Counsel had withdrawn on the fifth day of the trial of the defendant for rape after the prosecution witnesses had given their evidence and all that remained of the prosecution case was the defendant’s interview. The defendant (who wanted to challenge the accuracy of the interview record) asked for new representatives, but the judge made clear that the trial would have to continue and declined to allow the defendant new representation. She found that the defendant had made it impossible for his counsel to continue to act, that he was deliberately endeavouring to manipulate the system (he had already dispensed with his legal representatives on two previous occasions) and that he was capable of marshalling the relevant material, giving his own evidence in an orderly way, and making a closing speech to the jury.
Held: There was nothing unfair about the trial taken as a whole.
The statutory question for this court on an appeal against conviction is whether the conviction is safe. We agree, however, that if the trial, taken overall, was unfair, it is very likely, if not inevitable, that it will follow that a conviction emerging from it is unsafe. . . We observe only that we are not be taken as ruling that every incident in a trial, however small, to which the adjective ‘unfair’ might be applied, will necessarily have the consequence of rendering the conviction unsafe. The question is whether the process of trial was, taken overall, unfair and thus a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. . . We do not dissent from the proposition that improperly to deprive a defendant altogether of legal representation is very likely to render his trial unfair and his conviction unsafe . . It does not, however, follow from that case [Golder (1977) 88 EHRR 524], or any other, that a defendant to a criminal charge who has three sets of solicitors plus counsel for much of the trial and who then takes a stance on some point which prevents his trial lawyers from continuing is dealt with unfairly if the trial is not interrupted for him to instruct yet further lawyers. The question in such a case is whether the order of the judge that the trial continue did or did not amount to such a denial of representation as to render the trial as a whole unfair. . . Once again, it does not follow that if a defendant is represented, but through his own action makes it impossible for his counsel to continue, it is unfair to require the trial already embarked upon to proceed. . . we are satisfied that there was nothing unfair about this trial taken as a whole by reason of the fact that the appellant was unrepresented from the point at which counsel withdrew. He was not deprived of representation by the court, nor by the criminal justice system. He had been given representation and in abundance. He was deprived of it by his own actions.’
References: [2006] EWCA Crim 1457
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:
- Cited – Cadamartriea, Regina v CACD 18-Oct-2019 (, [2019] EWCA Crim 1736)
Appeal from conviction of murder – whether a fair trial after a withdrawal by his counsel at the conclusion of his evidence. Counsel had said they were professionally embarrassed by new instructions.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The judge had . .
These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 21 September 2020; Ref: scu.654028
