might make something of a case for an infringement here of Article 6, or conceivably Article 8, of the European Convention on Human Rights, but the reality is the Claimant would get a fair trial in the Crown Court, and that is accepted. It is only that it would be strongly preferable for policy reasons if he were in the Youth Court’.
Sir Anthony May P QBD, Langstaff J
[2011] EWHC 2326 (Admin), [2012] Crim LR 160, [2012] ACD 8, [2012] 1 WLR 2786, [2012] 1 Cr App R 13, (2011) 175 JP 467
Bailii
Magistrates Courts Act 1990 24(1)(b), Magistrates Courts Act 1980 6(2), Children and Young Persons Act 1933 4
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – ZN and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Bromley Youth Court Admn 9-Jul-2014
The applicants, both aged 16, sought permission to bring judicial review of a decision to commit thme for trial at the adult Crown Court on theft charges along with a co-defendant adult (though 18).
Held: Permission was granted.
Hayden J . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 July 2021; Ref: scu.443636

Regina v Norwich Crown Court ex parte Estabrook: QBD 2000

The court considered the ability of the Crown Court to investigate a suggestion that defendant’s plea was made under duress from his lawyer.
[2000] WL 281287 (QBD)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Huntingdon Crown Court ex parte Jordan 1981
The appellant, a wife had pleaded guilty to shoplifting before the magistrates, but now sought to allege that she had committed the act alleged and entered her plea only as a result of threats and pressure put upon her by her husband, who was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 July 2021; Ref: scu.239725

Regina v Knights and Another: HL 21 Jul 2005

The defendants had been convicted of offences involving dealing with goods on which customs duty had not been paid. After conviction a timetable was set for sentencing and for confiscation proceedings. The House considered the making of the confiscation order, the appellants saying that the date to which the determination had not been fixed, and that this failure to comply with the rules made the order ineffective.
Held: Lord Brown said: ‘When postponing the determination of one or other of the critical questions for decision in confiscation proceedings, the judge is required to specify the particular period of the postponement: he cannot simply adjourn the proceedings generally. I do not accept, however, that he is bound to specify the very date when the substantive hearing is to begin, still less the date when it is to end (the date, in other words, when the actual order, assuming there is to be one, will be made). To my mind it is sufficient, when postponing the proceedings, to give directions for the service of statements and to specify a date when the proceedings are next to be listed, whether for disposal, or for such further directions as may be needed, or to fix a final hearing date. Section 72A(2) expressly envisages that ‘more than one postponement may be made’. ‘
Lord Steyn, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Cullen of Whitekirk, Lord Carswell, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
[2005] UKHL 50, Times 21-Jul-2005, [2006] 1 AC 368, [2005] 4 All ER 347, [2005] 3 WLR 330
Bailii, House of Lords
Criminal Justice Act 1988 72A, Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 170(1)(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Regina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005
The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .
Appeal from – Sekhon, etc v Regina CACD 16-Dec-2002
The defendants appealed against confiscation orders on the basis that in various ways, the Crown had failed to comply with procedural requirements.
Held: The courts must remember the importance of such procedures in the fight against crime, . .
Cited – Regina v Copeland CACD 2002
The court considered the necessary of any postponment of a dermination of a confiscation order.
Held: The court rejected the contention that the postponement order must specify the period of postponement. It was pointed out that the word used . .
Cited – Regina v Davies CACD 2002
In confiscation proceedings, the trial judge had set a timetable for the service of statements but no further hearing date.
Held: The failure to specify a period for the postponement was fatal to the confiscation order subsequently made. . .
Cited – Ruddick v Regina CACD 16-Apr-2003
A judge was required to take into account a confiscation order before making an order for costs, but that need not invalidate the orders. Was a financial order made before the forfeiture process was complete void or merely a ground for appeal? The . .
Cited – Regina v Pisciotto CACD 27-Jun-2002
The defendant was subject to a confiscation order. The judge had postponed the determination of the amount, but without specifying when it would take place.
Held: The requirement in the Act was mandatory. When deciding to postpone an . .
Wrongly decided – Palmer, Regina v CACD 11-Oct-2002
The defendant appealed against a very substantial confiscation order. The prosecution had served notices under sections 71 and 72(1), but the section 72(1) notice was invalid. The judge allowed a second notice to be served, and the case to be . .

Cited by:
Cited – Guraj, Regina v SC 14-Dec-2016
The defendant had pleaded to charges of possession of drugs with intent to supply. He was sentenced, but then the prosecutor was 14 months’ late serving its notice with regard to the confiscation order under section 16. The crown now appealed . .
Cited – Guraj, Regina v CACD 6-Mar-2015
The defendant appealed against a confiscation order made on his plea to charges of possession of drugs with intent to supply. The Crown had served its statement under section 16 of the 2002 Act, but it was 14 months’ late. . .
Cited – McCool, Regina v SC 2-May-2018
The appellants complained that the recovery order made against them in part under the transitional provisions were unlawful. They had claimed benefits as single people but were married to each other and for a house not occupied. The difficulty was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.228954

Director of Public Prosecutions v Toney: Admn 14 Jul 2005

The defendant appealed a refusal to allow him to withdraw a plea of guilty. He was accused of assaulting his wife. He had had legal advice before interview and trial.
Held: Though the defendant had not waived privilege a note had been placed before the judge who rejected the application and which note had been relied upon. The application succeeded.
Lord Justice Kennedy Mr Justice Walker
[2005] EWHC 1865 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Drew CACD 1985
The court considered when a judge should allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty: ‘only rarely would it be appropriate for the trial judge to exercise his undoubted discretion in favour of an accused person wishing to change an unequivocal . .
Cited – Saik v Regina CACD 24-Nov-2004
The defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to launder the proeeds of crime. He had tendered the plea on the basis that he had only suspected and not known that the funds were the proceeds of crime. Whether to allow a defendant to withdraw . .
Cited – Sheikh and Others, Regina v CACD 8-Mar-2004
. .
Cited – Regina v Isleworth Crown Court and Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Buda 2000
When a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a plea. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.229736

Asliturk v HMP Wandsworth: Admn 16 Jun 2010

The claimant was remanded into custody pending extradition. He now appealed against refusal of bail.
Held: Bail was refused.
Pitchford LJ and Maddison J
[2010] EWHC 1720 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Asliturk v The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court Admn 12-Aug-2010
The claimants sought judicial review of the respondents’ refusal to order their discharge from extradition proceedings. The extradition hearing had not been commenced within the time specified in section 74. Though listed, through a prison error, . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 July 2021; Ref: scu.421504

Regina v Leathem: 1861

The court overruled an objection to production of a letter which had been discovered in consequence of an inadmissible statement made by the accused: ‘It matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible.’
Crompton J
(1861) 8 Cox CC 498
England and Wales
Cited by:
Approved – Kuruma v The Queen PC 8-Dec-1954
(Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa) The defendant appealed against his conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition, saying that the evidence had been obtained by unlawful means, and should not have been admitted against him.
Held: Lord . .
Cited – A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) HL 8-Dec-2005
The applicants had been detained following the issue of certificates issued by the respondent that they posed a terrorist threat. They challenged the decisions of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission saying that evidence underlying the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 July 2021; Ref: scu.235922

Regina v Hughes: 1879

Baron Huddleston said that: ‘objections and defects in the form of procuring the appearance of a party charged will be cured by appearance.’
Hawkins J said: ‘The information, which is in the nature of an indictment, of necessity precedes the process; and it is only after the information is laid, that the question as to the particular form and nature of the process can properly arise. Process is not essential to the jurisdiction of the justices to hear and adjudicate. It is but the proceeding adopted to compel the appearance of the accused to answer the information already duly laid, without which no hearing in the nature of a trial could take place (unless under special statutory enactment).’
Baron Huddleston, Hawkins J
(1879) 4 QBD 614
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – North Wales Police v Anglesey Justices CA 16-Jul-2008
A dog bit a constable. The defendant said that the police had wrongly begun proceedings as an information, rather than by way of a complaint, and that they were a nullity.
Held: Rule 2.1 of the 1981 Rules is expressed in terms which show that . .
Approved – Regina v Manchester Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Hill; Hill v Anderton HL 1982
The House was asked whether section 127 was satisfied where the information was laid within 6 months from the date of the alleged offence but was not considered by a magistrate, and no summons was issued, until after the expiration of the time . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.272264

Regina v Adams: CACD 23 Nov 2007

The defendant appealed his conviction after the court had allowed a prosecution witness’ statement to be read. The witness did not attend, only being notified in the last few working days before the hearing.
Held: Though the defendant’s appeal was dismissed, the court emphasised as strongly as it could that leaving a voice message on the evening before the hearing was not adequate. The prosecution could not be said to have done all it reasonably and practically could to secure his attendance. The evidence was of a technical nature in that it established the defendant’s unlawful possession of ecstasy tablets in a nightclub, technical because, as the recorder elicited from the defence, possession was not to be an issue in the trial.
Hughes LJ, Wyn Williams, Richard Brown JJ
[2007] EWCA Crim 3025, Times 14-Dec-2007
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 2003 116(2)(d)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Z CACD 23-Jan-2009
The defendant appealed against convictions for rape and indecent assault under the 1956 Act. The allegations dated from 1985 to 1989 when the complainant had been between 9 and 13. The prosecution brought in a doctor who said that in 1993 D . .
Cited – Regina v EED CACD 28-May-2010
EED_rCACD10
A witness had been warned to attend court, but had not served with an order and did not attend. The defendant appealed against his conviction saying that her evidence should not have been read to the jury. He had faced allegations of sexual abuse of . .
Cited – Regina v EED CACD 28-May-2010
EED_rCACD10
A witness had been warned to attend court, but had not served with an order and did not attend. The defendant appealed against his conviction saying that her evidence should not have been read to the jury. He had faced allegations of sexual abuse of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.262885

Vickers, Regina (on the Application Of) v West London Magistrates’ Court: Admn 11 Jul 2003

Application for judicial review challenging the decision of the West London Magistrates’ Court remanding the claimant in custody following a ruling by the clerk of the court that reasonable excuse was not a defence to an allegation of a breach of a bail condition under section 7 of Bail Act 1976.
[2003] EWHC 1809 (Admin)
Bailii
Bail Act 1976 7
England and Wales

Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.185649

Manchester City Council, Regina (on the Application Of) v Manchester Magistrates’ Court: Admn 8 Feb 2005

The council appealed the refusal of the magistrates to grant an interim Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) without notice. The magistrates clerk had said that there had been no violence, and no further incident after the police had given a warning.
Held: The clerk had not properly considered all the allegations, and that the behaviour complained of fell within the range of behaviour for which an order was proper. ‘a justices’ clerk, when deciding if he is satisfied that it is necessary for the application to be made without notice pursuant to Rule 5(2), would be well advised to have regard, inter alia, to the following factors (this list not being exhaustive), namely: (1) the likely response of the defendant upon receiving notice of such application; (2) whether such response is liable to prejudice the complainant having regard to the complainant’s vulnerability; (3) the gravity of the conduct complained of within the scope of conduct tackled by ASBOs in general as opposed to the particular locality; (4) the urgency of the matter; (5) the nature of the prohibitions sought in the interim ASBO; (6) the right of the defendant to know about proceedings against him; (7) the counterbalancing protections for the rights of the defendant, namely: (a) the ineffectiveness of the order until served; (b) the limited period of time the order is effective; (c) the defendant’s right of application to vary or discharge.’
Henriques J
[2005] EWHC 253 (Admin)
Bailii
The Magistrates’ Courts (Anti-Social Behaviour Orders) Rules 2002 5(2), Crime and Disorder Act 1998 1(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Kenny, Regina (on the Application of) v Leeds Magistrates Court, Leeds City Council Admn 5-Dec-2003
In cases involving children, Article 3 provides that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration, not the primary consideration.
The court looked at the test for making an interim ASBO: ‘Consideration of whether it is just to . .
Cited – Regina (M) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor CA 18-Mar-2004
The making of an interim Anti-Social Behaviour Order not on notice was not an infringement of the subject’s human rights, since the order was limited in time and subject to review by the courts. However, ‘The more intrusive the order the more the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.225266

Director of Public Prosecutions v Croydon Youth Court: Admn 17 Jun 2003

The Director of Public Prosecutions sought to challenge by way of judicial review a decision of the Croydon Youth Court that proceedings re-instituted by him pursuant to section 22B of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 against youths for robbery were invalid as proceedings in the Youth Court and could only be re-instituted by the preferment of a bill of indictment.
Held: Allowed.
[2003] EWHC 2240 (Admin)
Bailii
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 22B
England and Wales

Updated: 14 July 2021; Ref: scu.186695

F, Regina (on The Application of) v The Director of Public Prosecutions and Another: Admn 24 Apr 2013

Application for judicial review of the refusal of the Director of Public Prosecutions to initiate a prosecution for rape and/or sexual assault of the claimant by her former partner. The claimant said that she had initially consented to sex with her partner, but only on the basis that a condom was worn. He had not done so.
Held: Judicial review was granted: ‘What Assange underlines is that ‘choice’ is crucial to the issue of ‘consent’, and indeed we underline that the statutory definition of consent provided in s.74 applies equally to s.1(1)(c) as it does to s.1(1)(b). The evidence relating to ‘choice’ and the ‘freedom’ to make any particular choice must be approached in a broad commonsense way. If before penetration began the intervener had made up his mind that he would penetrate and ejaculate within the claimant’s vagina, or even, because ‘penetration is a continuing act from entry to withdrawal’ (see s.79(2) of the 2003 Act) he decided that he would not withdraw at all, just because he deemed the claimant subservient to his control, she was deprived of choice relating to the crucial feature on which her original consent to sexual intercourse was based. Accordingly her consent was negated. Contrary to her wishes, and knowing that she would not have consented, and did not consent to penetration or the continuation of penetration if she had any inkling of his intention, he deliberately ejaculated within her vagina. In law, this combination of circumstances falls within the statutory definition of rape.’
Sir John Thomas LCJ, Fulford, Sweeney JJ
[2013] EWHC 945 (Admin), [2013] 2 Cr App R 21, [2013] WLR(D) 178, [2014] 2 WLR 190, [2013] ACD 86, [2014] 1 QB 581
Bailii, WLRD
Sexual Offences Act 2003 1(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v The Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Manning, Ex Parte Melbourne QBD 17-May-2000
The applicants sought judicial review of the decision of the Director not to prosecute anybody after the death of their brother in prison custody, and while under restraint by prison officers. The jury at a coroner’s inquest had returned a verdict . .
Cited – Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority Admn 2-Nov-2011
The defendant argued that he should not be extradited under a European Arest warrant to Sweden to face allegations of serious sexual assaults. He argued that the prosecutor requesting the extradition was not a judicial authority, that some offences . .

Cited by:
Cited – Monica, Regina (on The Application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 14-Dec-2018
Deception as to identity did not undermine consent
The claimant had been an environmental campaigner. She had had a sexual relationship with a man who was unknown to her an undercover police officer. She now challenged the decision not to prosecute him for rape.
Held: Her claim failed. Case . .
Cited – Lawrance, Regina v CACD 23-Jul-2020
Consent not removed by Lie as to Vasectomy
The defendant appealed from his conviction of rape. He had represented to his victim that he had had a vasectomy to secure consent which the court found had been vitiated.
Held: The appeal was allowed. Could a lie about fertility negate . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.472950

Regina v Ollis: CCCR 1900

The defendant had obtained a sum of money by giving a worthless cheque. He was indicted for having obtained the money by false pretences. His defence was that when he gave the cheque he expected a payment into his bank account in time to meet the cheque, and he was acquitted. He was later tried on a second indictment charging him with three other acts of obtaining money by false pretences on three other worthless cheques. Counsel for the prosecution was allowed to call the same evidence that had been called against the defendant on the unsuccessful prosecution in respect of the one cheque, and the defendant was convicted.
Held: The evidence was legally admissible and that the conviction was right notwithstanding that the defendant had been acquitted of the former charge.
Lord Russell of Killowen CJ: ‘The evidence was, after discussion, admitted; and Ramsey made precisely the same statement he had made before upon the trial of the first indictment when the accused was acquitted. The only point for our present determination is, whether that evidence was legally admissible on the ground that the facts disclosed in it were relevant to the subsequent charges. It does not appear to have been argued that it was not relevant as showing guilty knowledge, if it were not inadmissible on the grounds suggested-namely, that the facts sought to be given in evidence had already been given, and that the accused had already been acquitted of the charge to which they related. It is clear that there was no estoppel; the negativing by the jury of the charge of fraud on the first occasion did not create an estoppel; nor is there any question arising upon the maxim ‘Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.’ The evidence was not less admissible because it tended to shew that the accused was, in fact, guilty of the former charge. The point is, was it relevant in support of the three subsequent charges? In the opinion of the majority of the court, and in my own opinion, it was relevant as shewing a course of conduct on the part of the accused, and a belief on his part that the cheques would not be met.’
Darling J: ‘It seems to me, therefore, that by the admission of this evidence the defendant was not ‘bis vexatus,’ for I feel sure that those words are not to be understood as meaning that a man is not to be more than once annoyed by the same evidence. I think they mean that he is not to be by legal process twice exposed to the risk of being found guilty of the same crime, or the same tort, or liable twice to pay the same debt, be it to the State or to his fellow citizen.
‘To hold otherwise seems to me to rule that evidence which has been given once shall never be produced again against the same defendant; yet it is plain that up to a certain point the evidence must often be the same, although the defendant is accused of wrongs done to two distinct persons, and that in different suits or forensic proceedings.’
Channell J: ‘Judges should be, and I believe generally are, careful not to allow proof of other acts of the prisoner besides those the subject of the indictment to be given, unless those facts have a clear bearing on some issue raised by the indictment, but if they have such a bearing I am unable to see how their proof becomes inadmissible because they have already, for a different purpose, been considered by another jury. Take as an illustration a case of counterfeit coin. Suppose a man passes a counterfeit half-crown, and on his trial, there being no proof of his having possession of any other counterfeit coin, the jury acquit. It is subsequently discovered that either before or after the passing of the one half-crown (in my opinion it matters not which) he has passed another counterfeit half-crown, and upon comparison of the two base coins they appear cast in the same mould. If tried for the secondly discovered case of uttering, the fact of the other uttering would be most cogent evidence, and the fact that when that other case was supposed to be an isolated one a jury had acquitted would neither detract from the weight of the evidence or in any way affect its admissibility, for the prisoner would not be being tried again for the offence of which he had been acquitted, but for a different offence, in respect of which the evidence given in the former case, or some of it, would be relevant . . .
I doubt whether the transaction with Ramsey was relevant on the subsequent indictment, but I am prepared to defer to the opinion of the majority of the court as to the mode in which the case should be dealt with, desiring only to express my clear opinion that, if the evidence was otherwise admissible, it is not the less so by reason of the former acquittal.’
Lord Russell of Killowen CJ, Mathew, Grantham, Wright, Darling and Channell JJ (Bruce and Ridley JJ dissenting)
[1900] 2 QB 758
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Terry CACD 21-Dec-2004
The prosecutor had a alleged a conspiracy basing the charge on a conversation in a car. The court rejected the admisibility of evidence of a voice recognition expert, and the defendant was acquitted on direction. He then said that in the absence of . .
Cited – Regina v Z (Prior acquittal) HL 22-Jun-2000
The defendant on a charge of rape had been tried and acquitted of the rape of different women on three previous occasions in three separate trials. The prosecution wished to call those three complainants to give similar fact evidence in support of . .
Distinguished – G (An Infant) v Coltart 1967
The defendant was a domestic servant. She was charged in two separate prosecutions before justices with theft of property from her employer and from a a guest. The property was found in her room after the guest had left. The prosecution offered no . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.221710

Regina v Stewart: CACD 1990

The Court recalled the fundamental distinction between the preferment of a bill of indictment and the signing of the bill: it is the signing of the bill which converts it into an indictment. The court then accepted that the proper officer had satisfied himself that the person charged had been committed for trial for the offence contained in the indictment or had been the subject of a voluntary bill or an order under section 9 of the Perjury Act in compliance with section 2(2) of the 1933 Act.
(1990) 91 Cr App R 301
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 2(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Clarke, Regina v; Regina v McDaid HL 6-Feb-2008
An indictment had not been signed despite a clear statutory provision that it should be. The defects were claimed to have been cured by amendment before sentence.
Held: The convictions failed. Sections 1(1) and 2(1) of the 1933 Act which . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.267616

Regina v Newland: CACD 1988

The trial had proceeded on an indictment which was invalid because it improperly contained unrelated counts. The defendant having pleaded guilty appealed.
Held: The proviso could not be applied, and the appeal must succeed. While recognising that there was no merit in the appeal at all, the appellant having pleaded guilty, his appeal was allowed and his conviction quas-hed.
The framing of a correct indictment is a task for counsel.
[1988] QB 402, [1988] 2 WLR 382
Indictments Act 1915 5(3), Indictmet Rules 1971 (1971 no 1253) 9
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Clarke, Regina v; Regina v McDaid HL 6-Feb-2008
An indictment had not been signed despite a clear statutory provision that it should be. The defects were claimed to have been cured by amendment before sentence.
Held: The convictions failed. Sections 1(1) and 2(1) of the 1933 Act which . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.267620

Regina v Hodges (George David): CACD 5 Jun 1981

The court considered a claim that the indictment was invalid.
Held: Peter Pain J said: ‘It seems to us that it is impossible for a criminal trial to start without there being a valid indictment to which the defendant can plead, and that the bill of indictment does not become an indictment until it is signed’.
Peter Pain
Unreported, 5 June 1981
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 2(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Applied – Regina v Morais CACD 1988
A High Court judge had given leave to prefer a voluntary bill against the appellant, who was arraigned on six counts in the voluntary bill. He pleaded not guilty, was convicted on four counts and was sentenced. Relying on section 2 of the 1933 Act, . .
Cited – Clarke, Regina v; Regina v McDaid HL 6-Feb-2008
An indictment had not been signed despite a clear statutory provision that it should be. The defects were claimed to have been cured by amendment before sentence.
Held: The convictions failed. Sections 1(1) and 2(1) of the 1933 Act which . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.267622

Hoque and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v HM Revenue and Customs: Admn 13 Mar 2013

The claimant sought judicial review of warrants issued at the request of the respondent, saying that they failed to comply with the requirements of section 15, and that no magistrate could reasonably have been satisfied that section 8 had been complied with.
Held: ‘ anyone reading the warrant could not ascertain the limits of Mr Blackwell’s authority to search for and seize objects which he deemed to be relevant. The investigation could, so far as the occupier was concerned, have comprised and embraced anything within the powers of HMRC to investigate. There is, it seem to me, a further flaw in the warrants as issued. It is the responsibility of the justice of the peace to apply the access criteria of section 8(1)(a)-(e). Section 8 does not permit the justice of the peace to delegate to the constable the very responsibility which the justice of the peace is exercising under section 8(1). On the contrary, the evidence submitted by the constable should establish to the satisfaction of the justice of the peace reasonable grounds for believing that the articles to be identified in the warrant so far as practicable meet the access criteria in section 8(1).’
Pitchford LJ, Kenneth Parker J
[2013] EWHC 725 (Admin)
Bailii
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 8(1) 15(6)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Lee and Others v Solihull Magistrates Court and Another Admn 5-Dec-2013
The claimant challenged search warrants issued by the respondents, on the grounds first that the warrants were too wide in the description of the property which might be seized, that the description of property sought in the warrant was so wide that . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 July 2021; Ref: scu.491901

F, Regina v: CACD 14 Mar 2013

The prosecutor appealed a decision that its child witness was incompetent to give evidence in criminal proceedings. The defendant said that the prosecution had failed to meet the requirement to give notice immediately after the ruling.
Held: The requirement arose on the formal giving of the decision, and not at an earlier point where the judge had indicated by email that that was what he would be doing.
Treacy LJ, Saunders J, Judge Milford QC
[2013] EWCA Crim R1, [2013] WLR(D) 100
Bailii, WLRD
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 53(3)
England and Wales

Updated: 09 July 2021; Ref: scu.471956

Regina v Birchall: 1999

[1999] Crim LR 311
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Black v Regina CACD 17-Jul-2020
Disclosure Sufficient to Support Inference
The court was asked whether sufficient evidence had been adduced about the strength of the prosecution case at the time of interview, to permit an adverse inference to be drawn from the failure to mention specific facts pursuant to section 34 of the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 July 2021; Ref: scu.652776

Beckles v The United Kingdom: ECHR 8 Oct 2002

The applicant had been convicted of serious offences, in part in reliance upon inferences drawn from his partial silence during interview. At trial, he said this had been on legal advice, and was ready to answer questions about that advice, but none were put.
Held: The right of silence was not absolute, but the right against self-incrimination lay at the heart of the notion of a fair trial. A conviction could not be based solely on inferences drawn from silence, but he could be expected to answer questions, where the situation clearly called for his explanation. In this case, the judge did not give the jury sufficiently clear direction on the accused’s explanation of why he had not answered questions, and had undermined that evidence. There had been a violation of his art 6.1 rights. ‘whether the drawing of adverse inferences from an accused’s silence infringes Article 6 is a matter to be determined in the light of all the circumstances of the case, having regard to the situations where inferences may be drawn, the weight attached to them by the national courts in their assessment of the evidence and the degree of compulsion inherent in the situation. Of particular relevance are the terms of the trial judge’s direction to the jury on the issue of adverse inferences’.
Pellonpaa, Bratza, Trdruejo, Palm, Casadevali, Marustem, Paviovschi JJ
Times 15-Oct-2002, 44652/98, (2002) 36 EHRR 162, [2002] ECHR 661, (2003) 36 EHRR 13, 13 BHRC 522
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 6.1
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – Beckles, Regina v CACD 12-Nov-2004
The appellant had been convicted in 1997 of robbery and false imprisonment. His case was now refererred by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The defendant had, on advice from his solicitor refused to answer questions at the police station. The . .
Cited – Regina v Boyle and Another CACD 25-Aug-2006
The appellants had been convicted of murder. They complained that the judge had misdirected the jury as to the effect of their silence and the inferences to be drawn.
Held: The appeals failed. Whilst the direction on s34 was defective, it had . .
Cited – Webster v Regina CACD 1-Dec-2010
The defendant appealed against his conviction under the 1889 Act for making a corrupt gift to a local government officer. He said that the 1916 Act placed an unfair burden on him to prove that the gift was not corruptly given.
Held: The appeal . .
Cited – Black v Regina CACD 17-Jul-2020
Disclosure Sufficient to Support Inference
The court was asked whether sufficient evidence had been adduced about the strength of the prosecution case at the time of interview, to permit an adverse inference to be drawn from the failure to mention specific facts pursuant to section 34 of the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 July 2021; Ref: scu.177426

The Serious Fraud Office v Lexi Holdings Plc: CACD 10 Jul 2008

Application was made for the variation of a restraint order made under the 2002 Act to enable payment to be made to a judgment creditor in advance of any confiscation order being made, or indeed before any criminal charges had even been preferred. The court considered the potential impact of a confiscation order on the rights of secured and unsecured creditors.
Held: The phrase ‘with a view to in section 82 is no more than ‘a steer’ and the court stressed the degree of ‘elasticity’ inherent in it.
[2008] EWCA Crim 1443, Times 18-Aug-2008, [2009] Bus LR 647, [2009] 1 All ER 586, [2008] Lloyd’s Rep FC 489, [2008] BPIR 1598, [2009] 1 Cr App R 23, [2009] QB 376, [2009] 2 WLR 905
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 1988 82
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Stodgell v Stodgell FD FD 18-Jul-2008
The parties were involved in ancillary relief proceedings. At the same time the husband was in prison after having hidden earnings from his business, and was subject to an unsatisfied confiscation order. The guardian had had doubts about the . .
Cited – Irwin Mitchell v Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office and Allad CACD 30-Jul-2008
The solicitors had been paid funds on account of their fees in defending the client. By the time a freezing order was made under the 2002 Act in respect of his assets, the firm’s fees exceeded the amount held. The court was asked what was to happen . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 01 July 2021; Ref: scu.270623

Rex v Wells and Another: 1904

The driver had been convicted of driving a motor car on a public highway ‘at a speed or in a manner’ dangerous to the public.
Held: The driver’s appeal succeeded. The charge was bad for duplicity. The court explained why this should happen: ‘a conviction ought to specify he particular offence of which the man was convicted, otherwise . . If a man were charged again with one of the two alternative offences mentioned in his conviction it would be impossible to say that the plea of autrefois convict would be satisfied by producing the document which contained the offence of which he had been previously convicted.’
Wills J
(1904) 91 LT 98
England and Wales

Updated: 28 June 2021; Ref: scu.652596

Regina v Salloum: CACD 2010

The accused had failed to appear on the first day of his trial but continued to give his lawyers instructions from afar up to and including an appeal. His lawyers claimed express authority to advance an appeal. He had been given leave by the single Judge.
Held: Relying on principles it derived from Gooch, the Court refused to hear the appeal (it not being an ‘exceptional case’) and adjourned to give the appellant one last chance to attend.
[2010] EWCA Crim 3120
England and Wales

Updated: 23 June 2021; Ref: scu.544632

Attorney-General’s Reference (No 14 of 2003) Regina v Sheppard: CACD 9 Apr 2003

The Attorney-General sought to refer a sentence to the Court of Appeal as too lenient.
Held: The Act introduced a new power, but provided several protections. The Attorney-General had himself to consider the sentence to be too lenient, and he exercised a discretion, not a duty, to refer the case. The Court of Appeal was to be asked to give leave to refer the case, and itself consider whether it was too lenient. The Court of Appeal’s leave should not be considered to be automatic. Here the reference was misconceived, mentioning elements which should not have been included, and excluding matters of mitigation which should have been mentioned. The Attorney-General had exercised his discretion under a mistake. Leave was refused.
Kay LJ, Goldring, Cox JJ
Times 18-Apr-2003, Gazette 19-Jun-2003
Criminal Law Act 1977 1
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Attorney-General’s Reference (No 10 of 2003); Regina v Jutue CACD 14-May-2003
A case had been referred to the court, but the court was unhappy about the state of the reference. It was essential that reference should be seen by counsel in the case so that he could check it. It should not be based upon the evidence as it stood . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 June 2021; Ref: scu.180848

Stellato v The Ministry of Justice: CA 14 Dec 2010

The claimant having been released on licence from a prison sentence refused to comply with the conditions of his licence on the ground that he was entitled to be released unconditionally. He was returned to prison. The Divisional Court dismissed his claim for judicial review. His appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal which granted a declaration that he was entitled to immediate release but stayed the declaration to permit a petition to the House of Lords and granted him conditional bail. He refused to comply with the bail conditions and, as a result, was arrested and returned to prison pursuant to an order of a Lord Justice who, the next day, ordered that his bail be revoked and that he remain in custody until the end of the stay granted by the Court of Appeal. Following the dismissal by the House of Lords of the Home Office’s appeal, he was released unconditionally and he then brought an action for false imprisonment and breach of his rights under article 5 ECHR against the Ministry of Justice as successor to the Home Office. The claimant now appealed against rejection of his claim for damages for his detention.
Held: The appeal raised important questions as to the legal consequences of the grant of bail by the Court and as to the scope of Article 5.1(b) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Stanley Burnton LJ explained that the only authority for the continued detention was the original sentence of imprisonment and the legislation which was the subject of the court’s judgment: ‘Turning to the effect of the orders of Hughes LJ, I consider that the answer is to be found in the nature of a grant of bail. In principle, a grant of bail is not an order for the detention of the person to whom it is granted. To the contrary, it is a grant of liberty to someone who would otherwise be detained. The legal justification for his detention is to be found elsewhere: in the case of a person suspected of crime, in the powers of arrest of a constable under a warrant issued by a magistrates’ court (see section 1 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980), or without a warrant (see section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984), and powers to remand pending trial or further hearing. Similarly, there is statutory authority for detention in immigration cases: see, for example, paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to, and paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to, the Immigration Act 1971.
A grant of bail may be conditional or unconditional. A condition of bail does not impose an obligation on the person granted bail. It is a true condition. It qualifies the grant of liberty made by the grant of bail. If the person granted bail does not comply with the conditions of his bail, he is liable to be returned to custody. If so, the legal authority for his detention is not the grant of bail, or his breach of the conditions of his bail, but the authority for his detention apart from the order for bail. All that his breach of the conditions of his bail does is to disentitle him to bail.’
Maurice Kay VP CA Stanley Burnton, Patten LJJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 1435, [2011] QB 856, [2011] UKHRR 622, [2011] 2 WLR 936, [2011] 3 All ER 251
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 5.1(b)
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Stellato, Regina (on the Application of)v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 28-Feb-2007
The prisoner had served part of his ten year sentence, been released on licence and then recalled. He complained that the new parole system under which he had then to apply was invalid, having been made Parliament by negative resolution.
Held: . .

Cited by:
Cited – B (Algeria) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 8-Feb-2018
Bail conditions only after detention
B had been held under immigration detention, but released by SIAC, purportedly in conditional bail, after they found there was no realistic prospect of his deportation because he had not disclosed his true identity. The court was asked ‘whether . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 21 June 2021; Ref: scu.427214

National Crime Agency v Solicitor for The Affairs of Her Majestys Treasury: TCC 18 Dec 2020

Claim by the National Crime Agency brought under s. 243 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (‘POCA’). Under Part 5 of POCA, s. 266, the NCA is enabled to recover property which is, or represents, property obtained through unlawful conduct. The NCA seeks a civil recovery order over the balance standing in a bank account, said to be the proceeds of unlawful conduct.
The Hon. Mrs Justice McGowan
[2020] EWHC 3491 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 June 2021; Ref: scu.663175

Regina v Spencer; Regina v Smails: HL 24 Jul 1986

The defendants were nurses employed at Rampton secure hospital accused of assaults on patients. The witnesses against them had been inmates. They complained that the judge had failed to direct the jurors about the dangers of relying upon their evidence, since they had had serious criminal convictions and/or mental illness.
Held: This was not the standard position where a witness’ evidence was suspect. The judge was to warn the jurors in such a class of case of the dangers of finding against the defendants without corroboration. As to bias, there had to be shown a real danger of bias.
There is an obligation on a judge to warn a jury about the special need for caution in cases of evidence given by those in a position analogous to an accomplice. These include cases where the witness’s evidence may have been tainted by an improper motive.
Lord Hailsham LC, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Ackner
[1987] AC 128, [1987] UKHL 2, [1986] 3 WLR 348, [1986] 83 Cr App Rep 277, [1986] 2 All ER 928
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Kilbourne HL 1973
The respondent was convicted of sexual offences against two groups of boys. The trial judge directed the jury that they would be entitled to take into account the uncorroborated evidence of the second group as supporting evidence given by the first . .
Cited – Regina v Beck CACD 1982
The defendant complained that the judge had failed to direct the jury about the dangers of relying upon the evidence of witnesses who, though not co-defendants, had their own conflicting interests. They also said that corroborative evidence should . .
Not followed – Regina v Bagshaw, Holmes and Starkey CA 1984
The defendants were nurses at a mental hospital, charged with assaulting their patients. They complained that the judge had not given the full direction as to the dangers of relying upon the uncorroborated evidence of of unreliable witnesses, they . .

Cited by:
Cited – Michael Pringle v The Queen PC 27-Jan-2003
PC (Jamaica) The court considered the way in which statistical conclusions drawn from DNA evidence had been presented to the jury. The judge had fallen into the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy.’ Also the court had relied . .
Cited – Regina v Gough (Robert) HL 1993
The defendant had been convicted of robbery. He appealed, saying that a member of the jury was a neighbour to his brother, and there was therefore a risk of bias. This was of particular significance as the defendant was charged with conspiracy with . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.181618

L, Regina (on The Application of) v The Director of Public Prosecutions: Admn 9 Jul 2020

The Claimant challenged the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service on behalf of the Defendant authority not to bring charges against her former employers for arranging her entry into the United Kingdom in circumstances in which they intended to exploit her, contrary to section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004
Lord Justice Hickinbottom
[2020] EWHC 1815 (Admin)
Bailii
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 4
England and Wales

Updated: 14 June 2021; Ref: scu.652392

Postermobile plc v London Borough of Brent: Admn 11 Nov 1997

At a meeting with Council Officers, the Appellants were told that they did not need consent for advertisements under the advertisements regulations. In reliance on that advice advertisements were erected and the Council then prosecuted the Appellants for not obtaining the necessary consent. The defendants appealed a refusal of a stay for abuse of process.
Held: The court commented on the absence of a warning letter from the prosecutor. The opportunity of challenging a prosecution was a possible abuse of process.
Schiemann LJ, Moses J
[1997] EWHC Admin 1002, Times 08-Dec-1997
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Norbrook Laboratories Ltd v Department of The Environment for Northern Ireland CANI 6-Sep-2011
. .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.251559

Muneka v Customs and Excise: Admn 2 Feb 2005

The Albanian claimant was found at Heathrow Airport with a ticket to Tirana and with over andpound;20,000 in cash in his baggage. The district judge held that the cash had been obtained through unlawful conduct and that it was therefore recoverable property and liable to forfeiture under section 298. The appellant appealed on the basis that the judge had not identified the kind of unlawful conduct which he found.
Held: It was unnecessary to identify such an activity: ‘All that has to be shown is that the source of the money was a criminal offence in the United Kingdom and that it was intended for a criminal use either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.’
Moses J
[2005] EWHC 495 (Admin)
Bailii
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 298
England and Wales
Cited by:
Distinguished – Director of Assets Recovery Agency and Others, Regina (on the Application of) v Green and others Admn 16-Dec-2005
The defendant challenged the making of civil orders for recovery of what were alleged to be the proceeds of crime. They complained that no specific offence had been made out. The court was asked, as a preliminary issue: ‘Whether a claim for civil . .
Cited – Wiese v The UK Border Agency Admn 29-Jun-2012
The claimant challenged a decision to seize a sustantial sum of cash being carried by him whilst passing through London City Airport. In the magistrates court, the claimant had objected to the reliance on parts of a customs officer’s statement which . .
Explained – Angus v United Kingdom Border Agency Admn 11-Mar-2011
The appellant appealed by case stated against an order for forfeiture of andpound;40,000 cash seized by the respondent on her entering the UK. The Crown Court, on appeal from the Magistrates Court, had found that that cash ‘may well have been’ the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.223900

Defending Christian Arabs, Regina (on The Application of) v: Admn 10 Jul 2020

Renewed application for permission to challenge the decision of a District Judge who refused an application to issue a summons pursuant to s.1(1)(a) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 against the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, for an offence of administering a noxious substance – allegation that the Prime Minister, ordered that the invading UK armed forces should use Depleted Uranium (DU) bullets in the invasion of Iraq.
Held: These grounds of appeal show very clearly that the application for a summons was made for an improper purpose in that the applicant wished to prosecute Tony Blair for war crimes rather than for the offence the subject of the summons application.
Cutts DBE J
[2020] EWHC 1850 (Admin)
Bailii
Magistrates Courts Act 1980, Offences Against the Person Act 1861
England and Wales

Updated: 07 June 2021; Ref: scu.652386

AT and MT, Regina v: CACD 12 Mar 2009

Application for leave to appeal.
Hallett LJ, Keith J
[2009] EWCA Crim 668
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 2003 58
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – NT, Regina v CACD 31-Mar-2010
The prosecutor appealed against a stay of the prosecution as an abuse. The prosecution had failed give the undertaking necessary on lodging the appeal to the court against whose ruling it wanted to appeal, that it agreed that the defendant should be . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 March 2021; Ref: scu.341581

Regina v Dietrich and Aldridge: CACD 1997

It would only rarely be appropriate to introduce before the jury something which had happened at the plea and directions hearing.
[1997] 1 Crim App R 369
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Firth v Epping Magistrates Court Admn 3-Feb-2011
firth_eppingAdmn11
The defendant had faced a charge of assault in the Magistrates Court and had pleaded not guilty. She had indicated in the ‘trial issues’ form through her lawyer that her defence was self defence. The prosecutor then indicated that the charge was to . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 March 2021; Ref: scu.430688

Regina v Durbin: CACD 1995

The appellant had been convicted of the importation of 875 kilos of cannabis. He had spent convictions but more significantly he admitted in interview being engaged in smuggling other contraband goods. Furthermore, he admitted telling lies to the prosecution witnesses about his relationship with a co-accused. The trial judge advised the jury to treat him as a man of good character but he declined to give the jury a good character direction. The direction was withheld out of consideration of a co-accused with relevant convictions.
Held: The appeal was allowed. A full but modified good character direction should have been provided to the appellant.
Evans LJ said: ‘In our judgment the law now is as follows:
(1) Where the defendant is of previous good character, then he is entitled to the good character direction (both limbs if his credibility is an issue, the second limb only if it is not), notwithstanding that he may have admitted telling lies in interview (R v Kabariti [1991] 92 Cr App R 362) and may have admitted other offences or disreputable conduct in relation to the subject matter of the charge, as we hold here (contrast Zoppola-Barrazza [1994] Crim LR 83, and R v Buzalek and Schiffer [1991] Crim LR 116). In such cases, however, the terms of the direction should be modified to take account of the circumstances of the case, including all facts known to the jury, either as regard credibility or propensity, or both.
(2) Where the defendant is not of absolutely good character the trial judge has a discretion as to whether or not to give a ‘good character’ direction, and if so in what terms, but he cannot properly decide not to do so, and in unqualified terms, if the blemishes can only be regarded as irrelevant, or of no significance, in relation to the offence charged. (H [1994] Crim LR 205, and contrast Zoppola-Barrazza).
(3) By the same token, there will be cases where the defendant is not of absolutely good character but where the only proper course is to given a qualified direction in suitably modified terms, assuming of course that the fact of the previous conviction or other character blemishes is known to the jury. This is likely to mean that careful consideration will have to be given to the distinction between the two limbs of credibility and propensity.
(4) Character, bad or good, is not simply a matter of the presence of absence of previous convictions, nor is it the same as reputation although the one may be evidence of the other.
(5) In all cases where the qualified direction is given, we consider it essential that it should be in realistic terms, taking account of all the facts as they are known to the jury. The jury should not be directed to approach the case on a basis which, to their knowledge, is artificial or untrue.’
Evans LJ
[1995] 2 Cr App R 84
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Payton, Regina v CACD 26-May-2006
The defendant appealed a conviction of possession of 66 grams of cannabis with intent to supply. Also found were a large number of small bags and pounds 7,000 in cash. The defendant said the cannabis was for his personal use, and the equipment had . .
Cited – Regina v Aziz; Regina v Tosun; Regina v Yorganci HL 16-Jun-1995
The defendant (one of three) relied upon his part exculpatory statement made in interview and did not give evidence. The judge said that his good character was relevant as to his own propensity, and the character of the others was relevant to their . .
Cited – GAI v Regina CACD 5-Oct-2012
The defendant’s appeal based on the absence of a good character direction had succeeded. The court now gave its reasons.
Held: After reviewing the authorities, the appeal succeeded: ‘the learned judge was wrong to find that the fact that . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 March 2021; Ref: scu.242251

In re Gunawardena, Harbutt and Banks: CACD 1990

The defendant applied to stay the proceedings on the grounds that they were an abuse of process.
Held: The application for leave to appeal was rejected. The application to stay was not within the ambit of the preparatory hearing and therefore was not within section 7(1), which was a necessary precondition to this Court having jurisdiction under section 9.
Watkins LJ said: ‘In our judgment the words of section 7, 8 and 9 themselves plainly demonstrate the object of Parliament in creating the preparatory hearing. It must have been, according to the language used, we think, the intention of Parliament, in introducing this novel procedure — novel in that it has not been introduced in respect of any other kind of criminal trial — to ensure that it be used for a specific purpose or purposes. It deliberately so enacted, in our view, the provisions of subsection (1) of section 7 in order to make it clear that it was creating this new and very valuable procedure for the specified purposes and no other.
We cannot bring ourselves to believe that Parliament can possibly, by using the clear words which it has used in sections 7 and 9, have intended to allow a preparatory hearing to commence for a certain specified purpose and then permit, once a preparatory hearing for that purpose is in being, argument to range around all manner of issues which cannot be said to relate to any of the specified purposes.’ and ‘Care must be taken to avoid confusion between a preparatory hearing under the Act and the informal pre-trial review.’
References: [1990] 1 WLR 703
Judges: Watkins LJ
Statutes: Criminal Justice Act 1987 7 8 9
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Moore CACD 5-Feb-1991
    The court considered whether to quash a count of theft: ‘The fact that a possible incidental effect of the purposes of the application does find itself within those sub-provisions (a) to (d) is not one of the purposes of those provisions. It is the . .
    (Unreported, 5 February 1991)
  • Cited – Regina v Jennings, Regina v Johnson, Regina v Mullins CACD 6-Sep-1993
    No appeal lies against a Crown Court decision not to sever an indictment at a preparatory hearing. As an interlocutory order no appeal lay. . .
    (Ind Summary 18-Oct-93, Ind Summary 06-Sep-93, Times 29-Oct-93, (1993) 98 Cr App R 308)
  • Not followed – Regina v Claydon; Regina v Regina v Hall; Regina v Costall; Regina v French CACD 13-Jun-2001
    The defendants faced substantial trials involving drugs offences. At a preparatory hearing the court made decisions about abuse of process and as to what evidence might be admitted. The prosecutor said there was no right of appeal.
    Held: . .
    (Times 13-Feb-04, , [2001] EWCA Crim 1359, [2004] 1 WLR 1575)
  • Cited – Regina v H; Regina v C HL 5-Feb-2004
    Use of Special Counsel as Last Resort Only
    The accused faced charges of conspiring to supply Class A drugs. The prosecution had sought public interest immunity certificates. Special counsel had been appointed by the court to represent the defendants’ interests at the applications.
    (, [2004] UKHL 3, Times 06-Feb-04, , Gazette 26-Feb-04, [2004] 2 AC 134, [2004] 2 WLR 335, [2004] HRLR 20, [2004] 2 Cr App R 10, [2004] 1 All ER 1269, [2004] 16 BHRC 332)
  • Cited – H, Regina v (Interlocutory application: Disclosure) HL 28-Feb-2007
    The trial judge had refused an order requested at a preparatory hearing by the defence for the disclosure of documents held by the prosecutor. The House was now asked whether a right of appeal existed against such a refusal.
    Held: The practice . .
    (Times 02-Mar-07, , [2007] UKHL 7, [2007] 3 All ER 269, [2007] Crim LR 731, [2007] 2 Cr App Rep 6, [2007] 2 AC 270)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.193471

Regina (Aru) v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police: CA 30 Jan 2004

The applicant had been cautioned by the police. The victim sought judicial review of that decision. The respondent now appealed.
Held: The court of appeal had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a judicial review in a criminal matter where there had been a final disposal of the matter. Any appeal must be to the House of Lords. The police caution operated as such, and no review would lay. The section referred to a criminal ’cause or matter’ not to proceedings. An official caution appeared to be a way of disposing of a complaint.
Maurice Kay LJ noted the use of the phrase ‘criminal cause or matter’ denoted a ‘wider ambit’ than merely ‘criminal proceedings’.
References: Times 05-Feb-2004, [2004] 1 WLR 1697
Judges: Waller, Longmore, Maurice Kay, LJJ
Statutes: Public Order Act 1986 5, Supreme Court Act 1981 18(1), Administration of Justice Act 1960 1(1)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Armand v Home Secretary 1943
    . .
    ([1943] AC 147)
  • Cited – United States Government v Montgomery and Another HL 6-Feb-2001
    An English court had power to make a restraining order against the disposal of assets pending an application for confiscation pursuant to a US order. This applied even if the US original judgment predated the date on which the US was added to the . .
    (Times 06-Feb-01, , , [2001] 1 WLR 196, [2001] 1 All ER 815, [2001] UKHL 3, [2002] ILPr 27)
  • Cited – Day v Grant (Note) CA 1985
    (January 1985) The court must look to the underlying nature of the proceedings in which the order was made and against which an appeal was sought to see to which court an appeal lay. ‘So Lord Wright was saying that you look not at the particular . .
    ([1987] QB 972)
  • Appeal from – Aru, Regina (on the Application of) v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police Admn 23-May-2003
    . .
    (, [2003] EWHC 1310 (Admin))

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Alexander, Farrelly and Others, Re Judicial Review QBNI 5-Mar-2009
    farrelly_ccniQBNI09
    Each claimant said that they had been wrongfully arrested, the arresting police officers having either failed to ask whether the arrest was necessary (Farrelly), or mistakenly concluding so.
    Held: The Order now contained in regulation . .
    (, [2009] NIQB 20)
  • Cited – Alexander, Farrelly and Others, Re Judicial Review QBNI 5-Mar-2009
    farrelly_ccniQBNI09
    Each claimant said that they had been wrongfully arrested, the arresting police officers having either failed to ask whether the arrest was necessary (Farrelly), or mistakenly concluding so.
    Held: The Order now contained in regulation . .
    (, [2009] NIQB 20)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.193378

Regina v Pigg: HL 1982

The appellant was charged on indictment with two counts of attempted rape. The jury failed to agree on their first retirement following the summing-up, and were then given an impeccable majority direction. They returned to court after a further retirement and the clerk asked whether at least 10 were agreed upon a verdict. The foreman answered, ‘Yes.’ The clerk asked if the jury found the defendant guilty or not guilty of rape and the foreman answered, ‘Not guilty.’ The clerk asked, ‘On the charge of attempted rape do you find him guilty or not guilty?’ and the foreman answered, ‘Guilty.’ The clerk asked if that was the verdict of ‘you all or by a majority’. The foreman answered, ‘By a majority.’ The clerk asked how many of the jury agreed on the verdict and how many dissented, and the foreman answered, ’10 agreed’. The clerk then observed, ’10 agreed to 2 of you.’ The foreman did not respond. The court was asked ‘Whether it is necessary in order to comply with the terms of the section . . for the foreman of the jury, having stated in open court the number agreeing to the verdict, to go on to state the number of those dissenting.’
Held: The defendant’s appeal failed. It is a necessary requirement of a lawful verdict that the jury say how many agreed and how many dissented.
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said: ‘In short, compliance with the requirement of section 17(3) of the 1974 Act is mandatory before a judge can accept a majority verdict of guilty; but the precise form of words used by the clerk of the court when asking questions of the foreman of the jury, and the precise form of words used by the latter in answer to such questions, as long as they make it clear to an ordinary person how the jury was divided, do not constitute any essential part of that requirement.’
References: [1983] 1 WLR 6, [1983] 1 All ER 56, (1982) 76 Cr App R 79
Judges: Lord Brandon
Statutes: Juries Act 1974 17(3)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Millward CACD 7-Apr-1998
    The defendant was tried for causing grievous bodily harm. After a majority direction, the jury returned, finding him guity. When asked if this was ‘the verdict of you all’, the formean replied ‘Yes’. The day after, he wrote to the judge to say that . .
    ([1998] EWCA Crim 1203, [1999] 1 Cr App R 61)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192258

Rex v Vodden: 1853

The court considered when a jury might be allowed to change its verdict. one of the jurors delivered a verdict of not guilty. The clerk heard, so did the chairman, who heard the same words. The prisoner was discharged from the dock. Others of the jury interfered. They said the verdict was guilty. The prisoner was brought back to the dock. The chairman asked the jury what the verdict was. All the 12 jurors answered that it was guilty. They had been unanimous. The chairman asked Owen Hughes why he had said ‘not guilty’, to which he replied that he had said ‘guilty’. A verdict of guilty was recorded.
Held: Pollock CB said: ‘We do not think the Court is called upon to say at what interval of time a correction should be made. All we do is to say that in the present case the interval was not too long. Nothing has been done but what daily takes place in the ordinary transactions in life; namely, a mistake is corrected within a reasonable time, and on the very spot on which it was made.’
References: (1853) Dears 229, (1853) 169 ER 706
Judges: Pollock CB
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Millward CACD 7-Apr-1998
    The defendant was tried for causing grievous bodily harm. After a majority direction, the jury returned, finding him guity. When asked if this was ‘the verdict of you all’, the formean replied ‘Yes’. The day after, he wrote to the judge to say that . .
    ([1998] EWCA Crim 1203, [1999] 1 Cr App R 61)
  • Cited – Regina v Andrews 1986
    Two defendants were tried for causing injuries to one child. The jury convicted the female defendant, of positive acts of cruelty against the child and returned a verdict of not guilty of those acts in respect of the male defendant. After the police . .
    ((1986) 82 Cr App R 148)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192261

Regina v Sullivan: CACD 1966

The defendant had refused to answer any questions at his trial. The court asked what significance could be atached to his exercise of this right if he was innocent.
Held: Authority showed in many cases that a court must not draw adverse inferences from an accused’s silence, but there were exceptions: ‘and this is one of them, in which the circumstances are such that it does not appear that there is any unfairness involved in the comment. The line dividing what may be said and what may not be said is a very fine one, and it is perhaps doubtful whether in a case like the present it would be even perceptible to the members of any ordinary jury. But there can be no doubt, on the authorities, that this court must hold that, in the present state of the law, what was said to the jury in the passage from the summing-up which has been cited amounted to a misdirection.’
References: (1966) 51 Cr App R 102
Judges: Lord Parker CJ, Salmon LJ and Fenton Atkinson J
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Regina v Davis CCA 1959
    A judge is not entitled in any circumstances to suggest to a jury, when a man refuses to answer any questions after having been cautioned, that, if he were innocent, it is likely that he would have answered the questions. . .
    ((1959) 43 Cr App R 215)
  • Cited – Rex v Leckey CCA 1943
    A conviction was set aside where the judge had invited the jury to take account of the defendant’s failure to give evidence. . .
    ((1943) 29 Cr App R 128, [1944] K B 80)
  • Cited – Rex v Naylor 1932
    The defendant’s conviction was found unsafe because of the judge’s adverse comments on his silence. . .
    ([1933] 1 KB 685, (1932) 23 Cr App R 177)

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Webber HL 22-Jan-2004
    The defendant complained that the judge had given a direction under s34 even though his counsel had only put matters to witnesses for the prosecution.
    Held: A positive suggestion put to a witness by or on behalf of a defendant may amount to a . .
    (, [2004] UKHL 1, , Times 23-Jan-04, [2004] 1 WLR 404)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192239

Regina v Gourley: 1981

The court emphasised the need for a clear direction to a jury on the standard of proof.
References: (1981) Crim L R 334
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Derek William Bentley (Deceased) CACD 30-Jul-1998
    The defendant had been convicted of murder in 1952, and hung. A court hearing an appeal after many years must apply laws from different eras to different aspects. The law of the offence (of murder) to be applied was that at the time of the offence. . .
    (Times 31-Jul-98, , [1998] EWCA Crim 2516, (2001) 1 Cr App R 307)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192067

Rex v Summers: HL 1952

The House considered the direction on the standard of proof. Lord Goddard said: ‘It is far better, instead of using the words ‘reasonable doubt’ and then trying to explain what is a reasonable doubt, to direct a jury: ‘You must not convict unless you are satisfied by the evidence that the offence has been committed’. The jury should be told that it is not for the prisoner to prove his innocence, but for the prosecution to prove his guilt. If a jury is told that it is their duty to regard the evidence and see that it satisfies them so that they can feel sure when they return a verdict of Guilty, that is much better than using the expression ‘reasonable doubt’ and I hope in future that that will be done. I never use the expression when summing up. I always tell a jury that, before they convict, they must feel sure and must be satisfied that the prosecution have established the guilt of the prisoner.’
References: (1952) 36 Cr App R 14, [1952] WN 185
Judges: Lord Goddard
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Derek William Bentley (Deceased) CACD 30-Jul-1998
    The defendant had been convicted of murder in 1952, and hung. A court hearing an appeal after many years must apply laws from different eras to different aspects. The law of the offence (of murder) to be applied was that at the time of the offence. . .
    (Times 31-Jul-98, , [1998] EWCA Crim 2516, (2001) 1 Cr App R 307)
  • Cited – Regina v Murtagh and Kennedy 1955
    . .
    ((1955) 39 Cr App R 72)
  • Explained – Regina v Hepworth and Fearnley 1955
    Lord Goddard discussed again the direction to the jury as to the standard of proof: ‘I think it is very unfortunate to talk to juries about reasonable doubt, because the explanations given of what is and what is not a reasonable doubt are so very . .
    ((1955) 39 Cr App R 152)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192063

Regina v Bradbury: 1969

A court must give a clear direction to a jury on the standard of proof. A mere reference to being ‘satisfied’ without a reference to being sure, or being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, was inadequate.
References: [1969] 2 QB 471, (1969) 53 Cr App R 217
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Derek William Bentley (Deceased) CACD 30-Jul-1998
    The defendant had been convicted of murder in 1952, and hung. A court hearing an appeal after many years must apply laws from different eras to different aspects. The law of the offence (of murder) to be applied was that at the time of the offence. . .
    (Times 31-Jul-98, , [1998] EWCA Crim 2516, (2001) 1 Cr App R 307)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192066

Regina v Fraser Marr: CACD 1990

The defendant complained that his defence, as unattractive as it may have been, had not been put to the jury with balanced treatment and consideration.
Held: Such treatment was the right of every criminal defendant. The court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.
References: (1990) 90 Cr App R 154
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Wilson CACD 15-May-2007
    The defendant appealed his conviction for murder saying that as a thirteen year old he had committed it on his father’s instructions and out of fear of his father.
    Held: Duress was no defence to a charge of murder. It was not necessary for the . .
    (Times 06-Jun-07)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192078

BM v Secretary Of State for the Home Department: Admn 3 Jul 2009

An anti-terrorist control order had been made, inter alia on the basis of evidence which had been withheld from the defendant. That now being seen to be unlawful, the Secretary of State had withdrawn that evidence. The court was asked whether the order could continue.
Held: In a case in which the core allegations or essential case have been withdrawn, the decision of the Secretary of State, which must have been based upon them, should be reviewed to determine whether it is capable of being supported by material which cannot have been at the forefront of her mind, which may be capable of being disentangled from that which was.
References: [2009] EWHC 1572 (Admin), [2010] 1 All ER 847
Links: Bailii
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Secretary of State for the Home Deparment v AN Admn 31-Jul-2009 (, [2009] EWHC 1966 (Admin))
    The court re-considered a control order made on the basis of material withheld from the defendant. The Secretary of State had now withdrawn his reliance on that material, rather than make further disclosures. The prosecution invited the court to . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 24 September 2020; Ref: scu.347440

Montes v HM Advocate: HCJ 1990

The appellant was convicted of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of a prohibition on the importation of cocaine by importing a quantity of cocaine on a ship which docked at Greenock. The trial judge directed the jury that, in considering the case against the appellant, they could to have regard to a statement by one of his co-accused, Jensen, to Customs and Excise officers, admitting that cocaine found in his possession had been put on the ship in Colombia.
Held: This had been a misdirection: ‘In my opinion this clearly constituted a misdirection. What the appellant Jensen said to the [Customs and Excise] officers was plainly evidence against him, but it was not evidence against the other appellants. In his report the trial judge deals with this ground of appeal. It is not entirely clear whether he is maintaining that because of the earlier direction which he had given to the jury about statements by one co-accused, they ought to have realised that the answers which the appellant Jensen gave to the Customs and Excise officers were not evidence against the other accused, or whether the trial judge’s view was that these answers were evidence against the other appellants. In his report he states: ‘It is my understanding that a statement made by one accused outwith the presence of another is only inadmissible against the latter if it incriminates him.’ The passage would suggest to me that the trial judge’s view was that the answers made by the appellant Jensen were in this case admissible against his co-accused. The trial judge recognised that what Jensen said was relevant to the question of importation of cocaine, but he opined that importation by itself was not a criminal act for the purposes of charge (1). That may well be so but importation was a fact which required to be proved by the Crown if guilt under charge (1) was to be established. What the Customs and Excise Officers testified that the appellant Jensen had said to them was hearsay evidence, and so was not admissible against the co-accused as evidence of the facts alleged in the statement. In directing the jury that the evidence of the appellant Jensen’s answers was evidence upon which the jury could rely in the case of the other appellants, the trial judge, in my opinion, misdirected the jury.’
References: 1990 SCCR 645
Judges: Lord Justice Clerk Ross
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Hayter HL 3-Feb-2005 (, , [2005] UKHL 6, Times 07-Feb-05, [2005] 1 WLR 605)
    The House considered the principle that the confession of a defendant is inadmissible in a joint criminal case against a co-defendant. In a trial for murder, one party was accused of requesting a middleman to arrange for the murder by a third party. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 24 September 2020; Ref: scu.222545

Regina v Anderson, Clarke, McDaid: CACD 9 Feb 1998

The defendants appealed their convictions on the basis that the voluntary bills of indictment had not been signed as required under the 1933 Act.
References: [1998] EWCA Crim 442
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Appeal from – Clarke, Regina v; Regina v McDaid HL 6-Feb-2008 (, [2008] UKHL 8, [2008] 1 WLR 338, [2008] 2 Cr App R 2, [2008] Crim LR 551, [2008] 2 All ER 665)
    An indictment had not been signed despite a clear statutory provision that it should be. The defects were claimed to have been cured by amendment before sentence.
    Held: The convictions failed. Sections 1(1) and 2(1) of the 1933 Act which . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.153316

Regina (Commissioners of Customs and Excise) v Canterbury Crown Court and Another: QBD 14 Nov 2002

The magistrates court had received a request to depose witnesses to provide evidence for the Dutch Court. The Commissioners opposed an order made by a judge of the Crown Court that no depositions should be taken without the consent of the Crown Court.
Held: Though these proceedings were now nugatory, since the foreign proceedings had been concluded, the Court nevertheless declared that the Crow Court had acted without jurisdiction. The Magistrates Court and the Commissioner had been acting as an agent of the Secretary of State for the Home department. The Crown Court judge was concerned at achieving fairness in his own court only.
References: Times 06-Dec-2002
Judges: Laws LJ, Field J
Jurisdiction: England and Wales

Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.178349

Regina v Gould: CACD 1968

Diplock LJ said: ‘In its criminal jurisdiction, which it has inherited from the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Court of Appeal does not apply the doctrine of stare decisis with the same rigidity as in its civil jurisdiction. If upon due consideration we were to be of opinion that the law had been either misapplied or misunderstood in an earlier decision of this court or its predecessor, the Court of Criminal Appeal, we should be entitled to depart from the view as to the law expressed in the earlier decision notwithstanding that the case could not be brought within any of the exceptions laid down in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd as justifying the Court of Appeal in refusing to follow one of its own decisions in a civil case (Rex v Taylor). A fortiori, we are bound to give effect to the law as we think it is if the previous decision to the contrary effect is one of which the ratio decidendi conflicts with that of other decisions of this court or its predecessors of co-ordinate jurisdiction.’
References: [1968] 2 QB 65
Judges: Diplock LJ
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Young v The Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd CA 28-Jul-1944 ([1944] KB 718, , 60 TLR 536, [1944] 2 All ER 293, , (1945) 78 Ll L Rep 6, , [1944] EWCA Civ 1)
    The claimant was injured and received compensation. He then sought to recover again, alleging breach of statutory duty by his employers.
    Held: The Court of Appeal was in general bound to follow its own previous decisions. The court considered . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Merriman CACD 1973 ([1973] AC 584)
    Although the criminal division of the Court of Appeal is not so strictly bound by its own previous decisions as is the civil division, its liberty to depart from precedent which it is convinced was erroneous is restricted to cases where the . .
  • Cited – Simpson v Regina CACD 23-May-2003 ([2003] EWCA Crim 1499, Times 26-May-03, Gazette 10-Jul-03, [2004] QB 118, [2003] 3 WLR 337, [2003] Cr App R 36, , [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 24, [2003] 2 Cr App R 36, [2003] 3 All ER 531)
    The appellant challenged a confiscation order. It was argued that one could not be made unless a proper notice had been given, and none of the offences occurred before 1995. On the assumption that section 1 of the 1995 Act was not in force, did the . .
  • Cited – Regina v Morgan HL 30-Apr-1975 ([1976] AC 182, [1975] 1 All ER 8, , [1975] UKHL 3)
    The defendants appealed against their convictions for rape, denying mens rea and asserting a belief (even if mistaken) that the victim had consented.
    Held: For a defence of mistake to succeed, the mistake must have been honestly made and need . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.182383

Regina v Copeland: CACD 2002

The court considered the necessary of any postponment of a dermination of a confiscation order.
Held: The court rejected the contention that the postponement order must specify the period of postponement. It was pointed out that the word used by the statute was ‘may’, not ‘must’: ‘there is no mention there of ‘must’: no mandatory provision. If it had been thought desirable then the statute could have been worded in words such as ‘for such period as the court shall specify.’
References: [2002] EWCA Crim 736, [2002] 2 Cr App R(S) 512
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Doubted – Regina v Pisciotto CACD 27-Jun-2002 (Times 19-Jul-02, Gazette 12-Sep-02, [2003] 1 Cr App R 68, [2002] EWCA Crim 1592, )
    The defendant was subject to a confiscation order. The judge had postponed the determination of the amount, but without specifying when it would take place.
    Held: The requirement in the Act was mandatory. When deciding to postpone an . .
  • Preferred – Sekhon, etc v Regina CACD 16-Dec-2002 (Times 27-Dec-02, [2003] 1 Cr App R 575, [2003] 1 WLR 1655, , [2002] EWCA Crim 2954)
    The defendants appealed against confiscation orders on the basis that in various ways, the Crown had failed to comply with procedural requirements.
    Held: The courts must remember the importance of such procedures in the fight against crime, . .
  • Cited – Simpson v Regina CACD 23-May-2003 ([2003] EWCA Crim 1499, Times 26-May-03, Gazette 10-Jul-03, [2004] QB 118, [2003] 3 WLR 337, [2003] Cr App R 36, , [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 24, [2003] 2 Cr App R 36, [2003] 3 All ER 531)
    The appellant challenged a confiscation order. It was argued that one could not be made unless a proper notice had been given, and none of the offences occurred before 1995. On the assumption that section 1 of the 1995 Act was not in force, did the . .
  • Cited – Regina v Knights and Another HL 21-Jul-2005 (, [2005] UKHL 50, , Times 21-Jul-05, [2006] 1 AC 368, [2005] 4 All ER 347, [2005] 3 WLR 330)
    The defendants had been convicted of offences involving dealing with goods on which customs duty had not been paid. After conviction a timetable was set for sentencing and for confiscation proceedings. The House considered the making of the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.180118

Regina v Newsome: CACD 1970

The court was dealing with the question of a guideline judgment on sentence. There was good reason to adopt a flexible approach. The discretion to depart from a previous precedent was not to be exercised lightly and we endorse that restrictive and cautious approach. The court sat with five judges for the purpose.
References: [1970] 2 QB 711
Judges: Widgery LJ
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Simpson v Regina CACD 23-May-2003 ([2003] EWCA Crim 1499, Times 26-May-03, Gazette 10-Jul-03, [2004] QB 118, [2003] 3 WLR 337, [2003] Cr App R 36, , [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 24, [2003] 2 Cr App R 36, [2003] 3 All ER 531)
    The appellant challenged a confiscation order. It was argued that one could not be made unless a proper notice had been given, and none of the offences occurred before 1995. On the assumption that section 1 of the 1995 Act was not in force, did the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.182386

Regina v Merriman: CACD 1973

Although the criminal division of the Court of Appeal is not so strictly bound by its own previous decisions as is the civil division, its liberty to depart from precedent which it is convinced was erroneous is restricted to cases where the departure is in favour of the accused. This would not be the case in the instant appeal. As to the issue of duplicity: ‘The rule against duplicity . . had always been applied in a practical, rather than a strictly analytical, way for the purpose of determining what constituted one offence. Where a number of acts of a similar nature committed by one or more defendants were connected with one another, in the time and place of their commission or by their common purpose, in such a way that they could fairly be regarded as forming part of the same transaction or criminal enterprise, it was the practice as early as the eighteenth century to charge them in a single count of indictment. ‘ (Lord Diplock)
References: [1973] AC 584
Judges: Lord Diplock
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Regina v Gould CACD 1968 ([1968] 2 QB 65)
    Diplock LJ said: ‘In its criminal jurisdiction, which it has inherited from the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Court of Appeal does not apply the doctrine of stare decisis with the same rigidity as in its civil jurisdiction. If upon due consideration . .
  • Approved – Jemmison v Priddle 1972 ([1972] 56 Cr App R 229)
    ‘it is legitimate to charge on a single information one activity even though the activity may involve more than one act’. . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Simpson v Regina CACD 23-May-2003 ([2003] EWCA Crim 1499, Times 26-May-03, Gazette 10-Jul-03, [2004] QB 118, [2003] 3 WLR 337, [2003] Cr App R 36, , [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 24, [2003] 2 Cr App R 36, [2003] 3 All ER 531)
    The appellant challenged a confiscation order. It was argued that one could not be made unless a proper notice had been given, and none of the offences occurred before 1995. On the assumption that section 1 of the 1995 Act was not in force, did the . .
  • Cited – Tovey and Another v Regina CACD 9-Mar-2005 (, [2005] EWCA Crim 530, Times 19-Apr-05)
    Each defendant appealed sentences where he had committed a series of offences and the sentence had been for specimen acts.
    Held: When choosing representative offences a prosecutor should be careful to try to give the court a proper picture of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.182384

Regina v Soneji; Regina v Bullen: CACD 20 Jun 2003

If the court could only postpone confiscation proceedings in exceptional circumstances, it behoved the court before allowing such an adjournment to enquire into the justification, and to record the circumstances which made it exceptional. The defendants appealed confiscation orders made after an extended delay.
Held: The freedom to allow a delay was only under exceptional circumstances, and such circumstances had to be recorded. That requirement now applied also under comon law (October). Though confiscation order were not to be set aside for mere failures of procedure (Sekhon), that did not displace the need for exceptional circumstances. In the absence of a finding of such, the orders failed.
References: Times 01-Jul-2003, [2003] EWCA Crim 1765, Gazette 04-Sep-2003, [2004] 1 Cr App R(S) 219
Links: Bailii
Judges: Pill LJ, Gray, Roderick Evans JJ
Statutes: Criminal Justice Act 1988 72A
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Regina v Shevki and Michael John Steele CACD 14-Dec-2000 (Times 11-Jan-01, , [2000] EWCA Crim 70, [2001] 2 Cr App R(S) 178)
    The making of a confiscation order is part of sentencing. Such an order might be delayed provided the determination was made within six months of conviction. If in the circumstances of the case of an adjournment beyond that period was necessary, . .
  • Cited – Regina v October CACD 27-Feb-2003 (Times 11-Mar-03, Gazette 24-Apr-03)
    The court had adjourned its proceedings in the absence of the defendant, so as not to fall foul of the requirement that a confiscation inquiry must take place within six months of conviction. The defendant appealed.
    Held: The court could . .
  • Cited – Sekhon, etc v Regina CACD 16-Dec-2002 (Times 27-Dec-02, [2003] 1 Cr App R 575, [2003] 1 WLR 1655, , [2002] EWCA Crim 2954)
    The defendants appealed against confiscation orders on the basis that in various ways, the Crown had failed to comply with procedural requirements.
    Held: The courts must remember the importance of such procedures in the fight against crime, . .

This case is cited by:

  • Appeal from – Regina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005 (, [2005] UKHL 49, , Times 22-Jul-05, [2005] 3 WLR 303, [2006] 1 AC 340, [2006] 1 Cr App R(S) 79, [2006] Crim LR 167, [2005] 4 All ER 321, [2006] 2 Cr App R 20)
    The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .
  • At Court of Appeal – Bullen And Soneji v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Jun-2007 (3383/06, , [2007] ECHR 531)
    . .
  • At Court of Appeal – Bullen and Soneji v The United Kingdom ECHR 8-Jan-2009 (, [2009] ECHR 28, , [2009] Lloyd’s Rep FC 210)
    The claimants said that the confiscation and money-laundering proceedings taken against them had taken too long, with delays of 43 months out of a total of 66 month case attributable to the state.
    Held: The delay was too long. The applicants . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.184145

Regina v McGovern: CACD 13 Feb 1998

The court considered an application to withdraw an unequivocal guilty plea: ‘What is, of course, highly material is whether or not on the Crown case there was evidence to support the charge in the terms to which the plea was entered and whether or not the instructions given by the defendant at the time the plea was entered were consistent with the basis of the plea being put forward.’
References: [1998] EWCA Crim 528, 9701076/X4
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Mason CACD 18-Nov-2004 (, [2004] EWCA Crim 2848)
    The defendant had entered a plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter, but now sought to vacate that plea. There had been a fight after a wedding reception. The defendant was said to have joined in a multi-handed attack on the victim. The defendant . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.153402

Regina v Williams (Derron Anthony): CACD 2006

Counsel had withdrawn on the fifth day of the trial of the defendant for rape after the prosecution witnesses had given their evidence and all that remained of the prosecution case was the defendant’s interview. The defendant (who wanted to challenge the accuracy of the interview record) asked for new representatives, but the judge made clear that the trial would have to continue and declined to allow the defendant new representation. She found that the defendant had made it impossible for his counsel to continue to act, that he was deliberately endeavouring to manipulate the system (he had already dispensed with his legal representatives on two previous occasions) and that he was capable of marshalling the relevant material, giving his own evidence in an orderly way, and making a closing speech to the jury.
Held: There was nothing unfair about the trial taken as a whole.
The statutory question for this court on an appeal against conviction is whether the conviction is safe. We agree, however, that if the trial, taken overall, was unfair, it is very likely, if not inevitable, that it will follow that a conviction emerging from it is unsafe. . . We observe only that we are not be taken as ruling that every incident in a trial, however small, to which the adjective ‘unfair’ might be applied, will necessarily have the consequence of rendering the conviction unsafe. The question is whether the process of trial was, taken overall, unfair and thus a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. . . We do not dissent from the proposition that improperly to deprive a defendant altogether of legal representation is very likely to render his trial unfair and his conviction unsafe . . It does not, however, follow from that case [Golder (1977) 88 EHRR 524], or any other, that a defendant to a criminal charge who has three sets of solicitors plus counsel for much of the trial and who then takes a stance on some point which prevents his trial lawyers from continuing is dealt with unfairly if the trial is not interrupted for him to instruct yet further lawyers. The question in such a case is whether the order of the judge that the trial continue did or did not amount to such a denial of representation as to render the trial as a whole unfair. . . Once again, it does not follow that if a defendant is represented, but through his own action makes it impossible for his counsel to continue, it is unfair to require the trial already embarked upon to proceed. . . we are satisfied that there was nothing unfair about this trial taken as a whole by reason of the fact that the appellant was unrepresented from the point at which counsel withdrew. He was not deprived of representation by the court, nor by the criminal justice system. He had been given representation and in abundance. He was deprived of it by his own actions.’
References: [2006] EWCA Crim 1457
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Cadamartriea, Regina v CACD 18-Oct-2019 (, [2019] EWCA Crim 1736)
    Appeal from conviction of murder – whether a fair trial after a withdrawal by his counsel at the conclusion of his evidence. Counsel had said they were professionally embarrassed by new instructions.
    Held: The appeal succeeded. The judge had . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 21 September 2020; Ref: scu.654028

Regina v Baldry: 1852

References: (1852) 2 Den CC Res 430
Coram: Parke B and Lord Campbell CJ
Ratio: It is not that the law presumes a confession obtained by duress or by promise to be untrue, but from the danger of receiving such evidence judges have thought it better to reject it for the due administration of justice.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ibrahim v The King PC (Bailii, PC, [1914] UKPC 1, [1914] AC 599)
    (Hong Kong) The defendant was an Afghan subject with the British Army in Hong Kong. He was accused of murder. Having accepted the protection of the British Armed forces, he became subject to their laws. In custody, he was asked about the offence by . .
  • Cited – A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) HL (Bailii, [2005] UKHL 71, House of Lords, Times 09-Dec-05, [2005] 3 WLR 1249, [2006] 2 AC 221, [2006] 1 All ER 575, 19 BHRC 441, [2006] UKHRR 225, [2006] HRLR)
    The applicants had been detained following the issue of certificates issued by the respondent that they posed a terrorist threat. They challenged the decisions of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission saying that evidence underlying the . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 22 March 2017
Ref: 184181

Regina v Barron: 1973

References: [1973] 1 WLR 115
Coram: Caulfield J
Ratio: The judge at trial had refused to set aside a subpoena to produce documents which had been served on behalf of the accused in a criminal trial.
Held: Caulfield J said: ‘I think the correct principle is this, and I think it must be restricted to these particular facts in a criminal trial, and the principle I am going to enunciate is not supported by any authority that has been cited to me, and I am just working on what I conceive to be the rules of natural justice. If there are documents in the possession or control of a solicitor which, on production, help to further the defence of an accused man, then in my judgment no privilege attaches. I cannot conceive that our law would permit a solicitor or other person to screen from a jury information which, if disclosed to the jury, would perhaps enable a man either to establish his innocence or to resist an allegation made by the Crown.’
This case is cited by:

  • Overruled – Regina v Ataou CACD ([1988] QB 798)
    Legal professional privilege is an interest which falls to be balanced against competing public interests: ‘When a communication was originally privileged and in criminal proceedings privilege is claimed against the defendant by the client concerned . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales

Last Update: 19-Mar-17
Ref: 580911

In re K and Others (Restraint Order); 1 Mar 2005

References: Times 15-Mar-2005
Coram: Laws, Toulson, Royce JJ
Ratio: The defendants were accused of using companies as a front for customs fraud. The Customs and Excise sought leave to appeal the terms of a criminal restraint order.
Held: The court when making such an order was entitled to take into account the statutory assumptions about the lifestyle of the defendants. The commissioners’ application to have a receiver appointed would be of no effect unless the receiver would be ready to become substantially involved in the day to day management of the company. They intended a light touch approach but would not achieve what they wanted. Application refused.
Statutes: Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 48

Last Update: 09-Aug-16
Ref: 223735

Regina v Salisbury; 19 May 2004

References: Unreported, 19 May 2004
Coram: Pitchford J
Ratio:(Crown Court at Chester) The judge gave directions as to the effect of witness training: ‘The course was delivered by a member of the Bar I judge to have been well aware of the implications. She took pains to ensure that any witnesses who attended her courses knew of the possible consequences of collusion and she forbade it. No attempt was made to indulge in application of the facts of this case or anything remotely resembling them. True it is that witnesses would have undergone a process of familiarisation with the pitfalls of giving evidence and were instructed how best to prepare for the ordeal. This, it seems to me, was an exercise any witness would be entitled to enjoy were it available. No one engaged in special pleading with a view to gaining any expertise beyond the application of sound common sense.
I do not accept that this training, if such is the correct description, was capable of converting a lying but incompetent witness into a lying but impressive witness. Having considered the course content in some detail it seems to me that witnesses can have gained only a rudimentary understanding of what was to come and received no coaching in how to lend a specious quality to their evidence. What they would have received was knowledge of the process involved. It was lack of knowledge and understanding which created demand for support in the first place. Acquisition of knowledge and understanding has probably prepared them better for the experience of giving evidence. They will be better able to give a sequential and coherent account. None of this gives them an unfair advantage over any other witness. Although ease of manner or confidence in the witness box, if it exists, may be a matter of consideration by a jury, it does not seem to me that the ultimate judgment whether the witness is credible or not will depend on such considerations.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding and others ChD (Bailii, [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch))
    The parties had engaged in a bitter 95 day trial in which allegations of forgery, theft, false accounting, blackmail and arson. A company owning patents and other rights had become insolvent, and the real concern was the destination and ownership of . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 20-Jul-16
Ref: 230266

Regina v Stephen Jones: 1997

References: [1997] 1 Cr App R 86
Coram: Lord Bingham CJ
Ratio:The court consideed the practice applicable when seeking to adduce new expert evidence on an appeal against sentence.
Lord Bingham CJ said: ‘Expert witnesses, although inevitably varying in standing and experience, are interchangeable in a way in which factual witnesses are not. It would clearly subvert the trial process if a defendant, convicted at trial, were to be generally free to mount on appeal an expert case which, if sound, could and should have been advanced before the jury. If it is said that the only expert witness in an established field whose opinion supports a certain defence was unavailable to testify at the trial, that may be thought (save in unusual circumstances) to reflect on the acceptability of that opinion.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Rogers, Regina -v- CACD (Bailii, [2016] EWCA Crim 801)
    The court was asked as to as to the circumstances in which s.23 of the 1968 Act applies to fresh evidence or other information which an appellant may seek to adduce before this court on an appeal against sentence. . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 06-Jul-16
Ref: 566429

Rex v John Wilkes, Esq; 7 Feb 1770

References: [1770] EngR 34, (1770) 4 Burr 2527, (1770) 98 ER 327 (B)
Links: Commonlii
Ratio An information for a misdemearior may be amended the day before trial by a single Judge at chambers on hearing both sides aiid without the consent of the defendant.
On setting aside John Wilkes’ outlawry for publishing The North Briton, Lord Mansfield said that the law must be applied even if the heavens fell
This case cites:

  • See Also – John Wilkes, Esq -v- The King HL (Commonlii, [1768] EngR 2, (1768) Wilm 322, (1768) 97 ER 123)
    Mr Wilkes had been accused of making a seditious libel against the King. He had peaded not guilty, but then absconded after his conviction, but before his sentence. . .
  • See Also – John Wilkes -v- The King PC (Commonlii, [1769] EngR 25, (1769) 4 Bro PC 360, (1769) 2 ER 244)
    An information for an offence, is a surmise or suggestion upon record, on behalf of the King, to a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, and is to all intents and purposes the King’s suit; and may be filed by tbe Solicitor General, during a vacancy of the . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – PJS -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd SC (Bailii, [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] WLR(D) 272, WLRD, Bailii Summary)
    The appellants, had applied for restrictions on the publication of stories about extra marital affairs.The Court of Appeal had removed the restrictions on the basis that the story had been widely spread outside the jurisdiction both on the internet . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 29-May-16
Ref: 374207

Weiss v Regina; 15 Dec 2005

References: [2005] 223 ALR 662, [2005] 158 A Crim R 133, [2005] 80 ALJR 444, [2005] 224 CLR 300, [2005] HCA 81
Coram: Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan & Heydon JJ
Ratio (High Court of Australia) The Hight Court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice actually occurred. What is involved in assessing that question in the context of a trial by jury.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Noye, Kenneth, Regina -v- CACD ((2011) 119 BMLR 151, Bailii, [2011] EWCA Crim 650)
    The prisoner appealed against his conviction for murder on reference from the CCRC. There were new doubts about the reliabiity of the expert forensic expert.
    Held: The appeal was dismissed. Dr Heath’s evidence did not impinge on the essential . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 17-Apr-16
Ref: 430821

Regina v Hillier and Farrer: CACD 1993

References: (1993) 97 Cr App R 349
Statutes: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 74
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina -v- Thomas Shanks CACD (Bailii, [2003] EWCA Crim 680)
    The appellant appealed his conviction for murder. He had shot his lover as she walked away from an argument. The fact of his conviction following mention of a guilty plea to possession of the firearm was complained of.
    Held: The judge had . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 16-Nov-15 Ref: 223485

Regina v Pan; 29 Jun 2001

References: [2001] 2 SCR 344, 200 DLR (4th) 577, 155 CCC (3d) 97, 2001 SCC 42
Links: Vcanlii
Coram: Arbour J
(Supreme Court of Canada) The court considered the reason behind the common law rule against a court examining the activities of a jury: ‘the rule seeks to preserve the secrecy of the jury’s deliberations, while ensuring that those deliberations remain untainted by contact with information or individuals from outside the jury. As a result, where the evidence establishes that the jury has been exposed to outside information or influences, it will generally be admissible.’ However the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic matters ‘is not always self-evident and it is not possible to articulate with complete precision what is contemplated by the idea of a matter ‘extrinsic’ to the jury deliberation process.’ It is a distinction which is at times ‘difficult to discern.’
Arbour J identified the principal reasons for the common law rule of jury secrecy: ‘The first reason supporting the need for secrecy is that confidentiality promotes candour and the kind of full and frank debate that is essential to this type of collegial decision making. While searching for unanimity, jurors should be free to explore out loud all avenues of reasoning without fear of exposure to public ridicule, contempt or hatred. This rationale is of vital importance to the potential acquittal of an unpopular accused, or one charged with a particularly repulsive crime. In my view, this rationale is sound, and does not require empirical confirmation.
The Court of Appeal also placed considerable weight on the second rationale for the secrecy rule: the need to ensure finality of the verdict. Describing the verdict as the product of a dynamic process, the court emphasized the need to protect the solemnity of the verdict, as the product of the unanimous consensus which, when formally announced, carries the finality and authority of a legal pronouncement. That rationale is more abstract, and inevitably invites the question of why the finality of the verdict should prevail over its integrity in cases where that integrity is seriously put in issue. In a legal environment such as ours, which provides for generous review of judicial decisions on appeal, and which does not perceive the voicing of dissenting opinions on appeal as a threat to the authority of the law, I do not consider that finality, standing alone, is a convincing rationale for requiring secrecy.
The respondent, as well as the interveners supporting its position and, in particular, the Attorney General of Quebec, place great emphasis on the third main rationale for the jury secrecy rule – the need to protect jurors from harassment, censure and reprisals. Our system of jury selection is sensitive to the privacy interests of prospective jurors …, and the proper functioning of the jury system, a constitutionally protected right in serious criminal charges, depends upon the willingness of jurors to discharge their functions honestly and honourably. This in turn is dependent, at the very minimum, on a system that ensures the safety of jurors, their sense of security, as well as their privacy.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Pintori, Regina -v- CACD (Bailii, [2007] EWCA Crim 1700)
    The defendant appealed his conviction for possession of class A drugs, saying that the drugs found had belonged to somebody who had stayed at his flat whilst he had been away. One of the jurors later told a police officer that she had known through . .
  • Cited – Seckerson & Times Newspapers Ltd -v- The United Kingdom ECHR (33510/10, Bailii, [2012] ECHR 241, 32844/10)
    The first applicant had been chairman of a jury and had expressed his concerns about their behaviour to the second applicant who published them. They were prosecuted under the 1981 Act. They had said that no details of the deliberations had been . .

JDB v North Carolina; 16 Jun 2011

References: 09-11121
Links: USSC, LII
Coram: Justice Sotomayor
(United States Supreme Court) The court considered the applicability of Miranda protection to a police interview of a minor.
This case cites:

  • Considered – Miranda -v- Arizona ((1966) 384 US 436, Worldlii, [1966] USSC 143, (1966) 86 SCt 1602, (1966) 16 LEd2d 694)
    (United States Supreme Court) The prosecution may not use statements, whether incriminatory or exculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards which were sufficient to secure . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ambrose -v- Harris, Procurator Fiscal, Oban, etc SC (Bailii, [2011] UKSC 43, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, UKSC 2011/0101, 2011 SLT 1005, [2011] 1 WLR 2435)
    (Scotland) The appellant had variously been convicted in reliance on evidence gathered at different stages before arrest, but in each case without being informed of any right to see a solicitor. The court was asked, as a devolution issue, at what . .

Regina v NS; 20 Dec 2012

References: [2012] 3 SCR 726, 2012 SCC 72
Links: Canlii
Coram: McLachlin CJ and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ
Canlii Charter of Rights – Freedom of religion – Right to fair hearing – Right to make full answer and defence – Muslim witness at preliminary hearing in sexual assault trial wanting to testify with her face covered by niqab – Whether requiring witness to remove the niqab while testifying would interfere with her religious freedom -Whether permitting her to wear niqab while testifying would create a serious risk to trial fairness – Whether both rights could be accommodated to avoid conflict between them – If not, whether salutary effects of requiring the witness to remove niqab outweigh deleterious effects – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 2(a), 7, 11(d).
Criminal law – Evidence – Cross-examination – Muslim witness at preliminary hearing in sexual assault trial wanting to testify with her face covered by niqab – Whether permitting her to wear niqab while testifying would create a serious risk to trial fairness.

Domican v The Queen; HCA 1992

References: (1992) 173 CLR 555
Coram: Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ
(Australia) Mason CJ said: ‘A trial judge is not absolved from his or her duty to give general and specific warnings concerning the danger of convicting on identification evidence because there is other evidence, which, if accepted, is sufficient to convict the accused. See R v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR [260] at pp 270-271; cf R v Goode [1970] SASR 69, at p 77. The judge must direct the jury on the assumption that they may decide to convict solely on the basis of the identification evidence. If a trial judge has failed to give an adequate warning concerning identification, a new trial will ordinarily be ordered even when other evidence makes a very strong case against the accused. See R v Gaunt [1964] NSWR 864, at p 867. Of course, the other evidence in the case may be so compelling that a court of criminal appeal will conclude that the jury must have convicted on that evidence independently of the identification evidence. In such a case, the inadequacy of or lack of a warning concerning the identification evidence, although amounting to legal error, will not constitute a miscarriage of justice. But unless the Court of Criminal Appeal concludes that the jury must inevitably have convicted the accused independently of the identification evidence, the inadequacy of or lack of a warning concerning that evidence constitutes a miscarriage of justice even though the other evidence made a strong case against the accused.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Queen -v- Beckford and Another PC (Times 30-Jun-93, (1993) 97 Cr App R 409)
    The court rehearsed the Australian cases on the dangers of relying upon identification evidence, the need for proper jury directions, and the dangers of a court of appeal maintaining a conviction where an inadequate direction had been given relying . .
  • Cited – Shand -v- The Queen PC (Times 29-Nov-95, [1996] 1 WLR 67, Bailii, [1995] UKPC 46)
    (Jamaica) The case for the defence was that the identification witnesses were deliberately lying and it was not suggested that they were mistaken, so that the sole line of defence was fabrication. The identification evidence was exceptionally good . .

In re W; 15 Nov 1990

References: Times 15-Nov-1990
Where assets had been seized in criminal proceedings, the court had power to order a payment to creditors only where the value of the assets would not be reduced.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – In re X (Restraint Order: Payment out) QBD (Times 03-Jun-04)
    A restraint order had been made in respect of the defendant’s assets pending trial. Application was made to release a sum to pay the defendant’s company debts.
    Held: A payment could be made only where the the realisable value of the property . .

Regina v Grant; 17 Jul 2009

References: 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 SCR 353, 309 DLR (4th) 1, 245 CCC (3d) 1, 66 CR (6th) 1, 253 OAC 124
Links: Canlii
Coram: McLachlin CJ and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ
Canlii (Supreme Court of Canada) Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Arbitrary detention – Right to counsel – Encounter between accused and police going from general neighbourhood policing to situation where police effectively took control over accused and attempted to elicit incriminating information – Whether police conduct would cause a reasonable person in accused’s position to conclude that he or she was not free to go and had to comply with police demand – Whether accused arbitrarily detained – Whether accused’s right to counsel infringed – Meaning of ‘detention’ in ss. 9 and 10 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Constitutional law – Charter of Rights – Enforcement – Exclusion of evidence – Firearm discovered as result of accused’s statements taken in breach of his right against arbitrary detention and right to counsel – Firearm admitted into evidence at trial and accused convicted of five firearms offences – Whether admission of firearm bringing administration of justice into disrepute – Revised framework for determining whether evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights must be excluded – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 24(2).
Criminal law – Firearms – Possession of firearm for purposes of weapons trafficking – Whether simple movement of firearm from one place to another without changing hands amounts to weapons trafficking – Meaning of ‘transfer’ of weapon for purposes of ss. 84, 99 and 100 of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ambrose -v- Harris, Procurator Fiscal, Oban, etc SC (Bailii, [2011] UKSC 43, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, UKSC 2011/0101, 2011 SLT 1005, [2011] 1 WLR 2435)
    (Scotland) The appellant had variously been convicted in reliance on evidence gathered at different stages before arrest, but in each case without being informed of any right to see a solicitor. The court was asked, as a devolution issue, at what . .

Miranda v Arizona; 10 Oct 1966

References: (1966) 384 US 436, [1966] USSC 143, (1966) 86 SCt 1602, (1966) 16 LEd2d 694
Links: Worldlii
Coram: Warren CJ
(United States Supreme Court) The prosecution may not use statements, whether incriminatory or exculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards which were sufficient to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. These safeguards require that, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform the accused person of the right to silence and to assure continuous opportunity to exercise it, he must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement that he does make may be used as evidence against him, that he has the right to consult with an attorney and that, if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. ‘Custodial interrogation’ for the purposes of this rule means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Imbrioscia -v- Switzerland ECHR (Bailii, [1993] ECHR 56, 13972/88, ECHR, (1994) 17 EHRR 441, Bailii)
    The applicant had been questioned several times without access to a lawyer while he was in police custody.
    Held: Overall there had been no breach of article 6(1). The right set out in article 6(3)(c) is one element, among others, of the . .
  • Cited – Galstyan -v- Armenia ECHR (26986/03, Bailii, [2007] ECHR 936, (2007) 50 EHRR 618)
    The claimant had been was arrested on his way home from a protest rally. He was made aware of his rights and expressly declined a lawyer.
    Held: As it was his own choice not to have a lawyer, the authorities could not be held responsible for . .
  • Cited – Ambrose -v- Harris, Procurator Fiscal, Oban, etc SC (Bailii, [2011] UKSC 43, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, UKSC 2011/0101, 2011 SLT 1005, [2011] 1 WLR 2435)
    (Scotland) The appellant had variously been convicted in reliance on evidence gathered at different stages before arrest, but in each case without being informed of any right to see a solicitor. The court was asked, as a devolution issue, at what . .
  • Cited – Murray -v- The United Kingdom ECHR (Times 09-Feb-96, 18731/91, [1996] ECHR 3, (1996) 23 EHRR 313, [1996] 22 EHRR 29, Bailii)
    The applicant had been denied legal advice for 48 hours after he had been taken into custody.
    Held: There had been a violation of article 6(1) read with article 6(3)(c). However, it was not a breach of human rights to draw inferences from the . .
  • Considered – JDB -v- North Carolina (USSC, LII, 09-11121)
    (United States Supreme Court) The court considered the applicability of Miranda protection to a police interview of a minor. . .
  • Cited – McGowan (Procurator Fiscal) -v- B SC (Bailii Summary, Bailii, [2011] UKSC 54, SC, SC Summary, UKSC 2011/0201, [2011] 1 WLR 3121, 2012 SLT 37, 2012 SCCR 109, 2012 SCL 85)
    The appellant complained that after arrest, though he had been advised of his right to legal advice, and had declined the offer, it was still wrong to have his subsequent interview relied upon at his trial.
    Held: It was not incompatible with . .

S v Mthembu; 10 Apr 2008

References: 379/07, [2008] ZASCA 51, [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA), [2008] 4 All SA 517 (SCA), 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA)
Links: Saflii
Coram: Cameron, Maya et Cachalia JJA
Saflii (South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal) The evidence of an accomplice extracted through torture, (including real evidence derived from it), is inadmissible, even where the accomplice testifies years after the torture. The link was inextricable.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Her Majesty’s Advocate -v- P SC (Bailii, [2011] UKSC 44, Bailii Summary, 2012 SC (UKSC) 108)
    (Scotland) The appellant had been interviewed by police without being offered access to a solicitor. He complained that the interview and information obtained only through it had been used to found the prosecution.
    Held: The admission of the . .

Regina v Steidl and Baxendale-Walker; 27 Jun 2002

References: Unreported, 27 June 2002
Coram: Judge Wadsworth QC
(Southwark Crown Court) The case was a prosecution for serious fraud. In civil proceedings, despite evidence to suggest a powerful case for dishonesty, a High Court judge had concluded that the claimant had failed to establish that the defendant, Baxendale-Walker, was acting dishonestly, or intentionally ‘driving what he knew to be a dishonest transaction’.
Held: There was a concern about the effect of conflicting decisions of the High Court and a crminal court. The prosecution should be stayed on the grounds that it was ‘against the public interest that the criminal case should proceed . . in that the necessary effect of such a proceeding would be to re-litigate the issue with a view to achieving a result on the facts inconsistent with the findings of fact already made in a final judgment of the High Court’.
This case cites:

  • Applied – Smith -v- Linskills CA ([1996] 1 WLR 763)
    The claimant, a convicted burglar took proceedings against his former solicitors. He alleged that the negligence of the solicitor caused his wrongful conviction.
    Held: The case was dismissed. The claimant was seeking to re-litigate issues . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Levey, Regina -v- CACD (Bailii, [2006] EWCA Crim 1902, Times 24-Aug-06, [2006] 1 WLR 3092)
    The defendant appealed his conviction of manslaughter of his baby son. He said that a family court had previously investigated the same allegations and had explicitly found itself unable to say which of himself and the mother were responsible for . .