Category: Limitation

St Pancras and Humanist Housing Association Ltd v Leonard: CA 17 Dec 2008

The claimant sought possession of a garage. The defendant claimed adverse possession.
Held: The defendant’s appeal against an order for possession failed. The defendant had attended a meeting where his behaviour had allowed other parties to rely to their detriment on the paper title. The judge had found him estopped from asserting ownership inconsistent with that behaviour and the conclusion was well founded and unappealable.
[2008] EWCA Civ 1442
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Willmott v Barber ChD 19-Jun-1880
In 1869 Barber granted a 99-year lease of three acres of land in east London, subject to a covenant against assignment or sub-letting without consent. In 1874, in breach of covenant, he sub-let one acre on an annual tenancy to Willmott (who owned a . .
Cited – Armstrong v Sheppard and Short Ltd CA 1959
The plaintiff had a path at the rear of his property. The defendant constructed a sewer under the path, and asked the plaintiff for permission. He gave it informally, not knowing at the time that he owned the land. The sewer was constructed. Though . .
Cited – Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd ChD 1981
The fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine of estoppel. In the light of the more recent cases, the principle ‘requires a very much broader approach which is . .
Cited – Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd and Another v Cobbe HL 30-Jul-2008
The parties agreed in principle for the sale of land with potential development value. Considerable sums were spent, and permission achieved, but the owner then sought to renegotiate the deal.
Held: The appeal succeeded in part. The finding . .
Cited – Cobbe v Yeomans Row Management Ltd and Others ChD 25-Feb-2005
Principles for Proprietary Estoppel
A developer claimed to have agreed that upon obtaining necessary planning permissions for land belonging to the respondents, he would purchase the land at a price reflecting its new value. The defendant denied that any legally enforceable agreement . .
Cited – Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich CA 1981
A combination of defences based on delay was pleaded in a passing off action objecting to the use of a name which the defendants had been using without objection for many years. A permanent injunction was claimed.
Held: Oliver LJ said as to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 September 2021; Ref: scu.278822

Bradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid: CA 22 Jul 2005

The claimant sought recovery of a shortfall having sold the defendant’s house for a sum insufficient to clear the mortgage debt, and produced two letters which they claimed acknowledged the debt and restarted the limitation period running. The defendant said they were written without prejudice and were inadmissible. The lender appealed.
Held: The lender’s appeal failed. The letters in issue though not marked without prejudice were in fact so, and the judge’s decision was correct. Each such case must be heard on its particular facts.
[2005] EWCA Civ 1080
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 20(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Cutts v Head and Another CA 7-Dec-1983
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining . .
Cited – Unilever plc v Procter and Gamble Company CA 4-Nov-1999
The defendant’s negotiators had asserted in an expressly ‘without prejudice’ meeting, that the plaintiff was infringing its patent and they threatened to bring an action for infringement. The plaintiff sought to bring a threat action under section . .
Cited – Muller and Another v Linsley and Mortimer (A Firm) CA 8-Dec-1994
The plaintiff sued his former solicitors for professional negligence. The damages he sought to recover related to loss he suffered when dismissed as a director of a private company leading to a forced sale of his shares in the company. The plaintiff . .
Cited – Rush and Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council and Another HL 1988
Use of ‘Without Prejudice Save as to Costs”
A sub-contractor sought payment from the appellants under a construction contract for additional expenses incurred through disruption and delay. The appellants said they were liable to pay the costs, and were entitled to re-imbursement from the . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Bradford and Bingley Plc v Rashid HL 12-Jul-2006
Disapplication of Without Prejudice Rules
The House was asked whether a letter sent during without prejudice negotiations which acknowledged a debt was admissible to restart the limitation period. An advice centre, acting for the borrower had written, in answer to a claim by the lender for . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 29 August 2021; Ref: scu.229726

Sheldon and Others v R H M Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd: QBD 8 Dec 1993

Deliberate concealment could prevent the limitation period from running.
Times 08-Dec-1993
Limitation Act 1980 32
England and Wales
Citing:
Appealed to – Sheldon and Others v R H Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd and Others CA 1-Jul-1994
Concealment by Defendant after the event does not stop time running against Plaintiff. . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Sheldon and Others v R H Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd and Others CA 1-Jul-1994
Concealment by Defendant after the event does not stop time running against Plaintiff. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 August 2021; Ref: scu.89214

Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Barbrack Ltd: HL 1987

A two-stage test is to be applied by a court, first ascertaining if there are good reasons for extending time and second weighing all relevant factors and balancing the hardship between the parties before deciding whether the writ should be extended as a matter of discretion. Lord Brandon referred to an ‘accrued right of limitation’ when considering the correctness of a right being extended. It is not possible to define or circumscribe the scope of the expression ‘good reason’.
Lord Brandon (with whom the other members of the House of Lords agreed) formulated three categories of cases in which an application for an extension of time for service might be made. He said: ‘Category (1) cases are where the application for extension is made at a time when the writ is still valid and before the relevant limitation period has expired. Category (2) cases are where the application for extension is made at a time when the writ is still valid but the relevant period of limitation has expired. Category (3) cases are where the application for extension is made at a time when the writ has ceased to be valid and the relevant period of limitation has expired’ and ‘Good reason is necessary for an extension in both category (2) cases and category (3) cases. But in category (3) cases the applicant for an extension has an extra difficulty to overcome, in that he must also give a satisfactory explanation for his failure to apply for extension before the validity of the writ expired. The decision whether an extension should be allowed or disallowed is a discretionary one for the judge who deals with the relevant application. Jones v Jones shows that, in exercising that discretion, the judge is entitled to have regard to the balance of hardship. In doing so, he may well need to consider whether allowing an extension will cause prejudice to the defendant in all of the circumstances of the case.’
Lord Brandon
[1987] AC 597, [1987] 2 Lloyds Rep 1, [1987] 2 WLR 1053
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Binning Bros Limited (In Liquidation) v Thomas Eggar Verrall Bowles (a Firm) CA 11-Nov-1997
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.241595

Kleinwort Benson Ltd v South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council: ChD 1994

A claim for money had and received fell within section 5 Limitation Act, should be treated with caution. Hobhouse J said: ‘The cause of action in money had and received arises when the relevant money is paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.’
As to the general claim for recovery after unjust enrichment: ‘The position is therefore that if a plaintiff is entitled to a proprietary remedy against a defendant who has been unjustly enriched, the court may but is not bound to order the repayment of the sum with compound interest. If on the other hand the plaintiff is only entitled to a personal remedy which will be the case where, although there was initially a fiduciary relationship and the payer was entitled in equity to treat the sum received by the payee as his, the payer’s, money and trace it, but because of subsequent developments he is no longer able to trace the sum in the hands of the payee, then there is no subject matter to which the rationale on which the compound interest is awarded can be applied. The payee cannot be shown to have a fund belonging to the payer or to have used it to make profits for himself. The legal analysis which is the basis of the award of compound interest is not applicable. (It is possible that in some cases there might be an intermediate position where it could be demonstrated that the fiduciary had, over part of the period, profited from holding a fund as a fiduciary even though he no longer held the fund at the date of trial and that in such a case the court might make some order equivalent to requiring him to account for those profits; but that is not the situation which I am asked to consider in the present case.)’
Hobhouse J
[1994] 4 All ER 972
Limitation Act 1980 5
England and Wales
Cited by:
Followed – South Tyneside Metropolitan BC v Svenska International plc 1995
The question was asked as to whether an anticipatory change of position could support a defence to a claim for restitution: ‘save perhaps in exceptional circumstances, the defence of change of position is in principle confined to changes which take . .
Cited – Fuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd and Another ChD 6-Mar-2001
A tenant complained to the landlord about his failure to repair. He ceased paying rent, and the landlord eventually distrained for rent by direct action.
Held: The tenant was unable to claim a legal set-off because there was no context of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.188269

BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd v Chevron Transport (Scotland): HL 18 Oct 2001

A ship owned by the defenders caused substantial damage whilst moored at the claimant’s docks. The claim was made against different members of the defendants as they asserted and denied responsibility. The last company asserted that the claim was now time barred.
Held: Subject to interruption, the limitation period continued to run whatever the cause of the delay. For the purposes of the 1847 Act, any charterer, including a bareboat charterer was not the ‘owner’ of a vessel.
Lord Slynn of Hadley Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Clyde Lord Hobhouse of Wood-borough Lord Millett
Times 19-Oct-2001, Gazette 22-Nov-2001, [2001] UKHL 50, 2001 SLT 1394, 2002 SC (HL) 19, 2001 SCLR 1029, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2002] 1 LLR 77, 2001 GWD 33-1316, [2003] 1 AC 197, [2001] 3 WLR 949
House of Lords, Bailii
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 6(4), Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 74, Zetland County Council Act 1974 4
Scotland
Citing:
Cited – Playa Larga (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) v I Congreso del Partido (Owners) QBD 1978
The trading or commercial activities of states are not protected by state immunity. The basic principle of international law is that all states are equal, the rule is ‘par in parem non habet imperium’. . .
Cited – Workington Harbour and Dock Board v Towerfield (Owners) (‘The Towerfield’) HL 1951
The occasions upon which the master is called upon to exercise his reserve of authority either by interfering with the conduct of the ship or by taking the navigation out of the hands of a competent pilot are rare and should the master exercise that . .
Cited – Edgington v Fitzmaurice CA 7-Mar-1885
False Prospectus – Issuers liable in Deceit
The directors of a company issued a prospectus, falsely stating that the proceeds were to be used to complete alterations to the buildings of the company, to purchase horses and vans and to develop the trade of the company. In fact it was to pay off . .
At Outer House – BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd v Chevron Shipping Company; Same v Chevron Tankers (Bermuda) Ltd; Same v Chevron Transport Corporation OHCS 26-Jan-1999
Where an action had been delayed beyond the five year prescription period because of an error induced by the party sued, the prescriptive period did not restart until the party was disabused of its mistake. . .
Appeal from – BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd v Chevron Shipping Company and Chevron Tankers (Bermuda) Ltd and Chevron Transport Corporation SCS 13-Apr-2000
. .

Cited by:
Cited – Sawyer v Atari Interactive Inc ChD 1-Nov-2005
The claimant owned the copyright in several successful computer games. He had granted licenses for the use of the software, which licences were assigned to the defendants. Disputes arose as to the calculation of royalty payments, and the claimant . .
Cited – Hayward v Zurich Insurance Company Plc SC 27-Jul-2016
The claimant had won a personal injury case and the matter had been settled with a substantial payout by the appellant insurance company. The company now said that the claimant had grossly exaggerated his injury, and indeed wasfiully recovered at . .
See Also – BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd v Chevron Shipping Company Chevron Transport Corporation Chevron Tankers (Bermuda) Limited OHCS 13-Nov-2002
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 August 2021; Ref: scu.166630

Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others, Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank Plc (No 2): HL 8 Feb 2001

Part-time workers claimed that they had been unlawfully excluded from occupational pension schemes because membership was dependent on an employee working a minimum number of hours per week and that that was discriminatory because a considerably higher proportion of part-time workers were women.
Held: The restriction on claims under the Act for membership of a pension scheme to a period of two years was incompatible with Community law, since it would deprive many of any substantial opportunity to claim. The effect was disproportionate in its effect on women. The limitation period requiring a claim to be made within six months was not incompatible in the same way or at all.
Lord Slynn explained the meaning of the ECJ judgment: ‘A stable employment relationship
The employees concerned in these appeals were variously employed, some under consecutive, but separate, contracts of service with breaks in between (e.g. teachers on a termly or academic year contract); some were regularly employed over a long period on this basis, others were not regularly employed but were employed from time to time and in that category some had what has been called an ‘umbrella’ contract. Where there is an ‘umbrella’ contract there is an ongoing contractual relationship but in the other cases there are separate contracts of employment. The Employment Appeal Tribunal . . and the Court of Appeal . . held that s 2(4) was dealing with specific contracts so that as a matter of interpretation a claim could only be brought in respect of employment in existence within the six months preceding the reference of the claim to the industrial tribunal. Your Lordships . . agreed with that interpretation but the question inevitably arose as to whether or not such interpretation meant that s 2(4) was incompatible with art 119. The Court of Justice, whilst accepting that time limits could be imposed in the interests of legal certainty, considered: ‘Whilst it is true that legal certainty also requires that it be possible to fix precisely the starting point of a limitation period, the fact nevertheless remains that, in the case of successive short-term contracts of the kind referred to in the third question, setting the starting point of the limitation period at the end of each contract renders the exercise of the right conferred by article 119 of the Treaty excessively difficult.
Where, however, there is a stable relationship resulting from a succession of short-term contracts concluded at regular intervals in respect of the same employment to which the same pension scheme applies, it is possible to fix a precise starting point for the limitation period.
There is no reason why that starting point should not be fixed as the date on which the sequence of such contracts has been interrupted through the absence of one or more of the features that characterise a stable employment relationship of that kind, either because the periodicity of such contracts has been broken or because the new contract does not relate to the same employment as that to which the same pension scheme applies.’
Accordingly, it is clear that where there are intermittent contracts of service without a stable employment relationship, the period of six months runs from the end of each contract of service, but where such contracts are concluded at regular intervals in respect of the same employment regularly in a stable employment relationship, the period runs from the end of the last contract forming part of that relationship.’
Lord Slynn of Hadley Lord Goff of Chieveley Lord Nolan Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Clyde
Gazette 08-Mar-2001, Times 09-Feb-2001, [2001] UKHL 5, [2001] 2 WLR 448, [2001] ICR 217, [2001] Emp LR 256, [2001] 3 All ER 947, [2001] 2 AC 455, [2001] IRLR 237, [2001] Pens LR 39, [2001] OPLR 1, [2001] 1 CMLR 46
House of Lords, Bailii
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 Sch 1 Part 1, Occupational Pension Schemes (Equal Access to Membership) Regulations 1976 (1976 No 142) 12, ECTreaty (OJ 1992 C 224, p 6) Art 119, Equal Pay Act 1970 2(4) 2(5)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland (Judgment) ECJ 16-Dec-1976
‘the right of individuals to rely on the directly effective provisions of the Treaty before national courts is only a minimum guarantee and is not sufficient in itself to ensure the full and complete implementation of the Treaty’ . .
See Also – Fletcher and others and Preston and others v Midland Bank Plc and Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust Secretary of State for Health and others EAT 24-Jun-1996
EAT Equal Pay Act – Addendum to principal judgment. Part timers’ claims for membership of pension schemes only made out of time.
EAT Equal Pay Act – (no sub-topic). . .
Returned from ECJ – Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others; Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc ECJ 16-May-2000
ECJ Social policy – Men and women – Equal pay – Membership of an occupational pension scheme – Part-time workers – Exclusion – National procedural rules – Principle of effectiveness – Principle of equivalence. . .
See Also – Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS and Others; Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank Plc HL 26-Feb-1998
‘Employment’ in context of a sex discrimination claim referred to a current employment contract even in context of there having been a series of repeated contracts of employment. The question was referred to the European Court of Justice. . .
See Also – Preston and others v Wolverhampton Healthcare Trust Secretary of State for Health CA 13-Feb-1997
. .

Cited by:
At HL – Preston and others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and others EAT 3-Nov-2003
EAT Judge McMullen QC adopted a limited view of the scope of the new principle of stable employment set out at the ECJ and HL. He thought it was intended ‘to rescue employees who do not have a permanent job’; and . .
See Also – Preston and others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others (No 3) CA 7-Oct-2004
The claimants had had their employments transferred to another body under TUPE. They complained that their pension rights had been discriminatory. The employer appealed a finding that their claim had not been out of time.
Held: The effect of . .
See Also – Powerhouse Retail Ltd and others v Burroughs and others; Preston and others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and others (No 3) HL 8-Mar-2006
The appellants said they had been had been discriminated against on the grounds of their sex by the TUPE Regulations. Their discrimination cases had been dismissed as out of time.
Held: The employees’ appeals were dismissed: ‘A statute cannot . .
At HL – Bainbridge and others v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council EAT 23-Mar-2007
EAT Practice and Procedure – Compromise
Equal Pay Act – Work rated equivalent; Damages/Compensation
This case raises three issues, two of which are of particular significance in the field of equal . .
Cited – North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust v Fox and Others CA 30-Jun-2010
ncumbria_foxA10
The employer had altered existing employment contracts. The claimants having commenced discrimination claims then sought to add to the existing proceedings comparators from different job groups. The tribunal had been asked whether, given that this . .
Cited – Abdulla and Others v Birmingham City Council QBD 17-Dec-2010
The defendant applied for an order declaring that the claim would better be brought in an employment tribunal and that accordingly the County court should decline jurisdiction.
Held: The application was dismissed: ‘ I reject the submission by . .
Cited – Birmingham City Council v Abdulla and Others SC 24-Oct-2012
Former employees wished to argue that they had been discriminated against whilst employed by the Council. Being out of time for Employment Tribunal Proceedings, they sought to bring their cases in the ordinary courts. The Council now appealed . .
Cited – Totel Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 26-Jul-2018
The taxpayer challenged the ‘pay first’ rule under VAT which required them, before challenging a VAT assessment, first to deposit the VAT said to be due under the assessment.
Held: The appeal failed. There had not been shown any true . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 August 2021; Ref: scu.85027

Browne v Perry: PC 14 Oct 1991

(Antigua and Barbuda) The parties disputed a claim for land by adverse possession.
Held: Any acknowledgement of a paper title must be in writing. Lord Templeman explained the rule against reliance upon oral acknowledgements in adverse possession cases: ‘If an oral acknowledgment were allowed to constitute an interruption litigation would be encouraged and litigants would dispute what was said, by whom and to whom . . Once an acknowledgment has been reduced to writing, there is certainty about the words used and the court need only decide whether the words which have been written amount to an acknowledgment. There is no room for fraud, mistake or failure of memory. The written word speaks for itself.’
Lord Templeman, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Goff, Sir Maurice Casey
[1991] WLR 1297, [1991] UKPC 33
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 S1
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth v George Bigden and Others CA 1-Dec-2000
A block of flats had been occupied over several years by a succession of squatters. The present occupiers appealed an order for possession, and the authority appealed refusal of possession for other flats. The occupiers asserted possessory title. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 July 2021; Ref: scu.187455

Michael Batt Charitable Trust v Adams: ChD 2001

The court looked at what was required to establish adverse possession in a claim for land. Laddie J said: ‘The only factor that appears, at first sight, to point in the direction to exclude anyone, is the fact that Mr Higgs maintained and repaired the fence separating the disputed land from Rushymead . . A fence is a barrier. It keeps things in and it keeps things out. No doubt it is reasonable to assume in many cases that a person who maintains a fence is doing so for both purposes, but that is not necessarily so. Having read all the evidence and the transcript of the cross-examination, there is nothing in this case that suggests that Mr Higgs was doing anything other than putting up a sufficient barrier to keep his livestock in. This also is not unequivocal evidence of an intention to exclude others.’
Laddie J
(2001) 82 P and CR 406, [2001] 2 EGLR 92
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Tower Hamlets v Barrett and Another CA 19-Jul-2005
The defendant tenants appealed an order for them to surrender possession of land which they claimed had been acquired by adverse possession. The buildings, including one which shared a party wall with the building owned by the defendants had been . .
Cited – Inglewood Investments Company Ltd v Baker CA 8-Nov-2002
The court considered a claim for the adverse possesion of land.
Held: Dyson LJ said: ‘to establish a claim of adverse possession for the requisite period of 12 years it is necessary to establish: (1) actual possession; (2) an intention to . .
Cited – Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD 14-Mar-2007
The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
Cited – Chambers v London Borough of Havering CA 20-Dec-2011
chambers-HaveringCA2011
The defendant appealed against an order for him to surrender possession of land he had claimed by adverse possession. The Council was the registered proprietor. The defendant said he had used the land since 1981 for dumping of motor vehicle parts. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 July 2021; Ref: scu.228936

Ayr v St Andrew’s Ambulance Association: SCS 22 Dec 1917

An ambulance association, incorporated by royal charter, sued for damages in respect of injuries sustained through the alleged negligence of one of its servants, pleaded the time limit contained in section 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893. There was no averment that the Association was exercising an authority or discharging a public duty imposed upon it. Held ( aff. judgment of Lord Cullen) that the Act did not apply.
[1917] SLR 160
Bailii
Scotland

Updated: 29 July 2021; Ref: scu.616845

J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom: ECHR 8 Jun 2004

Admissibility
Pellonpaa P
[2004] ECHR 727, [2005] ECHR 921
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights A1P1, Limitation Act 1980, Land Registration Act 1925
Human Rights
Cited by:
Admissibility – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-2005
The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the . .
Admissibility – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Aug-2007
UK Advers Possession Law – Not Compliant
The claimant had said that the UK law which allowed it to lose land by virtue of twelve year’s occupation by a squatter, interfered with its right to ownership of property.
Held: The UK law on adverse possession did comply with the Convention. . .
Admissibility – Pye v United Kingdom ECHR 8-Nov-2006
Press announcement – Grand Chamber hearing . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 July 2021; Ref: scu.451406

J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom: ECHR 15 Nov 2005

The claimants had been the registered proprietors of land, they lost it through the adverse possession of former tenants holding over. They claimed that the law had dispossessed them of their lawful rights.
Held: The cumulative effect of the provisions of the 1980 and 1925 legislation was to deprive the claimant of their possessions without compensation. The requirement on them to recover possession was an excessive burden and upset the fair balance between the demands of the public interest and the right of the claimants to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. ‘The Court does not share the Government’s view that the operation of the legislation is to be regarded as an incident of, or limitation on, the applicants’ property right at the time of its acquisition, such that Article 1 ceased to be engaged when the relevant provisions took effect and the property right was lost after 12 years of adverse possession. It is true that the relevant provisions of the legislation existed at the time the property was acquired by the applicants and that the consequences for the applicants’ title to the land of 12 years adverse possession were known. However, Article 1 does not cease to be engaged merely because a person acquires property subject to the provisions of the general law, the effect of which is in certain specified events to bring the property right to an end, and because those events have in fact occurred. Whether it does so will depend on whether the law in question is properly to be seen as qualifying or limiting the property right at the moment of acquisition or, whether it is rather to be seen as depriving the owner of an existing right at the point when the events occur and the law takes effect. It is only in the former case that Article 1 may be held to have no application.’
44302/02, Times 21-Nov-2005, [2005] 3 EGLR 1, [2007] ECHR 5559, 43 EHRR 3, [2005] 47 EG 145, [2006] RVR 188, [2005] 49 ERG 90, (2006) 43 EHRR 3, 19 BHRC 705
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980, Land Registration Act 1925, European Convention on Human Rights A1P1
Human Rights
Citing:
At House of Lords – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
At first instance – J A Pye and Another v Graham and Another ChD 14-Mar-2000
The fact alone of being prepared to take a licence of land would not defeat an application for adverse possession, but a request for a licence would be relevant. The adverse possession commenced from the time when the licence expired, given that a . .
At Court of Appeal – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Caroline Graham and Another CA 6-Feb-2001
Where a tenant under a grazing license had stayed over after the end of the tenancy, and had been refused a renewed licence, and had continued to graze the land for over twelve years, the mere overstaying was not enough to evidence an animus . .
Cited – Gasus Dosier-Und Fodertechnik Gmbh v The Netherlands ECHR 23-Feb-1995
Even where an interference in property rights involved the complete loss of a person’s economic interest in an asset for the benefit of the State, an absence of compensation might still be compatible with Article 1. ‘The Court recalls that the . .
Cited – Beyeler v Italy ECHR 5-Jan-2000
The concept of ‘possessions’ in Art. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of physical goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law, and requires the examination of the question whether the . .
Cited – Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer ChD 23-Mar-2005
The paper owner sought possession of land. The defendant said he had acquired a possessory title. The land was registered.
Held: The claimant’s human rights under article 1 were engaged. To be justifiable, the interference in that right had to . .
Cited – Bruncrona v Finland ECHR 16-Nov-2004
ECHR Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) – Preliminary objection dismissed (six month period, non-exhaustion of domestic remedies); Violation of P1-1;Just satisfaction reserved. . .
Cited – James and Others v The United Kingdom ECHR 21-Feb-1986
The claimants challenged the 1967 Act, saying that it deprived them of their property rights when lessees were given the power to purchase the freehold reversion.
Held: Article 1 (P1-1) in substance guarantees the right of property. Allowing a . .
Cited – Papachelas v Greece ECHR 25-Mar-1999
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Preliminary objection rejected (six month period); No violation of Art. 6-1; No violation of P1-1 (amount of compensation); Violation of P1-1 (presumption); Costs and . .
Cited – Hakansson And Sturesson v Sweden ECHR 21-Feb-1990
Where agricultural property is bought subject to the conditions of the general law, and the purchaser is subsequently obliged to re-sell the property at a substantially lower price, the Court will consider the lawfulness and purpose of the . .
Cited – Jahn And Others v Germany ECHR 30-Jun-2005
A deprivation of property without compensation can, in certain circumstances, be compatible with Article 1. . .
Cited – Jokela v Finland ECHR 21-May-2002
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of P1-1; No violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to witnesses; No violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to reasons for decision; Pecuniary damage – financial . .
Cited – The Former King Of Greece And Others v Greece ECHR 23-Nov-2000
Hudoc Violation of P1-1; Not necessary to examine Art. 14 + P1-1; Just satisfaction reserved . .
Cited – AGOSI v The United Kingdom ECHR 24-Oct-1986
Krugerrand coins were seized by the Commissioners and the claimant was unsuccessful in obtaining their restoration under what is now section 152(b) of the 1979 Act. It was argued that the request for restoration of the coins amounted to a . .
Cited – Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece ECHR 9-Dec-1994
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion, estoppel); Violation of Art. 6-1; Violation of P1-1; Pecuniary damage – financial award; Costs and expenses partial . .
Cited – Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) HL 10-Jul-2003
The respondent appealed against a finding that the provision which made a loan agreement completely invalid for lack of compliance with the 1974 Act was itself invalid under the Human Rights Act since it deprived the respondent of its property . .
Cited – Gudmundsson v Iceland ECHR 1996
A revocation of a licence is not a deprivation of property, but rather a control of its use within the second paragraph of article 1 under a proportionate and Convention compliant scheme . .
Cited – Stubbings and Others v The United Kingdom ECHR 22-Oct-1996
There was no human rights breach where the victims of sex abuse had been refused a right to sue for damages out of time. The question is whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law: . .
Admissibility – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 8-Jun-2004
Admissibility . .

Cited by:
Cited – Oxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council and others HL 24-May-2006
Application had been made to register as a town or village green an area of land which was largely a boggy marsh. The local authority resisted the application wanting to use the land instead for housing. It then rejected advice it received from a . .
Appeal from – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Aug-2007
UK Advers Possession Law – Not Compliant
The claimant had said that the UK law which allowed it to lose land by virtue of twelve year’s occupation by a squatter, interfered with its right to ownership of property.
Held: The UK law on adverse possession did comply with the Convention. . .
Cited – Ofulue and Another v Bossert CA 29-Jan-2008
The claimants appealed an order finding that the defendant had acquired their land by adverse possession. They said that the defendant had asserted in defence to possession proceedings that they were tenants, and that this contradicted an intent to . .
First Hearing – Pye v United Kingdom ECHR 8-Nov-2006
Press announcement – Grand Chamber hearing . .
Cited – JP Whitter (Water Well Engineers) Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 13-Jun-2018
The taxpayers registration under the Construction Industry Scheme had been withdrawn. The Court was now asked whether HMRC are obliged, or at least entitled, to take into account the impact on the taxpayer’s business of the cancellation of its . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 July 2021; Ref: scu.235149

Bundesanstalt fur Landwirtschaft und Ernahrung v Pfeifer and Langen: ECJ 29 Mar 2012

ECJ Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 – Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – Articles 3 and 4 – Administrative measures – Recovery of wrongly obtained advantages – Default and compensatory interest due under national law – Application of the limitation rules in Regulation No 2988/95 to the recovery of default interest – Start of the limitation period – Concept of suspension – Concept of interruption
Bonichot P
[2012] EUECJ C-564/10, C-564/10
Bailii
European
Citing:
See Also – Bundesanstalt fur Landwirtschaft und Ernahrung v Pfeifer and Langen ECJ 26-Jan-2012
(Opinion) Protection of the financial interests of the European Union – Limitation period for claims of interest due under national law in addition to reimbursement of amounts of aid wrongly received – Interpretation and applicability of Article 3 . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.460436

Banjo v London Borough of Brent: CA 17 Mar 2005

The tenant had occupied the premises under a long lease which expired by effluxion of time. The landlord failed to take any steps to retake possession, and the tenant continued as a tenant at will, paying no rent. The landlord eventually issued proceedings, and the tenant objected that he had become a secure tenant, having satisfied sections 80 and 81 of the 1985 Act.
Held: The Act did not operate to give a tenant a secure tenancy where the occupier had ceased to be a tenant before the court was called upon for a possession order. Here the tenancy at will was determined by the notice to quit, and that the time the court made its decsion, there was no tenancy which could become secure.
Thorpe, Chadwick, Buxton LJJ
[2005] EWCA Civ 292, Times 29-Mar-2005, [2005] 1 WLR 2520
Bailii
Housing Act 1985 80 81, Leasehold Reform Act 1967
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Chamberlain v Farr CA 1943
A prospective purchaser of a house (No 1 Falling Lane) under construction had agreed that, if he were allowed into occupation before completion, he would occupy, pending completion, as tenant at will, paying a weekly sum. In the event, the house not . .
Cited – Javad v Aqil CA 15-May-1990
P in possession – tenancy at will Until Completion
A prospective tenant was allowed into possession and then made periodic payments of rent while negotiations proceeded on the terms of a lease to be granted to him. The negotiations broke down.
Held: The tenant’s appeal failed. It was inferred . .
Cited – Harrison v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council CA 1981
The court considered the relationship between statutory provisions and the terms of a tenancy agreement.
Held: Brandon LJ said: ‘In the various Housing and rent Acts the legislature did not seek to interfere with the common law principles on . .
Cited – Francis Jackson Developments Ltd v Stemp CA 1943
The landlord had served a notice determining a tenancy at will before commencing proceedings for possession.
Held: The provisions of the Rent Acts applied to premises let on a tenancy at will. Lord Greene: ‘In my opinion this tenancy was a . .
Cited – Remon v City of London Real Property Co Ltd CA 1921
The court was asked whether the plaintiff, a tenant of rooms to which (once enacted) the Act of 1920 applied and who had been excluded from possession by the landlord’s re-entry on the day that the Act came into force following service of a notice . .
Cited – Crane v Morris 1965
A tenancy at will can be determined by either party on his expressly or impliedly intimating to the other his wish that the tenancy should be at an end. The issuing of a writ claiming possession is a sufficient demand for possession to bring the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.223628

Lord Bishop of Leeds v Dixon Coles and Gill (A Firm) and Others: ChD 28 Oct 2020

The claimants had been clients of the defendant solicitors former firmer. A partner of the defendants had stolen large sums of money in the names of the claimants from the firm’s client account. The defendants themselves were not said to have been in any way party to the thefts. Some thefts predated the claim by more than six years and the defendants sought to rely on limitation law as a defence.
Held: The partners, though innocent could not rely on limitation as requested.
His Honour Judge Saffman
[2020] EWHC 2809 (Ch)
Bailii
Partnership Act 1890
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Moore v Knight ChD 18-Dec-1890
The court considered the liability of partners in a solicitors’ firm for embezzlement of client money by an employee of the firm. Once the true position became known, after many years, the client sued the surviving partners, who relied on . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Dixon Coles and Gill (A Former Firm) v Baines, Bishop of Leeds and Another CA 20-Jul-2021
Innocent co-trustee not liable for Default
Proceedings were brought by former clients against their former solicitors. One of the partners stole money held in the firm’s client account on behalf of the claimants. The other two partners were entirely innocent of, and in no way implicated in, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.655613

Moore v Knight: ChD 18 Dec 1890

The court considered the liability of partners in a solicitors’ firm for embezzlement of client money by an employee of the firm. Once the true position became known, after many years, the client sued the surviving partners, who relied on limitation, and in particular section 8. Stirling J noted that the second exception in the section might well apply, since the money had been received by the members of the firm and converted to the use of the firm, but he did not decide the case on that footing. Instead he based his decision on the concealment of the fraud, following Blair v Bromley (1847) 2 Ph 354. Interest had been paid to the client all along as if the fund had been invested as it should have been. That payment of interest was the act of the partnership, so that the partners were all affected by the implicit representation that the funds had been invested as they should have been, thereby concealing the fraud, even though they were innocent of the fraud. It was not argued that the first exception to section 8 applied, and this is therefore of no assistance on the application of the phrase ‘party or privy’.
Sterling J said: ‘Money came into the hands of the firm of Messrs Bromley without fraud and that one of the firm afterwards committed a fraud in respect of it, but made misrepresentations (some of which were attributable to the firm) which prevented the fraud from being discovered until the period fixed by the Statute of Limitations had expired. It was held that the innocent partner was deprived of the benefit of the statute by those representations which bound him as a partner. The decision rests on principles of the law relating to representation and to partnership, not on those which relate to trusts.’
Sterling J
(1891) 1 Ch 547, [1890] UKLawRpCh 172
Commonlii
Trustee Act 1888 8
England and Wales
Cited by:
Distinguished – Thorne v Heard CA 24-Jan-1894
A first mortgagee, Heard, had sold property under the power of sale and had retained a solicitor, Searle, to act in relation to the sale. Searle received the proceeds of sale, satisfied the first mortgage debt, but retained the balance, falsely . .
Cited – Lord Bishop of Leeds v Dixon Coles and Gill (A Firm) and Others ChD 28-Oct-2020
The claimants had been clients of the defendant solicitors former firmer. A partner of the defendants had stolen large sums of money in the names of the claimants from the firm’s client account. The defendants themselves were not said to have been . .
Cited – Dixon Coles and Gill (A Former Firm) v Baines, Bishop of Leeds and Another CA 20-Jul-2021
Innocent co-trustee not liable for Default
Proceedings were brought by former clients against their former solicitors. One of the partners stole money held in the firm’s client account on behalf of the claimants. The other two partners were entirely innocent of, and in no way implicated in, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.666142

Blair v Bromley: ChD 18 Nov 1846

Two solicitors having entered into partnership, each of them continued to attend to the business of his former clients, but on the partnership account; and one of the partners having proposed to invest a sum of money belonging to a client in a certain mortgage, the proposal was agreed to by the client, and the money was paid to the joint account of the partnership, at their bankers, for the purpose of the investment. The negotiations for the mortgage were broken off by the proposed mortgagor, but the partner by whom the proposal had been made to the client untruly represented to the client that the mortgage had been effected, and thenceforward continued to pay the interest as if it had actually been done. Although the banking account was kept in the name of the firm, the monies standing to the account belonged exclusively to the partner who committed the fraud ; he alone attended to and had the control of the account, and the fraud was unknown to the other partner. Five years after the receipt of the money from the client the partnership was dissolved ; and ten years after the dissolution of the partnership, the partner who had committed the fraud became bankrupt, and the client, who, from the time of the dissolution until the bankruptcy, had continued to employ him as his solicitor, discovered the fraud. The client then filed his bill against the other partner to recover the money.
Held, that the defendant was originally liable to the Plaintiff for the money received by the firm ; that his original liability was continued, as well after as before the dissolution of the partnership, by the fraudulent representations of his former partner; and that in equity the limitation in bar of the claim did not begin to run in favour of the Defendant until the time when the client discovered the fraud.
That the fraud and misrepresentation of one of the partners entitled the client to relief in equity against the other, not only if the case was one in which the client might have recovered in an action at Law against such other partner, but also if the remedy at law against the other partner was barred by the lapse of time.
Sir James Wigram VC
[1846] EngR 1082, (1846) 5 Hare 542, (1846) 67 ER 1026
Commonlii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Blair v Bromley CA 3-Jul-1847
Held; . .
Cited – Dixon Coles and Gill (A Former Firm) v Baines, Bishop of Leeds and Another CA 20-Jul-2021
Innocent co-trustee not liable for Default
Proceedings were brought by former clients against their former solicitors. One of the partners stole money held in the firm’s client account on behalf of the claimants. The other two partners were entirely innocent of, and in no way implicated in, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.302977

Blair v Bromley: CA 3 Jul 1847

Held;
Cottenham LC
[1847] EngR 684, (1847) 2 Ph 354, (1847) 41 ER 979
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Blair v Bromley ChD 18-Nov-1846
Two solicitors having entered into partnership, each of them continued to attend to the business of his former clients, but on the partnership account; and one of the partners having proposed to invest a sum of money belonging to a client in a . .

Cited by:
Cited – Dixon Coles and Gill (A Former Firm) v Baines, Bishop of Leeds and Another CA 20-Jul-2021
Innocent co-trustee not liable for Default
Proceedings were brought by former clients against their former solicitors. One of the partners stole money held in the firm’s client account on behalf of the claimants. The other two partners were entirely innocent of, and in no way implicated in, . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.301300

Cottrell v Price: 1960

The rights of a secured creditor against his security were held to be rights ‘outside the bankruptcy’. As to the case of Benzon: ‘The importance of that case and of the way in which the doctrine is stated in the judgment of the Court is that it makes it clear that it is only ‘in the bankruptcy’ that the statute ceases to operate. It does not have any effect on the operation of the statute on any rights or remedies which are unaffected by the bankruptcy.’
Buckley J
[1960] 1 WLR 1097
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – In re Benzon CA 1914
Limitation applies where a claim is not against a bankrupt’s estate or is not a claim ‘in the bankruptcy’. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Doodes v Gotham, Perry ChD 17-Nov-2005
The trustee in bankruptcy had taken a charge on the property in 1992 to support the bankruptcy in 1988. He sought to enforce it in 2005. The chargor appealed an order which denied he was protected by limitation.
Held: The appeal succeeded. . .
Cited – Anglo-Manx Group Ltd v Aitken 2002
The court discussed the case of Cottrell v Price: ‘There was considerable argument before me as to what is meant by the words ‘in the bankruptcy’ as distinct from the words ‘outside the bankruptcy’. Mr Adair submitted that the question can be . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.235332

Various Claimants v G4S Plc: ChD 10 Mar 2021

Questions about the ability of claimants to have themselves added to a claim after a limitation period has expired and about amendments to the descriptions of claimants (to use a neutral term) after service and after the expiry of the limitation period.
Mann J
[2021] EWHC 524 (Ch), [2021] 4 WLR 46, [2021] WLR(D) 151
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales

Updated: 16 July 2021; Ref: scu.659560

Housemaker Services Ltd v Cole and Another: ChD 7 Apr 2017

Part 8 Claim seeking a direction from the Court that the period of 608 days from November 2014 to July 2016, during which it was struck off the register and thus ceased to exist, should be discounted for the purposes of limitation in relation to the Claimant’s claim against the Defendants in respect of unpaid invoices delivered for building services.
Matthews HHJ
[2017] EWHC 753 (Ch)
Bailii
Companies Act 2006 1028(3)
England and Wales
Cited by:
See Also – Housemaker Services Ltd and Another v Cole and Another ChD 26-Apr-2017
Appeal from limitation direction, and third party costs order: ‘in order to make it just to order a director to pay the costs of unsuccessful company litigation, it is necessary to show something more. This might be, for example, that the claim is . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 July 2021; Ref: scu.581734

David T Morrison and Co Ltd (T/A Gael Home Interiors) v ICL Plastics Ltd and Another: SCS 14 Mar 2013

Extra Division – Inner House – An explosion at the defenders’ neighbouring premises had damaged those of the pursuer. The defenders now appealed against a finding that the claim was out of time calculated from the time when it had sufficient knowledge of the facts to state a claim.
Held: The Court recalled the interlocutor below and allowed a proof before answer on prescription and the effect of section 11(3). They followed the approach in GGHB and Glasper but rejected the submission that the fact that there had been an explosion in a building meant that it had been caused by negligence. Because the maxim of res ipsa loquitur applied where the cause of the accident was not known, an action based on the maxim was the antithesis of the requirement in Glasper, namely ‘awareness, not only of the fact of loss having occurred, but of the fact that it is loss caused by negligence.’
Lady Paton, Lord Mackay of Drumadoon and Lady Smith
[2013] ScotCS CSIH – 19, 2013 SC 391, 2013 GWD 11-237, 2013 SLT 413
Bailii
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 11(3)
Scotland
Citing:
See Also – ICL Plastics Ltd and Others, Re Application for Judicial Review SCS 11-Mar-2005
The applicants were concerned at the decision to exclude them from their premises to investigate the cause of an explosion leading to the collapse of the factory. . .
Appeal from – David T Morrison and Co Ltd v ICL Plastics Ltd and Others SCS 9-Mar-2012
Outer House – Opinion – In May 2004 an explosion at the defenders factory caused nine deaths. A pipeline carrying LPG gas had not been assessed for risks. Morrison owned neighbouring premises which were damaged. They began an action for damages. The . .
Cited – Glasper v Rodger SCS 1996
First Division – Inner House – Lord President Hope said: ‘In our opinion the lack of awareness which requires to be established for the purposes of section 11(3) of the 1973 Act is a lack of awareness that a loss has occurred caused by an act, . .
Cited – Dunlop v McGowans HL 6-Mar-1980
The landlord of a block of flats needed vacant possession to pursue redevelopment. The respondent solicitors failed to give the necessary notice in good time, delaying the development by a year. The landlord appellant delayed five years before . .
Cited – Greater Glasgow Health Board v Baxter Clark and Paul SCS 1990
Outer House Court of Session – Lord Clyde held (obiter) that the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase ’caused as aforesaid’ included the distinct ingredient of causation by negligence: ‘The question is one of the interpretation of section . .
Cited – AMN Group Ltd v Gilcomston North Ltd and others SCS 20-Jun-2008
Outer House – The phrase ‘aware . . that loss, injury or damage caused as aforesaid had occurred’ as meaning ‘aware . . that a stateable prima facie claim . . could properly be advanced against someone’ the resolution of that issue will ultimately . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 July 2021; Ref: scu.472119

Gravgaard v Aldridge and Brownlee (A Firm): CA 9 Dec 2004

After the court had sent its draft judgment to the parties, counsel on each side had written to the court making fresh submissions.
Held: Contentious matters should only be allowed to be re-opened in very limited circumstances once a draft judgment has been issued. In this case, the submissions would not make an alteration to the result of the appeal, though minor textual alterations would be imported.
May LJ, Arden LJ
[2004] EWCA Civ 1529, Times 02-Dec-2004
Bailii
Limitation Act 1980 14A
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Robinson v Fernsby, Scott-Kilvert CA 19-Dec-2003
The judge had drafted his judgment and sent the drafts to the parties for comment. He then received additional written representations from one party, from which he realised that he had made an error, and issued a corrected judgment which a . .

Cited by:
Cited – Hutchinson v Metropolitan Police Commissioner and Another QBD 27-Jul-2005
The claimant sought damages for assault by a probationary constable. The constable had been called to a drunken party for Sainsbury’s employees.
Held: The claimant had been assaulted. Miss Morgan had introduced herself as a police officer, had . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 July 2021; Ref: scu.220163

Matthew and Others v Sedman and Others: SC 21 May 2021

The Respondents were trustees of a trust which could make a claim under a scheme of arrangement. They failed to make a claim on or before the bar date under the scheme of arrangement, which was midnight on Thursday 2 June 2011. The Appellants issued a claim form on Monday 5 June 2017 seeking a remedy from he Respondents for their failure to make the claim. In response, the Respondents argued that the Appellants’ claim was brought after the expiry of the relevant limitation periods.
Lord Hodge, Deputy President, Lady Arden, Lord Sales, Lord Burrows, Lord Stephens
[2021] UKSC 19, [2021] 2 WLR 1232
Bailii, Bailii Press Summary, Bailii Issues and Facts
England and Wales

Updated: 01 July 2021; Ref: scu.663387

Allsop v Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago: PC 28 Jul 2005

(Trinidad and Tobago) ‘from the time of his accident, it was known that the appellant would be permanently disabled. So he was going, ultimately, to be paid a lump sum calculated in accordance with section 5(1)(c)(ii) and (2). As at 3 April 1998, however, the degree of his permanent disability had not been finally determined. So the lump sum could not be calculated and he was still receiving weekly payments. Therefore, as of that date, Petroleum had not discharged their obligation to pay the appellant the appropriate lump sum under the statute. In those circumstances he had not received the ‘compensation payable to him under this Act’ and so the one-year time-bar in section 4(3) did not apply to him. The present proceedings were raised in time.’
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Sir Andrew Leggatt
[2005] ukpc 34
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 28 June 2021; Ref: scu.229325

Boyse (International) Ltd v Natwest Markets Plc and Another: ChD 25 May 2021

Whether the Chief Master was correct to conclude that it was sufficiently clear that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was barred by the provisions of sections 2 and 32(1) of Limitation Act 1980 to justify the grant of summary judgment in favour of the defendants.
Mr Justice Trower
[2021] EWHC 1387 (Ch)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 June 2021; Ref: scu.663049

Sciortino v Beaumont: CA 25 May 2021

The primary issue raised by this second appeal concerns the date when a cause of action in negligence accrues against a barrister who has advised on two separate occasions about the same or similar issues. Is there one single cause of action which accrues when the first negligent advice was given and acted upon (in which case, on the facts of this case, the claim would be statute-barred), or does a separate cause of action – albeit for lesser loss and damage – accrue when the second advice is given and acted upon (in which case the lesser claim here, based on that second advice, would not be statute-barred)?
Coulson LJ
[2021] EWCA Civ 786
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 June 2021; Ref: scu.662795

Spencer v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Moore v Similar: CA 1 Jul 2008

Frankovich claim – arises with measurable loss

Each claimant sought Frankovich damages alleging a failure to implement European law leading to a loss.
Held: Such a claim was available against the government after it had failed to implement the Directive so as to provide them with the required remedy. Such a claim arose as soon as measurable damage arose, and therefore Mr Spencer’s claim was now out of time.
Waller VP Carnwath, Stanley Burnton LJJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 750, Times 24-Jul-2008, [2008] IRLR 911, [2008] PIQR P21, [2008] Eu LR 779, [2008] CP Rep 40, [2009] QB 358, [2008] ICR 1359, [2008] 3 CMLR 15, [2009] RTR 5, [2009] 1 All ER 314, [2009] 2 WLR 593
Bailii
Council Directive 89/391/EEC (OJ 1989 L183/1) 6, Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (SI 1992 No 2051)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – DW Moore and Co Ltd v Ferrier CA 1988
moore_ferrierCA1988
A solicitor was instructed to prepare an agreement providing for the introduction of a new working director into an insurance broking business carried on by a company. His instructions called for the new director to enter into a restrictive covenant . .
Cited – Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) HL 27-Nov-1997
A surveyor’s negligent valuation had led to the plaintiff obtaining what turned out to be inadequate security for his loan. A cause of action against a valuer for his negligent valuation arises when a relevant and measurable loss is first recorded. . .
Cited – Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc and Another CA 30-Oct-1997
A claim in negligence was brought against insurance brokers for failing to advise the claimant of certain matters with the result that an insurance policy entered into by the claimant was voidable for non-disclosure.
Held: The claimant . .
Cited – Francovich v Italy ECJ 9-Nov-1995
ECJ Council Directive 80/987 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer is to be interpreted as applying to all . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.270534

Siddiqui v The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of The University of Oxford: QBD 7 Feb 2018

[2018] EWHC 184 (QB)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Siddiqui v University of Oxford QBD 2016
Kerr J refused an application for him to recuse himself based inter alia on the fact that counsel for the Defendant before him was a member of his former chambers: ‘It is true that I was a member of the same chambers of Mr Milford until June 2015. . .
See Also – Siddiqui v University of Oxford QBD 5-Dec-2016
The University applied to have struck out the claim by the claimant for damages alleging negligence in its teaching leading to a lower class degree than he said he should have been awarded.
Held: Strike out on the basis that the claim was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.604813

Walkin v South Manchester Health Authority: CA 3 Jul 1995

A claim for damages for an unwanted pregnancy occurring after a failed sterilisation. The plaintiff claimed damages for her economic losses. She issued only four years after the birth.
Held: The limitation period ran from the date of conception. Such a claim fell to be treated akin to an action for personal injuries.
Times 03-Jul-1995, [1995] 1 WLR 1543
Limitation Act 1980 11(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Farraj and Another v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust and Another QBD 26-May-2006
The claimants sought damages after the birth of their child with a severe hereditary disease which they said the defendant hospital had failed to diagnose after testing for that disease. The hospital sought a contribution from the company CSL who . .
Cited – Yearworth and others v North Bristol NHS Trust CA 4-Feb-2009
The defendant hospital had custody of sperm samples given by the claimants in the course of fertility treatment. The samples were effectively destroyed when the fridge malfunctioned. Each claimant was undergoing chemotherapy which would prevent them . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.90256

Brooksbank And Another v Smith: 24 Feb 1836

The testatrix died in 1818 leaving a fund in trust, subject to a life interest, for her children in equal shares, with substitutional gifts if any child predeceased her leaving issue. Her daughter Elizabeth did predecease her by two months, but on the death of the life tenant in 1827 the trustees were given incorrect information about the date of Elizabeth’s death and her share (andpound;1,000 nominal of stock) was transferred to her widower instead of to her children. When the mistake was discovered in 1833 the trustees claimed andpound;100 stock (which was all that remained unsold) from Elizabeth’s widower. The bill was issued within six years of discovery of the mistake. Alderson B held that the claim was not statute-barred. He treated it as a proprietary claim based on a mistake of fact.
Alderson B
[1836] EngR 446, (1836) 2 Y and C Ex 59, (1836) 160 ER 311
Commonlii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Smith v Brooksbank 25-Jun-1834
A bequeathed a reversionary interest, expectant on his wife’s death, in a sum of stock to B. B. bequeathed it to C., and C. bequeathed it to D, who, on the death of A’s wife, filed a bill against the trustees to have the stock transferred to him, . .
See Also – Brooksbank v Smith 24-Feb-1836
In this case, trustees under a will, who were solicitors, had by mistake transferred stock to a person not entitled. Baron Alderson said, this being under circumstances of mistake, it appeared clear to him that the Plaintiffs were entitled to . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 March 2021; Ref: scu.314778

West Bank Estates Ltd v Arthur: PC 1967

(From Federal Supreme Court of the West Indies) A claim was made for possessory title to a strip of land, based upon acts of cultivation, the cutting of timber, wood and grass, fishing and growing rice. The trial judge disallowed the claim to a possessory title. The Federal Supreme Court reversed him. They took the view that the respondents had made what was, for persons of their means and class, normal user of the land.
Held: The precise nature of the acts and rights required to amount to possession varies with the nature of the land and all the circumstances. Lord Wilberforce said: ‘The learned judge . . applied his mind correctly to the question whether the respondents had proved ‘sole and undisturbed possession user and enjoyment’ of the disputed strip. As the Federal Supreme Court itself stated, these words convey the same meaning as possession to the exclusion of the true owner. The learned judge gave recognition to the fact that what constitutes possession, adequate to establish a prescriptive claim, may depend upon the physical characteristics of the land. On the other hand, he was, in their Lordships’ view, correct in regarding such acts as cutting timber and grass from time to time as not sufficient to prove the sole possession which is required . . The respondents had, in [the view of the Federal Supreme Court], proved that they had made what was for persons of their means and class normal user of the land . . This does not appear to be a correct approach to the evidence. Admitting the utility of the respondents’ operations, and that they did what was normal for small peasant farmers, this still does not establish a sufficient degree of sole possession and user to satisfy the Ordinance, or carry the matter beyond a user which remains consistent with the possession of the true owner.’
References: [1967] AC 665
Judges: Lord Wilberforce
Jurisdiction: Commonwealth
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Cobham v Frett PC 18-Dec-2000 (Times 24-Jan-01, , , , [2000] UKPC 49, [2001] 1 WLR 1775)
    (British Virgin Islands) Two issues arose. First, what was the consequence of inordinate delay between a judge hearing a case and giving his decision, and secondly, how was the law of adverse possession to be applied in cases of interrupted or . .
  • Cited – Hall and Others v Mayor of London (on Behalf of The Greater London Authority) CA 16-Jul-2010 (, [2010] EWCA Civ 817, [2010] WLR (D) 195, , [2011] 1 WLR 504)
    The appellants sought leave to appeal against an order for possession of Parliament Square on which the claimants had been conducting a demonstration (‘the Democracy Village’).
    Held: Leave was refused save for two appellants whose cases were . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 25 October 2020; Ref: scu.179830

Stubbings v Webb and Another: HL 10 Feb 1993

Sexual Assault is not an Act of Negligence
In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A woman suffered child abuse and claimed as an adult. The limitation period for non-accidental personal injuries arising from complaints of rape or of indecent assault is six years (section 2).
Held: The damage arising from injuries deliberately inflicted arose at the time, or if the victim was a child, at the age of attaining majority. The time did not begin to run only when the claimant became aware of a causal connection between her damage and the injuries. An action for damages for deliberate assault or trespass to the person was not an ‘action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty’ in respect of personal injuries within the meaning of section 11(1) of the 1980 Act. Such an assault or trespass was not a breach of duty within the meaning of the section. It followed that, on the one hand, the limitation period was six years and, on the other hand, the court had no discretion under section 33 to extend the six year period.
References: Gazette 10-Feb-1993, [1993] AC 498, [1993] 2 WLR 120, Times 17-Dec-1992, [1993] 1 All ER 322, [1992] 1 QB 197
Judges: Griffiths L
Statutes: Limitation Act 1980 2 33 11(1) 11(2)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Appealed to – Stubbings and Others v The United Kingdom ECHR 22-Oct-1996 (Times 24-Oct-96, (1996) 23 EHRR 213, , [1996] ECHR 44, 22083/93, 22095/93, )
    There was no human rights breach where the victims of sex abuse had been refused a right to sue for damages out of time. The question is whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law: . .
  • Appeal from – Stubbings v Webb CA 1992 ([1992] QB 197)
    The claimant sought damages for having been raped. The defendant said the claim was out of time. . .
  • Cited – Letang v Cooper CA 15-Jun-1964 ([1965] 1 QB 232, , [1964] EWCA Civ 5, [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 339, [1964] 2 All ER 929, [1964] 3 WLR 573)
    The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
    Held: Trespass is strictly speaking . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Feb-2003 (, Times 17-Feb-03, [2003] EWCA Civ 85, [2003] QB 1441, [2003] Fam Law 482, [2004] 2 All ER 716, [2003] 1 FLR 1203, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep Med 175, [2003] 3 WLR 107, [2003] 1 FCR 385)
    The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
    Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down . .
  • Cited – Barry Young (Deceased) v Western Power Distribution (South West) Plc CA 18-Jul-2003 (, [2003] EWCA Civ 1034, Times 18-Jul-03, [2003] 1 WLR 2868, [2003] 1 WLR 2868)
    The deceased had begun an action on becoming ill after exposure to asbestos by the defendant. He withdrew his action after receiving expert evidence that his illness was unrelated. A post-mortem examination showed this evidence to be mistaken. His . .
  • Mentioned – McDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees (Formerly Irish Christian Brothers) and others HL 4-Dec-2003 (, [2003] UKHL 63, , Times 05-Dec-03, [2004] 1 AC 1101)
    In 2000, the claimant sought damages for sexual abuse from before 1951. The issue was as to whether the limitation law which applied was that as at the date of the incidents, or that which applied as at the date when he would be deemed uner the . .
  • Cited – A v Hoare QBD 14-Oct-2005 (, [2005] EWHC 2161 (QB), Times 27-Oct-05, [2006] ACD 12)
    The defendant had been convicted and sentenced for the attempted rape of the claimant. He had subsequently won a substantial sum on the lottery, and she now sought damages. He replied that the action was statute barred being now 16 years old. The . .
  • Criticised – A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006 ([2006] Fam Law 533, [2006] 2 FLR 727, [2006] 1 WLR 2320, [2006] 3 FCR 673, , [2006] EWCA Civ 395, Times 28-Apr-06, [2006] 1 WLR 2320)
    Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
  • Cited – KR and others v Royal and Sun Alliance Plc CA 3-Nov-2006 (, [2006] EWCA Civ 1454, Times 08-Nov-06)
    The insurer appealed findings of liability under the 1930 Act. Claims had been made for damages for child abuse in a residential home, whom they insured. The home had become insolvent, and the claimants had pursued the insurer.
    Held: The . .
  • Overruled – A v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008 (, [2008] UKHL 6, Times 31-Jan-08, [2008] 2 WLR 311, Gazette 14-Feb-08, [2008] 1 AC 844, (2008) 11 CCL Rep 249, [2008] 1 FCR 507, [2008] Fam Law 402, [2008] 1 FLR 771, (2008) 100 BMLR 1, [2008] 2 All ER 1)
    Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .
  • Appeal from – Stubbings and Others v The United Kingdom ECHR 22-Oct-1996 (Times 24-Oct-96, (1996) 23 EHRR 213, , [1996] ECHR 44, 22083/93, 22095/93, )
    There was no human rights breach where the victims of sex abuse had been refused a right to sue for damages out of time. The question is whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law: . .
  • Cited – Stingel v Clark 20-Jul-2006 ((2006) 80 ALJR 1339, , (2006) 228 ALR 229, [2006] HCA 37)
    Asutlii (High Court of Australia) Limitation of Actions – Appellant alleged respondent had raped and assaulted her in 1971 – Appellant alleged that she suffered post-traumatic stress disorder of delayed onset in . .
  • Reversed by Hoare – RAR v GGC QBD 10-Aug-2012 (, [2012] EWHC 2338 (QB))
    The claimant alleged that the defendant, her stepfather, had sexually and otherwise assaulted her when she was a child. He had pleaded guilty to one charge in 1978, and now said that the claim was out of time. The claimant sought the extension of . .
  • Cited – Alves v Attorney General of The Virgin Islands (British Virgin Islands) PC 18-Dec-2017 (, [2017] UKPC 42)
    From the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (British Virgin Islands) . .
  • Cited – Archbishop Bowen and Another v JL CA 21-Feb-2017 (, [2017] EWCA Civ 82)
    The defendants appealed against finding that they were responsible for the assaults by a priest on the claimant. . .
  • Cited – F and S v TH QBD 1-Jul-2016 (, [2016] EWHC 1605 (QB))
    Claim for damages as victims of sexual abuse alleged against father. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.89598

Stubbings v Webb: CA 1992

The claimant sought damages for having been raped. The defendant said the claim was out of time.
References: [1992] QB 197
Statutes: Limitation Act 1980 2
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another CA 12-Feb-2003 (, Times 17-Feb-03, [2003] EWCA Civ 85, [2003] QB 1441, [2003] Fam Law 482, [2004] 2 All ER 716, [2003] 1 FLR 1203, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep Med 175, [2003] 3 WLR 107, [2003] 1 FCR 385)
    The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years.
    Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down . .
  • Appeal from – Stubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993 (Gazette 10-Feb-93, [1993] AC 498, [1993] 2 WLR 120, Times 17-Dec-92, [1993] 1 All ER 322, [1992] 1 QB 197)
    In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.179308

Letang v Cooper: CA 15 Jun 1964

The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period.
Held: Trespass is strictly speaking not a cause of action but a form of action. It was the form anciently used for a variety of different kinds of claim which had as their common element the fact that the damage was caused directly rather than indirectly; if the damage was indirect, the appropriate form of action was the action on the case. A negligent trespass to the person could only be pursued in negligence and not in trespass. A cause of action was defined: ‘a cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.’ (Diplock LJ)
Lord Denning MR said that the cause of action of trespass to the person was limited to intended acts, and that when the act was not intended the plaintiff’s cause of action lay in negligence. He referred to the Tucker report which parliament had not adopted: ‘In this very case, Parliament did not reduce the period to two years. It made it three years. It did not make any exception of ‘trespass to the person’ or the rest. It used words of general import; and it is those words we have to construe, without reference to the words of the Committee.’ ‘Breach of duty’ in the section meant any breach of duty: ‘Our whole law of tort today proceeds on the footing that there is a duty owed by every man not to injure his neighbour in a way forbidden by law. Negligence is a breach of such a duty. So is nuisance. So is trespass to the person. So is false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or defamation of character.’
Diplock LJ said that the cause of action in trespass included both intended and unintended acts. The expression ‘breach of duty’ in section 2 of the 1939 Act, as amended, included both intended and unintended trespass. ‘A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.’
References: [1965] 1 QB 232, [1964] EWCA Civ 5, [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 339, [1964] 2 All ER 929, [1964] 3 WLR 573
Links: Bailii
Judges: Diplock LJ, Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts LJ
Statutes: Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act 19392
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Adopted – Kruber v Grzesiak 1963 ([1963] VR 621)
    The plaintiff had issued a writ claiming damages for personal injuries caused by negligent driving more than three years after the accident, and now wanted to amend the writ by adding a claim for trespass to the person based on the same facts. The . .
  • Applied – Billings v Reed CA 1945 ([1945] KB 11)
    The plaintiff’s wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person.
    Held: Lord Greene MR said: . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Wainwright and another v Home Office HL 16-Oct-2003 (, [2003] UKHL 53, , Times 20-Oct-03, [2003] 3 WLR 1137, 2004] 2 AC 406)
    The claimant and her son sought to visit her other son in Leeds Prison. He was suspected of involvement in drugs, and therefore she was subjected to strip searches. There was no statutory support for the search. The son’s penis had been touched . .
  • Cited – Bici and Bici v Ministry of Defence QBD 7-Apr-2004 ([2004] EWHC 786(QB), , Times 11-Jun-04)
    Claimants sought damages for personal injuries incurred when, in Pristina, Kosovo and during a riot, British soldiers on a UN peacekeeping expedition fired on a car.
    Held: The incidents occurred in the course of peace-keeping duties. It was . .
  • Cited – A v Hoare QBD 14-Oct-2005 (, [2005] EWHC 2161 (QB), Times 27-Oct-05, [2006] ACD 12)
    The defendant had been convicted and sentenced for the attempted rape of the claimant. He had subsequently won a substantial sum on the lottery, and she now sought damages. He replied that the action was statute barred being now 16 years old. The . .
  • Cited – Stubbings v Webb and Another HL 10-Feb-1993 (Gazette 10-Feb-93, [1993] AC 498, [1993] 2 WLR 120, Times 17-Dec-92, [1993] 1 All ER 322, [1992] 1 QB 197)
    In claims for damages for child abuse at a children’s home made out of the six year time limit time were effectively time barred, with no discretion for the court to extend that limit. The damage occurred at the time when the child left the home. A . .
  • Cited – Harb v King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz and Another CA 9-Nov-2005 (Times 21-Nov-05, , [2005] EWCA Civ 1324)
    The wife sought to continue her claim for ancillary relief despite the death of her husband, the former King of Saudi Arabia.
    Held: The court’s jurisdiction over the King had been challenged. However the claimants claim now abated on the death . .
  • Cited – A v Hoare; H v Suffolk County Council, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening; X and Y v London Borough of Wandsworth CA 12-Apr-2006 ([2006] Fam Law 533, [2006] 2 FLR 727, [2006] 1 WLR 2320, [2006] 3 FCR 673, , [2006] EWCA Civ 395, Times 28-Apr-06, [2006] 1 WLR 2320)
    Each claimant sought damages for a criminal assault for which the defendant was said to be responsible. Each claim was to be out of the six year limitation period. In the first claim, the proposed defendant had since won a substantial sum from the . .
  • Cited – Hill (As Trustee In Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Company Ltd and Another CA 12-May-2006 (, Times 10-Jul-06, [2006] EWCA Civ 542, [2007] 1 BCLC 450, [2007] 1 WLR 2404)
    The defendants sought relief for transactions entered into at an undervalue. The bankrupt had entered into charges and an assignment of a loan account in their favour before his bankruptcy, and the trustee had obtained an order for them to be set . .
  • Cited – A v Hoare HL 30-Jan-2008 (, [2008] UKHL 6, Times 31-Jan-08, [2008] 2 WLR 311, Gazette 14-Feb-08, [2008] 1 AC 844, (2008) 11 CCL Rep 249, [2008] 1 FCR 507, [2008] Fam Law 402, [2008] 1 FLR 771, (2008) 100 BMLR 1, [2008] 2 All ER 1)
    Each of six claimants sought to pursue claims for damages for sexual assaults which would otherwise be time barred under the 1980 Act after six years. They sought to have the House depart from Stubbings and allow a discretion to the court to extend . .
  • Cited – Nolan v Wright ChD 26-Feb-2009 (, [2009] EWHC 305 (Ch))
    The defendant sought to re-open the question of whether the charge under which he might otherwise be liable was an extortionate credit bargain. The creditor said that that plea was time barred. The defendant argued that a finding that the agreement . .
  • Cited – Roberts v Gill and Co Solicitors and Others SC 19-May-2010 ([2010] WLR (D) 130, , , [2010] UKSC 22, , , , [2010] PNLR 30, [2010] WTLR 1223, [2010] 2 WLR 1227, [2011] AC 240)
    The claimant beneficiary in the estate sought damages against solicitors who had acted for the claimant’s brother, the administrator, saying they had allowed him to take control of the assets in the estate. The will provided that property was to be . .
  • Cited – Sarwar v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (Rev 1) ChD 27-Jul-2011 (, [2011] EWHC 2233 (Ch))
    The claimant appealed against a finding of indebtedness to the bank. He had said at trial that the bank had been charging interest at 25%. The bank denied this, but after trial it became clear that he had been correct. The bank argued for abuse of . .
  • Cited – Miller v Jackson CA 6-Apr-1977 ([1977] 1 QB 966, [1977] 3 All ER 338, , [1977] EWCA Civ 6)
    The activities of a long established cricket club had been found to be a legal nuisance, because of the number of cricket balls landing in the gardens of neighbouring houses. An injunction had been granted to local householders who complained of . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.186857

St Marylebone Property Co Ltd v Fairweather: HL 1963

References: [1963] AC 510, [1962] UKHL 1, [1962] 2 WLR 1020, [1962] 2 All ER 288
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Radcliffe, Lord Denning
Ratio: To defeat a defence of adverse possession, the plaintiff must succeed in an action which itself had been commenced within the twelve year period. A squatter does not succeed to the title that he has disturbed: by sufficiently long adverse possession he obtains a title of his own, but ‘his possession only defeats the rights of those to whom it has been adverse’. Therefore, said Lord Radcliffe: ‘the effect of the ‘extinguishment’ sections of the Limitation Acts is not to destroy the lessee’s estate as between himself and the lessor; and that it would be incorrect to say that if he offers a surrender to the lessor he has nothing to surrender to him in respect of the land in the possession of the squatter. What the lessee surrendered in this case was the incumbrance on the fee simple in possession which was represented by the term of years . . Now if the landlord then goes to the lessee and gets him to surrender the outstanding term, which incumbers his fee simple in possession, then the squatter’s defence against the landlord disappears and, since he has not completed adverse possession against the landlord, he must give way to the rightful owner’s claim to the land.’
Lord Denning said: ‘the title of the leaseholder is extinguished as against the squatter, but remains good as against the freeholder.’ and ‘The only reason, it seems to me, which can be urged against this conclusion is that it means that a squatter’s title can be destroyed by the leaseholder and freeholder putting their heads together. It is said that they can by a surrender – or by a surrender and regrant – destroy the squatter’s title completely and get rid of him. So be it. There is no way of preventing it.’
Statutes: Land Registration Act 1925 75(1)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Wrongly decided – Walter v Yalden QBD ([1902] 2 KB 304)
    The surrender of a lease by a lessee whose right and title to possession had been extinguished by effluxion of time gave the leaseholder no right of re-entry during the remainder of the term. . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Distinguished – Chung Ping Kwan and others v Lam Island Development Company Limited PC (Times 16-Jul-96, Bailii, [1996] UKPC 23)
    (Hong Kong) Various provisions had been made for the termination of long leases in Hong Kong. Land had come to be occupied by adverse possession. At first instance the judge had given judgment against the squatters, but then retracted after a later . .
  • Cited – Markfield Investments Ltd v Evans CA (Bailii, [2000] EWCA Civ 281, [2001] 1 WLR 1321)
    The claimants were paper owners of land occupied by the defendant. The claimant said the acquiescence had been interrupted by an abortive court action by the claimant’s predecessor in title.
    Held: With regard to any particular action the . .
  • Cited – Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd and Another ChD (Bailii, [2007] EWHC 513 (Ch), [2008] 2 WLR 1111, [2007] 2 PandCR 17)
    The court heard preliminary applications in a case asserting acquisition of land by adverse possession, the land being parts of the foreshore of the Severn Estuary.
    Held: A person may acquire title to part of the bed of a tidal river by . .
  • Cited – Smith, Regina (on The Application of) v Land Registry (Peterborough Office) and Another CA (Bailii, [2010] EWCA Civ 200, [2010] NPC 31, [2010] 11 EG 121, [2010] 3 All ER 113, [2010] 21 EG 92, [2010] 3 WLR 1223, [2011] 1 QB 413)
    The appellant had lived in a caravan on the verge of a byway and had been here for more than twelve years. He appealed against rejection of his request for possessory title. He said that there was no support in law for the maxim that adverse . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 06 April 2019
Ref: 191153

Jones v Bellgrove Properties Limited: 1949

References: [1949] 2 KB 700
Ratio: The court allowed the plaintiff to establish by evidence that his particular debt was included in the total sum acknowledged to be due to a number of creditors.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 11 March 2019
Ref: 187456

Jameson and Wyatt (Executors of the Estate of David Allen Jameson) v Central Electricity Generating Board and Babcock Energy Limited; 10 Mar 1995

References: Unreported, 10 March 1995
Coram: Tudor Evans J
The plaintiff claimed damages for mesothelioma. CEGB had provided a contractual indemnity in respect of damage or injury occurring before building works were taken over by a client in 1960. The question was whether a workman who died from mesothelioma well after 1960 but was exposed during the building work before 1960 had suffered damage or injury before 1960.
Held: The evidence did not establish even that minimal microscopic changes had occurred before 1960 and that the damage or injury occurred many years after the deceased had finished working.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 13-Dec-15 Ref: 238333

KM v HM; 29 Oct 1992

References: (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 289, [1992] 3 SCR 6, 14 CCLT (2d) 1, AZ-92111111, EYB 1992-67549, JE 92-1644, [1992] SCJ No 85 (QL), 36 ACWS (3d) 466, 57 OAC 321
Links: Canlii
Coram: La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ
Supreme Court of Canada – Limitation of actions – Torts – Assault and battery – Incest – Woman bringing action against father for damages for incest – Whether or not action limited by Limitations Act – Application of the reasonable discoverability principle – Whether or not incest a separate and distinct tort – Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 240, s. 45(1)(j), 47.
Limitation of actions – Equity – Fiduciary relationship – Parent/child – Woman bringing action against father for incest – Whether incest constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty by a parent – Whether limitation period applicable and whether the defence of laches applies.
Limitation of actions – Fraudulent concealment – Incest – Whether a limitation period in an incest action is postponed by defendant’s fraudulent concealment.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – AIB Group (UK) Plc -v- Mark Redler & Co Solicitors SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 58, [2014] 3 WLR 1367, [2014] WLR(D) 466, WLRD, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2013/0052, SC, SC Summary)
    The court was asked as to the remedy available to the appellant bank against the respondent, a firm of solicitors, for breach of the solicitors’ custodial duties in respect of money entrusted to them for the purpose of completing a loan which was to . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 03-Nov-15 Ref: 554205

Brooksbank v Smith; 24 Feb 1836

References: , [1836] EngR 447, (1836) Donn Eq 11, (1836) 47 ER 193 (B)
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Baron Alderson
In this case, trustees under a will, who were solicitors, had by mistake transferred stock to a person not entitled. Baron Alderson said, this being under circumstances of mistake, it appeared clear to him that the Plaintiffs were entitled to equitable relief ; for, on looking into the authorities he found that fraud or mistake were each of them grounds for relief in equity. Then came the question, whether the Statute of Limitations was a bar? The Statute of Limitations did not apply to Courts of Equity so as to bind them, Undoubtedly, they had exercised discretion, and very rightly, upon the rules laid down. For instance, in cases of fraud, Courts of Equity did not apply the rule in the same manner as Courts of law, which were so bound by the words of the statute, that if the cause of action bad occurred more than six years before, however equitabIe it might be, they could not permit the statute to run. Courts of Equity held, that in cases of fraud, the statute of Limitations ran from the discovery of the fraud, It appearet to jim that cases of mistake fell under the same rule, and that it would be inequitable to apply the Statute of Limitations, except in cases where a party had lain by after the mistake had been discovered, more than six years ; in this case the mistake had been discovered within six years, the statute did not, therefore, bar the Plaintiff’s claim.
This case cites:

  • See Also – Smith -v- Brooksbank (, Commonlii, [1834] EngR 880, (1834) 7 Sim 18, (1834) 58 ER 743 (B))
    A bequeathed a reversionary interest, expectant on his wife’s death, in a sum of stock to B. B. bequeathed it to C., and C. bequeathed it to D, who, on the death of A’s wife, filed a bill against the trustees to have the stock transferred to him, . .

This case is cited by:

  • See Also – Brooksbank And Another -v- Smith (, Commonlii, [1836] EngR 446, (1836) 2 Y & C Ex 59, (1836) 160 ER 311)
    The testatrix died in 1818 leaving a fund in trust, subject to a life interest, for her children in equal shares, with substitutional gifts if any child predeceased her leaving issue. Her daughter Elizabeth did predecease her by two months, but on . .
  • Cited – Test Claimants In The Franked Investment Income Group Litigation -v- Inland Revenue SC (Bailii, [2012] UKSC 19, [2012] WLR(D) 161, [2012] STC 1362, [2012] 2 WLR 1149, [2012] 3 All ER 909, [2012] BTC 312, [2012] 2 AC 337, [2012] Bus LR 1033, [2012] STI 1707)
    The European court had found the UK to have unlawfully treated differently payment of franked dividends between subsidiaries of UK companies according to whether all the UK subsidiaries were themselves UK based, thus prejudicing European . .

Randall v Stevens And Others; 25 Jun 1853

References: [1853] EngR 767, (1853) 2 El & Bl 641, (1853) 118 ER 907
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Lord Campbell LC
A landlord evicted a tenant who had failed to pay any rent for twenty years. Statute provided that a house could not be repossessed simply by exercising a right of entry.
Held: Lord Campbell LC, giving the judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench on appeal from a judgment given at assizes, held that entry could be made ‘by stepping on any corner of the land in the night time and pronouncing a few words, without any intention or wish to take possession.’ However, where possession was taken with an intention to possess, then ‘whether possession was retained by the landlord an hour or a week must for this purpose [i.e. taking possession other than by mere entry] be immaterial.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Zarb and Another -v- Parry and Another CA (Bailii, [2011] EWCA Civ 1306, [2011] WLR (D) 331, WLRD)
    The parties disputed the position of the boundary between their neighbouring properties. The appellant Z had succeeded in establishing that the the boundary was as they decribed on paper, but the respondents had succeeded in their claim for adverse . .

Whitehouse v Fellowes; 12 Feb 1861

References: (1861) 10 CB (NS) 765, [1861] EngR 314, (1861) 10 CB NS 765, (1861) 142 ER 654
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Williams J, Byles J
The trustees of a turnpike road converted an open ditch by the side of the road into a covered drain but did so negligently, and the catch pits were constructed and kept, so that the drain was at times of heavy rain insufficient to carry off the water to its accustomed channel and was diverted onto other land causing damage. The issue was whether time began to run against a plaintiff from the date of the original construction of the works.
Held:’the continuance by the defendants of that negligent and improper condition of the road under their charge, if accompanied by fresh damage to the plaintiff, constitutes a new cause of action’. And ‘Suppose an action to have been commenced immediately after the first injury accrued to the plaintiff’s pits from the flow of water down the road in question: when that cause came to be tried, the only question would be how much damage the plaintiff had actually sustained. It would be monstrous injustice to hold that the damages must be assessed upon that assumption. All that the jury could do would be to find what damages the plaintiff had sustained from the wrongful act complained of: and they would be told to give him such damages as they might find he has sustained down to the time of the commencement of the action. According to the assumption, the plaintiff has sustained damage from the wrongful construction of the nuisance. Did the statute intend that he should have no remedy for that? The true answer to this objection, as it seems to me, is, that no fresh cause of action arises from each fresh damage, but that, where there is not only a fresh damage but a continuance of the cause of damage, such continuance of the wrongful act which caused the damage constitutes a fresh cause of action.’
Byles J said: ‘There would be a new and distinct injury every time a storm came; and this declaration is in form a declaration for a continuation of a nuisance.’
Keating J stated:
‘Here is a continuation of the nuisance, and a new distinct and complete cause of action in respect thereof, for which I think the plaintiff had a right to sue.’

Peconic Industrial Development Ltd v Lau Kwok FAI; 27 Feb 2009

References: [2009] HKCFA 16, [2009] 5 HKC 135, [2009] 2 HKLRD 537, (2009) 12 HKCFAR 139
Links: HKLii
Coram: Mr Justice Bokhary PJ, Mr Justice Chan PJ, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr Justice Litton NPJ and Lord Hoffmann NPJ
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. The limitation period for a claim in dishonest assistance is 6 years. For limitation purposes a distinction is to be made between two kinds of constructive trustees: those who are fiduciaries and those who are non-fiduciaries. The distinction between the two classes was made clear in the judgment of Lord Hoffmann: ‘First, there are persons who, without any express trust, have assumed fiduciary obligations in relation to the trust property; for example as purchaser on behalf of another, trustee de son tort, company director or agent holding the property for a trustee. I shall call them fiduciaries. They are treated in the same way as express trustees and no limitation period applies to their fraudulent breaches of trust. Then there are strangers to the trust who have not assumed any prior fiduciary liability but make themselves liable by dishonest acts of interference. I shall call them non-fiduciaries. They are also called constructive trustees but this, as Ungoed-Thomas J said in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555, p1582 is a fiction: ‘nothing more than a formula for equitable relief’. They are not constructive trustees within the meaning of the law of limitation.’
This case cites:

  • Cited – Soar -v- Ashwell CA ([1893] 2 QB 390)
    Trustees under a will had entrusted the trust fund to a solicitor for investment. The solicitor exercised all of their administrative and investment powers for them and distributed part of the fund invested to the beneficiaries under the will but . .

This case is cited by:

  • Highly Persuasive – Williams -v- Central Bank of Nigeria QBD (Bailii, [2011] EWHC 876 (QB))
    The claimant had been defrauded by a customer of the defendant bank. He brought a claim against the bank, saying that they knew or ought to have known of the fraudster’s activities, and were liable. The Bank denied that the UK courts had . .
  • Cited – Williams -v- Central Bank of Nigeria SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 10, 16 ITELR 740, [2014] WLR(D) 88, [2014] 2 All ER 489, [2014] 2 WLR 355, [2014] WTLR 873, WLRD, Bailii Summary, UKSC 2012/0113, SC Summary, SC)
    The appellant sought to make the bank liable for a fraud committed by the Bank’s customer, the appellant saying that the Bank knew or ought to have known of the fraud. The court was asked whether a party liable only as a dishonest assistant was a . .

Smith v Clay; 10 May 1767

References: [1767] EngR 55, (1767) 3 Bro CC 646, (1767) 29 ER 743
Links: Commonlii
Coram: Lord Camden LC
Ratio Review was sought of a decree pronounced some thirty or forty years before. The defect was apparent on the face of the record.
Held: The review was barred by the length of time elapsed.
Ratio Lord Camden LC applied the doctrine of laches, saying: ‘A Court of Equity has always refused its aid to stale demands, where a party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this Court into activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the Court is passive, and does nothing.’ Equity would not countenance laches beyond the period for which a legal remedy had been limited by statute, and that where the legal right had been barred, the equitable right to the same thing was also barred: ”Expedit reipublicae ut sit finis litium’, is a maxim that has prevailed in this court at all times, without the help of parliament.
But, as the Court has no legislative authority, it could not properly define the time of bar, by a positive rule, to an hour, a minute, or a year; it was governed by circumstances.
But as often as parliament had limited the time of actions and remedies, to a certain period, in legal proceedings, a Court in Chancery adopted that rule, and applied to similar cases in equity.
For when the Legislature had fixed the time at law, it would have been preposterous for equity (which, by its own proper authority, always maintained a limitation), to countenance laches beyond the period, that law had been confined to by parliament.
And therefore in all cases where the legal right has been barred by parliament, the equitable right to the same thing has been concluded by the same bar.’
This case cites:

  • See Also – Smith -v- Clay (Commonlii, [1767] EngR 54, (1767) Amb 645, (1767) 27 ER 419)
    Bill of review for error apparent will not lie after twenty years from the making of the decree. The time runs from the decree, not from the inrolment. . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Adamson and Others -v- Paddico (267) Ltd SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 7, [2014] 1 AC 1072, [2014] 1 P & CR 24, [2014] 2 WLR 300, [2014] 2 All ER 1, [2014] JPL 745, [2014] WLR(D) 51, [2014] BLGR 249, [2014] 1 P &CR 24, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, UKSC 2012/0089)
    Land had been registered as a town or village green but wrongly so. The claimant had sought rectification, but the respondents argued that the long time elapsed after registration should defeat the request.
    Held: The appeal were solely as to . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 25-Mar-16
Ref: 374834

Keenen v Miller Insulation and Engineering Ltd; 8 Dec 1987

References: Unreported, 8 December 1987
Coram: Piers Ashworth QC
The claimant’s cause of action for lung fibrosis did not arise at the time he was exposed to asbestos between August 1952 and May 1953 because at that stage he had not suffered physical injury by May 1953. Basing himself on the evidence of Dr Rudd the court held that for a long time after exposure the defence mechanisms of the body held their own and only became exhausted after a period of equilibrium which lasted well after 4th June 1954, the relevant date for limitation.
This case is cited by:

  • Approved – McCaul -v- Elias Wild (Unreported, 14 September 1989)
    The plaintiff who had suffered pleural thickening from inhalation of asbestos fibres in 1943 – 1950 suffered no actionable injury until about 1985, when he first experienced breathlessness. . .
  • Cited – Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council -v- Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd CA (Bailii, [2006] EWCA Civ 50, Times 09-Feb-06, [2006] 1 WLR 1492, [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 173)
    The deceased had come into contact with asbestos when working on building sites for more than one contractor. The claimant here sought contribution from the defendants for the damages it had paid to his estate. The issue was as to liability on . .