A newspaper was held to have been in contempt of court for publishing details of the deliberations of a jury, even though it had not solicited the information. Beldam LJ said of the word ‘disclosure’: ‘It is a word wide enough to encompass the revealing of the secrets of the jury room by a juryman to his friend or neighbour as well as the opening up of such knowledge to the public as a whole by someone to whom it has been revealed. And in the light of the background to which we have referred, we see every reason why Parliament should have intended the word ‘disclose’ to cover both situations. Nor do we regard it as significant that the secrets came into the hands of the newspaper indirectly. The existence of a market for the transcript of interviews with jurors containing prohibited details of their deliberations is as inimical to the interests of justice as the direct solicitation for money which occurred in this case. Section 8 is aimed at keeping the secrets of the jury room inviolate in the interests of justice. We believe that it would only be by giving it an interpretation which would emasculate Parliament’s purpose that it could be held that the widespread disclosure in this case did not infringe the section.’
Beldam LJ pointed out that if disclosures were allowed, jurors may come under pressure to make disclosures: ‘It was against this background that Parliament enacted section 8 of the Act of 1981. If breaches of the secrecy of the jury room had escalated to a degree that Parliament deemed a statutory sanction to be necessary, then its duty was to define clearly the circumstances in which an offence would be committed so that criminal sanctions were restricted to those offences which, in Lord Diplock’s words in Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1994] AC 440, 449: ‘involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing process.” and ‘Thus, we believe, the law has long recognised the importance of complete freedom of discussion in the jury room. If a juror were to be deterred from expressing his doubt of the accused’s guilt because he feared subsequent recrimination or ridicule, the accused might be deprived of a persuasive voice in his favour. So, too, a jury deciding a plaintiff’s claim to damages for libel ought not to be exposed to interrogation by the erstwhile defendants or others who share an interest in avoiding liability for, or reducing the consequences of, defamatory publication. We consider that the free, uninhibited and unfettered discussion by the jury in the course of their deliberations is essential to the proper administration of a system of justice which includes trial by jury. The enacted provisions designed to maintain such discussion are confined to soliciting, disclosing or publishing the particular aspects of the discussion in the jury room identified in the section. To that extent only do they restrain freedom expression. There is no restriction, as Mr Pannick [counsel for the newspaper] suggested, on the freedom to express opinions, advance arguments, advocate changes or promote reform on the many aspects of jury trial which have already been the subject of public debate and which are, and remain, proper objects of public concern and interest. In due course the European Court of Human Rights may be called upon to decide whether the measures enacted by Parliament are disproportionate to the restriction imposed on freedom of expression. When it does so, it will surely take full account of Parliament’s experience of trial by jury as an instrument of justice in the United Kingdom and its appreciation of the need today to protect the secrecy of the jury room. We were invited to take these factors into account to guide our interpretation of section 8. To the extent that it is permissible for this purpose, we have considered them.’
Judges:
Beldam LJ
Citations:
Gazette 09-Dec-1992
Statutes:
European Convention on Human Rights, Contempt of Court Act 1981 8(1)
Citing:
Appealed to – HM Attorney-General v Associated Newspapers Ltd and Others HL 4-Feb-1994
Following the acquittal of a prominent politician on a charge of conspiracy to murder, the New Statesman magazine published an article, based on an interview with one of the jurors, which gave an account of significant parts of the jury’s . .
Cited – Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd HL 1-Feb-1979
The appellants were magazines and journalists who published, after committal proceedings, the name of a witness, a member of the security services, who had been referred to as Colonel B during the hearing. An order had been made for his name not to . .
Cited by:
Appeal from – HM Attorney-General v Associated Newspapers Ltd and Others HL 4-Feb-1994
Following the acquittal of a prominent politician on a charge of conspiracy to murder, the New Statesman magazine published an article, based on an interview with one of the jurors, which gave an account of significant parts of the jury’s . .
Cited – HM Attorney General v Seckerson and Times Newspapers Ltd Admn 13-May-2009
The first defendant had been foreman of a jury in a criminal trial. He was accused of disclosing details of the jury’s votes and their considerations with concerns about the expert witnesses to the second defendant. The parties disputed the extent . .
At First Instance – Associated Newspapers Ltd v United Kingdom ECHR 30-Nov-1994
The newspaper said that a finding against it of contempt of court for publishing material derived from a jury’s deliberations infringed its rights of free speech.
Held: The complaint was declared inadmissible. ‘The Commission agrees with the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Human Rights, Media, Contempt of Court
Updated: 08 April 2022; Ref: scu.81405
