Tag: Family

James Fairie v James Watson: HL 19 Feb 1770

Conquest – Approbate and Reprobate.-
In a marriage contract, the husband had conveyed the whole lands and heritages that he might conquest or acquire during the marriage, one half to themselves in conjunct fee and liferent, and to the children of the marriage in fee; whom failing, to his wife’s own nearest heirs. And in case of his dying without children, and his wife surviving him, then in that case disponing to her 100 merks, in full of all she, or her next of kin could claim: Held, in an action by her next of kin, for one half of the conquest after her death, that she could not approbate and reprobate the same deed by accepting the 100 merks, and also claiming the conquest; and that the house purchased during the marriage was not conquest, it appearing to have been purchased with funds at his disposal at the commencement of the marriage, and not with funds acquired by him subsequent thereto, and during the subsistence thereof.

[1770] UKHL 2 – Paton – 213
Bailii
Scotland

Family

Updated: 13 January 2022; Ref: scu.561662

Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath: CA 28 Oct 1999

The claimant and her husband had been married at a Sikh temple, and lived together for many years before his death. The temple had not been accredited for marriages, and the Secretary of State resisted payment of benefits to the claimant as a widow, saying that she had not been married.
Held: The claimant’s appeal succeeded. There was nothing to make the marriage void, and there was a presumption of a valid marriage where the parties had gone through a ceremony and had lived together on that basis. The fact discovered many years later that the ceremony was defective would not mean that the couple were not married. This was supported by old common law rules. The validity of a marriage should be upheld wherever possible: ‘there is nothing to suggest that the Sikh marriage ceremony and the consequences thereof in the eyes of the Sikh religious authorities was other than such a voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. In my view that ‘marriage’ is validated by the common law presumption from long cohabitation, in pursuance of the policy of the law that, in the absence of the clearest possible reason why there should not be such a presumption, a ceremony of ‘marriage’ bona fide entered by parties who thereafter who live monogamously and bring up children of the union should be respected and accorded the proper legal status of marriage. ‘

Times 28-Oct-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 3008
Bailii, Bailii
Marriage Act 1949
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Sastry Velaider Aronegary v Sembecutty Vaigalie 1881
There had been ceremony of marriage which was prima facie valid. There was therefore a presumption of marriage. . .
Cited – Bibi v Chief Adjudication Officer CA 25-Jun-1997
A widow from a polygamous marriage is not entitled to the widowed mother’s allowance, despite the payment of national insurance contributions by the deceased father. There must have been a valid English marriage, according to the lex loci. . .
Cited – Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee 20-Mar-1866
A marriage contracted in a country where polygamy is lawful, between a man and a woman who profess a faith which allows polygamy, is not a, marriage as understood in Christendom; and although it is a valid marriage by the lex loci, and at the time . .
Cited – Re Green, Noyes v Pitkin 1909
There had been a foreign marriage ceremony. The court applied the presumption of marriage from long cohabitation without ceremony. . .
Cited – Re Shephard, George v Thyer 1904
The parties gave evidence that the only ceremony of marriage through which they went took place in France. The case was argued and decided on the basis, accepted by the learned judge, that expert evidence showed that the ceremony could not have been . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Benefits

Updated: 13 January 2022; Ref: scu.79037

William Morison, of Preston Grange, Esq; v Sir William Scott of Thirlestayn, William Nisbet of Dirleton, and John Scott of Harden, A Minor, By His Guardian: HL 19 Feb 1720

Husband and Wife – A bond, with a clause of annualrent is granted blank in the creditor’s name, but delivered to a wife, during the subsistence of her marriage: the husband entails his real estate on the grantor of the bond, and also conveys to him all his personal estate, but was not privy to said bond; in a competition between the executor of the husband, and the executor of the wife, the husband’s executor is preferred to said bond: and the wife’s executor is ordered to refund what had been paid to her, in her widowhood.
General Disposition – A general disposition of a man’s personal estate, made in favour of one who had, without the husband’s knowledge, granted a bond to the wife did not release this bond.

[1720] UKHL Robertson – 269, (1720) Robertson 269
Bailii
Scotland

Family, Trusts

Updated: 05 January 2022; Ref: scu.553641

Matouskova: ECJ 6 Oct 2015

Judgment – Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and in the matters of parental responsibility – Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 – Article 1(1)(b) – Substantive scope – Inheritance settlement agreement between the surviving spouse and minor children represented by a guardian ad litem – Classification – Requirement for approval of such an agreement by the court – Measure relating to parental responsibility or measure relating to succession

C-404/14, [2015] EUECJ C-404/14
Bailii
European

Children, Family, Wills and Probate

Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.553099

Oliari And Others v Italy (LS): ECHR 21 Jul 2015

ECHR Article 8
Positive obligations
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Respect for private life
Lack of legal recognition of same-sex partnerships: violation
Facts – The applicants are three couples living in stable same-sex relationships who were not allowed to publish marriage banns because the Italian Civil Code provided that the spouses had to be of the opposite sex. Following an appeal by the first couple, the appeal court made a referral to the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of the relevant legislation. In April 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicants’ constitutional challenge inadmissible, after finding that the right to marriage, as guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, did not extend to homosexual unions and was intended to refer to marriage in its traditional sense. At the same time, that Constitutional Court pointed out that it was for the Parliament to regulate, in time and by the means and limits set by law, the juridical recognition of the rights and duties pertaining to same-sex couples. The appeal was consequently dismissed.
Law – Article 8: The Court had already held in previous cases that relationships of cohabitating same-sex couples living in stable de facto partnerships fell within the notion of ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8. It also acknowledged that same-sex couples were in need of legal recognition and protection of their relationship, as both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had further underlined.
The Court considered that the legal protection currently available in Italy to same-sex couples failed to provide for the core needs relevant to a couple in a stable committed relationship. Whereas registration of same-sex unions with the local authorities was possible in about 2% of municipalities, this had a merely symbolic value and did not confer any rights on same-sex couples. Since December 2013 same-sex couples had had the possibility of entering into ‘cohabitation agreements’, which were however rather limited in scope. They failed to provide for some basic needs fundamental to the regulation of a stable relationship between a couple, such as mutual material support, maintenance obligations and inheritance rights. Moreover, such agreements were open to any cohabiting persons which meant that they did not primarily aim to protect couples. Furthermore, they required the couple concerned to be cohabiting, whereas the Court had already accepted that cohabitation was not a prerequisite for the existence of a stable union between partners given that many couples – whether married or in a registered partnership – experienced periods during which they conducted their relationship at long distance, for example for professional reasons.
Hence there existed a conflict between the social realities of the applicants living openly as couples, and their inability in law to be granted any official recognition of their relationship. The Court did not consider it particularly burdensome for Italy to provide for the recognition and protection of same-sex unions and considered that a form of civil union or registered partnership would allow them to have the relationship legally recognised which would be of intrinsic value for the persons involved.
The Court further noted a trend among Council of Europe member States towards legal recognition of same-sex couples, with 24 of the 47 member States having legislated in favour of such recognition. Moreover, the Italian Constitutional Court had pointed out the need for legislation to recognise and protect same-sex relationships, but the Italian legislature had for a long time failed to take this into account thus potentially undermining the authority of the judiciary and leaving the individuals concerned in a situation of legal uncertainty. Such calls by the Italian courts reflected the sentiments of a majority of the Italian population who, according to recent surveys, supported legal recognition of homosexual couples. The Italian Government had not denied the need for legal protection of such couples and had failed to point to any community interests justifying the current situation.
In view of the foregoing, the Court found that Italy had failed to fulfil its obligation to ensure that the applicants had available a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of their union. To find otherwise, the Court would have had to be unwilling to take note of the changing conditions in Italy and reluctant to apply the Convention in a way which was practical and effective.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 5,000 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage; claim in respect of pecuniary damage dismissed.

18766/11 and 36030/11 – Legal Summary, [2015] ECHR 752
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Cited by:
Legal Summary – Oliari And Others v Italy ECHR 21-Jul-2015
The claimants complained of the ban in Italy on the recognition of same sex relationships. Despite several rulings of the Italian Constitutional Court that they had a constitutional right to have their relationships recognised by the law, the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Discrimination, Family

Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.552055

London Borough of Southwark v P and Others: CoP 20 Apr 2015

Application made both in the Court of Protection and for a Forced Marriage Protection order in the High Court (Family Division). It concerns P who was born on a date in 1986 and is aged 28 years. There is a dispute as to the extent to which he lacks capacity to litigate and capacity to consent to marriage or sexual relations.

Moor J
[2015] EWCOP 40
Bailii
England and Wales

Family, Health

Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.551311

Oliari And Others v Italy: ECHR 21 Jul 2015

The claimants complained of the ban in Italy on the recognition of same sex relationships. Despite several rulings of the Italian Constitutional Court that they had a constitutional right to have their relationships recognised by the law, the Italian state had failed over some thirty years to provide a legal means for them to obtain this recognition.
Held: Italy had failed to fulfil its obligation to ensure that the applicants had available a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of their union. To find otherwise, the Court would have had to be unwilling to take note of the changing conditions in Italy and reluctant to apply the Convention in a way which was practical and effective.
For the purposes of a complaint under Article 14 taken with Article 8, the applicants did not need to show that the action of the state violated their rights under Article 8, but only that their complaint fell within the ‘ambit’ or scope of Article 8: ‘As the Court has consistently held, Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms’ safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter’

18766/11 36030/11 – Chamber Judgment, [2015] ECHR 716
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8 14
Human Rights
Citing:
Legal Summary – Oliari And Others v Italy (LS) ECHR 21-Jul-2015
ECHR Article 8
Positive obligations
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Respect for private life
Lack of legal recognition of same-sex partnerships: violation
Facts – The . .

Cited by:
Cited – Steinfeld and Another v Secretary of State for Education CA 21-Feb-2017
Hetero Partnerships – wait and see proportionate
The claimants, a heterosexual couple complained that their inability to have a civil partnership was an unlawful discrimination against them and a denial of their Article 8 rights. The argument that the appellants’ case did not come within the ambit . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Family, Discrimination

Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.550729

Y v Y (Financial Remedy: Marriage Contract): FD 27 Jun 2014

Application by a wife for financial remedy orders. It is made in the context of a long marriage in respect of which Decree nisi was pronounced in May 2013, some 22 years after its celebration. The parties married in June 1991, having by then lived together for two years. Three children were born during the course of the marriage. Two of the children are now in their early twenties and one is 15 years old.

Roberts J
[2014] EWHC 2920 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.547093

Janet Auchinlech v James Stewart: SCS 18 Dec 1540

Quhen ony man and his wife are simpliciter partit and divorcit be the authority of the Judge Ordinar, for adulterie, or ony other trespass committed be the man, the hail tocher-gude, and all that was ressavit be the man fra the woman, by vertue of the matrimonie contractit betwix thame, aucht to be restorit to the woman, with the prosseits thairof, ester the giving of the sentence of divorce betwix thame.

[1540] Mor 339
Bailii

Scotland, Family

Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.543981

Chai v Peng (1): FD 17 Oct 2014

Bodey J
[2014] EWHC 3519 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 13-Mar-2014
Application for further maintenance pending suit. . .
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 1-May-2014
The court was severely critical of the practice in divorce proceedings of uissuing a petition for divorce but then not serving it for some time. Holman J referred to a colourful metaphor deployed by leading counsel for the husband: ‘To file [a . .

Cited by:
See Also – Chai v Peng (2) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See Also – Chai v Peng CA 12-Jun-2015
Application to adjourn full hearing of appeal. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Estoppel

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538865

Chai v Peng (2): FD 17 Oct 2014

Bodey J
[2014] EWHC 3518 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 13-Mar-2014
Application for further maintenance pending suit. . .
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 1-May-2014
The court was severely critical of the practice in divorce proceedings of uissuing a petition for divorce but then not serving it for some time. Holman J referred to a colourful metaphor deployed by leading counsel for the husband: ‘To file [a . .
See Also – Chai v Peng (1) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .

Cited by:
See Also – Chai v Peng CA 12-Jun-2015
Application to adjourn full hearing of appeal. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Jurisdiction

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538864

Smallman v Smallman: CA 1972

An order was sought under the 1882 Act to decide the shares in which the family home was to be held. An overall agreement had been negotiated in correspondence between solicitors that W should have a half share in the proceeds of sale of the property and that H would pay the children’s school fees and maintenance but this was conditional upon W providing evidence on which H could divorce her and on ‘the approval of the court.’ W gave the confession but H then sought to resile from the agreement claiming that it was not binding until it had been approved by the court. W proceeded under section 17 and the Registrar held there was a binding agreement but that before the proceeds could be distributed the court must approve it.
Held: Lord Denning MR said: ‘In my opinion, if the parties have reached an agreement on all essential matters, then the clause ‘subject to the approval of the court’ does not mean there is no agreement at all. There is an agreement, but the operation of it is suspended until the court approves it. It is the duty of one party or the other to bring the agreement before the court for approval. If the court approves, it is binding on the parties. If the court does not approve, it is not binding. But, pending the application to the court, it remains a binding agreement which neither party can disavow. Orr L.J. has drawn my attention to a useful analogy. Many contracts for the sale of goods are made subject to an export or import licence being obtained. Such a condition does not mean that there is no contract at all. It is the duty of the seller, or the buyer, as the case may be, to take reasonable steps to obtain a licence. If he applies for a licence and gets it, the contract operates. If he takes all reasonable steps to obtain it, and it is refused, he is released from his obligations. If he fails to apply for it or to do what is reasonable to obtain it, he is in breach and liable to damages.’

Lord Denning MR
[1972] Fam 25
Married Women’s Property Act 1882 17
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Soulsbury v Soulsbury CA 10-Oct-2007
The claimant was the first wife of the deceased. She said that the deceased had promised her a substantial cash sum in his will in return for not pursuing him for arrears of maintenance. The will made no such provision, and she sought payment from . .
Cited – Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd TCC 3-Mar-2010
The parties had contracted for the construction of an estate of houses and flats to be followed by the interim purchase by the defendants. The defendants argued that the slump in land prices frustrated the contract and that they should not be called . .
Cited – Warwick (Formerly Yarwood) v Trustee In Bankruptcy of Clive Graham Yarwood ChD 13-Sep-2010
The trustee sought to have set aside as an unlawful preference, the payment of 75% of the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home to the bankrupt’s wife, saying that the payment had been made after the presentation of the petition. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Contract

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.259832

A v A, B v B: FD 2000

‘the court is not a ‘common informer’.

Charles J
[2000] 1 FLR 701
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Churchhouse, Regina (on the Application of) v Inland Revenue Admn 4-Apr-2003
The taxpayer was a revenue informer one whose trade is described by Coke as ‘viperous vermin [who] under the reverend mantle of law and justice instituted for protection of the innocent, and the good of the Commonwealth, did vexe and depauperize the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 12 December 2021; Ref: scu.194953

Practice Direction (Family Proceedings: Human Rights): FD 12 Oct 2000

Those seeking to present to the court arguments under the Human Rights Act must produce to the court full and authoritative texts of the cases they relied upon (including texts downloaded from the ECHR Internet site), and cases involving a possible application for a declaration of incompatibility should be allocated to a High Court judge. Cases involving claims arising from a judicial act should be reserved in the County Court to a circuit judge, and in the High Court to a High Court Judge.

Times 12-Oct-2000
Human Rights Act 1998
England and Wales

Human Rights, Family

Updated: 11 December 2021; Ref: scu.84887

Bellenden (formerly Satterthwaite) v Satterthwaite: CA 1948

The court considered the role of the appeal court in assessing an order for maintenance payable for a divorced wife. The judge’s decision had been made by an exercise of his discretion.
Held: Asquith LJ said: ‘It is, of course, not enough for the wife to establish that this court might, or would, have made a different order. We are here concerned with a judicial discretion, and it is of the essence of such a discretion that on the same evidence two different minds might reach widely different decisions without either being appealable. It is only where the decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and is, in fact, plainly wrong, that an appellate body is entitled to interfere.’

Asquith LJ
[1948] 1 All ER 343
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Piglowska v Piglowski HL 24-Jun-1999
No Presumption of House for both Parties
When looking to the needs of parties in a divorce, there is no presumption that both parties are to be left able to purchase alternative homes. The order of sub-clauses in the Act implies nothing as to their relative importance. Courts should be . .
Approved – G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) HL 25-Apr-1985
The House asked when a decision, on the facts, of a first instance court is so wrong as to allow it to be overturned on appeal.
Held: The epithet ‘wrong’ is to be applied to the substance of the decision made by the lower court. ‘Certainly it . .
Cited – AM v Local Authority and Another; Re B-M (Care Orders) CA 16-Mar-2009
The father sought leave to appeal against care orders made in respect of his three children. The family were Pakistani Pathan muslims. There had been disputes and violence within the extended family. One family member sought protection but was now . .
Cited – Clarke-Hunt v Newcombe CA 1982
Cumming-Bruce LJ discussed the difficulty faced by an appeal court: ‘There was not really a right solution: there were two alternative wrong solutions. The problem for the judge was to appreciate the factors pointing in each direction and to decide . .
Applied – Norbis v Norbis 30-Apr-1986
The parties disputed a settlement of property on divorce, and on appeal the court had to consider how it should approach a judgment made at the discretion of the judge at first instance.
Held: After citing Bellendon, Brennan J added: ‘The . .
Cited – In re R (A Child) CA 29-Apr-2009
The mother appealed against an order awarding residence of her two children to the paternal grandparents. . .
Cited – In re R (A Child) CA 22-May-2009
. .
Cited – Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Beck CA 26-Jun-2009
. .
Cited – MHA v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions UTAA 28-Oct-2009
. .
Cited – Truter v University of Leicester and Others EAT 24-Nov-2009
EAT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Postponement or stay
There was no basis for interfering with case management directions of an Employment Judge refusing a stay, nor grounds for allowing interim appeals when the . .
Cited – Macintyre v Chief Constable of Kent and others CA 24-Jul-2002
The defendants appealed against case management directions made in this defamation action. . .
Quoted – Horth v Thompson QBD 6-Jul-2010
After a personal injury claim, the judge had apportioned liability and ordered each side to pay the costs of the other. The case had been allocated to the fast track.
Held: The appeal failed. The existence of the Conditional Fee Agreement did . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Litigation Practice

Updated: 06 December 2021; Ref: scu.197924

In re A (A Child) (Vulnerable Witness): FD 17 Jun 2013

Pauffley J said: ‘Once more in these long running private law proceedings it is necessary to consider competing Convention rights so as to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, achieving justice and, on the other, protecting a vulnerable young woman from the potential for further and perhaps very considerable physical as well as psychological harm. The key question is as to whether, imminently, steps should be taken which could lead to the giving, in some form or another, of oral evidence by that vulnerable individual. ‘

Pauffley J
[2013] EWHC 1694 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family, Litigation Practice

Updated: 06 December 2021; Ref: scu.512056

Cornick v Cornick (No 2): FD 1995

The court considered an application to vary an ancillary relief award and gave a wife more than the sum set out in the budget in circumstances where she had received a capital sum that, with hindsight, was far too low.
Hale J said: ‘Where such a dramatic change in the comparative wealth of the parties takes place very shortly after a capital settlement in divorce proceedings, it is not surprising that the disadvantaged party should want the settlement set aside in some way. But it is only possible to do this in very limited circumstances and it is important not to allow ones natural sympathy for the position in which the wife finds herself to colour the application of those principles to the facts of the particular case.’ and ‘There are three possible interpretations of a situation such as this. The first is that it is simply a change in the parties circumstances which has taken place since the order. This would not normally give rise to any case for reopening matters. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 does not allow for the variation of capital settlements, including lump sum orders save as to instalments. Capital settlements are by their nature intended to be final. They have to be based upon a snapshot taken at the time of trial. The court has to do its best with the evidence available to apply the considerations which the court has, under section 25 of the 1973 Act to take into account at the time. Under section 25(2)(a), these include the assets which each party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future.’
and ‘On analysis, therefore, there are three possible causes of a difference in the value of assets taken into account at the hearing, each coinciding with one of the three situations mentioned earlier:
(1) An asset which was taken into account and correctly valued at the date of the hearing changes value within a relatively short time owing to natural processes of price fluctuation. The court should not then manipulate the power to grant leave to appeal out of time to provide a disguised power of variation which Parliament has quite obviously and deliberately declined to enact.
(2) A wrong value was put upon that asset at the hearing, which had it been known about at the time would have led to a different order. Provided that it is not the fault of the person alleging the mistake, it is open to the court to give leave for the matter to be reopened. Although falling within the Barder principle it is more akin to the misrepresentation or non-disclosure cases than to Barder itself.,br />(3) Something unforeseen and unforeseeable had happened since the date of the hearing which has altered the value of the assets so dramatically as to bring about a substantial change in the balance of assets brought about by the order. Then, provided that the other three conditions are fulfilled, the Barder principle may apply. However, the circumstances in which this can happen are very few and far between. The case-law, taken as a whole, does not suggest that the natural processes of price fluctuation, whether in houses, shares or any other property, and however dramatic, fall within this principle.
In my judgment this case clearly falls within the first category. There was no misevaluation or mistake at the trial. Nothing has happened since then other than a natural albeit dramatic change in the value of the husband’s shareholding. The wife’s case amounts in effect to saying that it is all terribly unfair.’

Hale J
[1995] 2 FLR 490
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Cornick v Cornick (No 1) FD 1994
. .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Cornick v Cornick (No 2) CA 2-Jan-1995
The court considered the boundary of its power in ordering periodical payments: ‘I do not believe that Hale J erred in her approach in principle to this case, and I reject the submission which Mr Mostyn has made that there was a delimiting factor . .
Cited – M v M (Financial Relief: Substantial Earning Capacity) FD 29-Mar-2004
The parties had been married for 12 years, there were three children, one with special needs, and assets of over 12 million pounds. The court considered the application for ancillary relief. It was substantially agreed that the wife should receive . .
Cited – Myerson v Myerson (No 2) CA 1-Apr-2009
The couple had compromised a very substantial ancillary relief claim on divorce, but the husband now said that the value of the shareholdings from which payment was to be made had collapsed.
Held: His appeal was dismissed. The principles for . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 06 December 2021; Ref: scu.244875

Chai v Peng: FD 1 May 2014

The court was severely critical of the practice in divorce proceedings of uissuing a petition for divorce but then not serving it for some time. Holman J referred to a colourful metaphor deployed by leading counsel for the husband: ‘To file [a divorce petition] prematurely is the equivalent of laying one’s towel at dawn upon the sun lounger of the English court and returning at high noon to bask in the warmth of the law of England and Wales on divorce and financial remedies.’

Holman J
[2014] EWHC 1519 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 13-Mar-2014
Application for further maintenance pending suit. . .

Cited by:
See Also – Chai v Peng (1) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See Also – Chai v Peng (2) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See Also – Chai v Peng CA 12-Jun-2015
Application to adjourn full hearing of appeal. . .
Cited – Thum v Thum FC 21-Oct-2016
No abuse of process in service error
The husband claimed that the W was guilty of abuse of process by issuing the divorce petion, but then not serving it for many months in an attempt to gain a tactical jurisdictional advantage under Brussels II.
Held: H’s application was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 03 December 2021; Ref: scu.525862

Chai v Peng: FD 13 Mar 2014

Application for further maintenance pending suit.

Holman J
[2014] EWHC 750 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 1-May-2014
The court was severely critical of the practice in divorce proceedings of uissuing a petition for divorce but then not serving it for some time. Holman J referred to a colourful metaphor deployed by leading counsel for the husband: ‘To file [a . .
See Also – Chai v Peng (1) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See Also – Chai v Peng (2) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See Also – Chai v Peng CA 12-Jun-2015
Application to adjourn full hearing of appeal. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.522559

Ellis-Carr v Levy (Home Rights : Requirements To Establish Interest): LRA 19 Nov 2013

LRA Family Law Act 1996 – home rights notice – meaning and effect of ‘intention’ in statute – Applicant’s evidence – property never occupied as a matrimonial home – whether husband ever had entitlement to occupy by virtue of a beneficial estate or interest or application – application opposed by Applicant’s husband’s trustee in bankruptcy – effect of orders relating to property made by Registrar Derrett in the bankruptcy upheld by Norris J on appeal – Mental Capacity Act 2005 – CPR 21 – s283A Insolvency Act – s261 Enterprise Act 2002

Judge Hargreaves
[2013] LRAD 2012 – 1122
Bailii
Family Law Act 1996

Registered Land, Family, Human Rights, Insolvency

Updated: 01 December 2021; Ref: scu.521988

Regina v Secretary of State for Health, Ex Parte Lally: QBD 26 Oct 2000

Tight restrictions had been placed on the circumstances under which children might visit prisoners in high security hospitals who were seen to be a risk to them having been convicted of murder or similar or who were schedule 1 offenders. The restrictions were valid, since they always allowed visits where a court had ordered contact, and there was no clear line to be drawn between different classes of convicted murderers. Contact was to be assessed in accordance with the child’s best interests, and breaks in contact with remoter family members such as nephews and nieces, need not be considered interference with family life.

Times 26-Oct-2000
European Convention on Human Rights
England and Wales

Children, Human Rights, Family

Updated: 29 November 2021; Ref: scu.85486

Rubin v Rubin: FD 10 Mar 2014

The court heard an application by the wife for a legal services payment order.

Mostyn J
[2014] EWHC 611 (Fam)
Bailii
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – TL v ML and others FD 9-Dec-2005
. .
Cited – Currey v Currey CA 18-Oct-2006
Where one party in an ancillary relief claim was not entitled to legal aid, but showed a need for legal representation which he or she could not afford, the court could make an order requiring the other party to make a costs allowance. The nature of . .
Cited – Makarskaya v Korchagin FD 21-Jun-2013
. .

Cited by:
Cited – MG v AR FD 16-Nov-2021
Family Case: Costs Security depends on Case Merits
Application for security for costs in family cases.
Held: In contrast to civil cases generally, in a family case the merits of the application and the strength of the defence necessarily have to be carefully considered. It is only by . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Costs

Updated: 22 November 2021; Ref: scu.522292

Burns v Burns: CA 30 Jul 2004

Application for leave to appeal against ancillary relief order.

[2004] EWCA Civ 1258, [2004] 3 FCR 263
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Mentioned – Heyer v Newby CA 19-Oct-2005
The parties had settled their ancillary relief case by consent, but shortly afterwards, shares in the husband’s company were sold creating a very substantial windfall in his favour. The former wife sought to vary the order. The husband appealed an . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.276322

Richards v Dove: ChD 1974

[1974] 1 All ER 888
Cited by:
Applied – Burns v Burns CA 1984
Long Relationship Not Enough for Interest in Home
The parties lived together for 17 years but were not married. The woman took the man’s name, but beyond taking on usual household duties, she made no direct financial contribution to the house. She brought up their two children over 17 years. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Trusts

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.198162