In re S-B (Children) (Care proceedings: Standard of proof): SC 14 Dec 2009

A child was found to have bruising consistent with physical abuse. Either or both parents might have caused it, but the judge felt it likely that only one had, that he was unable to decide which, and that they were not so serious that he had to say that the other must have known.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the case remitted for a rehearing.
Lady Hale said: ‘the law has drawn a clear distinction between probability as it applies to past facts and probability as it applies to future predictions. Past facts must be proved to have happened on the balance of probabilities, that is, that it is more likely than not that they did happen. Predictions about future facts need only be based upon a degree of likelihood that they will happen which is sufficient to justify preventive action. This will depend upon the nature and gravity of the harm: a lesser degree of likelihood that the child will be killed will justify immediate preventive action than the degree of likelihood that the child will not be sent to school.’
The nostrum, ‘the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence needed to prove it’, is a common misinterpretation of what Lord Nicholls said in in re H (Minors).
Lady Hale emphasised that the decision whether to make an order interfering with individual rights must be taken by an independent and impartial court. In order to bring home to judges that their role is not merely supervisory, she drew an analogy with criminal proceedings: ‘Social workers are the detectives. They amass a great deal of information about a child and his family. They assess risk factors. They devise plans. They put the evidence which they have assembled before a court and ask for an order. . . The court subjects the evidence of the local authority to critical scrutiny, finds what the facts are, makes predictions based upon the facts, and balances a range of considerations in deciding what will be best for the child. We should no more expect every case which a local authority brings to court to result in an order than we should expect every prosecution brought by the CPS to result in a conviction. The standard of proof may be different, but the roles of the social workers and the prosecutors are similar. They bring to court those cases where there is a good case to answer. It is for the court to decide whether the case is made out.’

Lord Hope, Deputy President, Lord Rodger, Lady Hale, Lord Brown, Lord Collins, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke
Times 18-Dec-2009, [2009] UKSC 17, [2009] WLR (D) 365, [2010] 1 FCR 321, [2010] PTSR 456, [2010] 1 All ER 705, [2010] Fam Law 231, [2010] 2 WLR 238, UKSC 2009/0184, [2010] 1 FLR 1161
Bailii, SC Summary, SC
Children Act 1989, European Convention on Human Rights 6 8
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re H and R (Minors) (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) HL 14-Dec-1995
Evidence allowed – Care Application after Abuse
Children had made allegations of serious sexual abuse against their step-father. He was acquitted at trial, but the local authority went ahead with care proceedings. The parents appealed against a finding that a likely risk to the children had still . .
Appeal fromIn re S-B (Children) CA 30-Jun-2009
. .
CitedIn re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening) HL 11-Jun-2008
Balance of probabilities remains standard of proof
There had been cross allegations of abuse within the family, and concerns by the authorities for the children. The judge had been unable to decide whether the child had been shown to be ‘likely to suffer significant harm’ as a consequence. Having . .
CitedClingham (formerly C (a minor)) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Regina v Crown Court at Manchester Ex parte McCann and Others HL 17-Oct-2002
The applicants had been made subject of anti-social behaviour orders. They challenged the basis upon which the orders had been made.
Held: The orders had no identifiable consequences which would make the process a criminal one. Civil standards . .
CitedIn re M and R (Child abuse: Expert Evidence) CA 21-May-1996
On an application for a care order the judge found there was a real possibility that sexual abuse had occurred but the evidence was not sufficient to prove the allegations to the requisite standard. The threshold criteria were met on another ground. . .
CitedIn re K (Children) (Non-accidental injuries: Perpetrator: New Evidence) CA 27-Aug-2004
The children had been taken into care, and freed for adoption. The mother appealed saying the blame for non-accidental injury was misplaced. The court had not thought her responsible for the non-accidental injuries, but she had been unwilling to . .
CitedNorth Yorkshire County Council v SA and others CA 1-Jul-2003
The child was taken to hospital with injuries which the doctors concluded were non-accidental. The identity of the abuser was in doubt.
Held: The court set out to identify the procedures in cases involving suspected non-accidental injuries . .
CitedLancashire County Council and Another v B and Others; Lancashire County Council v A HL 16-Mar-2000
A seven month old child had been injured, but it was not possible to establish whether this had taken place whilst with her parents or with a child minder. The Council brought care proceedings also for the minder’s own child B.
Held: Even . .
CitedIn re O and N (Minors); In re B (Minors) (Care: Preliminary hearing) HL 3-Apr-2003
The appeals were from conflicting decisions in care applications where one or other or both parents were guilty of lack of care, but there was no evidence to say which was responsible.
Held: The threshold criteria had been met, and the court . .
CitedB v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary QBD 5-Apr-2000
The defendant appealed the making of a sex offender order under 1998 Act. The justices had found that the defendant was a sex offender within section 2(1)(a) and that he had acted on a number of occasions in a way which brought him within section . .
CitedSecretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman HL 11-Oct-2001
The applicant, a Pakistani national had entered the UK to act as a Muslim priest. The Home Secretary was satisfied that he was associated with a Muslim terrorist organisation, and refused indefinite leave to remain. The Home Secretary provided both . .

Cited by:
CitedIn re L (A Child: Media Reporting) FD 18-Apr-2011
The local authority had intervened on suspecting physical abuse. L was placed with the maternal grandmother who took L to Ireland before care proceedings were commenced. The Irish court found him to have been wrongfully removed, and orders were made . .
CitedANS and Another v ML SC 11-Jul-2012
The mother opposed adoption proceedings, and argued that the provision in the 2007 Act, allowing a court to dispense with her consent, infringed her rights under Article 8 and was therefore made outwith the powers of the Scottish Parliament.
CitedIn re J (Children) SC 20-Feb-2013
The mother had been, whilst in a previous relationship, involved in care proceedings after the death from physical abuse of her baby. Whilst being severely critical of her, the court had been unable to identify the author of the child’s death. Now, . .
CitedRe D (A Child) CA 26-Mar-2014
F appealed against the removal of his parental responsibility for his son. M and F were not married, but F had been named on the birth certificate. He had later been convicted of sexual assaults against two daughters of M by an earlier relationship. . .
CitedRe EV (A Child) SC 1-Mar-2017
Appeal from application for permanence order. EV had been in care from her birth. Her parents, each with long standing learning difficulties opposed the order.
Held: The Court allowed the parents’ appeals. The meeting of the threshold test was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Human Rights

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.384146

C v M: ECJ 9 Oct 2014

ECJ (Judgment) Urgent preliminary ruling procedure – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 – Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the civil aspects of international child abduction – Concept of ‘habitual residence’ of a child following the divorce of its parents – Lawful removal of the child to another Member State – Wrongful retention
The French F had applied to the Irish Court for the return of children who had been taken to Ireland by M. There was an initial decision of the French court permitting relocation to Ireland, which had been appealed promptly. M had moved notwithstanding the pending appeal, a stay having been refused to F, and subsequently the French decision had been reversed by the appeal court. The Irish court was minded to find that the child had become at some stage habitually resident in Ireland, but referred several questions to the CJEU.
Held: (1) The initial removal to Ireland had not been wrongful, because of the then extant first instance decision permitting the move, (2) that the subsequent retention there after the French appellate decision might justify an order for return but (3) this would depend on whether by then the child was habitually resident in Ireland.
If habitual residence had by then been established in Ireland, there could be no order for return: ‘Article 11(1) of the Regulation [Brussels II Revised] . . provides that paragraphs 2-8 of that article are to apply where the holder of rights of custody applies to the competent authorities of a member state to deliver a judgment on the basis of the 1980 Hague Convention in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained ‘in a member state other than the member state where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention’. It follows that this is not the case if the child was not habitually resident in the member state of origin immediately before the removal or retention.’

Maciej Szpunar AG
C-376/14, [2014] EUECJ C-376/14, [2014] EUECJ C-376/14 – V, [2015] 1 FAM 116, [2015] 1 FCR 496, [2015] CEC 686, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2268, [2015] 1 FLR 1, [2014] WLR(D) 415, [2014] Fam Law 1674, [2015] All ER (EC) 426, [2015] 2 WLR 59, [2015] ILPr 25
Bailii, Bailii, WLRD
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003
European
Cited by:
CitedAR v RN (Scotland) SC 22-May-2015
The court was asked whether it should order the return to France of two little girls who have been living with their mother in Scotland since July 2013. The issue arose under article 3 of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of . .
CitedRe C (Children) SC 14-Feb-2018
‘This appeal concerns the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. It raises general questions relating to:
(1) the place which the habitual residence of the child occupies in the scheme of that Convention, and . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.537472

Regina v Gorrie: 1918

Salter J directed the jury in the criminal trial of a child that the prosecution had to satisfy them that when the boy who was accused committed the act charged ‘he knew that he was doing what was wrong – not merely what was wrong, but what was gravely wrong, seriously wrong.’

Salter J
(1918) 83 JP 136
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedJTB, Regina v HL 29-Apr-2009
The defendant appealed against his convictions for sexual assaults. He was aged twelve at the time of the offences, but had been prevented from arguing that he had not known that what he was doing was wrong. The House was asked whether the effect of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Crime, Children

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.341783

In re L (A Child: Media Reporting): FD 18 Apr 2011

The local authority had intervened on suspecting physical abuse. L was placed with the maternal grandmother who took L to Ireland before care proceedings were commenced. The Irish court found him to have been wrongfully removed, and orders were made for his return. The child was again hidden, but then found and returned to England. Expert witnesses failed to find anything to support the mother’s belief that the injuries arose from some underlying medical condition.
Held: The approach was: ‘Firstly, I must consider whether any of the fractures and bruises are non-accidental injuries. Secondly, if I find that one or more of the injuries is a non-accidental injury I must then go on to consider whether I am able to identify the perpetrator. Thirdly, if I am unable to identify the perpetrator then I must consider who falls within the pool of possible perpetrators.’ Applying that, the court concluded that the injuries were non-accidental. ‘sometimes good people do bad things. I have found that L has sustained several non-accidental injuries; seven fractures and two bruises. The parents accept that they alone cared for L during the first six weeks of his life. The sad but inevitable truth is that one, or perhaps both, of them is responsible for causing these injuries.’ Narrowing the time of the injury, the child had been in the mother’s sole care.
The court went on to criticise reporting by the Daily Telegraph, which had reported the mother’s version of events uncritically, and also the web-site forced-adoption which had in turn ‘sexed up’ the Telegraph article: ‘In my experience, parents involved in court proceedings cannot always be relied upon to be unbiased and dispassionate. More often, as Sir Nicholas Wall has said, they are partisan and tendentious. It is not only judges that need to recognise that but journalists too. As this case has shown, to rely uncritically upon what a parent says can lead to reporting that is unbalanced, inaccurate and just plain wrong.’

Bellamy J
[2011] EWHC B8 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedNorth Yorkshire County Council v SA and others CA 1-Jul-2003
The child was taken to hospital with injuries which the doctors concluded were non-accidental. The identity of the abuser was in doubt.
Held: The court set out to identify the procedures in cases involving suspected non-accidental injuries . .
CitedIn In Re T (Abuse: Standard of Proof) CA 19-May-2004
Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P said that in abuse cases, evidence: ‘cannot be evaluated in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases has to have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an . .
CitedIn Re B (Threshold Criteria: Fabricated Illness) FD 2004
Bracewell J said that: ‘Although the medical evidence is of very great importance, it is not the only evidence in the case. Explanations given by carers and the credibility of those involved with the child concerned are of great significance. All . .
CitedIn re LU (A Child); In re LB (A Child) (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof); re U (A Child) (Department for Education and Skills intervening) CA 14-May-2004
In each case, the other parent appealed care orders where she had been found to have injured her children. In each case the sole evidence was the injury to the child’s health and expert medical evidence. The cases were referred following the . .
See AlsoIn re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening) HL 11-Jun-2008
Balance of probabilities remains standard of proof
There had been cross allegations of abuse within the family, and concerns by the authorities for the children. The judge had been unable to decide whether the child had been shown to be ‘likely to suffer significant harm’ as a consequence. Having . .
CitedIn re S-B (Children) (Care proceedings: Standard of proof) SC 14-Dec-2009
A child was found to have bruising consistent with physical abuse. Either or both parents might have caused it, but the judge felt it likely that only one had, that he was unable to decide which, and that they were not so serious that he had to say . .
CitedA Local Authority v K, D and L FD 8-Mar-2005
The court gave guidance on the approach to expert evidence in children’s cases. Charles J said ”in determining the facts, a court should have regard to the guidance given in R v Lucas (Ruth) [1981] QB 720 and R v Middleton [2000] TLR 203. As . .
CitedNH v A County Council and Others; In re D (Children) (Care proceedings: Preliminary hearings) CA 4-Jun-2009
The father appealed against a finding that he had been the sole perpetrator of injuries to his children. There had been the first limb of a split hearing.
Held: The judge had made an unnecessary finding. It was clear that at least one of the . .
CitedIn Re M (Care Proceedings: Best Evidence) CA 2007
The court considered an application for an order for DNA sequencing to establish paternity in care proceedings. . .

Cited by:
CitedDoncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Haigh FD 22-Aug-2011
The Council sought to have certain aspects of a care application put into the public domain which would normally have remained private. Application was also made (by the father and the child) for an order restricting the right of the mother to make . .
CitedRe L (Psychologist – Duty To The Court) FD 20-Dec-2011
The court had made findings of non-accidental injury caused by the parents. A psychologist called in to assist the court was sympathetic to the parents invited the court to reconsider its findings of fact.
Held: The expert had gone beyond her . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Media

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.439590

London Borough of Hillingdon and Others, Regina (on the Application of) v The Lord Chancellor and others: Admn 6 Nov 2008

The claimant challenged the substantial increase in court fees in public law children cases in the Fees Orders. The respondent said that the orders were intended to reflect the true costs of such proceedings and that funding had been provided to local authorities to match the increases. The claimants said there had been inadequate consultation and that there was still a shortfall in funding.
Held: The challenge failed. Any common law duty to consult had been displaced by the provisions of the 2003 Act. The defendant had complied with its duties to consult. Further it was not expected that authorities would be affected in performance of their statutory duties by financial considerations. The orders were not irrational, and nor had there been assurances such as to create a legitimate expectation that such orders would not be made.

Dyson LJ, Bennett, Pitchford JJ
[2008] EWHC 2683 (Admin), [2009] CP Rep 13, [2009] 1 FCR 1, [2009] PTSR CS20, [2009] 1 FLR 39, [2009] Fam Law 13, [2009] BLGR 554
Bailii
Magistrates’ Courts Fees Order 2008 (SI 2008/1052), Family Proceedings Fees Order 2008 (SI 2008/1054), Children Act 1989 31, Courts Act 2003 92
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRegina v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Nottinghamshire County Council HL 12-Dec-1985
The House heard a judicial review of the Secretary of State’s assessment of the proper level of expenditure by a local authority.
Held: A ‘low intensity’ of review is applied to cases involving issues ‘depending essentially on political . .
CitedBAPIO Action Ltd and Another, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another CA 9-Nov-2007
The action group appealed against refusal of a judicial review of guidelines as to the employment of non-EU doctors, saying that they were in effect immigration rules and issuable only under the 1971 Act. The court had said that since the guidance . .
CitedRegina v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd CA 1990
Legitimate Expectation once created not withdrawn
The claimant said that a change of practice by the Revenue was contrary to a legitimate expectation.
Held: The Inland Revenue could not withdraw from a representation if it would cause: substantial unfairness to the applicant; if the . .
CitedBancoult, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) HL 22-Oct-2008
The claimants challenged the 2004 Order which prevented their return to their homes on the Chagos Islands. The islanders had been taken off the island to leave it for use as a US airbase. In 2004, the island was no longer needed, and payment had . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Administrative, Children

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.277568

A Local Authority v W and Others (Application for Summary Dismissal of Findings): FC 2 Jun 2020

No summary dismissal of Care action allegations

The Court was asked: ‘i) Does the court have power at the case management stage to summarily dismiss disputed findings sought by a local authority against a parent in proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 independent of its case management powers under the Family Procedure Rules 2010?
ii) If the court does have such a power, should it be exercised in the circumstances of this case?
iii) If the court does not have such a power, should the court in any event decide and direct, pursuant to its case management powers under the FPR 2010, that it is not necessary for certain of the disputed findings sought by the local authority against the parents in these proceedings to be adjudicated by the court?’
Held: FPR 2010 expressly prohibited the striking out of a statement of case with respect to children proceedings and contained no power to order summary judgment. No alternative power could be used to circumvent that prohibition.
Case management required an identification of which issues needed determination, and the Local Authority had properly set out those factual issues.

Mr Justice MacDonald
[2020] EWFC 40, [2020] WLR(D) 327, [2020] 4 WLR 83
Bailii, WLRD
Children Act 1989 38, Family Proceedings Rules 2010
England and Wales

Children

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.651690

In re D (a Child): FD 31 Oct 2014

The two parents sought to challenge a decision that their child should be taken into care. Each parent had learning difficulties, but their income though small precluded the grant of legal aid. They wished to appeal against final care orders, but such cases did not come within the exemptions.
Held: Sir James Munby spoke of the severe inequity and consequences of the withdrawal of legal aid: ‘The father has a learning disability. He is a ‘protected party’ within the meaning of Rule 2.3 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. As a matter of law he is not able, as a protected party, to act without a litigation friend. Quite apart from that, the father’s learning disability in any event requires him to have considerable support and assistance to be able to participate effectively in the proceedings. The Official Solicitor has agreed to act as his litigation friend. The Official Solicitor cannot be compelled to act as anyone’s litigation friend. His practice is to agree to act only if there is funding for the protected party’s litigation costs, because his own budget – the monies voted to him by Parliament – is not sufficient to enable him to fund the costs of litigation of the type the father is involved in. The Official Solicitor was willing to act here only because the father’s solicitor and counsel have agreed to act, thus far, pro bono. But without the protection against an adverse costs order which the father (and derivatively the Official Solicitor) would enjoy if the father had legal aid, the Official Solicitor has a possible exposure to an adverse costs order – for instance, if the local authority was to obtain an order for costs against him – which, understandably, he is unwilling to assume. The consequence is that the Official Solicitor was not willing to act as the father’s litigation friend unless Ms Stevens agreed, as she has, to indemnify him against any adverse costs orders. And as if all this was not enough – indeed, far more than enough – I am told that Ms Stevens has spent in excess of 100 hours, all unremunerated, working to resolve, thus far without success, the issue of the father’s entitlement to legal aid. This is devotion to the client far above and far beyond the call of duty.’

Sir James Munby P
SN14C00004
Judiciary
Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Pa
yment for Services) Regulations 2013
, Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) FD 3-Oct-2014
Extension of Time for Parental Order
The court considered the making of a parental order in respect of a child through surrogacy procedures outside the time limits imposed by the 2008 Act. The child had been born under Indian surrogacy laws. The commissioning parents (now the . .
CitedA Father v SBC and Others CCF 23-May-2014
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, News, Legal Aid, Legal Professions

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.538294

TS, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department: Admn 26 Oct 2010

The claimant had sought asylum as a child, declaring that he had not applied for asylum elsewhere. His fingerprints were matched to an applicant in Belgium.
Held: Wyn Williams J construed section 55 and the statutory guidance referred to in section 55(3) as imposing upon the decision maker, the UK Borders Agency caseworker, a duty to treat the best interests of the child concerned as a primary consideration when exercising an immigration/asylum function. Section 55(3) placed a personal responsibility upon the decision maker to have regard to the statutory guidance which included the requirement, at paragraph 6, that the decision maker must apply the guidance as to the welfare of children, and, ‘if they decide to depart from it, have clear reasons for doing so’. The judge found that since UKBA had not addressed the claimant’s case that a removal to Belgium would be ‘detrimental to his welfare’ the decision made was unlawful.

Wyn Williams J
[2010] EWHC 2614 (Admin), [2011] Imm AR 164
Bailii
Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 55
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCastle and Others v Commissioner of Police for The Metropolis Admn 8-Sep-2011
The claimants, all under 17 years old, took a peaceful part in a substantial but disorderly demonstration in London. The police decided to contain the section of crowd which included the claimants. The claimants said that the containment of children . .
CitedAlladin, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department CA 16-Oct-2014
The court was asked whether the decisions of the Secretary of State to give limited (discretionary) leave to remain as opposed to indefinite leave to remain are unlawful because they were given in breach of the Secretary of State’s duty under . .
CitedAli, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for The Home Department Admn 9-Jan-2015
The claimant complained that the respondent when granting her a time limited leave to remain only, had by making her immigration status incompatible with that of her five children failed to comply with her obligations under the 2009 Act. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Children

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.425575

In Re N (Children): SC 13 Apr 2016

The Court considered whether the future of two little girls, aged four and two years, should be decided by the courts of this country or by the authorities in Hungary. Both children were born in England and lived all their lives here. But their parents were Hungarian and the children were nationals of Hungary, not the United Kingdom.
Held: The appeal succeeded, and the order for transfer set aside. Not only did the judge take the wrong approach to the ‘best interests’ question, he also left out of account some crucial factors in deciding upon the ‘better placed’ question: ‘what is encompassed in the ‘best interests’ requirement? The distinction drawn in In re I remains valid. The court is deciding whether to request a transfer of the case. The question is whether the transfer is in the child’s best interests. This is a different question from what eventual outcome to the case will be in the child’s best interests. The focus of the inquiry is different, but it is wrong to call it ‘attenuated’. The factors relevant to deciding the question will vary according to the circumstances. It is impossible to be definitive. But there is no reason at all to exclude the impact upon the child’s welfare, in the short or the longer term, of the transfer itself. What will be its immediate consequences? What impact will it have on the choices available to the court deciding upon the eventual outcome? This is not the same as deciding what outcome will be in the child’s best interests. It is deciding whether it is in the child’s best interests for the court currently seised of the case to retain it or whether it is in the child’s best interests for the case to be transferred to the requested court.’
The court considered the differences between articles 12 and 15: ‘the requirement in article 12.3 is quite different from the requirement in article 15.1. In article 12.3 (as also in article 12.1) it is the court which is deciding whether to accept jurisdiction, which it would not otherwise have, that has to decide whether to do so is in the best interests of the child. This is roughly equivalent to the requirement in article 15.5 that the court which is requested to take the case (here the Hungarian court) must consider that it is the best interests of the child to accept jurisdiction. Article 15.1 is directed towards the court which already has jurisdiction in an existing case. It imposes an additional requirement that the transferring court considers this to be in the best interests of the child. Obviously, the considerations applicable when deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction may be somewhat different from the considerations applicable when deciding whether to accept it.’

Lord Neuberger, President, Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lord Carnwath
[2016] UKSC 15, [2016] WLR(D) 190, [2016] Fam Law 681, [2017] AC 167, [2016] 1 FLR 1082, [2016] 3 FCR 394, [2016] 2 WLR 1103, UKSC 2016/0013
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary
England and Wales
Citing:
At FCJ and E (Children: Brussels II Revised: Article 15) FC 11-Nov-2014
The local authority applied to the court for care orders and placement orders in respect of two young girls. The parents opposed the local authority’s applications. The mother was Hungarian. The father was Hungarian/Roma. The mother applied under . .
CitedIn re J (A Child: Brussels II revised: Article 15: Practice and Procedure) FC 29-Oct-2014
Application to transfer children proceedings to anoher member state (Hungary)
Held: The order should be made. A Hungarian court might better be able to facilitate contact with siblings living there. . .
At CARe N (Children : Adoption: Jurisdiction) CA 2-Nov-2015
Appeal against care and placement order proceedings in relation to two Hungarian children, The orders were for the transfer of the case to Hungary.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. As to Article 15, the Court considered: What are the . .
CitedIn Re I (A Child) SC 1-Dec-2009
The child had been born in Britain to British citizen parents from Pakistan and India. There had been care proceedings, but later and with the court’s consent the father took him to Pakistan undertaking to return him, but then failed to do so. . .
CitedIn Re T (A Child: Article 15 of B2R) ((Care Proceedings: Request to Assume Jurisdiction) FD 13-Mar-2013
A pregnant 17 year old Slovakian girl ran away from a children’s home in Slovakia and gave birth to the baby in the UK.
Held: Although the court decided to transfer the case to Slovakia under article 15, Mostyn J said: ‘It is not disputed that . .
CitedSomafer Sa v Saar-Ferngas Ag ECJ 22-Nov-1978
ECJ 1. The Convention of 27 September 1968 must be interpreted having regard both to its principles and objectives and to its relationship with the treaty. The question whether the words and concepts used in the . .
CitedCriminal proceedings against Lindqvist ECJ 6-Nov-2003
Mrs Lindqvist had set up an internet site for her local parish containing information about some of her colleagues in the parish. She gave names, jobs, hobbies and in one case some of the person’s employment and medical details. The Court decided . .
CitedRe CB (A Child) CA 6-Aug-2015
P was the child of now separated women. P was born in the UK but taken by one parent to Pakistan. The other parent now appealed from refusal of her request for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction or wardship to support her application . .
CitedOrdre des barreaux francophones and Other v Conseil des Minsitres (Conseil des barreaux de l’Union eurpeenne and Ordre des avocats du barreau de Liege, interveners ECJ 26-Jun-2007
Bodies representing lawyers complained that the anti-money laundering Directive infringed their capacity to provide confidential advice to their clients, in turn infringing their right to a fair trial.
Held: The complaint failed. Insofar as . .

Cited by:
See AlsoChild and Family Agency v D (RPD Intervening) ECJ 27-Oct-2016
ECJ Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and in the matters of parental responsibility – . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Jurisdiction, European

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.562188

Re C (Children): CA 14 Apr 2016

‘The issue to be determined is whether there is power in this jurisdiction to prevent a parent with parental responsibility from registering a child with the forename of his or her choice. If the answer to that question is ‘Yes’, the second question (and one which rather unexpectedly requires a detailed consideration of somewhat labyrinthine technicalities) is by what procedural route the court should exercise that power.’

Gloster, King, David Richards LJJ
[2016] EWCA Civ 374
Bailii
England and Wales

Children

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.562148

A v East Sussex County Council and Chief Constable of Sussex Police: CA 2 Jul 2010

A appealed against the dismissal of her claim for damages under the 1998 Act after the defendants had taken action anticipating possible abuse of her baby child. The baby had been returned after the suspicions were allayed. She complained that the respondents had acted under section 46, avoiding the need to test their suspicions at court.
Held: The appeal failed. The judge acted properly on the evidence before him and assessed the evidence on the basis of what the decision makers knew (and reasonably should have known) at the time that they had to make decisions. In the light of heightened public concerns about child protection it is not right to criticise ESCC for taking what with the benefit of hindsight might appear an unduly cautious or even heavy approach. ESCC were entitled to conclude that the exercise of statutory powers was necessary to protect B.
Though it was beyond argument that the respondents should have taken the matter to court, the mother was threatening to take the child home immediately, and the officer had advice from a consultant paediatrician which he could not ignore.
Hedley LJ said: ‘child protection is just that. It is protection from the consequences of perceived risk. There will be cases, as here, where either the risk was incorrectly perceived or did not eventuate. That of itself does not mean that protective measures were wrongly taken. It merely illustrates the price that sometimes has to be paid for having a child protection system and it is unfortunate that it was exacted from this appellant and her son. Nevertheless, because child protection powers can have draconian consequences, it is essential that they are exercised lawfully and proportionately . . child protection only comes at a cost: to an innocent parent who is subject to it based on emergency assessment of risk and to public authorities who have had to account in a judicial setting for their exercise of power. It is, however, a cost that has inevitably to be exacted if the most vulnerable members of our society, dependent children, are to be protected by the state.’ and
‘Even in an emergency it is desirable, where possible, to work in partnership with a parent. Parents can with careful and sympathetic explanation be brought to agree to regimes of supervision, or to the child remaining in hospital or even to voluntary accommodation under Part III of the Act for a brief period. Where parents have access to a solicitor (particularly where, as here, he or she is available), then the solicitor should be apprised of the local authority’s concerns and proposals and then be invited (if the solicitor thinks it proper to do so) to give advice to the parent. Even where emergency powers are obtained under Section 44 or exercised under Section 46, least interventions are best. For example the police have power to prevent a removal from hospital. In the circumstances of this case it would have been surprising had the hospital if pressed refused to keep the child for an extra two days. The removal of the child to a known destination (e.g. a relative) is to be preferred to removal to a stranger. If, however, there is removal to a stranger, the parent should, in the absence of good reason (e.g. abusive or irrational behaviour) be informed of the fact and be allowed to pass relevant information to the carer and speedy arrangements be made for contact. ‘

Carnwath, Jackson LJJ, Hedley J
[2010] EWCA Civ 743, [2011] 1 FCR 116, [2010] Fam Law 924, [2010] 2 FLR 1596
Bailii
Human Rights Act 1998 7, Children Act 1989 46
England and Wales
Citing:
ApprovedIn re X, (Emergency Protection Orders) FD 16-Mar-2006
Within two hours of a case conference which mentioned possible removal of children, but agreed other steps, the local authority applied for an emergency protection order, and forcibly removed the child from the family.
Held: The decision . .
ApprovedX Council v B (Emergency Protection Orders) FD 16-Aug-2004
Munby J reviewed the grant of Emergency Protection Orders, and summarised the applicable law: ‘The matters I have just been considering are so important that it may be convenient if I here summarise the most important points:
(i) An EPO, . .
CitedLangley and others v Liverpool City Council and others CA 11-Oct-2005
Families had challenged the removal of their children into the care of foster parents by the respondents. The family father, who was blind, had taken to driving. The respondents appealed findings that they had acted unlawfully and in breach of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Police

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.420205

In re O and N (Minors); In re B (Minors) (Care: Preliminary hearing): HL 3 Apr 2003

The appeals were from conflicting decisions in care applications where one or other or both parents were guilty of lack of care, but there was no evidence to say which was responsible.
Held: The threshold criteria had been met, and the court must next consider the welfare stage. Inability to identify the perpetrator is not always accompanied by a finding of failure to protect. One appeal was allowed and the other dismissed. In assessing risk the judge at the disposal hearing should have regard, to any failure by the mother to protect the child, that one is the more probable perpetrator, and that the mother might have been the perpetrator. In each case subsequent events were also relevant.
Baroness Hale said: ‘The court must first be satisfied that the harm or likelihood of harm exists. Once that is established, as it was in both the Lancashire and In re O cases, the court has to decide what outcome will be best for the child. It is very much easier to decide upon a solution if the relative responsibility of the child’s carers for the harm which she or another child has suffered can also be established. But the court cannot shut its eyes to the undoubted harm which has been suffered simply because it does not know who was responsible.’

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Millett, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
[2003] UKHL 18, Times 04-Apr-2003, Gazette 12-Jun-2003, [2003] 2 WLR 1075, [2003] 1 FCR 673, [2003] 1 FLR 1169, [2003] Fam Law 464, [2003] 2 All ER 305, [2004] 1 AC 523
House of Lords, Bailii
Children Act 1989 31
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromRe B (Non-accidental injury: compelling medical evidence) CA 2002
A child had died. Care proceedings were begun for the elder child. It was not clear just who had been responsible for the death.
Held: There were two questions. First, who perpetrated the injuries recorded by the experts? The answer to that . .
Appeal fromRe O and N (Care: preliminary hearing) CA 2002
Care proceedings were commenced for one child after the death of a sibling, but without evidence as to which carer was responsible.
Held: It had not been established upon a balance of probabilities that any one or more of the injuries were . .
CitedIn re H and R (Minors) (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) HL 14-Dec-1995
Evidence allowed – Care Application after Abuse
Children had made allegations of serious sexual abuse against their step-father. He was acquitted at trial, but the local authority went ahead with care proceedings. The parents appealed against a finding that a likely risk to the children had still . .
DoubtedLancashire County Council and Another v B and Others; Lancashire County Council v A HL 16-Mar-2000
A seven month old child had been injured, but it was not possible to establish whether this had taken place whilst with her parents or with a child minder. The Council brought care proceedings also for the minder’s own child B.
Held: Even . .
CitedRe B (minors) (Care proceedings: practice) FD 1999
Section 31 and its associated emergency and interim provisions comprise the only court mechanism available to a local authority to protect a child from risk. The interpretation of the ‘attributable’ condition adopted by the House of Lords is . .
CitedRe G (Care proceedings: split trials) CA 2001
In a situation where an application is made for a care order, and the threshold criteria are met, but the court cannot decide which carer is responsible, the preferable interpretation is that in such cases the court is able to proceed at the welfare . .
CitedIn re M and R (Child abuse: Expert Evidence) CA 21-May-1996
On an application for a care order the judge found there was a real possibility that sexual abuse had occurred but the evidence was not sufficient to prove the allegations to the requisite standard. The threshold criteria were met on another ground. . .
CitedIn re R (Care: disclosure: nature of proceedings) FD 2002
In care proceedings, unproved allegations of harm were abandoned, before being rejected by the court. The threshold criteria were satisfied on a different ground, namely, neglect and emotional harm.
Held: As matters stood the local authority . .

Cited by:
Appealed toRe B (Non-accidental injury: compelling medical evidence) CA 2002
A child had died. Care proceedings were begun for the elder child. It was not clear just who had been responsible for the death.
Held: There were two questions. First, who perpetrated the injuries recorded by the experts? The answer to that . .
CitedIn re A (a Child) (Care proceedings: Non-accidental injury) CA 1-Jul-2003
The 11 year old child had been subject to non-accidental injury. The perpetrator could not be identified form among those who had care of him. The Family Court had held the first part of a split trial. The judge had been unable to exclude the . .
CitedIn re K (Children) (Non-accidental injuries: Perpetrator: New Evidence) CA 27-Aug-2004
The children had been taken into care, and freed for adoption. The mother appealed saying the blame for non-accidental injury was misplaced. The court had not thought her responsible for the non-accidental injuries, but she had been unwilling to . .
CitedNorth Yorkshire County Council v SA and others CA 1-Jul-2003
The child was taken to hospital with injuries which the doctors concluded were non-accidental. The identity of the abuser was in doubt.
Held: The court set out to identify the procedures in cases involving suspected non-accidental injuries . .
CitedIn re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening) HL 11-Jun-2008
Balance of probabilities remains standard of proof
There had been cross allegations of abuse within the family, and concerns by the authorities for the children. The judge had been unable to decide whether the child had been shown to be ‘likely to suffer significant harm’ as a consequence. Having . .
CitedLancashire County Council v R (A Minor) and others FD 4-Dec-2008
The local authority sought a care order, alleging serious physical abuse of the child. The mother said that any injuries had been inflicted by the father. The father said that the cause was the mother.
Held: The injuries were not likely to . .
CitedIn re S-B (Children) (Care proceedings: Standard of proof) SC 14-Dec-2009
A child was found to have bruising consistent with physical abuse. Either or both parents might have caused it, but the judge felt it likely that only one had, that he was unable to decide which, and that they were not so serious that he had to say . .
CitedIn re J (Children) SC 20-Feb-2013
The mother had been, whilst in a previous relationship, involved in care proceedings after the death from physical abuse of her baby. Whilst being severely critical of her, the court had been unable to identify the author of the child’s death. Now, . .
CitedIn re J (Children) CA 3-Apr-2012
The mother JJ’s first baby had died after physical abuse inflicted either by her or the father. In care proceedings for a later child, the judge concluded ‘T-L’s injuries could have been inflicted by either, or both, of them. Singling out a likely . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.180417

In re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan): HL 14 Mar 2002

Section 3(1) of the 1998 Act is not available where the suggested interpretation is contrary to express statutory words or is by implication necessarily contradicted by the statute. The judge’s task is to interpret, not to legislate. The proposed ‘starring system’ was inconsistent in an important respect with the scheme of the Children Act 1989, and the proposed system had far-reaching practical ramifications for local authorities.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said: By virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 the right to respect for private and family life which is guaranteed by article 8 of the Convention is now part of a person’s civil rights in domestic law for the purposes of article 6(1). The provisions of the CA 1989 are compliant with the Convention and the Act was framed so as to take account of the Convention.
Lord Nicholls said: ‘a right guaranteed by Article 8 is not in itself a civil right within the meaning of Article 6(1).
Although a right guaranteed by Article 8 is not in itself a civil right within the meaning of Article 6(1), the Human Rights Act has now transformed the position in this country. By virtue of the Human Rights Act Article 8 rights are now part of the civil rights of parents and children for the purposes of Article 6(1). This is because now, under section 6 of the Act, it is unlawful for a public authority to act inconsistently with Article 8 . . the court remedies provided by sections 7 and 8 should ordinarily provide effective relief for an infringement of Article 8 rights.’

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Mackay of Clashfern
[2002] UKHL 10, [2002] 2 AC 291, [2002] 2 All ER 192, [2002] UKHRR 652, [2002] BLGR 251, [2002] HRLR 26, [2002] 1 FLR 815, [2002] 2 WLR 720, [2002] Fam Law 413, [2002] 1 FCR 577
Bailii
Human Rights Act 1998 3, Children Act 1989, European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedAl-Hasan, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 16-Feb-2005
Prisoners were disciplined after refusing to be squat searched, saying that the procedure was humiliating and that there were no reasonable grounds to suspect them of any offence against prison discipline. The officer who had been involved in . .
CitedClingham (formerly C (a minor)) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Regina v Crown Court at Manchester Ex parte McCann and Others HL 17-Oct-2002
The applicants had been made subject of anti-social behaviour orders. They challenged the basis upon which the orders had been made.
Held: The orders had no identifiable consequences which would make the process a criminal one. Civil standards . .
CitedMB, Re, Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB Admn 12-Apr-2006
The applicant challenged the terms of a non-derogating control order. It was anticipated that unless prevented, he would fight against UK forces in Iraq.
Held: The section allowed the Secretary of State to impose any necessary conditions, but . .
CitedWilkinson v Kitzinger and others FD 31-Jul-2006
The parties had gone through a ceremony of marriage in Columbia, being both women. After the relationship failed, the claimant sought a declaration that the witholding of the recognition of same-sex marriages recoginised in a foreign jurisdiction . .
CitedSecretary of State for the Home Department v JN CA 14-May-2008
The Secretary of State appealed against a declaration that paragraph 3(2)(b) of Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the 2004 Act was incompatible with Article 3. The clause was said to restrict the Home Secretary from considering anything beyond the country . .
CitedGC v The Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis SC 18-May-2011
The court was asked to decide from whom DNA samples could lawfully be taken by the Police,and for how long they should be kept. The first respondent now said that a declaration of incompatibility of section 64(1A) could not be avoided.
Held: . .
CitedKing, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice CA 27-Mar-2012
In each case the prisoners challenged their transfer to cellular confinement or segregation within prison or YOI, saying that the transfers infringed their rights under Article 6, saying that domestic law, either in itself or in conjunction with . .
CitedRe D (A Child) CA 26-Mar-2014
F appealed against the removal of his parental responsibility for his son. M and F were not married, but F had been named on the birth certificate. He had later been convicted of sexual assaults against two daughters of M by an earlier relationship. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Human Rights

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.184025

In re A (A Child): SC 12 Dec 2012

A woman, X, had made an allegation in confidence she had been sexually assaulted as a child. The court was asked whether that confidence could be overriden to allow an investigation to protect if necessary a child still living with the man. Evidence suggested that a disclosure of her complaint may cause X further damage.
Held: In the particular circumstances now prevailing, and where there was sufficient support available to X to minimise the risks to her, disclosure was ordered.
‘If we were dealing with the common law principles alone, the answer would be clear. There is an important public interest in preserving the confidence of people who come forward with allegations of child abuse. The system depends upon the public as its eyes and ears. The social workers cannot be everywhere. The public should be encouraged to take an interest in the welfare of the children in their neighbourhoods. It is part of responsible citizenship to do so. And that includes victims of historic child abuse who have information about the risks to which other children may now be exposed.
But many of these informants will not be required to give evidence in order to prove a case, whether in criminal or care proceedings, against the perpetrators of any abuse. Their information will simply trigger an investigation from which other evidence will emerge. Their confidence can be preserved without harming others. In this case, however, that is simply not possible. We do not know whether A is at risk of harm from her father. But we do know of allegations, which some professionals think credible and which would, at the very least, raise the serious possibility of such a risk. Those allegations have to be properly investigated and tested so that A can either be protected from any risk of harm which her father may present to her or can resume her normal relationship with him. That simply cannot be done without disclosing to the parents and to the Children’s Guardian the identity of X and the detail and history of the allegations which she has made. The mother can have no basis for seeking to vary the arrangements for A to have contact with her father unless this is done. If this were an ordinary public interest immunity claim, therefore, there would be no question where the balance of public interest would lie.’

Lord Neuberger, President, Lady Hale, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Reed
[2012] UKSC 60, UKSC 2012/0193, [2012] 3 WLR 1484, [2013] 1 FCR 69, [2013] Fam Law 269, [2013] 2 AC 66, [2013] BLGR 179, [2013] 1 All ER 761, [2012] WLR(D) 378, [2013] HRLR 11
Bailii, SC Summary, SC, Bailii Summary, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedA, Re (Disclosure of Third Party Information) FD 16-Feb-2012
The mother and father disputed contact. It was known that a third party had made a confidential allegation of sexual abuse against the father. Disclosure was sought. The application was resisted on the basis that the woman’s own health would be . .
First AppealIn re X CA 24-Jul-2012
X had made, in confidence, an allegation that she had been abused as a child. The alleged perpetrator was now in another relationship, and with children. X resisted the disclosure of her complaint.
Held: An order was made for disclosure. There . .
Appeal fromIn re J (A Child: Disclosure) CA 21-Sep-2012
X had complained in confidence of an alleged assault by the father of A. Social services had wished to include that disclosure in an investigation of J’s care of A. . .
CitedIn re K (Infants) ChD 1963
Ungoed Thomas J discussed the balance of interests in a wardship case, as it affected disclosure of documents: ‘However, where the paramount purpose is the welfare of the infant, the procedure and rules of evidence should serve and certainly not . .
CitedIn Re K (Infants); Official Solicitor v K HL 2-Jan-1963
The House considered the propriety of a tribunal chairman seeing material not placed before the parties. This was a wardship case.
Held: Where the interests of the parents and the child conflicted, ‘the welfare of the child must dominate’.
CitedConway v Rimmer HL 28-Feb-1968
Crown Privilege for Documents held by the Polie
The plaintiff probationary police constable had been investigated, prosecuted and cleared of an allegation of theft. He now claimed damages for malicious prosecution, and in the course of the action, sought disclosure of five documents, but these . .
CitedD v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children HL 2-Feb-1977
Immunity from disclosure of their identity should be given to those who gave information about neglect or ill treatment of children to a local authority or the NSPCC similar to that which the law allowed to police informers.
Lord Simon of . .
MentionedHerczegfalvy v Austria ECHR 24-Sep-1992
The applicant was detained in an institution for mentally deranged offenders. While so detained he was subjected to the forcible administration of food and neuroleptics and to handcuffing to a security bed. He complained of violation of his Article . .
CitedRe D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality) HL 1-Sep-1995
The House considered whether it was right for a tribunal to see and rely upon papers not disclosed to the parties. Lord Mustill said: ‘a first principle of fairness that each party to a judicial process shall have an opportunity to answer by . .
CitedOsman v The United Kingdom ECHR 28-Oct-1998
Police’s Complete Immunity was Too Wide
(Grand Chamber) A male teacher developed an obsession with a male pupil. He changed his name by deed poll to the pupil’s surname. He was required to teach at another school. The pupil’s family’s property was subjected to numerous acts of vandalism, . .
CitedKudla v Poland ECHR 26-Oct-2000
Just what treatment is sufficiently severe to reach the high threshold required for a violation of article 3 ‘depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its . .
CitedPorter and Weeks v Magill HL 13-Dec-2001
Councillors Liable for Unlawful Purposes Use
The defendant local councillors were accused of having sold rather than let council houses in order to encourage an electorate which would be more likely to be supportive of their political party. They had been advised that the policy would be . .
CitedBerg v IML London Ltd 2002
A judge should recuse himself in a civil case only if, subjectively, he considered that the knowledge he acquired of privileged communications disabled him from fairly continuing with the case or, objectively, a fair-minded and informed observer . .
CitedA Mother v A Father; A Local Authority v A CA 14-Oct-2009
Care proceedings were under way. The mother objected to the disclosure of certain materials to the father, saying that they were extremely sensitive, and would threaten her relationship with him. She appealed against an order allowing it.
CitedJuhnke v Turkey ECHR 13-May-2008
Medical treatment, may well be experienced as degrading by a patient who is subjected to it against his will, but ‘A measure which is therapeutically necessary from the point of view of established principles of medicine cannot in principle be . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Information

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.467052

Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria): FD 2007

Toleration of Diverse Parenting Standards

Hedley J considered the meaning of ‘significant harm’: ‘What about the court’s approach . . to the issue of significant harm? In order to understand this concept and the range of harm that it’s intended to encompass, it is right to begin with issues of policy. Basically it is the tradition of the UK, recognised in law, that children are best brought up within natural families. Lord Templeman, in Re KD (A Minor: Ward) (Termination of Access) [1988] 1 AC 806, [1988] 2 FLR 139, at 812 and 141 respectively, said this: ‘ The best person to bring up a child is the natural parent. It matters not whether the parent is wise or foolish, rich or poor, educated or illiterate, provided the child’s moral and physical health are not in danger. Public authorities cannot improve on nature.’
There are those who may regard that last sentence as controversial but undoubtedly it represents the present state of the law in determining the starting point. It follows inexorably from that, that society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done.
That is not, however, to say that the state has no role, as the 1989 Act fully demonstrates. Nevertheless, the 1989 Act, wide ranging though the court’s and social services’ powers may be, is to be operated in the context of the policy I have sought to describe. Its essence, in Part III of the 1989 Act, is the concept of working in partnership with families who have children in need. Only exceptionally should the state intervene with compulsive powers and then only when a court is satisfied that the significant harm criteria in s 31(2) is made out. Such an approach is clearly consistent with Art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. Article 8(1) declares a right of privacy of family life but it is not an unqualified right. Article 8(2) specifies circumstances in which the state may lawfully infringe that right. In my judgment, Art 8(2) and s 31(2) contemplate the exceptional rather than the commonplace. It would be unwise to a degree to attempt an all embracing definition of significant harm. One never ceases to be surprised at the extent of complication and difficulty that human beings manage to introduce into family life. Significant harm is fact specific and must retain the breadth of meaning that human fallibility may require of it. Moreover, the court recognises, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead pointed out in Re H and others that the threshold may be comparatively low. However, it is clear that it must be something unusual; at least something more than the commonplace human failure or inadequacy.’

Hedley J
[2007] 1 FLR 2050
Children Act 199 31
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedIn Re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) HL 1988
The local authority sought to terminate parental contact with a child taken into care under a wardship.
Held: The court had to consider the human rights of the parent as against the welfare interest of the child. Lord Oliver of Aylmerton said: . .

Cited by:
CitedRe MA and Others (Children) CA 31-Jul-2009
Children appealed against dismissal of their care proceedings on the basis that the threshold had not been reached. The parents resisted.
Held: It could not be said that the decision so plainly wrong that the judge’s conclusion on the facts . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.371673

Principal Reporter v K: SC 15 Dec 2010

The court was asked as to the right of an unmarried father to take part in Children’s hearings under the 1995 Act, and depending on the answer whether the scheme was human rights compliant. K was father of the child, but the mother was unmarried. He applied to the Sheriff’s court for a parental responsibility order. He was not allowed to attend the initial hearings, not being deemed a ‘relevant person’.
Held: The words of section 93(2)(b)(c) should be read to include the additional words: ‘or who appears to have established family life with the child with which the decision of a children’s hearing may interfere’. The appellant was such a person, and the procedure adopted had been unfair in that it had not allowed him opportunity to answer the allegations made.

Lord Hope, Deputy President, Lord Rodger, Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Dyson
[2010] UKSC 56, 2011 Fam LR 2, 2011 SLT 271, [2011] 1 WLR 18, UKSC 2010/0128
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC Summ, SC
Children (Scotland) Act 1995 93(2)(b)(c)
Scotland
Citing:
At Outer HousePrincipal Reporter, Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration, Re Suspension Ad Interim Of an Interlocutor SCS 30-Jun-2009
(Outer House) . .
Appeal fromThe Principal Reporter v JPK and Another SCS 21-Jan-2010
. .

Cited by:
CitedANS and Another v ML SC 11-Jul-2012
The mother opposed adoption proceedings, and argued that the provision in the 2007 Act, allowing a court to dispense with her consent, infringed her rights under Article 8 and was therefore made outwith the powers of the Scottish Parliament.
Children, Human Rights

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.427165

EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: HL 22 Oct 2008

The claimant challenged the respondent’s decision to order the return of herself and her son to Lebanon.
Held: The test for whether a claimant’s rights would be infringed to such an extent as to prevent their return home was a strict one, but in this case, the appeal was allowed, and the decision quashed. The order would infringe the claimant’s human rights. The effect of such a removal would be completely to deny or nullify her right to family life in the destination country. She had lived as a muslim in Lebanon, but if returned, the father of the child would be free to remove him to Saudi Arabia under Lebanese law, and any rights of visitation would be no more than nominal. Lebanon was not a party to the Convention, and therefore was not bound by it, though its family law reflected its own traditions which were themselves respected and observed throughout the world.
Lord Hope said: ‘The mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company is a fundamental element of family life. Under our law non-discrimination is a core principle for the protection of human rights. The fact is however that Shari’a law as it is applied in Lebanon was created by and for men in a male dominated society. The place of the mother in the life of a child under that system is quite different under that law from that which is guaranteed in the Contracting States by article 8 of the Convention read in conjunction with article 14. There is no place in it for equal rights between men and women. It is, as Lord Bingham points out, the product of a religious and cultural tradition that is respected and observed throughout much of the world. But by our standards the system is arbitrary because the law permits of no exceptions to its application, however strong the objections may be on the facts of any given case. It is discriminatory too because it denies women custody of their children after they have reached the age of custodial transfer simply because they are women. That is why the appellant removed her child from that system of law and sought protection against its effects in this country. ‘
Lady Hales said: ‘Separate consideration and separate representation are, however, two different things. Questions may have to be asked about the situation of other family members, especially children, and about their views. It cannot be assumed that the interests of all the family members are identical. In particular, a child is not to be held responsible for the moral failures of either of his parents. Sometimes, further information may be required. If the Child and Family Court Advisory and Support Service or, more probably, the local children’s services authority can be persuaded to help in difficult cases, then so much the better. But in most immigration situations, unlike many ordinary abduction cases, the interests of different family members are unlikely to be in conflict with one another. Separate legal (or other) representation will rarely be called for.’

Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
[2008] UKHL 64, [2008] 3 WLR 931, [2009] HRLR 6, [2009] AC 1198, [2009] 1 FCR 441, [2009] 1 All ER 559, [2009] UKHRR 22, [2008] Fam Law 1190, [2008] 2 FLR 2067
Bailii, Times, HL
European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromEM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept CA 21-Nov-2006
The asylum applicant said that if she was returned to her home country, she would be judged under Sharia law, and would thereby lose custody of her son, and this would deny her her right to family life.
Held: Any such loss would not be . .
CitedRegina v Department of Education and Employment ex parte Begbie CA 20-Aug-1999
A statement made by a politician as to his intentions on a particular matter if elected could not create a legitimate expectation as regards the delivery of the promise after elected, even where the promise would directly affect individuals, and the . .
CitedMamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey ECHR 4-Feb-2005
(Grand Chamber) The applicants had resisted extradition to Uzbekistan from Turkey to stand trial on very serious charges, saying that if returned they would be tortured. There was material to show that that was not a fanciful fear. On application . .
CitedRegina v Special Adjudicator ex parte Ullah; Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 17-Jun-2004
The applicants had had their requests for asylum refused. They complained that if they were removed from the UK, their article 3 rights would be infringed. If they were returned to Pakistan or Vietnam they would be persecuted for their religious . .
CitedDevaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department IAT 2003
The tribunal asked as to the relevance of the possible mistreatment of the applicant if returned to his home country: ‘The reason why flagrant denial or gross violation is to be taken into account is that it is only in such a case – where the right . .
CitedSoering v The United Kingdom ECHR 7-Jul-1989
(Plenary Court) The applicant was held in prison in the UK, pending extradition to the US to face allegations of murder, for which he faced the risk of the death sentence, which would be unlawful in the UK. If extradited, a representation would be . .
CitedRegina v Sectretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Razgar etc HL 17-Jun-2004
The claimant resisted removal after failure of his claim for asylum, saying that this would have serious adverse consequences to his mental health, infringing his rights under article 8. He appealed the respondent’s certificate that his claim was . .
CitedF v United Kingdom ECHR 22-Jun-2004
An Iranian citizen claimed asylum saying that he feared persecution as a homosexual. When his application was rejected, he claimed that there would be a breach of article 8 if he were to be removed to Iran because a law in that country prohibited . .
CitedN v The United Kingdom ECHR 27-May-2008
(Grand Chamber) The appellant was found after her arrival in this country from Uganda to have an AIDS-defining illness for which she was still receiving treatment. She claimed that the treatment would not be available in Uganda and she would die . .
CitedMarckx v Belgium ECHR 13-Jun-1979
Recognition of illegitimate children
The complaint related to the manner in which parents were required to adopt their own illegitimate child in order to increase his rights. Under Belgian law, no legal bond between an unmarried mother and her child results from the mere fact of birth. . .
CitedGul v Switzerland ECHR 19-Feb-1996
A Turkish father, who had been permitted on humanitarian grounds to reside with his wife in Switzerland, failed to establish that, by refusing to allow their seven-year-old son to join them in Switzerland, the state had interfered with respect for . .
CitedChahal v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-1996
Proper Reply Opportunity Required on Deportation
(Grand Chamber) The claimant was an Indian citizen who had been granted indefinite leave to remain in this country but whose activities as a Sikh separatist brought him to the notice of the authorities both in India and here. The Home Secretary of . .
CitedZ and T v United Kingdom ECHR 28-Feb-2006
The applicants were Christian Pakistanis. Their asylum claims having failed, they feared that if returned to Pakistan, they would be persecuted, and asked for their article 9 rights, saying that the flagrant denial test should not be applied, as . .
CitedRe J (A Child), Re (Child returned abroad: Convention Rights); (Custody Rights: Jurisdiction) HL 16-Jun-2005
The parents had married under shariah law. They left the US to return to the father’s home country Saudi Arabia. They parted, and the mother brought their son to England against the father’s wishes and in breach of an agreement. The father sought . .
CitedD v The United Kingdom ECHR 2-May-1997
The applicant, an AIDS sufferer, resisted his removal to St Kitts where lack of medical treatment would hasten his death.
Held: The deportation of a convicted person suffering from Aids to a country with less care facilities was inhuman or . .
CitedMamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v Turkey ECHR 6-Feb-2003
A retrospective complaint of extradition to Uzbekistan was made. The applicants sought to resist their extradition from Turkey to Uzbekistan, saying they would be tortured.
Held: Convention states must comply with orders made by the European . .
CitedMcMichael v United Kingdom ECHR 2-Mar-1995
In the course of care proceedings, medical and social services’ reports were disclosed to the courts, but not to the parents involved.
Held: The courts’ failure to show reports to the parents in care proceedings was a breach of the Convention. . .
CitedJohansen v Norway ECHR 7-Aug-1996
The court had to consider a permanent placement of a child with a view to adoption in oposition to the natural parents’ wishes.
Held: Particular weight should be attached to the best interests of the child, which may override those of the . .
CitedBensaid v The United Kingdom ECHR 6-Feb-2001
The applicant was a schizophrenic and an illegal immigrant. He claimed that his removal to Algeria would deprive him of essential medical treatment and sever ties that he had developed in the UK that were important for his well-being. He claimed . .
CitedAl-Nashif v Bulgaria ECHR 20-Jun-2002
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Preliminary objections dismissed (non-exhaustion, abuse of right of petition); Violation of Art. 5-4; Violation of Art. 8; Violation of Art. 13; Not necessary to . .
CitedChikwamba v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 25-Jun-2008
The appellant had fled Zimbabwe. Though her asylum application was refused, she was not returned for the temporary suspension of such orders to Zimbabwe. In the meantime she married and had a child. She now appealed an order for her removal citing . .
CitedBeokuBetts v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 25-Jun-2008
The appellant had arrived from Sierra Leone and obtained student permits. When they expired he sought asylum, citing his family’s persecution after a coup, and that fact that other members of his family now had indefinite leave, and he said that an . .
CitedGovernment of the United States of America v Barnette and Montgomery (No 2) HL 22-Jul-2004
The applicant sought to resist orders for the return to the US of what were alleged to be the proceeds (direct or indirect) of a fraud committed there. She had been in contempt of the court in the US and was a fugitive here. She complained that the . .

Cited by:
CitedAl-Saadoon and Another, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Defence Admn 19-Dec-2008
The two applicants had been detained by the armed forces in Iraq suspected of murder. They sought release before being transferred to the civilian authorities for trial saying that the trials would not be fair. The respondent denied that the . .
CitedRB (Algeria) and Another v Secretary of State for the Home Department; OO (Jordan) v Same; MT (Algeria) v Same HL 18-Feb-2009
Fairness of SIAC procedures
Each defendant was to be deported for fear of involvement in terrorist activities, but feared that if returned to their home countries, they would be tortured. The respondent had obtained re-assurances from the destination governments that this . .
CitedZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 1-Feb-2011
The respondent had arrived and claimed asylum. Three claims were rejected, two of which were fraudulent. She had two children by a UK citizen, and if deported the result would be (the father being unsuitable) that the children would have to return . .
CitedKapri v The Lord Advocate (Representing The Government of The Republic of Albania) SC 10-Jul-2013
The Court was asked whether it would be compatible with the appellant’s Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 for the appellant, who is an Albanian national, to be extradited to Albania. On 7 April 2001, while he was in . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Human Rights, Children

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.277127

X Council v B (Emergency Protection Orders): FD 16 Aug 2004

Munby J reviewed the grant of Emergency Protection Orders, and summarised the applicable law: ‘The matters I have just been considering are so important that it may be convenient if I here summarise the most important points:
(i) An EPO, summarily removing a child from his parents, is a ‘draconian’ and ‘extremely harsh’ measure, requiring ‘exceptional justification’ and ‘extraordinarily compelling reasons’. Such an order should not be made unless the FPC is satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate and that no other less radical form of order will achieve the essential end of promoting the welfare of the child. Separation is only to be contemplated if immediate separation is essential to secure the child’s safety: ‘imminent danger’ must be ‘actually established’.
(ii) Both the local authority which seeks and the FPC which makes an EPO assume a heavy burden of responsibility. It is important that both the local authority and the FPC approach every application for an EPO with an anxious awareness of the extreme gravity of the relief being sought and a scrupulous regard for the European Convention rights of both the child and the parents.
(iii) Any order must provide for the least interventionist solution consistent with the preservation of the child’s immediate safety.
(iv) If the real purpose of the local authority’s application is to enable it to have the child assessed then consideration should be given to whether that objective cannot equally effectively, and more proportionately, be achieved by an application for, or by the making of, a CAO under s 43 of the Children Act 1989.
(v) No EPO should be made for any longer than is absolutely necessary to protect the child. Where the EPO is made on an ex parte (without notice) application very careful consideration should be given to the need to ensure that the initial order is made for the shortest possible period commensurate with the preservation of the child’s immediate safety.
(vi) The evidence in support of the application for an EPO must be full, detailed, precise and compelling. Unparticularised generalities will not suffice. The sources of hearsay evidence must be identified. Expressions of opinion must be supported by detailed evidence and properly articulated reasoning.
(vii) Save in wholly exceptional cases, parents must be given adequate prior notice of the date, time and place of any application by a local authority for an EPO. They must also be given proper notice of the evidence the local authority is relying upon.
(viii) Where the application for an EPO is made ex parte the local authority must make out a compelling case for applying without first giving the parents notice. An ex parte application will normally be appropriate only if the case is genuinely one of emergency or other great urgency – and even then it should normally be possible to give some kind of albeit informal notice to the parents – or if there are compelling reasons to believe that the child’s welfare will be compromised if the parents are alerted in advance to what is going on.
(ix) The evidential burden on the local authority is even heavier if the application is made ex parte. Those who seek relief ex parte are under a duty to make the fullest and most candid and frank disclosure of all the relevant circumstances known to them. This duty is not confined to the material facts: it extends to all relevant matters, whether of fact or of law.
(x) Section 45(7)(b) of the Children Act 1989 permits the FPC to hear oral evidence. But it is important that those who are not present should nonetheless be able to know what oral evidence and other materials have been put before the FPC. It is, therefore, particularly important that the FPC complies meticulously with the mandatory requirements of rr 20, 21(5) and 21(6) of the Family Proceedings Courts (Children Act 1989) Rules 1991. The FPC must ‘keep a note of the substance of the oral evidence’ and must also record in writing not merely its reasons but also any findings of fact.

(xi) The mere fact that the FPC is under the obligations imposed by rr 21(5), 21(6) and 21(8), is no reason why the local authority should not immediately, on request, inform the parents of exactly what has gone on in their absence. Parents against whom an EPO is made ex parte are entitled to be given, if they ask, proper information as to what happened at the hearing and to be told, if they ask: (i) exactly what documents, bundles or other evidential materials were lodged with the FPC either before or during the course of the hearing; and (ii) what legal authorities were cited to the FPC. The local authority’s legal representatives should respond forthwith to any reasonable request from the parents or their legal representatives either for copies of the materials read by the FPC or for information about what took place at the hearing. It will, therefore, be prudent for those acting for the local authority in such a case to keep a proper note of the proceedings, lest they otherwise find themselves embarrassed by a proper request for information which they are unable to provide.
(xii) Section 44(5)(b) of the Children Act 1989 provides that the local authority may exercise its parental responsibility only in such manner ‘as is reasonably required to safeguard or promote the welfare of the child’. Section 44(5)(a) provides that the local authority shall exercise its power of removal under s 44(4)(b)(i) ‘only . . in order to safeguard the welfare of the child’. The local authority must apply its mind very carefully to whether removal is essential in order to secure the child’s immediate safety. The mere fact that the local authority has obtained an EPO is not of itself enough. The FPC decides whether to make an EPO. But the local authority decides whether to remove. The local authority, even after it has obtained an EPO, is under an obligation to consider less drastic alternatives to emergency removal. Section 44(5) requires a process within the local authority whereby there is a further consideration of the action to be taken after the EPO has been obtained. Though no procedure is specified, it will obviously be prudent for local authorities to have in place procedures to ensure both that the required decision-making actually takes place and that it is appropriately documented.
(xiii) Consistently with the local authority’s positive obligation under Art 8 to take appropriate action to reunite parent and child, s 44(10)(a) and s 44(11)(a) impose on the local authority a mandatory obligation to return a child who it has removed under s 44(4)(b)(i) to the parent from whom the child was removed if ‘it appears to [the local authority] that it is safe for the child to be returned’. This imposes on the local authority a continuing duty to keep the case under review day by day so as to ensure that parent and child are separated for no longer than is necessary to secure the child’s safety. In this, as in other respects, the local authority is under a duty to exercise exceptional diligence.
(xiv) Section 44(13) of the Children Act 1989 requires the local authority, subject only to any direction given by the FPC under s 44(6), to allow a child who is subject to an EPO ‘reasonable contact’ with his parents. Arrangements for contact must be driven by the needs of the family, not stunted by lack of resources.’

Munby J
[2005] 1 FLR 341, [2004] EWHC 2015 (Fam)
Bailii
Children Act 1989 43
England and Wales
Cited by:
AppliedIn re X, (Emergency Protection Orders) FD 16-Mar-2006
Within two hours of a case conference which mentioned possible removal of children, but agreed other steps, the local authority applied for an emergency protection order, and forcibly removed the child from the family.
Held: The decision . .
CitedIslington v Z and others; In the Matter of X and Y twins FD 18-Jul-2007
The court set out to explain how care proceedings had been brought to an end suddenly. The children had been taken into care after one was brought to hospital with injuries received by way of unexplained trauma. It was suggested that the child had . .
CitedLangley and others v Liverpool City Council and others CA 11-Oct-2005
Families had challenged the removal of their children into the care of foster parents by the respondents. The family father, who was blind, had taken to driving. The respondents appealed findings that they had acted unlawfully and in breach of the . .
ApprovedA v East Sussex County Council and Chief Constable of Sussex Police CA 2-Jul-2010
A appealed against the dismissal of her claim for damages under the 1998 Act after the defendants had taken action anticipating possible abuse of her baby child. The baby had been returned after the suspicions were allayed. She complained that the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.241299

In re H and R (Minors) (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof): HL 14 Dec 1995

Evidence allowed – Care Application after Abuse

Children had made allegations of serious sexual abuse against their step-father. He was acquitted at trial, but the local authority went ahead with care proceedings. The parents appealed against a finding that a likely risk to the children had still been been found.
Held: A care order could only to be made if the need was proved on the facts, however strong is the suspicion.
The House considered the matters which, in this context, the court may take into account in assessing whether the child is likely to suffer significant harm. In the context of section 31(2)(a) ‘likely’ does not mean more probable than not. It means a real possibility, a possibility that cannot sensibly be ignored having regard to the nature and gravity of the feared harm in the particular case. This is a comparatively low level of risk.
(Majority) For the purpose of satisfying this threshold level of risk in cases (such as alleged sexual abuse) in which there is a dispute over whether the child has indeed suffered past harm, the court may have regard only to harm proved to the requisite standard to have happened. Otherwise the purpose for which the threshold criteria were prescribed by Parliament could be defeated in a case where the only evidence that the child was likely to suffer harm in the future was an unproved allegation that he had suffered harm in the past. It would be extraordinary if, in respect of the self-same non-proven allegations, the self-same insufficient evidence could nonetheless be regarded as a sufficient factual basis for satisfying the court there is a real possibility of harm in the future.’
The court will require cogent evidence before making a finding of dishonesty: the very gravity of an allegation of fraud is a circumstance which has to be weighed in the scale in deciding as to the balance of probabilities. ‘Where the matters in issue are facts the standard of proof required in non-criminal proceedings is the preponderance of probability, usually referred to as the balance of probability.’
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said: ‘The balance of probability standard means that the court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely than negligence. Deliberate physical injury is usually less likely than accidental physical injury. A stepfather is usually less likely to have repeatedly raped and had non-consensual oral sex with his under age stepdaughter than on some occasion to have lost his temper and slapped her. Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation . .
Although the result is much the same, this does not mean that where a serious allegation is in issue the standard of proof required is higher. It means only that the inherent probability or improbability of an event is itself a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred. The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence it did occur before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be established. Ungoed-Thomas J expressed this neatly in In re Dellow’s Will Trusts [1964] 1 WLR 451,455: ‘The more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required to overcome the unlikelihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it.’
This substantially accords with the approach adopted in authorities such as the well known judgment of Morris LJ of Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 QB 247, 266. This approach also provides a means by which the balance of probabilities standard can accommodate one’s instinctive feeling that even in civil proceedings a court should be more sure before finding serious allegations proved than when deciding less serious or trivial matters. No doubt it is this feeling which prompts judicial comment from time to time that grave issues call for proof to a standard higher than the preponderance of probability.”
Lord Browne-Wilkinson dissenting, said that ‘the facts relevant to an assessment of risk (‘is likely to suffer . . harm’) are not the same as the facts relevant to a decision that harm is in fact being suffered. In order to be satisfied that an event has occurred or is occurring the evidence has to show on balance of probabilities that such event did occur or is occurring. But in order to be satisfied that there is a risk of such an occurrence, the ambit of the relevant facts is in my view wider. The combined effect of a number of factors which suggest that a state of affairs, though not proved to exist, may well exist is the normal basis for the assessment of future risk. To be satisfied of the existence of a risk does not require proof of the occurrence of past historical events but proof of facts which are relevant to the making of a prognosis.’

Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
Independent 17-Jan-1996, [1996] AC 563, [1996] 1 FLR 80, [1995] UKHL 16, [1996] Fam Law 74, [1996] 1 FCR 509, [1996] 2 WLR 8, [1996] 1 All ER 1
Bailii
Children Act 1989 31(2)(a)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHornal v Neuberger Products Ltd CA 1956
Proof Standard for Misrepresentation
The court was asked what was the standard of proof required to establish the tort of misrepresentation, and it contrasted the different standards of proof applicable in civil and criminal cases.
Held: The standard was the balance of . .
CitedIn re Dellow’s Will Trusts; Lloyd’s Bank v Institute of Cancer Research ChD 1964
Husband and wife, having made mutual wills each leaving their estate to the other, had been found dead in their home from coal gas poisoning. The court asked what was required to displace the presumption that the husband, the older of the two, had . .
CitedBlyth v Blyth HL 1966
The House was asked as to the standard of proof required to establish that adultery had been condoned under the subsection.
Held: Lord Denning said: ‘In short it comes to this: so far as the grounds for divorce are concerned, the case, like . .
Appeal fromIn re H and R (Minors) CA 1994
An allegation had been made by a daughter of sexual abuse against her step-father. Despite his acquittal, the local authority went ahead with an application for a care order. The authority now appealed against a finding that it had not established a . .
CitedIn Re W (Minors) (Wardship: Evidence) CA 1990
A wardship was applied for after allegations of sexual abuse. Butler-Sloss LJ said ‘It is not necessary to make a finding of sexual abuse against a named person in order for the judge to assess the risks to the child of returned to that environment. . .
CitedH v H (Minor) (Child Abuse: Evidence); Re H (A Minor); Re K (Minors) (Child Abuse: Evidence) CA 1989
An application was made for a wardship after allegations of child abuse.
Held: The test for evidence of child abuse which is appropriate is the ordinary civil standard of balance of probabilities as applied to the facts of each case.
CitedDavies v Taylor HL 1974
The plaintiff’s husband was killed in a road accident caused by the defendant’s negligence. They were childless. She had deserted him five weeks before his death and thereafter, he learned about her adultery with a fellow employee. He tried to . .
CitedDunning v United Liverpool Hospitals’ Board of Governors CA 1973
Mrs D had been treated at hospital, and sought release of her records to establish whether she had any basis for a claim in negligence. The court considered whether an application under section 31 of the 1970 Act for pre-action discovery had been . .
CitedPreston-Jones v Preston-Jones HL 1951
There are some medical matters of which the court has judicial knowledge, such as the normal period of human gestation. At common law the presumption of legitimacy could only be rebutted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof of adultery in . .
CitedIn re A (A Minor) (Care Proceedings) FD 2-Jan-1993
It was again argued that ‘likely’ meant more probable than not.
Held: The argument was not open to the appellants in the light of Newham London Borough Council. . .
CitedNewham London Borough Council v Attorney-General CA 1993
The court rejected an argument that ‘likely to suffer significant harm’ in the subsection was to be equated with ‘on the balance of probabilities’. . .
CitedIn re Dellow’s Will Trusts; Lloyd’s Bank v Institute of Cancer Research ChD 1964
Ungoed-Thomas J said: ‘The more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required to overcome the unliklihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it.’ . .

Cited by:
CitedIn re O and N (Minors); In re B (Minors) (Care: Preliminary hearing) HL 3-Apr-2003
The appeals were from conflicting decisions in care applications where one or other or both parents were guilty of lack of care, but there was no evidence to say which was responsible.
Held: The threshold criteria had been met, and the court . .
CitedIn re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) CA 10-Jul-2003
An order was sought to protect from publicity a child whose mother faced trial for the murder of his brother. The child was now in care.
Held: The court must balance the need to protect the child with the need for freedom of the press. The . .
CitedIn re A (a Child) (Care proceedings: Non-accidental injury) CA 1-Jul-2003
The 11 year old child had been subject to non-accidental injury. The perpetrator could not be identified form among those who had care of him. The Family Court had held the first part of a split trial. The judge had been unable to exclude the . .
CitedLord, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Admn 1-Sep-2003
The claimant was a category A prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment for murder. He sought the reasons for his categorisation as a Class A prisoner. Unhappy at the disclosure made, he sought information under the 1998 Act. It was argued . .
CitedSadler v The General Medical Council PC 15-Jul-2003
(The Committee on Professional Performance of the GMC) The distinction drawn in Krippendorf between a practitioner’s current competence and past performance was not to be taken too far. The purpose of the assessment was not to punish the . .
CitedThe Chief Constable of Lancashire v Potter Admn 13-Oct-2003
The claimant appealed refusal of an Anti-Social Behaviour order by the magistrates. The respondent was a street prostitute in Preston. The magistrates had declined to aggregate her behaviour with that of others to find that it caused harrassment . .
CitedNiru Battery Manufacturing Company, Bank Sepah Iran v Milestone Trading Limited CA 23-Oct-2003
The claimant had contracted to purchase lead from some of the defendants. There were delays in payment but when funds were made available they should have been repaid. An incorrect bill of lading was presented. The bill certified that the goods had . .
CitedDEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3) CA 28-Jul-2003
The company sought to recover damages from a director who had acted dishonestly, by concealing a financial interest in a different company which had made loans to the claimant company. He replied that the claim was out of time. At first instance the . .
CitedLancashire County Council and Another v B and Others; Lancashire County Council v A HL 16-Mar-2000
A seven month old child had been injured, but it was not possible to establish whether this had taken place whilst with her parents or with a child minder. The Council brought care proceedings also for the minder’s own child B.
Held: Even . .
CitedSmith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers HL 21-Nov-1996
The defendant had made misrepresentations, inducing the claimant to enter into share transactions which he would not otherwise have entered into, and which lost money.
Held: A deceitful wrongdoer is properly liable for all actual damage . .
CitedA Father (Mr A) v A Mother (Mrs A); Their Two Children (B And C) FD 4-Feb-2004
After a divorce, the father sought a joint residence order for the two young children. The mother alleged sexually inappropriate behaviour by the father. The court found this allegation clearly untrue. The dispute was bitter and protracted. . .
CitedIn re LU (A Child); In re LB (A Child) (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof); re U (A Child) (Department for Education and Skills intervening) CA 14-May-2004
In each case, the other parent appealed care orders where she had been found to have injured her children. In each case the sole evidence was the injury to the child’s health and expert medical evidence. The cases were referred following the . .
CitedB v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary QBD 5-Apr-2000
The defendant appealed the making of a sex offender order under 1998 Act. The justices had found that the defendant was a sex offender within section 2(1)(a) and that he had acted on a number of occasions in a way which brought him within section . .
CitedClingham (formerly C (a minor)) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Regina v Crown Court at Manchester Ex parte McCann and Others HL 17-Oct-2002
The applicants had been made subject of anti-social behaviour orders. They challenged the basis upon which the orders had been made.
Held: The orders had no identifiable consequences which would make the process a criminal one. Civil standards . .
AppliedRe ET (Serious Injuries: Standard of Proof) FD 2003
The court heard a care application in which the baby had sustained skull, brain and other injuries alleged to be at the hands of her parents.
Held: The standard of proof was the civil standard of the balance of probabilities and directed . .
CitedA Local Authority v S and W and T By her Guardian FD 27-May-2004
A child had died. The father was accused and acquitted of murder by way of shaken baby syndrome. The local authority persisted with an application for care orders for the other children.
Held: ‘I do not claim to have divined truth. I have . .
CitedBici and Bici v Ministry of Defence QBD 7-Apr-2004
Claimants sought damages for personal injuries incurred when, in Pristina, Kosovo and during a riot, British soldiers on a UN peacekeeping expedition fired on a car.
Held: The incidents occurred in the course of peace-keeping duties. It was . .
CitedNorth Yorkshire County Council v SA and others CA 1-Jul-2003
The child was taken to hospital with injuries which the doctors concluded were non-accidental. The identity of the abuser was in doubt.
Held: The court set out to identify the procedures in cases involving suspected non-accidental injuries . .
CitedParks v Clout CA 10-Jun-2003
The claimant said that the respondent had obtained a grant of letters of administration, and taken a share in the estate, by fraudulently destroying the deceased’s last will. He appealed against his claim being struck out as having no realistic . .
CitedCream Holdings Limited and others v Banerjee and others HL 14-Oct-2004
On her dismissal from the claimant company, Ms Banerjee took confidential papers revealing misconduct to the local newspaper, which published some. The claimant sought an injunction to prevent any further publication. The defendants argued that the . .
DistinguishedRegina (DJ) v Mental Health Review Tribunal; Regina (AN) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region) Admn 11-Apr-2005
Each applicant sought judicial review of the refusal of the tribunal to authorise their release from detention under the 1983 Act, saying that the Tribunal had accepted evidence to a lower standard of proof.
Held: Neither the criminal standard . .
CitedJ v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
CitedRaja v Van Hoogstraten ChD 19-Dec-2005
Damages were claimed after claimant alleged involvement by the defendant in the murder of the deceased. The defendant had been tried and acquitted of murder and manslaughter, but the allegation was now pursued. The defendant had since failed to . .
CitedAttheraces Ltd and Another v British Horse Racing Board and Another ChD 21-Dec-2005
The claimants relayed horse racing events to bookmakers. The respondents collected data about the races and horses. The claimants sought the freedom to use that data, and the defendants asserted a database right to control such use.
Held: BHB . .
CitedAN, Regina (on the Application of) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region) and others CA 21-Dec-2005
The appellant was detained under section 37 of the 1983 Act as a mental patient with a restriction under section 41. He sought his release.
Held: The standard of proof in such applications remained the balance of probabilities, but that . .
CitedRoiter Zucker (A Firm) v Minai QBD 30-Nov-2005
The defendant resisted payment of her solicitors’ fees saying that they had failed in their duty to her not to exchange contracts without having finance in place to complete the purchase. It was alleged that she had tampered with documents produced . .
CitedHenry v British Broadcasting Corporation QBD 9-Mar-2006
The claimant said that the defendant had accused her of falsifying hospital waiting statistics. The defendant pleaded justification.
Held: There were stark differences in the evidence given by different witnesses. Nevertheless the evidence . .
CitedKD v Chief Constable of Hampshire QBD 23-Nov-2005
The claimant’s daughter had made a complaint of rape. She alleged that she was sexually harassed by the investigating police officer, and sought damages also from the defendant, his employer. The officer denied that anything improper or . .
CitedSt Paul Travelers Insurance Co Ltd v Okporuah and others ChD 10-Aug-2006
The first defendant had acquired several properties, and was due to make repayments greatly in excess of his income. A further defendant, his brother, was a solicitor who was known to have been involved in mortgage fraud and was suspected of having . .
CitedB and B v A County Council CA 21-Nov-2006
The claimants sought damages from the defendant local authority after their identities had been wrongfully revealed to the natural parents of the adoptees leading to a claimed campaign of harassment. The adopters has specifically requested that . .
CitedCrystal Palace FC (2000) Ltd v Dowie QBD 14-Jun-2007
The parties had agreed a compromise on the leaving of the defendant as manager. The club now said that the agreement had been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation. He had been released but had said he had not had contact with another London club . .
CitedChester City Council and Another v Arriva Plc and others ChD 15-Jun-2007
The claimant council alleged that the defendant had acted to abuse its dominant market position in the provision of bus services in the city.
Held: It was for the claimant to show that the defendant had a dominant position. It had not done so, . .
CitedMP v Dainty CA 21-Jun-1999
The defendant sought leave to appeal out of time against an award of damages for sexual assault. He had been unable to recover his file of papers from his former solicitors.
Held: The delay had nevertheless been excessive, and the prejudice to . .
CitedBarlow Clowes International Ltd and Others v Henwood CA 23-May-2008
The receiver appealed against an order finding that the debtor petitioner was not domiciled here when the order was made. The debtor had a domicile of origin in England, but later acquired on in the Isle of Man. He then acquired a home in Mauritius . .
CitedIn re D; Doherty, Re (Northern Ireland); Life Sentence Review Commissioners v D HL 11-Jun-2008
The Sentence Review Commissioners had decided not to order the release of the prisoner, who was serving a life sentence. He had been released on licence from a life sentence and then committed further serious sexual offences against under-age girls . .
CitedIn re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening) HL 11-Jun-2008
Balance of probabilities remains standard of proof
There had been cross allegations of abuse within the family, and concerns by the authorities for the children. The judge had been unable to decide whether the child had been shown to be ‘likely to suffer significant harm’ as a consequence. Having . .
CitedBirmingham City Council v Shafi and Another CA 30-Oct-2008
The Council appealed a finding that the court did not have jurisdiction to obtain without notice injunctions to control the behaviour of youths said to be creating a disturbance, including restricting their rights to enter certain parts of the city . .
CitedLancashire County Council v R (A Minor) and others FD 4-Dec-2008
The local authority sought a care order, alleging serious physical abuse of the child. The mother said that any injuries had been inflicted by the father. The father said that the cause was the mother.
Held: The injuries were not likely to . .
CitedWebster (the Parents) v Norfolk County Council and others CA 11-Feb-2009
Four brothers and sisters had been adopted after the parents had been found to have abused them. The parents now had expert evidence that the injuries may have been the result of scurvy, and sought leave to appeal.
Held: Leave was refused. . .
CitedW v Chief Constable of Northumbria Admn 7-Apr-2009
The claimant challenged the decision of the respondent to reveal to his employers details of a conviction in 1987, when he was 15, for sexual assault on a child, and that he was presently on bail pending a decision for a further allegation. He was . .
CitedCheltenham Borough Council v Laird QBD 15-Jun-2009
The council sought damages saying that their former chief executive had not disclosed her history of depressive illness when applying for her job.
Held: The replies were not dishonest as the form could have been misconstrued. The claim failed. . .
CitedRe MA and Others (Children) CA 31-Jul-2009
Children appealed against dismissal of their care proceedings on the basis that the threshold had not been reached. The parents resisted.
Held: It could not be said that the decision so plainly wrong that the judge’s conclusion on the facts . .
CitedIn re S-B (Children) (Care proceedings: Standard of proof) SC 14-Dec-2009
A child was found to have bruising consistent with physical abuse. Either or both parents might have caused it, but the judge felt it likely that only one had, that he was unable to decide which, and that they were not so serious that he had to say . .
CitedThe Solicitor for the Affairs of HM Treasury v Doveton and Another ChD 13-Nov-2008
The claimant requested the revocation of a grant of probate to the defendant. They had suspicions about the will propounded and lodged a caveat which was warned off and the grant completed. In breach of court orders, the defendant had transferred . .
CitedWilson and Another v Grainger ChD 4-Dec-2009
The claimants appealed against a decision of the Adjudicator that they had not acquired a piece of their neighbour’s land by adverse possession, on the basis that their use had been by virtue of an oral licence. The judge had found the occupation to . .
CitedCharles and Others v Fraser ChD 11-Aug-2010
The claimants said that the last will had purported to revoke and earlier but mutual will. They said that the executors should be required to implement the revoked will. The wills had been made by elderly sisters. The wills were in similar terms, . .
CitedCalzaghe v Warren QBD 20-Jan-2010
The claimant boxer had secured judgement for fight fees from a company operated by the respondent manager and promoter. After the judgment the defendant had put the company into administration. The claimant now sought payment from the defendant . .
CitedSharon’s Bakery (Europe) Ltd v Axa Insurance UK Plc and Another ComC 9-Feb-2011
The insurers refused a claim for fire damage alleging that the insured had created a false invoice for use as evidence of title in a separate transaction when seeking finance. . .
CitedThornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd QBD 26-Jul-2011
The claimant alleged defamation and malicious falsehood in an article published and written by the defendants. She complained that she was said to have fabricated an interview with the second defendant for her book. An interview of sorts had now . .
CitedBento v The Chief Constable of Bedfordshire Police QBD 1-Jun-2012
bento_ccbpQBD2012
The claimant had been convicted of the murder of his girlfriend. On his acquittal on appeal, the police criticised the CPS decision not to retry the claimant, in effect, the claimant now said, continuing the accusation against him, and so defaming . .
CitedIn re J (Children) SC 20-Feb-2013
The mother had been, whilst in a previous relationship, involved in care proceedings after the death from physical abuse of her baby. Whilst being severely critical of her, the court had been unable to identify the author of the child’s death. Now, . .
CitedIn re J (Children) CA 3-Apr-2012
The mother JJ’s first baby had died after physical abuse inflicted either by her or the father. In care proceedings for a later child, the judge concluded ‘T-L’s injuries could have been inflicted by either, or both, of them. Singling out a likely . .
CitedBraganza v BP Shipping Ltd and Others CA 22-Mar-2013
The claimant widow sued in negligence after the disappearance overboard of her husband from the respondent’s ship. The court had found insufficient evidence to establish the cause of death, either as to negligence as suggested by the claimant, or as . .
CitedWallis v Bristol Water Plc Admn 10-Dec-2009
The farmer appealed against a conviction uder the 1999 Regulations saying that the fitting to his water supply pipework in a dairy udder wash were not likely to allow backwash so as to risk contamination of the respondent’s water supply. He said . .
CitedAli Haider v Syed ChD 19-Dec-2013
It was alleged that the signature on the deceased’s will was a forgery.
Held: Given the serious nature of the allegation of forgery the legal burden of proving that the signature on the Will was forged rested on the Defendant, and cogent proof . .
CitedBraganza v BP Shipping Ltd SC 18-Mar-2015
The claimant’s husband had been lost from the defendant’s ship at sea. The defendant had contracted to pay compensation unless the loss was by suicide. They so determined. The court was now asked whether that was a permissible conclusion in the . .
CitedWhitmar Publications Ltd v Gamage and Others ChD 4-Jul-2013
Whitmar claimed damages for breach of contract; an account of profits; damages for breach of fiduciary duty and/or for infringement of its Database Rights under the Copyright and Rights in Database Regulations 1997; and for a permanent injunction . .
CitedRe EV (A Child) SC 1-Mar-2017
Appeal from application for permanence order. EV had been in care from her birth. Her parents, each with long standing learning difficulties opposed the order.
Held: The Court allowed the parents’ appeals. The meeting of the threshold test was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Litigation Practice

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.85792

Re B (A Child): SC 3 Feb 2016

Habitual Residence of Child not lost

(Orse In re B (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening)) The Court considered the notion of habitual residence. The British girl with same sex parents had been taken to Pakistan, and her mother here sought her return. The other mother said that she was no longer habitually resident in the UK. The questions was, the girl having gone with the mother’s settled intention of making her home in Pakistan, did the child lose her habitual residence here upon leaving.
Held: The child remained habitually resident here (Lord Clarke and Lord Sumption dissenting). The court considered the two main principles, that a child should not be left without an habitual residence, and that the UK interpretation of the concept should be aligned with the international one. Here, however, a third principle was in play, the consideration of how and when a child may lose (or change) her habitual residence. UK law had taken it to depend largely on parental intention.
The presence of a child within a particular jurisdiction was no longer sufficient to determine habitual residence. The greater a child’s involvement in a particular society, the greater should be the need for matters to confirm any change in habitual residence.

Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Toulson
[2016] UKSC 4, [2016] WLR(D) 52, [2016] AC 606, [2016] 1 FLR 561, [2016] Fam Law 298, [2016] 2 WLR 557, [2016] 2 FCR 307, UKSC 2015/0214
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary
England and Wales
Citing:
At First InstanceRe B (A Child) FD 31-Jul-2014
The child had been taken to Pakistan by one of the now separated parents. Not knowing that P had been so taken, the other mother applied for an order to help her find her, and for contact. Having learnt that the respondent had taken her to Pakistan, . .
CitedRe CB (A Child) CA 6-Aug-2015
P was the child of now separated women. P was born in the UK but taken by one parent to Pakistan. The other parent now appealed from refusal of her request for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction or wardship to support her application . .
CitedIn re J (a Minor) (Abduction: Custody rights) HL 1-Jul-1990
On 21 March 1990 the mother removed the child, aged two, from Australia, where he had been habitually resident, to England with the intention of permanently residing here. She did so without the knowledge of the father who also resided in Australia . .
CitedRe F (A Minor) (Child Abduction) CA 1992
The family had moved to Australia from England. Within weeks the father moved out of the house at the mother’s suggestion. The father took the child to England on 10 July. Johnson J had held at first instance that by 21 May the family were . .
Citedin Re M (Abduction: Habitual Residence) CA 1996
The court accepted a proposition that one parent with parental responsibility could not achieve a change in the child’s habitual residence without the consent of the other parent with parental responsibility. . .
CitedA (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) ECJ 2-Apr-2009
ECJ Judicial co-operation in civil matters – Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility – Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 . .
CitedMercredi v Richard Chaffe (Area of Freedom, Security And Justice) ECJ 22-Dec-2010
ECJ Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 – Matrimonial matters and parental responsibility – Child whose parents are not married – Concept of ‘habitual residence’ of an infant – . .
CitedIn re LC (Children) SC 15-Jan-2014
The test for determining whether a child was habitually resident in a place is whether there was some degree of integration by her (or him) in a social and family environment there, may the court, in making that determination in relation to an . .
CitedAR v RN (Scotland) SC 22-May-2015
The court was asked whether it should order the return to France of two little girls who have been living with their mother in Scotland since July 2013. The issue arose under article 3 of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of . .
CitedRe CB (A Child) CA 6-Aug-2015
P was the child of now separated women. P was born in the UK but taken by one parent to Pakistan. The other parent now appealed from refusal of her request for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction or wardship to support her application . .

Cited by:
CitedM (Children : Habitual Residence : 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention) CA 25-Aug-2020
F sought the return of his children to Germany. They had lived there, but brought to the UK by M with F’s consent. She stayed for a year, and the court now considered where was their habitual residence. The judge considered that they had not lost . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.559504

L v M, Interveners R, K: ECJ 12 Nov 2014

ECJ Judgment – Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility – Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 – Article 12(3) – Child whose parents are not married – Prorogation of jurisdiction – No other related proceedings pending – Acceptance of jurisdiction – Challenge to the jurisdiction of a court by a party who has made an application to that court

M Ilesic P
C-656/13, [2014] EUECJ C-656/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2364, [2014] WLR(D) 480, [2015] 1 FAM 173, [2015] CEC 498, [2015] ILPr 9, [2015] 2 FLR 169, [2015] Fam Law 31, [2015] 2 WLR 801, [2015] 1 FCR 149, [2015] All ER (EC) 188
Bailii, WLRD
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 1293)
European

Children

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.538762

In Re K (Infants); Official Solicitor v K: HL 2 Jan 1963

The House considered the propriety of a tribunal chairman seeing material not placed before the parties. This was a wardship case.
Held: Where the interests of the parents and the child conflicted, ‘the welfare of the child must dominate’.
Lord Devlin spoke of ‘the fundamental principle of justice that the judge should not look at material that the parties before him have not seen’.
Referring to ‘the ordinary principles of a judicial inquiry’, he continued: ‘They include the rules that all justice shall be done openly and that it shall be done only after a fair hearing; and also the rule that is in point here, namely, that judgment shall be given only upon evidence that is made known to all parties. Some of these principles are so fundamental that they must be observed by everyone who is acting judicially, whether he is sitting in a court of law or not; and these are called the principles of natural justice. The rule in point here is undoubtedly one of those.’ and ‘[w]here the judge sits purely as an arbiter and relies on the parties for information, the parties have a correlative right that he should act only on information which they have had the opportunity of testing. Where the judge is not sitting purely, or primarily, as an arbiter, but is charged with the paramount duty of protecting one outside the conflict, a rule that is designed for just arbitrament cannot in all circumstances prevail.’

Lord Devlin
[1965] AC 201, [1963] 3 All ER 191
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal fromIn Re K (Infants) CA 2-Jan-1963
The court discussed the need for those appearing before tribunals to be given sufficient access to all the material placed before the judge. Upjohn LJ said: ‘It seems to be fundamental to any judicial inquiry that a person or other properly . .
At first Instance (Dicta approved)In re K (Infants) ChD 1963
Ungoed Thomas J discussed the balance of interests in a wardship case, as it affected disclosure of documents: ‘However, where the paramount purpose is the welfare of the infant, the procedure and rules of evidence should serve and certainly not . .

Cited by:
CitedRoberts v Parole Board HL 7-Jul-2005
Balancing Rights of Prisoner and Society
The appellant had been convicted of the murder of three police officers in 1966. His tariff of thirty years had now long expired. He complained that material put before the Parole Board reviewing has case had not been disclosed to him.
Held: . .
CitedIn re W (Children) (Family proceedings: Evidence) (Abuse: Oral Evidence) SC 3-Mar-2010
The court considered the approach to be taken when considering whether to order a child’s attendance at court in care proceedings. It was argued that the starting point of assuming that a child should not attend, failed to respect the human right to . .
CitedAl Rawi and Others v The Security Service and Others CA 4-May-2010
Each claimant had been captured and mistreated by the US government, and claimed the involvement in and responsibility for that mistreatment by the respondents. The court was asked whether a court in England and Wales, in the absence of statutory . .
CitedChief Constable and Another v YK and Others FD 6-Oct-2010
cc_ykFD10
The court gave directions in Forced Marriage Protection order applications. An order had been made at the request of the police on behalf of A, and the court had declined to discharge it on A’s own application.
Held: Special advocates were not . .
CitedIn re A (A Child) SC 12-Dec-2012
A woman, X, had made an allegation in confidence she had been sexually assaulted as a child. The court was asked whether that confidence could be overriden to allow an investigation to protect if necessary a child still living with the man. Evidence . .
CitedA v British Broadcasting Corporation (Scotland) SC 8-May-2014
Anonymised Party to Proceedings
The BBC challenged an order made by the Court of Session in judicial review proceedings, permitting the applicant review to delete his name and address and substituting letters of the alphabet, in the exercise (or, as the BBC argues, purported . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Administrative, Natural Justice

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.228359

In re MR (A Child): FD 7 May 2013

MR, now 18 months, had sustained life threatening injuries when only a month old. The court was now asked to complete the care proceedings. The mother asked the court to consider rehabilitation of contact. It was the father who was found guilty of assault.
Held: The application was rejected. The mother showed no sign of acknowledging any responsibility for the events through her inaction. The child had also reacted very negatively to attempts to restore contact, and ‘I see no basis for concluding that any further assessment of the mother is necessary and even although the effect of so deciding will be to extinguish the only remaining chance for KH of being rehabilitated with MR. His overwhelming and pressing need now is to be placed within an adoptive home where he is able to feel secure, settled and protected from harm. He is fortunate indeed to have had an excellent experience of being looked after by loving and nurturing foster parents who have been attuned to his every need. As the result, the chances of him making a good attachment to adoptive parents are seen as high.’

Pauffley J
[2013] EWHC 1156 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Children

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.510087

C (A Child), Re: Misc 11 May 2012

Romford County Court – C, a girl aged 10 and a half wished to be baptised a christian. Her Jewish parents, were now separated, and her father had converted. The mother refused, and all four grandparents opposed. The father said that C was a bright girl, well ahead in maturity. The mother accepted that the family had not been practising Jews. Cafcass had proposed a delay until C matured.
Held: C had genuinely expressed her own wishes and feelings and that they were entitled to proper respect. The court’s powerswere limited to a possible prohibition on her ather taking positive steps toward a baptism. On consideration of all the evidence there was no purpose in delay. C was to be allowed to enrol for baptism classes, and be accepted if appropriate.

Platt J
[2012] EW Misc 15 (CC)
Bailii
Children Act 1989 8
Citing:
CitedETS v BT; in re T (A child); In Re L (a child) (internal relocation: shared residence order CA 28-Jan-2009
The mother appealed against a residence order granting the father equal time with the child, saying that she wished to move away.
Held: Wall LJ examined the authorities.
Wall LJ P said: ‘In twenty years time it will not matter a row of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.510053

AAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd: CA 20 May 2013

An order had been sought for the claimant child for damages after publication by the defendant of details of her identity and that of her politician father. She now appealed against refusal of her claim for damages for publication of private information.
Held: The appeals were dismissed. The judge had correctly recognised that (i) the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to her paternity, (ii) respect for this expectation was in her best interests and (iii) considerable weight was to be attached to her best interests, but the particular circumstances of the case had changed the normal balance. The mother had herself been incautious, and ambivalent as to disclosing the information to members of the media she did not know at a social event.The judge’s assessment was unassailable, and she had correctly balanced the parties’ respective article 8 and 10 rights
Dyson MR, Tomlinson, Ryder LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 554
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8 10
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 1-Feb-2011
The respondent had arrived and claimed asylum. Three claims were rejected, two of which were fraudulent. She had two children by a UK citizen, and if deported the result would be (the father being unsuitable) that the children would have to return . .
CitedJIH v News Group Newspapers Ltd CA 31-Jan-2011
Principles on Request for Anonymity Order
The defendant appealed against an order granting the anonymisation of the proceeedings.
Held: The critical question is whether there is sufficient general public interest in publishing a report of proceedings which identifies a party by name, . .
CitedLord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd CA 3-Apr-2007
The appellant sought to restrict publication by the defendants in the Mail on Sunday of matters which he said were a breach of confidence. He had lied to a court in giving evidence, whilst at the same time being ready to trash the reputation of his . .
CitedETK v News Group Newspapers Ltd CA 19-Apr-2011
The claimant appealed against refusal of an injunction to restrain the defendant newspaper from publishing his name in connection with a forthcoming article. The claimant had had an affair with a co-worker. Both were married. The relationship ended, . .
CitedMurray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd; Murray v Express Newspapers CA 7-May-2008
The claimant, a famous writer, complained on behalf of her infant son that he had been photographed in a public street with her, and that the photograph had later been published in a national newspaper. She appealed an order striking out her claim . .
Appeal fromAAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 25-Jul-2012
The claimant child sought damages and an injunction from and against the defendant newspapers, alleging harassment and breach of her privacy. At times there had been as many as ten reporters encamped outside her house. . .
First Instance CostsAAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd QBD 31-Jul-2012
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.509982

Re (A Child): CA 16 May 2013

Appeal by the mother (M) of a 4 yr old child, S, against an order concerning S’s contact with her father (F). M also wishes to appeal against a number of ‘findings’ made against her by the judge in the course of his judgment that day. She wants those findings set aside.
Mummery, Patten, Black LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 543
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.509307

Vojnity v Hungary: ECHR 12 Feb 2013

ECHR Article 14
Discrimination
Total removal of applicant’s access rights on account of his attempts to transmit his religious beliefs to his child: violation
Facts – The applicant belonged to the religious denomination Hit Gyulekezete (Congregation of the Faith). In 2000 he divorced and his son, who was born in 1994, was placed with the mother. The applicant was granted access. He twice applied without success for custody or an order varying his rights of access. In 2006 the domestic courts withdrew custody from the mother and placed the boy with his older brother. It refused to give custody to the applicant after noting a comment in an expert psychologist’s report that the applicant held unrealistic educational ideas hallmarked by religious fanaticism which rendered him unfit to provide the boy with a normal upbringing. Ultimately, in 2008, the courts removed the applicant’s access rights altogether, on the grounds that he had abused them by imposing his religious convictions on his son.
Law – Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8: The decision to deprive the applicant of access rights in respect of his son had constituted an interference with his right to respect for family life. When deciding on the applicant’s suitability to contribute to his son’s development, the domestic authorities had added to their consideration the factor – that had evidently been decisive – of the applicant’s religious convictions and its possible effects on the child. The applicant’s religious convictions had thus had a direct bearing on the outcome of the matter in issue and there had been a difference of treatment between the applicant and other parents in an analogous situation. The aim pursued, namely the protection of the child’s health and rights, was legitimate. However, the rights to respect for family life and religious freedom as enshrined in Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention, together with the right to respect for parents’ philosophical and religious convictions in education, as provided in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, conveyed on parents the right to communicate and promote their religious convictions in their children’s upbringing. That would be an uncontested right in the case of two married parents sharing the same religious ideas or worldview and promoting them to their child, even in an insistent or overbearing manner, unless it exposed them to dangerous practices or physical or psychological harm. The Court saw no reason why the position of a separated or divorced parent who did not have custody of his or her child should be different per se. In the instant case there was no evidence that the applicant’s religious convictions involved dangerous practices or exposed his son to physical or psychological harm. No convincing evidence had been presented to substantiate a risk of actual harm, as opposed to the mere unease, discomfort or embarrassment which the child might have experienced on account of his father’s attempts to transmit his religious beliefs. The expert had not examined the applicant, nor had his suggestion that the applicant should be examined by a psychiatrist been followed up. The Government had not demonstrated the presence of exceptional circumstances which could justify a measure as radical as the total severance of contact between the applicant and his son. The domestic courts had decided to apply an absolute ban on the applicant’s access rights without giving any consideration to the question whether the mere suspension of access for a certain period of time or any other less severe measure that existed under Hungarian law (such as the exercise of access rights in controlled circumstances) would have sufficed to allow the child to regain his emotional balance. For the Court, the approach adopted by the authorities had amounted to a complete disregard of the principle of proportionality that was requisite in this field and inherent in the spirit of the Convention. Consequently, the applicant had been discriminated against on the basis of his religious convictions in the exercise of his right to respect for family life.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 12,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
29617/07 – Legal Summary, [2013] ECHR 426
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 14

Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.509230

A, Regina (on The Application of) v Cardiff County Council and Others: Admn 7 Mar 2011

The claimant pursued an application for permission to apply for judicial review against the Secretary of State. He had entered unlawfully, and been held in immigration detention, but said that as a child at the time, he should not have bee detained.
Held: Blake J dismissed the application describing the appellant’s argument as intermingling matters of policy with the requirements of the statutory regime for detention. Paragraph 16 permitted the detention of children if the statutory conditions were met, but there were strong policy reasons against such detention unless it was necessary in all the circumstances. He continued: ‘Insofar as the applicant relies upon policy, then in my judgment the application of policy depends upon the assessment of facts made by the decision maker at the material time. At the time this applicant was detained the Secretary of State knew that Hampshire had assessed him to be over 18 in an assessment which they claimed was Merton-compliant. Secondly he knew that the immigration judge, acting on all material available to him in February 2010, had reached a similar conclusion not entirely dependant upon the approach of Hampshire. Thirdly, no discrete submissions had been made to the Secretary of State as to why the immigration judge and/or Hampshire assessment was wrong in fact.’
He held that in the circumstances the Secretary of State had no reason to have reached a conclusion contrary to that of the other authorities.
Blake J
[2011] EWHC 1216 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
At first instanceAA, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 10-Jul-2013
The issue on this appeal is the effect of section 55 on the legality of the appellant’s detention under paragraph 16 over a period of 13 days. At the time of the detention the Secretary of State acted in the mistaken but reasonable belief that he . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 October 2021; Ref: scu.512265

Maumousseau and Washington v France: ECHR 6 Dec 2007

The child’s mother (M) complained that the effective operation of the Hague Convention, in ordering the return of the applicant’s daughter to her habitual residence in the United States, M having taken her to France for the holidays and refused to return her afterwards, was in breach of their article 8 rights.
Held: The claim failed. The positive obligation to reunite parents with their children had to be interpreted in the light of the requirements of the Hague Convention and the UNCRC. In deciding whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the decisive issue was ‘whether a fair balance between the competing interests at stake – those of the child, of the two parents, and of public order – was struck’. Several aspects were involved in the primary consideration of the best interests of the child: for example, ‘to guarantee that the child develops in a sound environment and that a parent cannot take measures that would harm its health and development; secondly, to maintain its ties with its family, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit’. The concept of the child’s ‘best interests’ was also a primary consideration in the context of the Hague Convention procedures. The Court accepted entirely the philosophy underlying the Hague Convention. It did not agree that the domestic courts’ interpretation of article 13b was necessarily incompatible with the notion of the child’s best interests. There was ‘no automatic or mechanical application of a child’s return’ once the Hague Convention was invoked, because of the exceptions ‘based on objective considerations concerning the actual person of the child and its environment’.
39388/05, [2007] ECHR 1204, (2010) 51 EHRR 35
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Cited by:
CitedRe E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) SC 10-Jun-2011
Two children were born in Norway to a British mother (M) and Norwegian father (F). Having lived in Norway, M brought them to England to stay, but without F’s knowledge or consent. M replied to his application for their return that the children would . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 October 2021; Ref: scu.440729

R, Regina (on The Application of) v London Borough of Croydon: Admn 14 Jun 2011

The Claimant, R, challenged the determination of his age by the Defendant, the London Borough of Croydon. R was an asylum seeker originally from Afghanistan. He claimed presently to be a child aged 17. R was unaware of his exact date of birth but said he was born in the Afghan year 1372. The Afghan year runs from March to March. The year 1372 is equivalent to 1993/94 so R’s case was that he was born on a date between 21 March 1993 and 20 March 1994.
Kenneth Parker J
[2011] EWHC 1473 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 26 October 2021; Ref: scu.440865

B v B (Residence: Imposition of conditions): CA 28 May 2004

The court was asked whether it had jurisdiction to hear applications with regard to a child removed from Scotland. The father lived in Scotland, and the mother and child in England. The child had been habitually resident in Scotland and removed to England without the father’s consent. The father sought transfer of the proceedings to Scotland.
Held: The county court had not had jurisdiction. However the child had lived for more than a year in England before the mother began proceedings. All the section did was to deem a child to be resident in the country from which he had been taken for a period of one year. It was wrong to suggest that the proceedings once tainted with unlawfulness must continue to be so. The father’s appeal was rejected.
Otherwise In re B (Court’s Jurisdiction)
Lady Justice Arden DBE and Lord Justice Wall
[2004] EWCA Civ 681, Times 07-Jul-2004, [2004] 2 FLR 741
Bailii
Family Law Act 1996, Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedHadkinson v Hadkinson CA 1952
The courts adopt an approach similar to that of the United States courts where there has been a significant contempt on the part of a party to litigation. Denning LJ said: ‘Those cases seem to me to point the way to the modern rule. It is a strong . .
CitedM v M (Abduction: England and Scotland) CA 1997
A couple went to live in Scotland with their children. The father was Scottish: the mother English. The mother left the family home and took the children to England without the father’s knowledge, and obtained an ex-parte residence order and a . .
CitedIsaacs v Robertson PC 13-Jun-1984
(St Vincent and The Grenadines) Where the point at issue before the Board was as to a point of procedure with no direct comparable provision in UK law, the Board of the Privy Council should be reluctant to depart from the interpretation set down by . .
CitedJohnson v Walton 1990
There was a continuing obligation to obey a court order until it was discharged. . .

Cited by:
CitedMajera, Regina (on The Application of v Secretary of State for The Home Department SC 20-Oct-2021
The Court was asked whether the Government (or, indeed, anyone else) can lawfully act in a manner which is inconsistent with an order of a judge which is defective, without first applying for, and obtaining, the variation or setting aside of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 October 2021; Ref: scu.197803

Re A (A Child): FD 16 Oct 2020

The mother seeks an order for the summary return of A to the jurisdiction of Italy pursuant to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (‘the 1980 Hague Convention’). Her case is that A was wrongfully removed from Italy to England by (or on behalf of) the father on or about 16 October 2019.
[2020] EWHC 2784 (Fam)
Bailii
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
England and Wales

Updated: 25 October 2021; Ref: scu.656327

Re X (Female Genital Mutilation Protection Order No 2): FD 24 Jul 2019

Application made by a local authority for a protection order when a British mother expressed her concern over the attitude towards FGM in Egypt ahead of a proposed trip there with young daughter to reunite with father.
Cobb J
[2019] EWHC 1990 (Fam), [2019] 4 WLR 114,, [2020] 1 FLR 470, [2019] WLR(D) 442
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales

Updated: 25 October 2021; Ref: scu.648653

Regina (on the Application of J) v London Borough of Enfield and Another: Admn 4 Mar 2002

The mother and child were destitute, and sought to oblige the local authority to provide accommodation and support.
Held: The duty to a child under the section could not be extended to include a duty to accommodate and support the child and his or her mother. Section 2 of the 2000 Act might be of assistance, being drafted in broad terms to provide new powers for local authorities, including the power to assist in these circumstances. A local authority had power under the 2000 Act to provide an immigrant from Ghana whose status had not yet been determined with financial assistance for acquiring accommodation if this was the only way to avoid a breach of the applicant’s Article 8 rights. The facts of that case were that, if the immigrant was not assisted to acquire accommodation, it would be necessary to take her child into care. It was common ground that this would violate her Article 8(1) rights. Where a Convention right would be infringed if a local authority concluded that it was not open to it to exercise a particular power which it had, but that the infringement could be avoided by exercising some other power which it had, the power to exercise that other power becomes a duty to exercise it.
Justice Elias
Times 18-Apr-2002, [2002] EWHC 432 (Admin), [2002] 5 CCLR 434, [2002] 2 FLR 1
Bailii
Children Act 1989 17, Local Government Act 2000 2, European Convention on Human Rights A8
England and Wales
Citing:
AppliedRegina (A) v Lambeth London Borough Council CA 5-Nov-2001
The provisions requiring local authorities to look to the welfare of children within their area was a general one, and was not enforceable to secure the interests of individual children. It was not the case that a ‘target’ duty crystallised into an . .
CitedRegina (A) v Lambeth London Borough Council QBD 25-May-2001
The duty imposed by section 17 of the Act on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children is a general duty only, and is not capable of being enforced for the benefit of a particular child by way of judicial review. As a so . .

Cited by:
CitedK v London Borough of Lambeth CA 31-Jul-2003
The claimant appealed against refusal of judicial review. She had entered the UK, and applied for asylum. She was then found to have contracted a marriage of convenience, and thus become ineligible for support. She appealed and now sought housing . .
CitedAnufrijeva and Another v London Borough of Southwark CA 16-Oct-2003
The various claimants sought damages for established breaches of their human rights involving breaches of statutory duty by way of maladministration. Does the state have a duty to provide support so as to avoid a threat to the family life of the . .
CitedMorris, Regina (on the Application of) v Westminster City Council and Another Admn 7-Oct-2004
The applicant questioned the compatibility of s185 of the 1996 Act with Human Rights law. The family sought emergency housing. The child of the family, found to be in priority housing need, was subject also to immigration control. Though the matter . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 October 2021; Ref: scu.168730

Auditor Curle’s Case: 1572

The grant of the office of one of the auditors of the Court of Wards to two and the survivor of them is good. The stat. 32 H. 8. c. 46, makes the auditors one officer.
The words et alterius eorum diutius viventis in the grant are material ; for if an office be granted to two for their lives (withoutmore) by the death of one of them the grant will be void. But by these words the survivor remains one of the persons to whom another shall be added ; and, till another is added, the judicial voice of the survivor is suspended.
The nomination of auditors of the Court of Wards must be under the Great Seal.
This office is partly ministerial and partly judicial, and cannot be granted in reversion; for it is by Act of Parliament so entire, that the ministerial part cannot be divided from the judicial.
A grant of the King of this office in reversion, to begin after a former grant of the same office in reversion, and which grant is recited in the last made grant, is not good, – first, as being a grant in reversion ; and, secondly, because it recites a void grant as one that is good. Cit. acc 6 Price 135.
[1572] EngR 20, (1572-1616) 11 Co Rep 2, (1572) 77 ER 1147
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 October 2021; Ref: scu.431987

In re W (A Child); AW v SW: CA 30 Oct 2008

The father sought leave to appeal against an order made on his application for contact. The mother appeared to have encouraged great hostility in the children toward the father. The court had decided that the children were aroaching ages when they would make their own decisions.
Held: Leave was refused. The judge’s decision had been a discretionary one. The judge ‘knew the case well, and recognised that she had reached the end of the road. There is no evidence that she made any error of law in the exercise of her discretion, and the factors she weighed in the balance are all, in my judgment, appropriate. Furthermore, it seems to me that although tersely expressed, the reasons for her decision are sufficient, and adequately explained.’
Wall LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1181
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRe M (Threshold Criteria: Parental Concessions) CA 1999
In care proceedings the court is not constrained to take the shortest route to an uncontested disposal. Though, the court identified as a general principle ‘there should be no unnecessary litigation in the courts’. . .
CitedOxfordshire County Council v DP and others; By his children’s guardian FD 20-Jul-2005
In an application for a care order, McFarlane J, after listing a number of authorities, identified nine factors which needed to be borne in mind before deciding whether or not to conduct a fact-finding hearing. They were:- (1) the interests of the . .
CitedIn re T (a Child) (Contact: Alienation: Permission to Appeal) CA 24-Oct-2002
After a judgment the parties sought to appeal.
Held: The judge had failed to make a finding on a critical issue in the case, namely whether or not the mother of the child concerned had ‘even if prompted only at a subconscious level, . .
CitedIn re M-M (A Child) CA 16-May-2007
There had been an unexplained injury to the child. A doctor who had been instructed to advise on whether or not a child suffered from osteogenesis imperfecta recommended an expensive test to confirm his diagnosis. The judge refused to order the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 October 2021; Ref: scu.277359

Wyndham v Lord Ennismore: 23 Feb 1837

It appearing that an infant ward of the Court had been sent abroad in consequence of the advice of medical men that the infant’s removal to a milder climate was necessary for his health, the Court granted a reference to approve of a plan for the infant’s maintenance and education out of the jurisdiction, but limited the allowance
to be made to one year.
[1837] EngR 535, (1837) 1 Keen 467, (1837) 48 ER 386
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 October 2021; Ref: scu.313652

A Local Authority v The Mother and Others: FD 11 May 2020

‘The canard of secrecy has bedevilled the family justice system in the past. The significant strides towards transparency in recent years have not yet entirely changed the public perception. There is, in my view, an understandable concern amongst the public and members of the press that failings by public bodies, particularly on the scale I identified, should not be concealed in any way. For many the importance of scrutinising such failings in a fully transparent way transcends the need to protect the privacy of vulnerable children. There are two fundamental rights engaged here, freedom of speech and children’s privacy as a facet of their family life. When evaluating where the balance lies between these two competing rights and interests it is important, to my mind, that judges of the Family Court do not allow ourselves to remain magnetically attracted to the welfare principle (i.e. that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration). To do so distorts the relevant balancing exercise.’
[2020] EWHC 1162 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 19 October 2021; Ref: scu.655237

Re X (Non-Accidental Injury: Expert Evidence): FD 11 Apr 2001

A child had been injured, and the local authority sought a care order. An expert witness for the parents had argued that the child may have suffered a condition of Temporary Brittle Bone Disease (TBBD).
Held: Though the parents had been convicted before a criminal court, there had been no finding of fact relevant to the current application. The expert evidence was quite unsatisfactory. TBBD is not recognised as a condition, and the expert’s evidence was so tendentious as to call into question the validity of his claim to be an expert witness. The burden of proof of abuse lay upon the local authority but on the balance of probability. Though the injury could be safely ascribed to neither parent the threshold criteria had been reached and directions were given for further hearings.
Singer J
[2001] EWHC Fam 1, [2001] 2 FLR 90, [2001] EWHC Fam 6, [2001] Fam Law 497
Bailii, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedRe AB (Child Abuse: Expert Witnesses) FD 1995
. .
CitedRe R (A Minor) (Expert’s Evidence) FD 1991
The court gave guidance on the principles to be followed by experts providing evidence in children cases. . .

Cited by:
CitedKent County Council v The Mother, The Father, B (By Her Children’s Guardian); Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) FD 19-Mar-2004
The council had taken the applicant’s children into care alleging that the mother had harmed them. In the light of the subsequent cases casting doubt on such findings, the mother sought the return of her children. She applied now that the hearings . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.163054

Article 39, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Education: Admn 7 Aug 2020

Challenge to the lawfulness of the 2020 Regulations which amend a series of regulatory protections in respect of children social care services. The Claimant is a children’s rights charity whose aims are the promotion and protection of children living in institutional settings.
Mrs Justice Lieven DBE
[2020] EWHC 2184 (Admin)
Bailii
Adoption and Children (Coronavirus) Amendment Regulations 2020
England and Wales

Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.653049

Re Z (Children): CA 6 Apr 2009

Application by the mother of three children for permission to appeal against an order for unsupervised contact by their father to the two youngest of the children.
Held: Granted. H’s counsel went to see the judge to obtain from him an indication of the nature of his views in relation to the allegations made by the mother: ‘I do not wish to say more about this than is strictly necessary, but in my judgment the days for such private consultations between the judge and counsel are long over. I simply do not see how such discussions can properly survive the Human Rights Act and, equally, I do not think it right or appropriate — even if, as is undoubtedly the case, counsel obtained instructions to go and see the judge — that they should have done so. In my judgment, in cases involving children everything should be done in court and should be on the record. There should not be private discussions between the judge and counsel, particularly, as in this case, it appears that the judge gave an indication, although he went on to hear the case, that the allegations made by the mother did not, in his mind, amount to very much.’
Lord Justice Wall
[2009] EWCA Civ 430, [2009] 3 FCR 80, [2009] Fam Law 662, [2009] 2 FLR 877
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.346795

Re A (Family Proceedings: Expert Witnesses): FD 6 Feb 2001

Wall J
[2001] EWHC Fam 7, (2001) 151 NLJ 224, [2001] 1 FLR 723, (2001) 98(16) LSG 32
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedAM v Local Authority and Another; Re B-M (Care Orders) CA 16-Mar-2009
The father sought leave to appeal against care orders made in respect of his three children. The family were Pakistani Pathan muslims. There had been disputes and violence within the extended family. One family member sought protection but was now . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 14 October 2021; Ref: scu.263380

Norfolk County Council v Webster and others: FD 17 Nov 2006

There had been care proceedings following allegations of physical child abuse. There had been a residential assessment. The professionals accepted the parents’ commitment to their son, but also found that they were unreliable. It was recommended that he return to the parents for further assessment, but the parents now asserted that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, and made applications to assist them in explaining the injuries.
Held: The court made an order requiring the preparation of a further report. Having allowed the professional media access to the court hearings, it was necessary also to allow them access to appropriate papers upon which the discussion in court were founded. The court refused to engage in any exercise which might limit the scope of discussions either by the media or by the parents, however ‘parents in this situation may have to be prepared to take the rough with the smooth. If they want to put some parts of the case into the public domain, then they may have to accept that other – to them less appealing – parts of the case are also put into the public domain.’
Munby J
[2006] EWHC 2898 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 1146
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See AlsoRe a Minor CC 21-May-2004
(Norfolk County Court) . .
See AlsoNorfolk County Council v Webster CC 24-Nov-2004
(Norwich County Court) . .
See AlsoNorfolk County Council v Webster and others FD 1-Nov-2006
The claimants wished to claim that they were victims of a miscarriage of justice in the way the Council had dealt with care proceedings. They sought that the proceedings should be reported without the children being identified.
Held: A judge . .
CitedRex v Shipley; Rex v Dean of St Asaph 1784
Tasks of Jury and Judge in Defamation Trial
In an action for defamation it is the jury’s task to decide whether the words were published and whether they are true. It is for the judge to decide whether the words are libellous. Lord Mansfield said: ‘The liberty of the press consists in . .
CitedKent County Council v The Mother, The Father, B (By Her Children’s Guardian); Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) FD 19-Mar-2004
The council had taken the applicant’s children into care alleging that the mother had harmed them. In the light of the subsequent cases casting doubt on such findings, the mother sought the return of her children. She applied now that the hearings . .
CitedRe Angela Roddy (a child) (identification: restriction on publication), Torbay Borough Council v News Group Newspapers FD 2-Dec-2003
A twelve year old girl had become pregnant. The Catholic Church was said to have paid her not to have an abortion. After the birth she and her baby were taken into care. The authority proposed the adoption of the baby. There was more publicity. . .
CitedBritish Broadcasting Corporation v Kelly FD 9-Aug-2000
The interview for television of a child ward of court who had gone to live with members of a religious sect was not necessarily a contempt of court. There are three groups of ways in which a ward’s interests can be protected. First where the . .

Cited by:
CitedG, Regina (on the Application of) v Nottingham City Council Admn 1-Feb-2008
The respondent authority had removed the child from the mother at birth but without first obtaining any court authority. The court had made a peremptory order for the return of the child. The court explained its actions.
Held: Neither social . .
CitedIn re F (A Child) (Placement Order); C v East Sussex County Council (Adoption) CA 1-May-2008
The father sought to revoke a freeing order. He said that the social workers had conspired to exclude him from the process. The child was born of a casual relationship, and at first he was unaware of the proceedings. On learning of them he sought to . .
CitedWebster (the Parents) v Norfolk County Council and others CA 11-Feb-2009
Four brothers and sisters had been adopted after the parents had been found to have abused them. The parents now had expert evidence that the injuries may have been the result of scurvy, and sought leave to appeal.
Held: Leave was refused. . .
CitedDoctor A and Others v Ward and Another FD 8-Jan-2010
Parents wished to publicise the way care proceedings had been handled, naming the doctors, social workers and experts some of whom had been criticised. Their names had been shown as initials so far, and interim contra mundum orders had been made . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 October 2021; Ref: scu.246079

Bournemouth Borough Council v PS and Another: CoP 11 Jun 2015

The court was asked to decide (i) whether the package of care provided to BS was in his best interests; (ii) whether that package amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the terms of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950; and (iii) what contact Ben should have to his mother, the first respondent.
Mostyn J
[2015] EWCOP 39
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 5
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.548026

Re B (Children): CA 13 Aug 2021

Appeal against an order which refused the mother’s application for permission to dispense with the requirement for the local authority to give notice of the proceedings to ‘S’, the biological father of B
[2021] EWCA Civ 1221
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 10 October 2021; Ref: scu.666602

A Local Authority v Mother and Others: FD 5 May 2020

Decision as to whether to proceed with the lay evidence in this case remotely or whether to adjourn the case having heard the medical evidence. I have heard five days of medical evidence remotely through the Zoom platform and, as is explained in more detail below, I adjourned the trial at that point to hear submissions as to whether the hearing should continue with evidence from the parents and other lay witnesses via Zoom. An issue then arose as to the Father’s mental health and, ultimately he asked for an adjournment on the grounds of ill-health rather than specifically the remote hearing aspect of the case.
Lieven J
[2020] EWHC 1086 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 10 October 2021; Ref: scu.655236

T and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department: Admn 21 Dec 2010

The court was asked whether an unaccompanied minor not having a relevant family member legally present in any European Union Member State, comes to the United Kingdom and claims asylum having previously claimed asylum in another Member State, was liable to be removed under Article 6 of Council Regulation EC 343/2003 (‘Dublin II’) to the Member State where the an unaccompanied minor first lodged his or her application?
Davis J
[2010] EWHC 3572 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 08 October 2021; Ref: scu.443599