Claim for judicial review in respect of the Defendant’s award of a contract for the provision of focus group and communications support services without public notice or competition, relying on Regulation 32(2)(c) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015.
Mrs Justice O’Farrell DBE
[2021] EWHC 1569 (TCC)
Bailii, Judiciary
England and Wales
Updated: 11 June 2021; Ref: scu.663164
[2007] EWHC 1 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates plc HL 31-Oct-1984
The House was asked whether the 1971 Act permitted the relevant authorities, by resort to their development plans, to support the retention of traditional industries or was the ambit of the Act such as to permit only ‘land use’ aims to be pursued? . .
Cited by:
Appeal from – First Secretary of State and Another v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd CA 2-Nov-2007
. .
These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.247679
The claimant challenged a refusal by the Authority to provide medical care of the sort requested.
Held: Lord Bingham said: ‘I have no doubt that in a perfect world any treatment which a patient, or a patient’s family, sought would be provided if doctors were willing to give it, no matter how much it costs, particularly when a life was potentially at stake. It would however, in my view, be shutting one’s eyes to the real world if the court were to proceed on the basis that we do live in such a world. It is common knowledge that health authorities of all kinds are constantly pressed to make ends meet. They cannot pay their nurses as much as they would like; they cannot provide all the treatments they would like; they cannot purchase all the extremely expensive medical equipment they would like; they cannot carry out all the research they would like; they cannot build all the hospitals and specialist units they would like. Difficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients. That is not a judgment which the court can make. In my judgment, it is not something that a health authority such as this authority can be fairly criticised for not advancing before the court.’
Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Stephen Brown P, Simon Brown LJ
[1995] EWCA Civ 49, [1995] Fam Law 480, [1995] 6 Med LR 250, [1995] 1 FLR 1056, [1995] 2 FCR 485, [1995] 2 All ER 129, [1995] COD 407, [1995] 1 WLR 898
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – AC v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust, Equality and Human Rights Commissions intervening Admn 25-May-2010
ac_berkshireAdmn10
The claimant, a male to female transsexual, challenged a decision by the respondent to refuse breast augmentation treatment. The Trust had a policy ‘GRS is a Low Priority treatment due to the limited evidence of clinical effectiveness and is not . .
Cited – Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James SC 30-Oct-2013
The hospital where a gravely ill man had been treated had asked for a declaration that it would be in his best interests to withhold certain life-sustaining treatments from him. When can it be in the best interests of a living patient to withhold . .
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Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.416729
The House considered the availability of orders against the Crown in Scotland. It is inconceivable that Parliament should have intended to fetter the right of the subject to obtain a prohibitory order more strictly in Scotland than in England. The general purpose of the Act was ‘to make it easier rather than more difficult for a subject to sue the Crown’,
References: 1989 SC 65, 1989 SC HL 60
Judges: Lord Jauncey
Statutes: Crown Proceedings Act 1947 21
Jurisdiction: Scotland
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Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.194095
(High Court of Australia) ‘In our opinion, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales was correct in Tasker v Fullwood in criticising the continued use of the ‘elusive distinction between directory and mandatory requirements’ and the division of directory acts into those which have substantially complied with a statutory command and those which have not They are classifications that have outlived their usefulness because they deflect attention from the real issue which is whether an act done in breach of the legislative provision is invalid. The classification of a statutory provision as mandatory or directory records a result which has been reached on other grounds. The classification is the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. That being so, a court, determining the validity of an act done in breach of a statutory provision, may easily focus on the wrong factors if it asks itself whether compliance with the provision is mandatory or directory and, if directory, whether there has been substantial compliance with the provision. A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid. This has been the preferred approach of courts in this country in recent years, particularly in New South Wales. In determining the question of purpose, regard must be had to ‘the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute.”
References: (1998) 194 CLR 355, [1998] HCA 28, (1998) 153 ALR 490, (1998) 72 ALJR 841, (1998) 8 Legal Rep 41
Links: Austlii
Judges: McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
Jurisdiction: Australia
This case is cited by:
These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.228958
References: [2002] EWCA Civ 1472
Links: Bailii
Judges: Potter LJ
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.178092
An objection was made that an inquiry was ultra vires.
Held: Since the cost of the inquiry would have been wholly wasted if, thereafter, the Minister and Parliament had approved the scheme only to be told at that late stage that the scheme was ultra vires, the courts could examine the issue. Where some administrative order or regulation is required by statute to be approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament, the court can in an appropriate case intervene by way of judicial review before the Houses have given their approval.
Younger LJ said: ‘the interference of the Court in such a case as this, and at this stage, so far from being even in the most diluted sense of the words a challenge to its supremacy, will be an assistance to Parliament.’
Lord Atkin observed at a very early stage in the development of public law that he knew of ‘no authority which compels me to hold that a proceeding cannot be a judicial proceeding subject to prohibition or certiorari because it is subject to confirmation or approval, even where the approval has to be that of the Houses of Parliament.’
References: [1924] 1 KB 171
Judges: Younger LJ, Lord Atkin
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:
(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 09 August 2020; Ref: scu.258760
References: [1898] 1 QB 802
Ratio: To obtain an order of mandamus, the applicant must show that he has a sufficient interest.
Last Update: 12 March 2019
Ref: 258764
References: [2012] NIQB 75
Links: Bailii
Ratio: Application by chair of Inquiry for production of Hospital’s medical notes without the direct consent of the patients.
Held: The order was made.
Jurisdiction: Northern Ireland
Last Update: 01-Dec-16
Ref: 466477
References: (1985) 60 ALJR 113, (1985) 159 CLR 550, [1985] HCA 81
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane JJ
Ratio:(High Court of Australia) Immigration and Aliens – Deportation – Power of Minister – Principles of natural justice – Whether applicable – Standing as Australian citizen of infant daughter of aliens – Intended deportation order – Whether notice required – Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss. 6, 6A, 7, 18.
Administrative Law – Decision – Natural justice – Procedural fairness – Order for deportation of aliens – Review of decision – Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss. 5, 13.
The court described the essence of procedural fairness. Mason J said: ‘In this respect the expression ‘procedural fairness’ more aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case. The statutory power must be exercised fairly, that is, in accordance with procedures that are fair to the individual considered in the light of the statutory requirements, the interests of the individual and the interests and purposes, whether public or private, which the statute seeks to advance or protect or permits to be taken into account as legitimate considerations . .’
Brennan J stated: ‘a person whose interests are likely to be affected by an exercise of power must be given an opportunity to deal with relevant matters adverse to his interests which the repository of the power proposes to take into account in deciding upon its exercise; . . the person whose interests are likely to be affected does not have to given an opportunity to comment on every adverse piece of information, irrespective of its credibility, relevance or significance . . nevertheless in the ordinary case where no problem of confidentiality arises an opportunity should be given to deal with adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant to the decision to be made. It is not sufficient for the repository of the power to endeavour to shut information of that kind out of his mind and to reach a decision without reference to it. Information of that kind creates a real risk of prejudice, albeit unconscious, and it is unfair to deny a person whose interests are likely to be affected by the decision an opportunity to deal with the information . .’
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Last Update: 13-Jul-16
Ref: 222098
References: [1999] EWCA Civ 3010, [2000] 1 WLR 354, [1999] 3 All ER 231, [2000] Imm AR 10, [1999] INLR 241
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Woolf MR
Ratio:An appellant failed to use the prescribed form for his appeal, contrary to the Immigration Appeals (Procedure) Rules. There had not been substantial compliance with the Rules, although the irregularity had been waived by the Tribunal. In any event the irregularity could have been cured by the Tribunal under the Rules.
Held: The application for leave to appeal was not to be treated as a nullity.
Lord Woolf MR said: ‘I suggest that the right approach is to regard the question of whether a requirement is directory or mandatory as only at most a first step. In the majority of cases there are other questions which have to be asked which are more likely to be of greater assistance than the application of the mandatory/directory test: The questions which are likely to arise are as follows:
(a) Is the statutory requirement fulfilled if there has been substantial compliance with the requirement and, if so, has there been substantial compliance in the case in issue even though there has not been strict compliance? (The substantial compliance question.)
(b) Is the non-compliance capable of being waived, and if so, has it, or can it and should it be waived in this particular case? (The discretionary question.) I treat the grant of an extension of time for compliance as a waiver.
(c) If it is not capable of being waived or is not waived then what is the consequence of the non-compliance? (The consequences question.)
Which questions arise will depend upon the facts of the case and the nature of the particular requirement. The advantage of focusing on these questions is that they should avoid the unjust and unintended consequences which can flow from an approach solely dependent on dividing requirements into mandatory ones, which oust jurisdiction, or directory, which do not. If the result of non-compliance goes to jurisdiction it will be said jurisdiction cannot be conferred where it does not otherwise exist by consent or waiver.’
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Last Update: 05-Jun-16
Ref: 248202
References: [1851] EngR 722, (1851) 3 Mac & G 453, (1851) 42 ER 335
Links: Commonlii
Ratio A railway company was constituted in 1846 for the purpose of making a railway from A. to B., with a diverging line to C. In June 1851 the line of railway from A. to B. was nearly completed, but no steps had been taken to construct the diverging line, An information was then filed by the Attorney-General, at the relation of certain parties claiming to be interested in the diverging line, to restrain the company from opening the line from A. to B, except with the intention of oompleting also the diverging line. Held, upon demurrer, that the neglect by the company to complete the whole line could not be regarded in the light of a public injury so as to warrant the interference of the Attorney General.
Last Update: 01-Jun-16
Ref: 297038
References: Times 15-May-2001, 36337/97, 35974/97, (2002) 34 EHRR 529, [2001] 2 FLR 261, [2001] ECHR 295, [1999] ECHR 179
Links: Bailii, Bailii
Ratio The procedures in English law which provided for privacy for proceedings involving children did not in general infringe the human right to family life, nor the right to a public hearing. Where relatives more distant than immediate parties were affected, the rules allowed application for their admission to the proceedings, and leave could also be sought to disclose the results of the proceedings to named parties. Custody and contact disputes were prime examples of situations where exclusion of the press and public could be justified to protect the interests of the child and parties to the case: ‘such proceedings are prime examples of cases where the exclusion of the press and public may be justified in order to protect the privacy of the child and parties and to avoid prejudicing the interests of justice. To enable the deciding judge to gain as full and accurate a picture as possible of the advantages and disadvantages of the various residence and contact options open to the child, it is essential that the parents and other witnesses feel able to express themselves candidly on highly personal issues without fear of public curiosity or comment . . to pronounce the judgment in public would, to a large extent, frustrate these aims.’ Parties were expected to be candid and open about events, and that would be threatened if proceedings were held in public.
Statutes: European Convention on Human Rights 6.1
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(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 17-May-16
Ref: 166087
References: Times 15-Dec-2001, [2001] EWHC Admin 1085, [2001] EWCA Civ 2015, [2002] IRLR 297
Links: Bailii, Bailii
Coram: Lord Justice Schiemann, Lord Justice Clarke, And, Mr. Justice Wall
The applicant sought to challenge a decision suspending him from authorisation to act as a financial adviser. He was alleged to have sought to affect the Index of share values in order that his company should not be liable under certain options. He said the decision was in effect a criminal decision.
Held: It was not a criminal charge. Applying the principles set out in Human Rights case law, the proceedings were not sufficiently serious to take the case to that point. Nevertheless some aspects of the right to a fair trial might apply under article 6. The appellant knew the basis of the allegation against him, and decisions made by him as to the conduct of his defence made the question of free legal representation irrelevant. Because the charge was not criminal evidence obtained under compulsion was admissible.
Schiemann LJ said: ‘It is common ground between the parties, and we are content to accept, that the Disciplinary Tribunal was involved in the determination of M Fleurose’s civil rights for the purposes of Article 6. Therefore clearly the proceedings had to be fair. We accept for present purposes, as did the judge, that it was for the SFA to prove their case, that the SFA had to inform M Fleurose in good time of the nature of the charges, that he must have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence, a proper opportunity to give and call evidence and question those witnesses called against him. What fairness requires will vary from case to case and manifestly the gravity and complexity of the charges and of the defence will impact on what fairness requires. In this context we have born in mind, as did the judge, the points made by the Human Rights Court in Paragraphs 30 and 39 of Albert & Le Compte v Belgium, and in paragraphs 32 and 33 of Dombo Beheer BV v The Netherlands [1993] 18 EHRR 213.’
Statutes: European Convention on Human Rights Art 6
This case cites:
This case is cited by:
Last Update: 01-Oct-15 Ref: 167307
References: Times 31-Jan-1992
Coram: Pill J
The applicant sought to challenge the decision of the local authority to terminate his stallholder’s licence. The parties had agreed that a sufficient element of public law was involved to give the court jurisdiction to review the decision.
Held: It was not open to the parties to create jursidiction for the court. No sufficient element of public law was involved and a review was refused.
This case is cited by:
References: (1998) 194 CLR 355, [1998] HCA 28, (1998) 153 ALR 490, (1998) 72 ALJR 841, (1998) 8 Legal Rep 41
Links: Austlii
Coram: McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
(High Court of Australia) ‘In our opinion, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales was correct in Tasker v Fullwood in criticising the continued use of the ‘elusive distinction between directory and mandatory requirements’ and the division of directory acts into those which have substantially complied with a statutory command and those which have not They are classifications that have outlived their usefulness because they deflect attention from the real issue which is whether an act done in breach of the legislative provision is invalid. The classification of a statutory provision as mandatory or directory records a result which has been reached on other grounds. The classification is the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. That being so, a court, determining the validity of an act done in breach of a statutory provision, may easily focus on the wrong factors if it asks itself whether compliance with the provision is mandatory or directory and, if directory, whether there has been substantial compliance with the provision. A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid. This has been the preferred approach of courts in this country in recent years, particularly in New South Wales. In determining the question of purpose, regard must be had to ‘the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute.”
This case is cited by:
References: [2014] EWFC 33
Links: Bailii, Jud
Coram: Sir James Munby P FD
The applicant’s father had been adopted. Both he and the adopting parents had since died. The applicant now sought disclosure of the records to reveal her the court record of her father’s adoption order.
Held: The order should be made.
Statutes: Adoption and Children Act 2002 79(4)
This case cites:
References: PC/02/2006
Links: swarb.co.uk, statewatch
Coram: Sir Harry Ognall C, Boswell QC, Catchpole QC
The Mujaheddin-e-Khalq had been proscribed under the 2000 Act by the respondent. It now appealed against such proscription.
Held: The organisation had in the past used terrorist methods, but had repeatedly now renounced the use of violence. The proscription could not be upheld.
Sir Harry Ognall said: ‘We have reached the clear conclusion that the Secretary of State had reasonable grounds for believing that the PMOI was responsible for the attacks listed and, more importantly, to conclude that the PMOI had carried out many attacks over an extended period of time and that the examples set out in Mr Fender’s witness statement demonstrated the range and severity of the terrorist activities in which the PMOI had historically been involved.’ However, there had been a significant change in the MeK’s activities dating from June 2001 onwards, and that the MeK could no longer be said to be concerned with terrorism within the meaning of section 3 of the Terrorism Act.’
Statutes: Terrorism Act 2000 3(3)(b)
This case is cited by:
References: [2014] UKUT B8 (TCC)
Links: Bailii
UTTC PENSIONS REGULATOR – contribution notices – procedure – disclosure whether Applicant obliged to maintain legal professional privilege over documents passed to him by liquidator of sponsoring employer – no because employer dissolved – whether documents concerned not privileged as falling within the iniquity principle – no – disclosure permitted
References: Gazette 19-Jan-1994, Times 27-Oct-1993, Independent 26-Oct-1993, [1994] 1 WLR 621
Parliamentary Commissioners decisions are reviewable, but range of the discretion given to him by the Act is very wide, and his decisions will only rarely be susceptible to review. He is answerable to Parliament.
Statutes: Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967
This case is cited by:
References: [1767] EngR 55, (1767) 3 Bro CC 646, (1767) 29 ER 743
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Lord Camden LC
Ratio Review was sought of a decree pronounced some thirty or forty years before. The defect was apparent on the face of the record.
Held: The review was barred by the length of time elapsed.
Ratio Lord Camden LC applied the doctrine of laches, saying: ‘A Court of Equity has always refused its aid to stale demands, where a party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this Court into activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the Court is passive, and does nothing.’ Equity would not countenance laches beyond the period for which a legal remedy had been limited by statute, and that where the legal right had been barred, the equitable right to the same thing was also barred: ”Expedit reipublicae ut sit finis litium’, is a maxim that has prevailed in this court at all times, without the help of parliament.
But, as the Court has no legislative authority, it could not properly define the time of bar, by a positive rule, to an hour, a minute, or a year; it was governed by circumstances.
But as often as parliament had limited the time of actions and remedies, to a certain period, in legal proceedings, a Court in Chancery adopted that rule, and applied to similar cases in equity.
For when the Legislature had fixed the time at law, it would have been preposterous for equity (which, by its own proper authority, always maintained a limitation), to countenance laches beyond the period, that law had been confined to by parliament.
And therefore in all cases where the legal right has been barred by parliament, the equitable right to the same thing has been concluded by the same bar.’
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Last Update: 25-Mar-16
Ref: 374834