Citations:

[2003] RTR 483

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Breckon v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Aug-2007
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol.
Held: There was no requirement that the prosecutor should produce the results of the roadside breath test in evidence, and the breathalyser was of the approved . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.259152

It was for a defendant driver positively to establish that he had driven in accordance with a driving licence and with an appropriate policy of insurance.

Citations:

[1955] 1 WLR 325

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Hay QBD 13-Jun-2005
The driver was unconscious following an accident. The police attended the accident. He was acquitted of later failing to report the accident to the police. The prosecutor appealed. The car had crashed as the police pursued it. No notice had been . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 10 May 2022; Ref: scu.228584

K had a lot to drink and went to sleep in the passenger seat of a car driven by his brother-in-law. When later charged with driving car under the influence of drink, he said in his defence that when he woke up, he found that the driving seat was empty, and the car was moving down a hill with the hand brake off. He managed to steer the car into a grass verge at the bottom of the hill.
Held: The conviction for driving a car under the influence of drink stood. The ingredients of the offence were made out, and he had undoubtedly been driving the car within the meaning of the Act.

Citations:

[1955] 39 Cr App R 66

Cited by:

Cited – In Re A (Minors) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment); aka In re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) CA 22-Sep-2000
Twins were conjoined (Siamese). Medically, both could not survive, and one was dependent upon the vital organs of the other. Doctors applied for permission to separate the twins which would be followed by the inevitable death of one of them. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 09 May 2022; Ref: scu.213665

The arrested driver was given a warning under section 7(7) before two specimens of breath were obtained. The officer thought the specimens unreliable being of uneven volume. The officer then gave the appellant the chance to repeat the breath analysis procedure, but stressed that the appellant was under no obligation to do so. The appellant declined. He was then required to provide a specimen of blood. One of the issues on the appeal was whether the officer was entitled to require a specimen of blood in those circumstances. It was argued on the appellant’s behalf that if the officer believed that the breath test device would provide a reliable reading if used again he should have required a second set of specimens of breath rather than requiring a specimen of blood.
Held: That argument was rejected . The officer was lawfully entitled to invite the appellant to give further specimens of breath, as he did, but he could not require the appellant to do so. The effect of section 7(3), however, was that he was entitled, in the circumstances, to require a specimen of blood or urine, and by section 7(4) (which I have not read) it was for the officer to choose whether it should be blood rather than urine.

Judges:

McCombe J

Citations:

(2002} 167 JP 50, [2002] EWHC 2317 Admin

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 7(7) 11(3)(b)

Cited by:

Cited – John Kimball Stewart v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 2-Jun-2003
The defendant gave two specimens of breath, but they differed so markedly that the officer considered them unreliable. He offered the defendant the choice of a further two attempts or to give a specimen of blood or urine. He was convicted on the . .
Cited – Edmond v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Feb-2006
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. The readings on the Intoximeter were too wide apart and the officer requested a blood specimen. He complained that he had not been given a fresh warning before this request.
Cited – Hussain v the Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 19-Mar-2008
Appeal by case stated – conviction for failing to provide specimen of breath. Machine at one station had failed on two occasions – defendant taken to second station and re-tested. Whether third test request lawful.
Held: In completing the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.184552

Citations:

[1993] RTR 32

Cited by:

Cited – London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames v London Concrete Ltd Admn 13-Dec-2001
The respondent company was acquitted after its vehicle, exceeding the maximum weight, was driven on a restricted street in contravention of the regulations. No unrestricted street allowed access to the destination. The delivery was on the company’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.183449

It was not a proper purpose of an experimental traffic scheme to seek to ban heavy goods vehicles. The council used traffic calming measures to seek to dissuade heavy goods vehicles using certain roads to get to a waste management site.
Carnwath J said: ‘The second main point is in relation to the duty under section 122 to have regard to the desirability of maintaining reasonable access to premises. I do not find section 122 an altogether easy section to construe. It refers to a wide range of different matters which have to be taken into account, but it is not clear precisely how the priorities between these various matters are to be ordered. The words ‘ so far as practicable’ show that some limitation is intended on the weight to be given to some of the factors. In Greater London Council v. Secretary of State for Transport [1986] J.P.L. 513 at 517, the Court of Appeal appear to have assumed that those words qualify the duty to have regard to the items in subsection (2) , thus, in effect, making those matters subordinate to the matters which are referred to in subsection (1) . However, there appears to have been no detailed argument on the point in that case and the comments appear to be obiter. To my mind, it seems more likely that the intention is the other way round. Had it been as the Court of Appeal suggest, one would have expected the parenthesis to read, ‘ having regard so far as practicable to the matters specified in subsection (2) below.’ Furthermore, it is difficult to see the purpose of such a limitation on a duty which is simply to ‘ have regard’ to certain matters, since it is always practicable to have regard to matters, not always to give them effect. It is more likely that the limitation was intended to qualify the duty in subsection (1) to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of traffic, that being a duty which would otherwise be expressed in absolute terms.’

Judges:

Justice Carnwath

Citations:

Gazette 17-Apr-1996, Times 05-Apr-1996, [1996] RTR 201

Statutes:

Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 9

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Wilson and Another v Yorkshire Dales National Park Authority Admn 19-Jun-2009
The claimants, who promoted responsible motorsports challenged the defendant’s Traffic Regulation Order banning vehicular traffic on certain unsealed roads in the Dales, saying that there was nothing to show that the relevant committee had taken . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.90045

It was proper for a court sentencing for careless driving to allow for the fatal consequences of the driving. As long as culpability remains a sentencing consideration, the court was entitled to make such an allowance.

Citations:

Gazette 24-Feb-1999, Gazette 17-Mar-1999

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.85556

Citations:

[2020] EW Misc 12 (CC)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Bills of Exchange Act 1882

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.655643

The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing that the prosecution had failed to provide the roadside breath test figures.
Held: The appeal failed, and was indeed hopeless. Pill LJ said: ‘The specimens of breath which established whether or not a defendant has committed an offence under section 5(1) of the 1988 Act, are those which may be required of a defendant at the police station under section 7 of the Act, the two specimens of breath mentioned in section 7(1)(a). The requirement under section 15(2) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 to ‘take into account’ the specimen of breath is, in relation to the roadside test, no more than a requirement to ensure that the section 6 procedure which led to the arrest, and to the section 7 requirement, has been correctly followed.’ There was no obligation to disclose the figures of the roadside breath test.

Judges:

Pill LJ

Citations:

[2007] EWHC 100 (Admin), [2007] 4 All ER 1135

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)(a), Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 15(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Badkin v Director of Public Prosecutions 1988
The defendant driver had provided two specimens of breath at the police station. The device used failed to provide a printout and the constable operating it decided that it could be unreliable. He required the defendant to provide a specimen of . .
Cited – O’Sullivan v Director of Public Prosecutions 27-Mar-2000
Where a motorist challenges the accuracy of the intoximeter, there is only an evidential burden on him. . .
Cited – Lomas v Bowler 1984
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He had wanted to bring his own expert evidence. At the roadside, he had failed fully to inflate the device.
Held: The trial court had been entitled to be satisfied . .
Cited – Murphy v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 20-Jun-2006
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor should have put in evidence the results of the roadside breath test. Mitting J referred to the case of Badkin: ‘But nothing in the judgment of Glidewell LJ leads to the conclusion that . .
Cited – Jasper v The United Kingdom ECHR 16-Feb-2000
Grand Chamber – The defendants had been convicted after the prosecution had withheld evidence from them and from the judge under public interest immunity certificates. They complained that they had not had fair trials.
Held: The right was . .
Cited – O’Sullivan v Director of Public Prosecutions 27-Mar-2000
Where a motorist challenges the accuracy of the intoximeter, there is only an evidential burden on him. . .
Cited – Fox v Chief Constable of Gwent HL 1986
The driver left an accident. The police entered his home unlawfully, and on his refusal to supply a breath test, he was arrested and charged with faiing to supply.
Held: A lawful arrest is not an essential requirement before a breath test, and . .
Cited – O’Sullivan v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 25-Feb-2005
After routine procedures were followed at the police station, the police took a specimen of breath over two hours after those used for analysis to see if the defendant was then fit to leave. It showed a reading consistent with the analysis of the . .
Cited – Zafar v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 1-Nov-2004
The defendant appealed his conviction for failing a breath test. He said that since the meter could be affected by mouth alcohol, the prosecutor had a duty to show that the reading arose from a breath taken deep from the lung by a deep breath.

Cited by:

Cited – Breckon v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Aug-2007
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol.
Held: There was no requirement that the prosecutor should produce the results of the roadside breath test in evidence, and the breathalyser was of the approved . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.248833

The court identified three elements to be taken into account to see whether a defendant’s failure to provide a specimen of breath when required to do was reasonable: ‘(i) the need for evidence of physical or mental incapacity to provide the specimen; (ii) that medical evidence would normally be required to support such a claim . . and lastly (iii) to the necessary causative link between the physical or mental conditions and the failure to provide the specimen.’

Judges:

Curtis J

Citations:

[1994] RTR 279

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Brodzky 1997
The court was asked as to what would amount to a reasonable excuse for a driver failing to provide a specimen of breath when so requested: ‘The first point to make is that, although the first question has been put in the form of whether the justices . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Grundy Admn 3-May-2006
The prosecution appealed by way of case stated from the acquittal of the defendant for failing to provide a specimen of breath. She had been distressed on being arrested, and the magistrates concluded that her distress had been the cause of her . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.242535

The motorist defendant had been required to provide a laboratory test specimen, under section 9(1). He filled one-third of a two-pint container at 2:15 am. A constable disposed of that pursuant to section 9(6) and the container was washed out. A police sergeant who had been present throughout informed the defendant to indicate when he was ready to give the second specimen. The defendant adjusted his clothing; he sat down; he then indicated to the police constable that he was ready to give the second specimen, and provided it at 2:16 am – only a minute after the first. That specimen was taken for analysis. It showed that the proportion of alcohol in his urine exceeded the prescribed limit. The magistrates followed Prosser v Dickeson to regard what had happened as the provision of one single sample. The prosecutor appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded. He had indicated that he was ready to give a second specimen, and having given it albeit only a short time after the first, the only conclusion which could properly be reached on the facts was that two distinct specimens had been given. The procedure was complied with, and the second specimen was a proper basis for the prosecution.
Robert Goff LJ at page 89, he cited from the Court of Appeal decision in R v Radcliffe [1977] RTR 99 with this observation, that that case provided clear authority that it does not matter that the first specimen was of any particular quantity, and that it must follow that, provided two specimens are given, it does not matter whether there is any particular gap in time between the two specimens. All that matters is that the statutory procedure should be carried out.

Judges:

Robert Goff L

Citations:

[1985] RTR 84

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1972 9(1)

Cited by:

Cited – Ryder v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 14-Apr-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the collection of a sample of urine had not been in accordance with the requirements of section 7. He had had the samples taken whilst in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.470576

The defendant, prosecuted for a minor driving offence of driving without due care and attention, did not receive the information of intended prosecution within 14 days as the statute required. He appeal by case stated.
Held: Schedule 4 to the Road Traffic Act 1962 expressly provided that the notice would be deemed to have been served, even if in fact it was not, provided it was sent by registered post or recorded delivery addressed to the last known address. In view of that the court was satisfied that there had been proper service.

Judges:

Parker LCJ, Ashworth and Cantley JJ

Citations:

[1969] 3 All ER 1638

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1962 Sch4

Citing:

Cited – Beer v Davies QBD 1958
A bus driver was allegedly involved in an act of careless driving and was sent notice of an intention to prosecute by registered post ten days after the accident. In fact he was on holiday and the letter was returned without ever being delivered. . .

Cited by:

Cited – Nicholson v Tapp 1972
A traffic summons had to be served within 14 days and it was sent by registered post on the fourteenth day, so that in the normal course of post it would not have arrived until after the 14 days had elapsed. The prosecution sought to rely upon the . .
Cited – Gidden v Chief Constable of Humberside Admn 29-Oct-2009
The driver appealed against his conviction for speeding, saying that he had not been given the requisite notice within the 14 days required: ‘The notice of intended prosecution had been sent to him by first class ordinary post in circumstances where . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.471008

The driver entered a car park and walked over to a motor cycle parked in the car park. He placed his haversack on the platform of the motor cycle and pushed it for a distance of approximately six yards towards the entrance of the car park, which abutted on to the public road. He was stopped approximately seven yards from the entrance and before he had left the car park. On being asked where he was going he stated that he wanted to go for a ride.
Held: The defendant was guilty of attempting to drive the motor cycle whilst disqualified.

Judges:

Lord Widgery CJ

Citations:

[1974] RTR 142

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Moore Admn 2-Mar-2010
The defendant appealed by case stated from his conviction of attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a public road, having consumed alcohol in excess of the prescribed limit on the same occasion. At the time he was said to have attempted to drive, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.450579

The plaintiff was charged with an attempting to commit an offence of taking and driving away a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner. The Justices fined him andpound;10 and ordered that the particulars of the conviction should be endorsed on his licence.
Held: There was no jurisdiction to endorse for an offence of attempt and that the endorsement should be removed. The Justices had said that endorsement of a licence was not a punishment. Ashworth J did not agree: ‘The Justices said that nowadays an endorsement is not a penalty. For my part I am inclined to think counsel for the appellant is right, that whatever may have been the position before the recent legislation, the presence of an endorsement on a licence now is something that any motor driver would seek to avoid, and as it comes as the result of an offence by him, it is in my judgment truly described as part of the penalty. In my judgment, therefore, the justices were wrong in ordering that this appellant’s licence should be endorsed, and I would allow this appeal, and order the endorsement to be removed.’

Judges:

Ashworth J

Citations:

[1968] 2 All ER 333

Cited by:

Cited – Power v Provincial Insurance CA 18-Feb-1997
The insured had failed to disclose an earlier drink driving conviction on applying for insurance over five years later. The insurers refused cover on an accident. The plaintiff said that the conviction was spent under the 1974 Act. The endorsement . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.376001

The test for whether magistrates may find special reasons for not disqualifying a driver is not a subjective one as to what the defendant thought.

Citations:

[1974] RLT 71

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Taylor v Rajan 2-Jan-1974
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Ubhi Admn 11-Feb-2003
The prosecutors appealed the finding by the magistrates that there were special reasons for not disqualifying the defendant from driving after finding him guilty of driving with excess alcohol. He had driven his sister to hospital after she fell and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.277136

A special reason for not disqualifying a driver is one which is special to the facts of the case and not personal to the offender.

Citations:

[1946] 2 All ER 252

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Bristow QBD 28-Oct-1996
The prosecutor appealed against the decision of the magistrates, having found the defendant guilty of driving with excess alcohol, then not to disqualify him, finding special reasons for so doing. He had gone in answer to a call that a child niece . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.277134

Challenge to withdrawal of fleet notification for London Congestion Charge.

Citations:

[2005] EWHC 3002 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Greater London Act 1999 295

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.239270

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 39

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.136587

The evidence which is admissible on a challenge to the reliability of an intoximeter device is not limited to direct evidence of the unreliability of the breath testing device, but can be based on evidence such as the level of consumption, and the activities of the defendant before arrest and on his or her condition on arrest. Lord Griffiths said: ‘In the case of a breath specimen, there is of course a presumption that the machine is reliable. But if that presumption is challenged by relevant evidence, the magistrates will have to be satisfied that the machine has provided a reading upon which they can rely before making the assumption.’ However: ‘The magistrates will remember that the presumption of law is that the machine is reliable, and they will no doubt look with a critical eye on evidence such as was produced by Hughes and MacDonald [1985] Road Traffic Act 244, before being persuaded that it is not safe to rely on the reading that it produces.’

Judges:

Lord Griffiths

Citations:

[1988] RTR 1, [1988] AC 450

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Scheiner v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 13-Jun-2006
Appeal against conviction for driving with excess alcohol – officer having mobile phone with him and turned on contrary to manufacturer’s instructions.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘This appeal should, in my view, mark the end of arguments before . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Spurrier QBD 21-Jul-1999
It was not absolutely necessary for a defendant who asserted that a Lion Intoximeter was faulty because of a disparity between the reading and what had been drunk, to bring expert evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the Intoximeter was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.242962

The motorist who had been arrested and required to provide a laboratory test specimen under what was then section 9, under which it was for him to choose to provide a specimen of either blood or urine. He decided to provide two specimens of urine within the hour. He was taken to the lavatory by a police sergeant. He urinated into a jar, supplying a half to three-quarters of an inch of urine, when he was told by the sergeant to stop. That urine was discarded under section 9(6). This required the discarding of the first specimen, and the jar was washed out. Then the sergeant immediately directed the defendant to resume urinating, which he did. The justices concluded that two specimens of urine had not been provided. The two portions of urine constituted one and the evidence of the analysis was inadmissible. The prosecutor appealed.
Held: The appeal failed. Since the entire operation had occupied only two minutes, it was obviously one single operation, which was momentarily discontinued on the direction of the sergeant, and the justices had been justified in concluding as they had.
Phillips J said that the finding of fact as to whether there was within section 9(5)(b) two specimens of urine within one hour, depended: ‘partly on law but mainly on the view which the justices took of the facts of the case. It may be said, I suppose, that they have linked that finding to the proposition that there was only one specimen because — and I underline that word — two portions were provided from the same bladder content. So, although it is a finding of fact, and therefore binding on us, it is open to criticism if there is, in law, no requirement that two specimens come from different bladder contents. But essentially it is a factual question, provided the justices direct themselves properly, whether here there was one specimen or two, and essentially their decision is that there was only one.’ He cited Roney, and having quoted the Lord Chief Justice’s reference to a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to give his sample of urine, said: ‘Those words are important, because they indicate the purpose of these provisions, which in part at all events are for the protection of the motorist. It has be said here that, although Sergeant Prosser acted in good faith, the effect of what he did in practice was to deprive the defendant of that protection, and the defendant did not have what Lord Widgery CJ there refers to as the . . ‘full and fair opportunity to give his sample of urine’ in what, from his point of view would be the most beneficial circumstances. That is the vice which arises when the officer gives directions of this sort to the motorist which are not directions which he is authorised to give by the Act.’ There had been only one single operation momentarily discontinued on the direction of the sergeant.

Judges:

Phillips and McNeill JJ

Citations:

[1982] RTR 96

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1972 9

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Roney v Matthews QBD 1975
The LCJ considered an argument that the officer had not complied with the requirement that a defendant to be requested to provide two specimens within one hour of the request. He said: ‘The reference to two specimens of urine, I think, is explained . .

Cited by:

Cited – Ryder v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 14-Apr-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the collection of a sample of urine had not been in accordance with the requirements of section 7. He had had the samples taken whilst in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.470575

The LCJ considered an argument that the officer had not complied with the requirement that a defendant to be requested to provide two specimens within one hour of the request. He said: ‘The reference to two specimens of urine, I think, is explained in this way. It is an accepted medical fact that a specimen of urine may be misleading as to its alcohol content if given after a substantial time with a bladder inactive. Accordingly, a person requested to give a sample of urine might fairly be justified in saying that he would wish to give two after an interval, in order to get rid of the possibility of being tried on the basis of the first and inaccurate specimen. I think that Parliament, trying to make absolutely certain that the subject is given a full and fair opportunity to give his sample of urine, has laid down this requirement of two specimens in section 9(5)(b), but I do not believe that the relevance of a period of one hour goes beyond that.’

Judges:

Lord Widgery LCJ

Citations:

[1975] RTR 273

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1972

Cited by:

Cited – Prosser v Dickeson QBD 1982
The motorist who had been arrested and required to provide a laboratory test specimen under what was then section 9, under which it was for him to choose to provide a specimen of either blood or urine. He decided to provide two specimens of urine . .
Cited – Ryder v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 14-Apr-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the collection of a sample of urine had not been in accordance with the requirements of section 7. He had had the samples taken whilst in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.470573

May LJ considered the need to require two samples of urine under the Road Traffic act. He said that the only construction that he could give to that subsection was to read it precisely as it reads, namely that a specimen was to be provided within one hour of the request for it, and after the provision of the previous one, and then this: ‘The medical reason why there has to be a previous specimen of urine is well known. It is to ensure that the one that is ultimately sent for analysis is a fresh specimen and properly reflects the bodily condition of the person from whom it is taken.’

Judges:

May LJ

Citations:

[1987] RTR 412

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Ryder v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 14-Apr-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the collection of a sample of urine had not been in accordance with the requirements of section 7. He had had the samples taken whilst in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.470574

The defendant had been given a conditional discharge, which had the effect under section 12(2) of avoiding disqualification. The prosecutor appealed by case stated.
Held: The conditional discharge was set aside. The Divisional Court had said more than once that conditional discharge provisions should not be used in order to avoid disqualification in cases where, under the 1930 Act, the defendant must be disqualified in the absence of special circumstances. It further held that there were no special circumstances on the facts.

Judges:

Lord Goddard CJ

Citations:

[1954] 1 WLR 1338

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1930

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Varma, Regina v SC 10-Oct-2012
The defendant had been convicted of offences under the 1979 Act, but then conditionally discharged. He had appealed against a confiscation order. The prosecutor now appealed against an order quashing the confiscation.
Held: The appeal was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.464813

The driver had a medical condition requiring him to avoid strenuous exertion. Driving uphill, his clutch failed, though he did not understand the problem. He rolled back to the kerb, and revved the engine. He knew he would be unable to push the car. He appealed against his conviction of attempting to drive a car inapable of propulsion by the engine.
Held: ‘If somebody is sitting at the driving seat of the car either attempting to start it or attempting to put it in gear or accelerating the engine to try to make the car go forward, he is attempting to drive it, and the fact that there is some intervening factor which in the end will prevent him from fulfilling his attempt does not prevent it from being an attempt to drive.’

Citations:

[1978] RTR 225, (1978) 67 Cr App R 136,

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Moore Admn 2-Mar-2010
The defendant appealed by case stated from his conviction of attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a public road, having consumed alcohol in excess of the prescribed limit on the same occasion. At the time he was said to have attempted to drive, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.450578

The prosecutor appealed by case stated from the magistrates acquittal of the respondent under section 8(1) of the Vehicles Excise Act 1971, which provides that a person is liable to a penalty if he keeps on a public road any mechanically propelled vehicle for which a licence is not in force. The respondent had an Austin motor vehicle. He did not have a current tax disk. When, absent its gearbox, the vehicle was left parked on a public highway in Walton with a roller skate under each of the four wheels of the vehicle so that it was totally supported by the skates, and its wheels were not in contact with the road surface, he argued that because the Austin was not in actual contact with the road but was supported on roller skates, its position was analogous to that of being on a trailer. It could not be said that the vehicle was on the road if the roller skates were interposed between the road and the vehicle so that the vehicle was on roller skates, not on the road. Lord Widgery CJ observed, this argument, taken to its logical extent, would mean that if ‘one put a piece of newspaper under each wheel, the vehicle would no longer be on the road and no longer be liable to an excise licence’. He observed: ‘Unfortunately for the defendant, that would not do. It is perfectly clear that it was on the road for present purposes at the time of the alleged offence and I would allow the appeal and send the case back to the justices with a direction to convict.’
The other members of the court agreed.

Judges:

Lord Widgery CJ, Ashworth and Melford Stevenson JJ

Citations:

[1974] RTR 101

Statutes:

Vehicles Excise Act 1971 8(1)

Cited by:

Cited – Avery v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 28-Jul-2011
The defendant had parked his care on a driveway. He left to go drinking. On his return, a neighbour had parked across the foot of the drive obstructing all but pedestrian access. The defendant reversed his car within the driveway but so as to damage . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.444944

The driver had a minor accident reversing out of his drive. He was unaware of it. A few hours later, he was interviewed by a police officer, but the officer gave him neither oral or written warning pursuant to section 179(a) of the 1972 Act that he might be prosecuted. Four days later he was seen again, and was told that he would be reported for driving without due care and attention. The prosecutor now appealed against dismissal of the information by the Magistrates on the basis that no summons and notice had been served within 14 days as required by section 179(2)(b) and (c). The prosecutor argued that under section 179(3), since there had been an accident, no notice was needed.
Held: The appeal failed. The oral warning had not been given ‘at the time the offence was committed’ and therefore did not satisfy section 179(2)(a). Section 179(3) could not be read to have removed this protection from the public.

Citations:

[1983] RTR 3456

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1972 179(2)(a)(b)(c)(3A), Road Traffic Act 1974 2492)

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.444529

The defendant said there had been no sign plate displaying the times of restricted parking.
Held: That was a failure to provide adequate information, and the motorist’s conviction was quashed.

Citations:

[1992] RTR 209

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Herron and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v The Parking Adjudicator CA 27-Jul-2011
The claimant appealed against refusal of judicial review of decisions of the parking adjudicator as to the correctness of 39 penalty charge notices. In each case, they said that the signage supporting the notice, in particular single and double . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.442553

The court considered what it was for a vehicle to be intended or adapted for use as a motor vehicle.
Held: The phrase did not refer to the intention as such of any particular purpose. Salmon J suggested that the word ‘intended’ might be paraphrased as ‘suitable or apt’.

Judges:

Salmon J

Citations:

[1961] 1 WLR 487

Cited by:

Cited – Burns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
Cited – Coates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.442519

The defendant, a commercial traveller, fitted a rail across in the back of his private motor car to carry dresses. The issue was whether or not there had been some degree of adaptation.
Held: Lord Parker CJ said: ‘It seems to me that, by conjunction of the words ‘constructed or adapted’, the definition is really saying ‘originally constructed or where the structure is subsequently altered’. Immediately one says that, the question arises whether it can be said that the structure of the vehicle in the ordinary sense of the word has been altered, or whether the structure remains the same, but that some small fitting or attachment is changed which, although it physically involves making small holes for screws in the structure, could not in any ordinary sense of the word be an alteration of the structure. Indeed, in Minty v Glew , the alteration was that the wagonette in question had been fitted with stronger springs and the wheels had been strengthened and widened, matters which quite clearly, as it seems to me, would be alterations in the structure.’ and ‘I should add that it is not a question of what any of us sitting here would have found on the facts, but merely whether it is possible to say that their decision was perverse, and that, properly directing their minds to the question, the justices must have come to an opposite conclusion, namely that an offence was made out.’

Judges:

Lord Parker CJ

Citations:

[1961] 1 WLR 435

Cited by:

Cited – Coates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.442520

The court was asked whether a bicycle was a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of section 78. It was said to have been ‘ridden at a furious pace’. The appellant argued that: ‘A bicycle is not a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of the Act, nor can it be said to be ‘driven’ in the ordinary sense of the term. Bicycles were unknown when the Act was passed. The Act refers to carriages drawn by horses or other animals . . A person is never said to ‘drive’ a bicycle. The fact that a bicycle has wheels does not make it a carriage. A bath-chair or a wheelbarrow would not be a carriage within the Act. It would be far too wide a construction to hold that every apparatus by which a man is carried is a ‘carriage.’ Wheeled skates would be a carriage under such a construction’.
The respondent countered: ‘The person propelling the bicycle ‘drives’ it. He guides the machine and regulates its pace. Such a machine is clearly within the mischief of the Act.’
Held: It was. Mellor J said that if a person: ‘guides as well as propels it [a bicycle] he may be said to drive it as an engine driver is said to drive an engine.’
Mellor J said: ‘The expressions used are as wide as possible. It may be that bicycles were unknown at the time when the Act passed, but the legislature clearly desired to prohibit the use of any sort of carriage in a manner dangerous to the life or limb of any passenger. The question is, whether a bicycle is a carriage within the meaning of the Act. I think the word ‘carriage’ is large enough to include a machine such as a bicycle which carries the person who gets upon it, and I think that such person may be said to ‘drive’ it. He guides as well as propels it, and may be said to drive it as an engine driver is said to drive an engine. The furious driving of a bicycle is clearly within the mischief of the section, and seems to me to be within the meaning of the words, giving them a reasonable construction.’

Judges:

Mellor, Lush JJ

Citations:

(1879) 4 QBD 228

Statutes:

Highway Act 1835 78

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Determinative – Corkery v Carpenter KBD 1950
The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12 made it an offence to be ‘drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine’.
Held: The Act was . .
Cited – Coates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.442517

A public footpath four to five feet in width had been tarmaced but had deteriorated with potholes and bushes to the extent that it would not naturally be called a road. The appellant rode a motorcycle along it with excess alcohol and when disqualified and was convicted by the Justices.
Held: The court dismissed his appeal. The footpath was a highway, being a place where the public had a right to pass and repass either on foot or with animals or in vehicles, as the case may be, it fell within the appropriate definition.

Citations:

[1986] 2 RTR 71

Cited by:

Cited – Barrett v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 10-Feb-2009
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving whilst disqualified. He had driven on a roadway within a caravan park. A public footpath (a highway) went through the park. There were gates at the entrance but these were kept open. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.327994

That a motor vehicle was not, when stopped, carrying a patient, was not determinative of whether it was being used as an ambulance.

Citations:

[1996] RTR 160

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Lord-Castle v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD 23-Jan-2009
The defendant appealed by case stated from his conviction for using a motor vehicle fitted with a siren. When stopped various items suggesting that driver might be providing an ambulance service were found. The siren was not used.
Held: The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 May 2022; Ref: scu.281707

The court overturned a finding that the defendant was not guilty of the offence of speeding because he had not seen relevant signs.

Citations:

[1976] RTR 99

Cited by:

Cited – Coombes v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 20-Dec-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding. The speed camera was placed just after the 30mph limit was imposed, and the signs were obscured by foliage.
Held: There was no case law direct on the point. The appeal was allowed. It . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.270467

The appellant appealed his conviction for parking between a line of parking studs and a crossing. The studs were on a street running across the street where the crossing was set out and at right angles to the actual crossing.
Held: The regulations required the studs to be on the same road as the crossing and approximately parallel to the crossing. The layout did not create the restriction.

Citations:

(1964) 62 LGR 320

Statutes:

Pedestrian Crossing Regulations 1954 6

Cited by:

Applied – Davies v Heatley QBD 1971
The defendant appealed, by case stated, against his conviction of failing to stay to the left of a continuous white line. An intermittent white line had been placed between the two continuous white lines. The magistrates convicted saying that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.251551

Medical evidence is not always required for a driver to support a reasonable excuse for failing to provide a specimen of breath. Stocker LJ: ‘It would seem to me that in the vast majority of cases at least it will be necessary to have some medical or other expert evidence to say that the observations made of nervousness are, in the context of the defendant concerned, at least a possible explanation for the failure to provide the breath specimen. In the absence of such evidence it will be rare indeed, if indeed it could ever exist, that a condition of nervousness would be sufficient to explain a failure to be able to provide the breath test.’

Judges:

Stocker LJ

Citations:

[1992] RTR 413

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Brodzky 1997
The court was asked as to what would amount to a reasonable excuse for a driver failing to provide a specimen of breath when so requested: ‘The first point to make is that, although the first question has been put in the form of whether the justices . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Grundy Admn 3-May-2006
The prosecution appealed by way of case stated from the acquittal of the defendant for failing to provide a specimen of breath. She had been distressed on being arrested, and the magistrates concluded that her distress had been the cause of her . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.242536

The court was asked as to what would amount to a reasonable excuse for a driver failing to provide a specimen of breath when so requested: ‘The first point to make is that, although the first question has been put in the form of whether the justices were entitled to find that the defendant had a reasonable excuse for failing to provide the specimen of breath lawfully required, strictly, the burden is on the prosecution if the matter is raised by sufficient evidence to disprove the reasonable excuse which is put forward by the defendant.
The reasonable excuse which was put forward by the defendant was essentially that by reason of his physical or mental condition he was unable to provide the specimen. That argument was based upon the well-known guidance given by Lawton LJ in R v Lennard
The position has been reached in which the tests that have to be applied by the justices have, in my view, been correctly identified by Curtis J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Crofton [1994] RTR 279. . . The justices in the present case needed, therefore, first, to look for evidence of physical or mental incapacity to provide the specimen. The only such evidence was the evidence of the defendant in cross-examination, that he did not know why he could not provide a sample, save for the mental anguish which was caused to him due to the sergeant threatening him. There was no medical evidence to support such a claim. There is no doubt that medical evidence will not be necessary in every case. . . .
Stocker LJ accepts [in Smith v DPP] that there may be cases where medical evidence will not be necessary, but points out that in the generality of cases it will be necessary. Perhaps the most important reason for the need for such evidence is to enable the justices to answer the third question, which is: whether there is a proper causative link established between the physical or mental condition alleged and the failure to provide a specimen.
In my judgment, the material which was before the justices was wholly insufficient to justify the conclusion that they reached, that there was such a causative link. The defendant was said to be, on his own admission, a relatively fit man with no current medical problems. There was no doubt that he was perfectly able to understand all the instructions that he was given. The state of anguish which is described is not described in terms which enables, or would enable, a bench of justices, properly directing their minds to that evidence, to conclude that there was a causal connection between the anguish and his failure to provide a specimen.’

Judges:

Latham J

Citations:

[1997] RTR 425

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v Lennard CACD 1973
The defendant faced with an allegation of failng to provide a specimen of breath, argued that the consumption of alcohol since he had been driving could amount to a reasonable excuse.
Held: The court considered what would amount to a . .
Cited – Smith (Nicholas) v Director of Public Prosecutions 1989
Medical evidence is not always required for a driver to support a reasonable excuse for failing to provide a specimen of breath. Stocker LJ: ‘It would seem to me that in the vast majority of cases at least it will be necessary to have some medical . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Crofton 1994
The court identified three elements to be taken into account to see whether a defendant’s failure to provide a specimen of breath when required to do was reasonable: ‘(i) the need for evidence of physical or mental incapacity to provide the . .

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Grundy Admn 3-May-2006
The prosecution appealed by way of case stated from the acquittal of the defendant for failing to provide a specimen of breath. She had been distressed on being arrested, and the magistrates concluded that her distress had been the cause of her . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 May 2022; Ref: scu.242534

The court considered the means of proving the reading from a breath test meter: ‘It was clearly the intention of the legislature, in enacting subsection (5), that the defendant should be provided in advance of the hearing with the information recorded on the automatically produced statement. This information includes not only the results of the measurement effected by the instrument of the two specimens of breath — results of which the defendant might otherwise have only an imperfect recollection — but also, and of even greater importance, the results of the self-calibrating exercise which the instrument carries out both before and after the two specimens of breath are provided. If the measurement produced by the instrument is to be relied on by the prosecution, it is clearly vital for the prosecution to establish that the instrument was properly calibrated.
The case stated is silent as to whether, as a matter of fact, copies of the Intoximeter statement or print-out and supporting certificate were handed to or served upon the defendant as required by subsection (5). The prosecution, as we have said, simply elected not to rely upon the statement. By so doing, in our judgment, the prosecution failed to establish matters vital to the establishment of the defendant’s guilt. We would not regard the evidence of the police sergeant as inadmissible under the hearsay rule: it was direct evidence of what he had seen recorded on the instrument. The ground upon which we would uphold the decision of the justices is that the oral evidence of the police sergeant did not, and could not, come up to the standard of proof required by the legislation.’

Judges:

Watkins LJ

Citations:

[1985] RTR 191

Cited by:

Cited – Sneyd, Regina (on the Application Of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Jul-2005
The defendant wished to argue a point to overturn the decision in Chesters. Accordingly the matter was adjourned for hearing by a two judge court. . .
Explained – Thom v Director of Public Prosecutions 1993
The defendant was prosecuted for driving with excess alcohol. No print-out was produced but there was oral evidence from the officers who carried out the procedure that the machine was calibrated properly and working properly and what the readings . .
Cited – Sneyd v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 24-Feb-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that though the officers suspected him of having consumed alcohol, they asked him whether he had been drinking without cautioning him, and that no print out . .
Cited – Bielecki v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 23-Aug-2011
The court had delivered a draft judgment which counsel said was based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the case she had presented. Counsel now suggested that the matter should be referred to a two judge divisional court. That was refused. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.230382

The defendant appealed against his conviction of driving with excess alcohol, on the basis of a blood sample. He said that it was a requirement that the intoximeter should be shown to be working properly before the evidence of the blood sample was admissible.
Held: Simon Brown LJ said: ‘Assuming that the machine is working properly, clearly it is appropriate in a borderline case to give the defendant the opportunity to provide instead a specimen of blood. After all, if he does not provide it he will fall to be convicted on his breath specimen. Assume, however, that the machine is not working properly, then in any event it is open to the police officer to require the blood specimen. I can see no possible reason why the prosecution should have to prove one way or the other whether the machine was actually working properly. The defendant is, if anything, better off if it is assumed to be working: the option then becomes his.’
and ‘The plain fact is that the questions formulated raise but a single issue, that which I earlier identified: does the prosecution have to prove that the machine was actually working accurately when a driver is put to his election under section 8(2)? In my judgment, the plain answer to that is ‘No’ and in the result this appeal falls to be dismissed.’

Judges:

Simon Brown LJ

Citations:

[2000] RTR 235

Citing:

Cited – Prince v The Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 1996
The appellant had convicted of an offence under s5 on the basis of evidence provided by a laboratory test of a blood sample provided under section 8(2). In each case it was contended that the prosecution were required to prove that the intoximeter . .

Cited by:

Cited – Wright v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 25-May-2005
The defendant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He complained that the device used to measure his breath at the police station, the EC/IR intoximeter, was not an approved device. The court had refused to accept evidence to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.228467

The defendant had been acquitted of selling a trailer in an unroadworthy condition. He knew it to be unroadworthy and the trailer axle had collapsed as it was being towed to its destination.
Held: The magistrates were entitled to find the defendant able to rely upon the defence that since the trailer would be unloaded, it was not being used as required by the section.

Citations:

Times 13-Jan-2005

Road Traffic

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.222858

The defendant was accused of failing to give a sample of breath for testing for alcohol. The defence was that there had been no failure because the appellant had reasonably asked that he should be able to consult with a doctor and a solicitor. The deputy chairman had directed the jury that that was no defence.
Held: The court upheld that direction, but stated in the course of doing so: ‘The Deputy Chairman, in the opinion of this Court, ruled perfectly correctly that on those facts, which were completely agreed in all respects, the only result in law was that there was a failure, even though there was no refusal. There is failure if the opportunity to do so something is given and you do not do it. Here the sample of breath was not given.’

Judges:

Lord Parker LCJ

Citations:

[1970] 54 Cr App R 415

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Swan Admn 21-Oct-2004
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.220168

The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered when it should find special reasons allowing it a discretion not to disqualify a driver who was subject to an automatic disqualification for driving with excess alcohol. The test of whether the circumstances exist to find special reasons is an objective one. A higher reading would make the exercise of the discretion more difficult.
Lord Widgery CJ said: ‘This is not the first case in which the court had had to consider whether driving in an emergency can justify a conclusion that there are special reasons for not disqualifying the driver. If a man, in the well-founded belief that he will not drive again, puts his car into the garage, goes into his house, and has a certain amount of drink in the belief that he is not going to drive again, and if thereafter there is an emergency which requires him, in order to deal with it, to take his car out despite his intention to leave it in the garage, then that is a situation which can in law amount to a special reason for not disqualifying a driver.
On the other hand, justices who are primarily concerned with dealing with this legislation, should approach the exercise of the resultant discretion with great care. The mere fact that the facts disclosed a special reason does not mean that the driver is to escape disqualification as a matter of course. There is a very serious burden on the justices, even when a special reason had been disclosed, to decide whether in their discretion they should decline to disqualify in a particular case. The justices should have very much in mind that if a man deliberately drives when he knows he has consumed a considerable quantity of drink, he presents a potential source of danger to the public which no private crisis can lightly excuse.
One of the most important matters which justices have to consider in the exercise of this discretion is whether the emergency — and I call it such for want of a more convenient word — was sufficiently acute to justify the driver taking his car out. The Justices should only exercise the discretion in favour of the driver in clear and compelling circumstances. They ought to remember that the special reasons which they are considering and which are relevant are not the reasons which caused the driver to take his car on the road . . . The Justices therefore must consider the whole of the circumstances. They must consider the nature and degree of the crisis or emergency which has caused the defendant to take the car out. They must consider whether there was alternative means of transport or methods of dealing with the crisis other than and alternative to the use by the defendant of his own car. They should have regard to the manner in which the defendant drove, because if he committed traffic offences such as excessive speed or driving without due care and attention this again is a consideration which tells against his having discretion exercised in his favour, and they should generally have regard to whether the defendant acted responsibly or otherwise.’
The test for the existence of special reasons for not disqualifying is an objective one and not a subjective one, and ‘Last but by no means least, if the alcohol content of the defendant’s body is very high, that is a very powerful reason for saying that discretion should not be exercised in his favour. Indeed, if the alcohol content exceeds 100 milligrams per hundred millilitres of blood, the Justices should rarely exercise the discretion in favour of the defendant driver.’

Judges:

Lord Widgery Chief Justice

Citations:

[1974] RTR 304, [1974] 1 All ER 1087, [1974] QB 424

Citing:

Cited – Jacobs v Reid 1974
The test for whether magistrates may find special reasons for not disqualifying a driver is not a subjective one as to what the defendant thought. . .

Cited by:

Cited – Khan, Regina (on the Application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 12-Oct-2004
Defendant pleaded guity to drink driving – claim for special reasons – appeal against finding of absence of special reasons to disqualify. . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Bristow QBD 28-Oct-1996
The prosecutor appealed against the decision of the magistrates, having found the defendant guilty of driving with excess alcohol, then not to disqualify him, finding special reasons for so doing. He had gone in answer to a call that a child niece . .
Cited – Fleming v Mayne CANI 3-Mar-2000
The court set out the circumstances in which it could find special reasons for not disqualifying a driver who had driven with excess alcohol. . .
Cited – Police Service of Northern Ireland v Cassells CANI 2-Mar-2007
. .
Cited – Vaughan v Dunn 1984
Goff LJ considered the circumstances where, a defendant having been convicted of driving wih excess alcohol, the court could find special reasons for not disqualifying him. He referred to Taylor v Rajan and said: ‘The first is that the exercise of . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Tucker Admn 6-Nov-1996
. .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Elsender Admn 9-Jun-1999
. .
Cited – Police Service for Northern Ireland v Mullan CANI 22-Jan-2008
. .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Goddard Admn 19-Jan-1998
. .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Ellis Admn 2-Nov-1998
. .
Cited – Regina v St Albans Crown Court ex parte O’Donovan Admn 9-Jul-1999
. .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Ubhi Admn 11-Feb-2003
The prosecutors appealed the finding by the magistrates that there were special reasons for not disqualifying the defendant from driving after finding him guilty of driving with excess alcohol. He had driven his sister to hospital after she fell and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.220232

F was asked to lend L a car. F knew L was disqualified, but agreed provided L found an insured driver with a full valid driving licence. F did not know who L would ask or that he in fact asked R to drive; R was employed as delivery driver and the defendant neither knew or met him. L did not ask R if he was insured to drive the defendant’s car, both L and R assuming without discussion that R would be insured by virtue of his employment as a delivery driver. R drove the defendant’s car, was uninsured to drive it and was involved in a road traffic accident with another car as a result of which a passenger in the other car lost a leg.
Held: Distinguishing Newbury v Davis: ‘There was no communication of any kind between the owner and the driver. The defendant was unaware who [L] was going to ask to drive the vehicle and the defendant simply could not and did not know whether his so-called conditional permission would be passed on to that person. Thus it may be that [R] was wholly unaware of the qualified permission. Moreover he personally had not been made subject by the defendant. So far as the defendant knew, [R] could have been disqualified from driving and was uninsurable. It is quite ludicrous, I think, therefore to suppose that a so-called conditional permission was granted to him. To begin to establish such an unusual permission, a conditional one that is, the owner would have at least to have been found to have given it directly to the would-be driver of his vehicle, regardless as to whether he has also given it to some other person, a would-be passenger in the vehicle, for instance. For those reasons I would allow this appeal and send the case back to the justices with a direction to convict.’

Judges:

Watkins LJ

Citations:

[1992] RTR 93

Citing:

Distinguished – Newbury v Davis QBD 1974
The owner of a vehicle agreed to lend it to someone else on condition that that person insured against third party risks. In the owner’s absence, that person drove the car on a road without insurance.
Held: The appeal against conviction was . .

Cited by:

Cited – Philip Owen Lloyd-Wolper v Robert Moore; National Insurance Guarantee Corporation Plc, Charles Moore CA 22-Jun-2004
The first defendant drove a car belonging to his father and insured by his father. The father consented to the driving but under a mistaken belief that his son was licensed. The claimant was injured by the defendant in a road traffic accident.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.199928

The defendant believed that a driver was the holder of a driving licence and permitted him to use the vehicle, when the driver was not in fact such a holder. The prosecutor appealed his acquittal.
Held: Considering Newbury v Davis. The justices did not find that he imposed a condition on the use of the van. They found that he permitted the van to be used in the honest and mistaken belief that all would be well. That is not enough on authority to excuse him and the justices were wrong here in deciding that they could acquit.

Judges:

Lord Widgery CJ

Citations:

[1975] RTR 453

Statutes:

Road Traffic Act 1972 143

Citing:

Distinguished – Newbury v Davis QBD 1974
The owner of a vehicle agreed to lend it to someone else on condition that that person insured against third party risks. In the owner’s absence, that person drove the car on a road without insurance.
Held: The appeal against conviction was . .

Cited by:

Applied – Ferrymasters Ltd v Adams 1980
Employers were alleged to have caused or permitted an employee to drive a vehicle on the road while not holding a driving licence authorising him to do so. When the employee had entered the employment, the employers had ensured that he held a valid . .
Cited – Philip Owen Lloyd-Wolper v Robert Moore; National Insurance Guarantee Corporation Plc, Charles Moore CA 22-Jun-2004
The first defendant drove a car belonging to his father and insured by his father. The father consented to the driving but under a mistaken belief that his son was licensed. The claimant was injured by the defendant in a road traffic accident.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.199926

(Year?) ‘From the authorities the following principles can be established. Firstly, it is for the defendant on the balance of probability to establish that his drink had been laced unknown to him. Secondly, it is very rarely that a court will be justified in drawing an inference without direct evidence of it. Thirdly, the court should decide whether the accused would not have have exceeded the legal limit if his drinks had not been laced. Fourthly, he did not know or suspect that expect his drinks had been tampered with in that way. The authorities also show that it is seldom that what I have called point 3 can be established without medical or scientific evidence, but they do not say it is impossible for the Justices to reach that conclusion without there being scientific evidence.’

Judges:

Schiemann LJ, Smedley J

Citations:

Unreported

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v O’Connor and Chapman and Others 1991
The court looked at the elements needed to be established to support a defence to a charge of driving with excess alcohol on the basis that the defendant’s drinks had been spiked: ‘On the authorities, it is now clearly established that the matters . .

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v Gravesend Magistrates Court ex parte Baker Admn 16-Apr-1997
The defendant appealed a refusal of legal aid. She wished to establish that her drink had been spiked, and thus to establish special reasons for not being disqualified for driving with excess alcohol.
Held: Expert evidence would assist the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 29 April 2022; Ref: scu.187415

Citations:

[1989] RTR 54

Statutes:

Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 15

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions, Regina (on the Application Of) v Chambers Admn 25-Jul-2003
The prosecutor appealed dismissal of charges of driving with excess alcohol. The defendant had admited driving, but said she had consumed alcohol in the twenty minutes between driving and the police coming to her home. Expert evidence had been . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 29 April 2022; Ref: scu.187463

The court discussed the basis of a submission that there existed special reasons for non-disqualification for driving whilst under the influence of drink when the driver’s drinks had been spiked. It was necessary for the applicant to show first, that his drinks had been laced, and secondly that he did not know or suspect that his drinks had been laced, and thirdly, that if his drinks had not been laced he would have been below the prescribed limit. The burden of proof lay on the defendant.

Citations:

[1973] RTR 284, [1973] 1 WLR 578

Cited by:

Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v O’Connor and Chapman and Others 1991
The court looked at the elements needed to be established to support a defence to a charge of driving with excess alcohol on the basis that the defendant’s drinks had been spiked: ‘On the authorities, it is now clearly established that the matters . .
Cited – Smeaton v Harrow Crown Court Admn 9-Jul-2007
Renewed application for leave to bring judicial review of magistrates not to find special reasons for not imposing mandatory disqualification after conviction for driving with excess alcohol. Suggestion that drinks had been laced. . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Bristow QBD 28-Oct-1996
The prosecutor appealed against the decision of the magistrates, having found the defendant guilty of driving with excess alcohol, then not to disqualify him, finding special reasons for so doing. He had gone in answer to a call that a child niece . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 29 April 2022; Ref: scu.187417

If a police officer has reason to believe that a driver suspected of driving with excess alcohol has consumed alcohol within the previous 20 minutes, he must wait until 20 minutes has elapsed after the last drink before administering the breath test. If he does not know and has no reason to suppose such consumption, he need not wait the 20 minutes. The instructions for use are not part of the device as defined in the Act. The only relevance of non-compliance with any of the instructions for the use of the Alcotest including as to inflation, but not as to assembly, was that it might be evidence from which the mala fides of the constable could be inferred.
Lord Diplock considered the words of Melford Stevenson J below: ‘In my view, the words ‘carried out by means of a device of a type approved for the purpose of such a test’ involve by necessary implication the observance of the instructions which are printed as an integral part of the device issued for the purpose of taking the breath test.’ He observed that: ‘If it were correct that the instructions were an integral part of the device, it would no doubt follow that the breath test was not carried out by means of a device of the type approved by the Secretary of State and Scott v Baker would be in point. But, in my view, Melford Stevenson J’s statement involves a misconstruction of the Act.’
As to the significance of the manufacturer’s instructions: ‘The requirements of the Act are satisfied provided first, that the device used is of a type approved by the Secretary of State, and, secondly, that the test is conducted and its results are evaluated bona fide by the constable carrying out the test. He must accordingly comply with any instructions for the use of the device which to his knowledge in the circumstances in which the breath test is carried out need to be observed in order that the device may give a reliable indication whether or not the proportion of alcohol in the blood of the person to whom the test is administered exceeds the prescribed limit. If he does not, the test carried out by him is not a ‘breath test’ within the meaning of the Act because it is not carried out for the defined purpose. But provided that he acts bona fide in the conduct of the test and in the evaluation of its result, it matters not that it may subsequently be proved at the trial that the person to whom the test was administered that through inadvertence or ignorance of some relevant circumstances the instructions were not fully complied with.’

Judges:

Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Diplock

Citations:

[1970] AC 1072

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Grant v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 22-Jan-2003
The appellant had been convicted of failing to give a breath test, and of driving with excess alcohol. He had falsely claimed that he had had a drink in the five minutes before being asked to take the test, and said the officer should not have . .
Cited – Scheiner v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 13-Jun-2006
Appeal against conviction for driving with excess alcohol – officer having mobile phone with him and turned on contrary to manufacturer’s instructions.
Held: The appeal failed. ‘This appeal should, in my view, mark the end of arguments before . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 29 April 2022; Ref: scu.187055

In the context of road traffic regulation, unless extended to statutory instruments expressly, ‘enactment’ meant an Act of Parliament.

Citations:

[1962] 2 QB 260

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Chagos Islanders v The Attorney General, Her Majesty’s British Indian Ocean Territory Commissioner QBD 9-Oct-2003
The Chagos Islands had been a British dependent territory since 1814. The British government repatriated the islanders in the 1960s, and the Ilois now sought damages for their wrongful displacement, misfeasance, deceit, negligence and to establish a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 29 April 2022; Ref: scu.186667