Mitchell v Cantrill: CA 1887

In 1864 Sir Humphrey de Trafford granted a 999 year lease of a dwelling house ‘with all rights and appurtenances, legal, used, or reputed, to the said plot of land, except rights, if any, restricting the free use of any adjoining land or the conversion or appropriation at any time thereafter of such land for building or other purposes, obstructive or otherwise.’ A house was built on the adjoining land and this was leased to a Mr Cantrill. Mr Cantrill’s executrix sought to build an extension on the Cantrill land which interfered with light to the plaintiff’s windows. The plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain the building works. The question was whether the exception of easements was an agreement or consent for the purposes of section 3.
Held: The court eversed the decision of the District Registrar in the Palatine Court, held that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. The clause quoted above did not trigger the proviso to s.3.
Cotton LJ said: ‘Now does this clause which I have read bring it within that? In my opinion it does not. It is not an agreement given for the purpose of the enjoyment of the light, but it is simply an exception out of the grant made of appurtenances and rights, so as to prevent the lessee from urging as against the landlord or anybody claiming through him, before a right had been obtained under the statute, that the landlord could not derogate from his own grant either by his building or granting to anybody else a right to build so as to interfere with the Plaintiff’s lights. That is the reasonable, and I think, the only meaning of this clause. It was in effect saying, ‘If I grant this house to you without protecting myself, you will say, if I build up any adjoining house, that is derogating from my own grant; and this clause is to prevent any such contention being made.’ But if independently of the grant the lessee has enjoyed the use of these windows for twenty years he will have the same right as against the adjoining lessee as against a stranger. There was certainly no case referred to in the argument to shew that such claim as is contended for by the Plaintiff exists. But he has the right simply by the effect and operation, not of the grant, but of the statute, and in my opinion he is entitled to enforce that.’
Then there was another point which was suggested, that this must be considered an agreement between the landlord and the lessee, that the landlord should be at liberty if he thought fit to do anything, even although it would operate so as to interfere with his right to light; but I do not think that is the true meaning of it. If you had an express proviso in the contract between the parties that, notwithstanding the grant to the Plaintiff, the landlord should be at liberty to build so as to interfere with his right, that would be another point, but that is not the express form of it, and in my opinion the fair and clear meaning of this clause, construing it without reference to the consequences to one party or the other, is not anything of that sort.’
. .and: ‘The enactment is this, that the right to light is granted where there has been an enjoyment of the access and use of light for twenty years, ‘unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing.’ Now does this clause which I have read bring it within that? In my opinion it does not. It is an agreement given for the purpose of the enjoyment of the light, but it is simply an exception out of the grant made of appurtenances and rights, so as to prevent the lessee from urging as against the landlord or anybody claiming through him, before a right had been obtained under the statute, that the landlord could not derogate from his own grant either by his building or granting to anybody else a right to build so as to interfere with the Plaintiff’s lights. . . .If you had an express proviso in the contract between the parties that, notwithstanding the grant to the Plaintiff, the landlord should be at liberty to build so as to interfere with his right, that would be another point, but that is not the express form of it, and in my opinion the fair and clear meaning of this clause, construing it without reference to the consequences to one party or the other, is not anything of that sort.’
Lindley LJ said: ‘The last words in the section mean that when you find an agreement under which the light is enjoyed you must look at that agreement and see what, if any, right to light is expressly given by it. Here the Plaintiff falls under the words of the statute, and it appears to me the contention of the Defendant is not warranted by the words at the end of the section. There is nothing except the grant coupled with the words which Cotton LJ has alluded to, and which obviously are for the purpose of preserving to the lessee a right, until an adverse right is acquired, of doing what he likes with the adjoining property. Under the grant he could deal with that property as he liked within the twenty years, and within that period he might have blocked up all these lights; but after the Plaintiff has enjoyed them without interruption for twenty years the statute confers upon him the right to their future enjoyment. I think therefore this appeal should be allowed.’
Lopes LJ saw the exception as directed only to acquisition by the original grant, rather than by subsequent enjoyment. As to the argument that the exception was a consent or an agreement within section 3 he said ‘for the reasons which have already been given I am clearly of opinion that cannot be brought within those words’.

Judges:

Cotton, Lindley, Lopes LJJ

Citations:

(1887) 37 Ch D 36

Statutes:

Prescription Act 1832 3

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedMarlborough (West End) Ltd v Wilks Head and Eve ChD 20-Dec-1996
A dispute between neighbours was settled by a deed with the following clause: ‘IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED that notwithstanding that the Building Owners have placed windows in that part of their new buildings which overlook the premises . .
CitedRHJ Ltd v FT Patten (Holdings) Ltd and Another ChD 13-Jul-2007
The court was asked whether the grant of a lease including a clause reserving: ‘All rights to the access of light or air from the said adjoining property known as Victoria House and Graham House to any of the windows of the demised property.’ . .
CitedSalvage Wharf Ltd and Another v G and S Brough Ltd CA 29-Jan-2009
The claimant had agreed with a developer in 1999 to allow a development which would have a minor affect on his light. The developer later extended the development, to increase the interference with the right to light, relying on the earlier . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Land

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.567939

In re Howell: KBD 1895

The court considered whether, a tenant having become bankrupt during the currency of a quarter, that part of the quarter’s rent apportionable to the part of the quarter before the order of adjudication should be held to be rent ‘accrued due’, within section 42(1) of the 1883 1883. Such apportionable part of the quarter’s rent was of course not recoverable from the tenant until the expiry of the quarter; but it was held, nevertheless, that is to say, notwithstanding the fact that it was not payable until the end of the quarter, to have ‘accrued due’ within the meaning of section 42, from day to day. In other words, the effect of the Apportionment Act was held to be that, rent accruing de die in diem, the part attributable to the time elapsed must be considered as ‘accrued due’ for the purpose of applying a statute passed before the Apportionment Act itself.

Citations:

[1895] 1 QB 844

Statutes:

Bankruptcy Act 1883 42(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHydro-Electric Power Commission (Ontario) v Albright 2-May-1922
Supreme Court of Canada – Contract – Purchase of shares in company – Mortgage on company property – Security for bonds – Covenant to provide sinking fund – Earnings for calendar year-Payments at fixed date – Payments ‘accrued but not yet due’ . .
CitedTael One Partners Ltd v Morgan Stanley and Co International Plc SC 11-Mar-2015
This appeal raises a question of contractual interpretation. Its significance lies in the fact that the contractual condition in question forms part of the Loan Market Association standard terms and conditions for par trade transactions which are a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.564963

Banfai v Formula Fun Centre Inc: 13 Dec 1984

Canlii Ontario – Superior Court of Justice – The defendants operated an automobile-racing amusement ride on land adjacent to the plaintiffs’ motels. The plaintiffs and their customers complained of the noise emanating from the defendants’ ride. The plaintiffs brought an action in nuisance against the defendants seeking damages and an injunction.
Held, there should be judgment for the plaintiffs.
The noise created by the racing cars was not in keeping with the other noises in the vicinity. Generally speaking it was considerably louder and sharper than those noises, and was pervasive, intrusive, and annoying, while the other sounds of the area generally were not. In addition, the fumes and smoke from the track were completely out of keeping with such air pollution as otherwise existed in the area. The noise from the track by itself constituted an unreasonable, undue and material interference with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their property. The complaints of the plaintiffs did not arise from any abnormal sensitivity or delicacies on their part. The noise from the track was such that a high percentage of normal persons would find the noise disturbing and unacceptable. It was a noise that the plaintiffs should not have to put up with, given the character of the area in which they conduct their business.
An owner of land who leases it knowing the tenant is going to use it for an automobile-racing amusement ride is liable for the nuisance created by the tenant. Although normally an owner is not liable for the nuisance committed by a tenant, where the nuisance arises ‘from the natural and necessary result of what the landlord authorized’ or ‘the use from which the damage or nuisance necessarily arises was plainly contemplated by the lease’, then the owner-landlord is liable.

Judges:

O’Leary J

Citations:

1984 CanLII 2198, 34 CCLT 171(HCJ), [1984] OJ No 3444

Links:

Canlii

Jurisdiction:

Canada

Cited by:

CitedCoventry and Others v Lawrence and Another (No 2) SC 23-Jul-2014
Consequential judgment. Mr Coventry had been found liable in the principle judgment in nuisance to the appellant neighbours. The Court was now asked as to several matters arising. First, to what extent were the defendants’ landlords liable to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Nuisance, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.551696

Malzy v Eicholz: CA 1916

A tenant claimed against his landlord seeking to make him responsible for the nuisance of a co-tenant.
Held: The claim failed.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: ‘A lessor is not liable in damages to his lessee under a covenant for quiet enjoyment for a nuisance caused by another of his lessees because he knows that the latter is causing the nuisance and he does not himself take any steps to prevent what is being done. There must be active participation on his part to make him responsible for the nuisance. A common lessor cannot be called upon by one of his tenants to use for the benefit of that tenant all the powers he may have under agreements with other persons.’
A landlord will be liable for breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment only if the disturbance was by the landlord, his servants or agents.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: ‘It is quite a novel doctrine to me that permission by a lessee to use demised premises for a purpose which may or may not involve or create a nuisance is a wrong act on the part of the landlord, and that the landlord can be rendered liable merely because a person does carry on that business in such a manner as to create a nuisance. It would be different, of course, if it were let for a purpose which necessarily involved a nuisance, but this letting did not necessarily involve a nuisance. That is quite plain from the plaintiff’s own evidence. He says there was no ground for complaint until the Dents came into possession.’

Judges:

Lord Cozens-Hardy MR

Citations:

[1916] 2 KB 308, (1916) LJKB 1132, (1916) LT 9, (1916) 32 TLR 506, (1916) 60 Sol Jo 511

Cited by:

CitedCoventry and Others v Lawrence and Another (No 2) SC 23-Jul-2014
Consequential judgment. Mr Coventry had been found liable in the principle judgment in nuisance to the appellant neighbours. The Court was now asked as to several matters arising. First, to what extent were the defendants’ landlords liable to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.451201

Dooner v Odlum: 2 Jan 1914

(Court of Appeal – Ireland) The court affirmed the decision in the King’s Bench.
Cherry LCJ said: ‘The law is, I think, well settled that where a lessee of demised premises assigns portion of these premises to a stranger, the assignee is liable to the lessor upon the covenants contained in the lease only in so far as those covenants affect the lands in his possession; and, as regards rent, only for an apportioned part of the rent properly chargeable in respect of the land actually vested in him.’ he explained this conclusion, saying: ‘the liability of an assignee to pay the rent, which the original lessee has covenanted to pay, arises, not from privity of contract, but from privity of estate. It is not because the lessee has entered into the covenant with the lessor, but because he has vested in him the lands which are charged with the rent, that the assignee becomes liable. The covenant to pay the rent, in addition to the personal liability which it imposes upon the lessee who enters into it, also affixes upon the land itself a liability to pay.’
Kenny J said: ‘it will be found that throughout [previous cases] the principle was recognized that, in order to free the assignee of part of the lands from payment of the entire rent, he must hold the part in physical severalty. When he does so there is no privity of estate, as between him and the reversioner, in the entire of the lands . . The determination of the assignee’s liability depends on privity of estate, and I am unable to draw a distinction between a case where the act of severance is that of the covenantor and a case where the severance had taken place before the covenant was entered into. In neither case is there full privity of estate, and therefore, there is no liability on the part of the assignee for the whole rent.’

Judges:

Cherry LCJ, Kenny J

Citations:

Unreported, 1914

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromDooner v Odlum 1914
(Kings Bench Division – Ireland) Dodd J said: ‘The rent, according to the authorities I have cited, is divisible. There is absolutely no evidence and no presumption upon which to found an inference that she holds an undivided share in the lands . .

Cited by:

ConsideredUnited Dairies Ltd v Public Trustee 1922
Greer J discussed the effect in law of the division and assignment of a tenanted property: ‘Where the leased property has been physically divided amongst two or more assignees it is clear that the obligations of the lease, so far as they affect the . .
CitedSmith and Another v Jafton Properties Ltd CA 2-Nov-2011
The landlord challenged the right of the tenants to acquire the freehold. Lessees had been subdivided the apartments and then, without the landlord’s consent, assigned them. The new arrangement had increased the number of qualifying tenancies so as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.448992

Skipton Building Society v Clayton: CA 1993

The wife claimed that the husband had forged the mortgage document. The Society said that she had allowed them to believe that she had consented to the charge. Slade LJ set out the principle: ‘in a case where A, the holder of the legal estate in land, has executed a mortgage of the land in favour of B, and C, who claims an interest in the land, has so conducted himself as to give B reasonable grounds for believing that C is consenting to the creation by A of a charge over the land in favour of B which will have priority to C’s interest, then C will be estopped from asserting that his interest has priority to B’s charge.’

Judges:

Slade LJ

Citations:

(1993) 66 P and CR 223

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 149(6)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBerrisford v Mexfield Housing Co-Operative Ltd SC 9-Nov-2011
The tenant appealed against an order granting possession. The tenancy, being held of a mutual housing co-operative did not have security but was in a form restricting the landlord’s right to recover possession, and the tenant resisted saying that it . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Estoppel

Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.448480

Benjamin Charlewood v The Duke of Bedford, Smith, and Bever: 2 Mar 1738

The bare entry of a steward in his lord’s contract book with his tenmts, is not an evidence itself, that there is an agreement for a lease between the lord and a tenant.der of a ter

Citations:

[1738] EngR 994, (1738) 1 Atk 497, (1738) 26 ER 314

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.386387

Earl of Pomfret v Lord Windsor (1): 30 Jul 1752

An occupying beneficiary under a settlement, who was in possession by permission of the trustees, was a tenant at will to the trustees.

Judges:

Hardwicke LC

Citations:

[1752] EngR 145, (1752) 2 Ves Sen 472, (1752) 28 ER 302

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See AlsoEarl of Pomfret v Lord Windsor (2) 30-Jul-1752
. .
CitedWatts v Stewart and Others CA 8-Dec-2016
The court considered the status of residents of almshouses, and in particular whether they were licensees or tenants with associated security.
Held: The occupier’s appeal failed: ‘We do not accept the proposition that, if and insofar as Mrs . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.378363

Earl of Pomfret v Lord Windsor (2): 30 Jul 1752

Citations:

[1752] EngR 146, (1752) Ves Sen Supp 389, (1752) 28 ER 558 (A)

Links:

Commonlii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See AlsoEarl of Pomfret v Lord Windsor (1) 30-Jul-1752
An occupying beneficiary under a settlement, who was in possession by permission of the trustees, was a tenant at will to the trustees. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.378364

Marstons Plc v Charman and Others: CA 29 Apr 2009

The landlord let several public houses to the defendant, and sought to recover dilapidations on the tenant ceasing to trade. The defendant counterclaimed for damages alleging that the claimant had misrepresented the profitability of the businesses to him. The defendant had come to defend the proceedings acting in person.
Held: The judge at an interim hearing had taken matters beyond the scope of the application made and without giving the defendant notice or opportunity to answer the judge’s unless order. He had debarred the defence in default of the defendant providing substantial security for costs.

Judges:

Ward, Rix, Moore-Bick LJJ

Citations:

[2009] EWCA Civ 719, [2009] CP Rep 42

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant, Torts – Other

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.349049

Trustees of Henry Smiths Charity v Hemmings: 1982

A Mr Ludovici in 1977 took an assignment of the residue of a lease granted in 1953 which had some 5 months to run. He agreed to do works in return for which he would be granted a fresh lease. This was later assigned to Mr Hemmings.
Held: He was neither the tenant under the regulated tenancy nor was Mr Ludovici his predecessor in title. The tenancy which became the regulated tenancy did not commence until July 1972, after the previous tenancy had come to an end.

Citations:

(1982) P and CR 377

Statutes:

Rent Act 1977 70(3)(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHughes v Borodex Ltd Admn 25-Mar-2009
The tenant under a long lease appealed against a rent assessment which increased the amount payable to a level where she lost her security of tenure. She said that 17 year old improvements she had made should not have been taken into account.
CitedHughes v Borodex Ltd CA 27-Apr-2010
The court considered the determination of a new rent on the conversion of a long tenancy protected under Part I of the 1954 Act to an assured periodic tenancy under the 1988 Act. The tenant had carried out improvements which she now wanted to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.324696

East Coast Amusement v British Transport Board; Re “Wonderland” Cleethorps: HL 1965

Under the section, the benefit of improvements would only be obtained by the tenant if carried out during the current tenancy. Viscount Simonds said: ‘If there is any ambiguity about the extent of (the) derogation (by a statute from common law rights), the principle is clear that it is to be resolved in favour of maintaining common law rights unless they are clearly taken away.’

Judges:

Viscount Simonds

Citations:

[1965] AC 58

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 34

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedHughes v Borodex Ltd Admn 25-Mar-2009
The tenant under a long lease appealed against a rent assessment which increased the amount payable to a level where she lost her security of tenure. She said that 17 year old improvements she had made should not have been taken into account.
CitedHughes v Borodex Ltd CA 27-Apr-2010
The court considered the determination of a new rent on the conversion of a long tenancy protected under Part I of the 1954 Act to an assured periodic tenancy under the 1988 Act. The tenant had carried out improvements which she now wanted to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.324697

Lloyd-Jones v Church Commissioners for England: 1982

The tenant’s lease had about twelve years unexpired and was at a rent of andpound;45 per annum. The valuation of the landlord’s reversionary freehold interest involved two stages. The first stage was to assess the so-called investment value of the landlord’s interest. This had two components. The first was the right to receive the rent over the remaining 12 years of the lease, which involved capitalising that future rental stream. The second component was the value of the landlord’s deferred right to possession of the house at the end of the 12 years, which involved applying an appropriate annual deferment rate to the present value of the unencumbered freehold interest. The market value of the tenant’s interest was andpound;45,000, and the investment value of the landlord’s interest was andpound;84,257, while the value of what the tenant would end up owning, namely the unencumbered freehold interest, was andpound;187,500, which is andpound;58,243 more than the aggregate of those two figures. Accordingly, combining the two interests released a so-called marriage value of andpound;58,243.
Held: ‘Mr Hopper’s addition . . represents the actual amount which the lessee in friendly negotiations with the lessor would be willing to bid above the amount which any other purchaser would pay: that amount would take his bid well above that of any other potential purchaser. Mr Hopper assumed that the parties were of equal bargaining strengths. I agree: neither can unlock the marriage value without the other. In friendly negotiations they would agree to divide it equally as they had done in the 57 settlements [as between landlords and tenants of other houses where the tenant was seeking to enfranchise].’

Citations:

[1982] 1 EGLR 209

Statutes:

Leasehold Reform Act 1967 9

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

AppliedNorfolk v Trinity College, Cambridge 1-Apr-1976
The Tribunal considered, for the first time the effect of a marriage value in determining the price of the freehold reversion.
Held: The marriage value was to be divided equally between the freeholder and tenant applicant. . .

Cited by:

CitedEarl Cadogan v Pitts and Wang; Similar HL 10-Dec-2008
The House considered the basis of valuation on an acquisition of the freehold reversion of a lease under the 1967 Act of the three elements, the rent, vacant possession after the lease, and the marriage or hope value of the two interests when . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.278769

Greenwich London Borough Council v McGrady: CA 1982

A notice to quit given by one of two joint tenants without the consent of the other was effective to determine the periodic tenancy to which it related.
Sir John Donaldson MR said: ‘In my judgment, it is clear law that, if there is to be a surrender of a joint tenancy – that is, a surrender before its natural termination – then all must agree to the surrender, if there is to be a renewal, which is the position at the end of each period of a periodic tenancy, then again all must concur. In this case. Mrs McGrady made it quite clear by her notice to quit that she was not content to renew the joint tenancy on and after June 15, 1981. That left Mr McGrady without any tenancy at all, although it was faintly argued by Mr Osman that on, as he put it, the severance of a joint tenancy the joint tenant who did not concur was left with a sole tenancy. That cannot be the law, and no authority has been cited in support of it.
The only point that remains is whether Mr. McGrady is entitled to the protection of the Act of 1980 on the ground that what ‘was a secure contractual tenancy has been brought to an end. The short answer to that is that the Act of 1980 operates to give security where landlords give notice to quit; it does not give security where tenants give notice to quit.’

Judges:

Sir John Donaldson MR

Citations:

(1982) 46 P and CR 223

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedHowson v Buxton CA 1928
After one tenancy the former tenant as landlord’s representative became joint tenants with the new tenant who provided the funds and bought out the former tenants compensation rights. The landlord gave notice to terminate the tenancy, and the new . .
CitedLeek and Moorlands Building Society v Clark CA 1952
The court was asked whether one of two joint lessees could validly surrender the lease before the full period of the lease had run without the concurrence of the other joint lessee.
Held: Somervell LJ was in favour of the defendant lessees: . .

Cited by:

BindingHammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk CA 1990
Mr Monk and Mrs Powell held a tenancy of the council in their joint names. They fell out and Mrs Powell gave the contractual four week notice. Mr Monk objected that this should not have allowed the council to end the tenancy.
Held: The notice . .
CitedHammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk HL 5-Dec-1991
One tenant of two joint tenants of a house left and was granted a new tenancy on condition that the existing one of the house, still occupied by her former partner, was determined. She gave a notice to quit as requested, the council claimed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.272270

Knill v Prowse: 1884

An assignee of land may sue the tenant for the rent.

Citations:

[1884] 33 WR 163

Cited by:

CitedRhodes v Allied Dunbar Pension Services Ltd CA 1989
The intermediate tenant had charged the lease to the bank, which appointed receivers. Both the sub rent and the head rent fell into arrears. The head landlord then served a notice direct on the subtenant requiring him to pay the rent direct to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Equity, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.264579

Farrer v Nelson: 1885

The plaintiff was tenant of a farm over which the defendants’ predecessor had reserved shooting rights. The defendants had brought pheasants in coops on to land very close to the plaintiffs’ farm. The came onto the farm damaging his crops. The defendant said that having a right of shooting over the land, it was necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of this right that they should be at liberty to stock the land with pheasants.
Held: Pollock B said that so long as the lessee of the right of shooting was exercising the ordinary rights which the landlord who had reserved the right might have exercised, he was acting within his rights, but the moment he brings on game to an unreasonable amount or causes it to increase to an unreasonable extent, he is doing that which is unlawful, and an action may be maintained by his neighbour for the damage which he has sustained.

Judges:

Pollock B

Citations:

(1885) 15 QB 258

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

ExplainedPeech v Best CA 1931
The defendant owned a 700 acre farm. He granted to the plaintiff ‘the exclusive right of shooting and sporting in over and upon it’ for a term of fourteen years. With still some four years of the term to run, he conveyed 12 acres of the farm for the . .
CitedPole and Another v Peake and Another CA 17-Jul-1998
The defendants owned land over which the plaintiffs owned shooting and other sporting rights. When the plaintiffs licenced those rights to others the defendants objected and prevented access. They appealed a finding that they had infringed the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.264034

Cleve House Properties v Schildof: 1980

Citations:

(1980) CLY 1641

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedWembley National Stadium Ltd v Wembley (London) Ltd and Others ChD 4-Apr-2007
Land at Wembley stadium had been sold to the defendants and leased back. The defendant assigned the freehold within the group, declaring that the lease was held in trust for the original freeholder. The claimant now said that the defendant assignee . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.263795

Erskine v Adeane: 1873

Mellish LJ said: ‘The law of this country is that a tenant when he takes a farm must look and judge for himself what the state of the farm is. Just as in the case of a purchaser of a business the rule is caveat emptor, so in the case of the lease of property the rule is caveat lessee; he must take the property as he finds it.’

Judges:

Mellish LJ

Citations:

[1873] LR 8 CH 756

Cited by:

ApprovedCheater v Cater CA 1917
The defendant landlord let a farm to a tenant retaining the adjoining premises on which was a shrubbery containing yew trees. The branches of the yew trees overhung the farm and were within the reach of the tenant’s cattle and horses. The tenant’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.263271

Fisher v Walters: KBD 1926

T complained of being injured when the ceiling fell in the house. The defect was latent.
Held: L was not liable without notice of the defect.

Judges:

Finlay J, Mackinnon J

Citations:

[1926] 2 KB 315

Statutes:

Housing, Town Planning etc Act 1909 15

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

DisapprovedMcCarrick v Liverpool Corporation HL 1947
Premises’ Defect – No Notice Liability on L
The tenant’s wife was injured falling from defective stone steps leading from the kitchen to the back kitchen of the house. Under section the 1936 Act, the judge found the house not to have been kept in the state required. No notice of want of . .
CitedO’Brien v Robinson HL 19-Feb-1973
The plaintiffs sought damages after being injured when the ceiling of their bedroom fell on them. They were tenants of the defendants.
Held: The 1961 Act implied a duty on L to keep in repair the structure. What was meant by ‘keep in repair.’ . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.259930

Griffin v Fillet: 1926

The tenant gave notice to his landlord that steps to the dwelling-house needed attention but the lessee did not know that the steps were in fact actually dangerous.
Held: The landlord’s liability rested upon the lessor when subsequently he, though not his lessee, did acquire knowledge that the steps were actually dangerous.
Wright J said: ‘the lessor in my judgment was not liable for breach of covenant until he had been able to ascertain the nature of the repairs required. This he knew by 8th April, and I think he acted at his peril if he did not at once remedy the non-repair, either by temporary measures, if the permanent repairs could not be immediately effected, or by doing the permanent repairs, if this was practicable. If he did not do this he committed a breach of covenant.’

Judges:

Wright J

Citations:

[1926] 1 KB 17

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedO’Brien v Robinson HL 19-Feb-1973
The plaintiffs sought damages after being injured when the ceiling of their bedroom fell on them. They were tenants of the defendants.
Held: The 1961 Act implied a duty on L to keep in repair the structure. What was meant by ‘keep in repair.’ . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.259932

Shah v Givert: 1980

If a landlord seeks to recover possession of property under Order 113, he must take the risk that if the defendant raises an arguable case that he has a tenancy, the matter must go to trial.

Citations:

(1980) 124 SJ 513

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedCrancour Ltd v Da Silvaesa and Another CA 26-Feb-1986
The plaintiff sought possession of two rooms in a house occupied by the defendants separately. The agreements stated that they were licences. The agreements excluded the occupiers between 10:30am and noon on each day. The occupiers claimed to be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Litigation Practice

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.259696

In re Midland Railway Co’s Agreement, Charles Clay and Sons Ltd v British Railways Board: CA 1971

The lease agreement created a term for six months from 10 June 1920 and was to continue from half year to half year until determined. It was to be determined by three months’ written notice given by either party to the other provided that the landlords should not exercise that right unless they required the premises for their own business. The successors to the landlords served a six months’ written notice to quit under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 although they did not require the premises for their undertaking.
Held: The landlords’ appeal failed. The notice to quit was invalid and of no effect because the landlords did not require the premises for their undertaking. Russell LJ said that Lace v Chantler did not apply to a periodic tenancy: ‘we are persuaded that, there being no authority to prevent us, it is preferable as a matter of justice to hold parties to their clearly expressed bargain rather than to introduce for the first time in 1971 an extension of a doctrine of land law so as to deny the efficacy of that bargain.’

Judges:

Russell LJ

Citations:

[1971] Ch 725

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

AppliedDoe dem Warner v Browne 1807
The parties agreed a lease at a rent of andpound;40 per annum. The landlord was not to raise the rent nor turn out the tenant ‘so long as the rent is duly paid quarterly, and he does not expose to sale or sell any article that may be injurious to W . .
Not followedCheshire Lines Committee v Lewis and Co 1880
A weekly tenancy agreement contained an undertaking by the landlord not to give notice to quit until he needed to pull down the demised buildings.
Held: Lush J applied Warner v Browne saying: ‘This reasoning applies with at least equal force . .
Not followedLace v Chantler CA 1944
The freeholder purported to let the house to the tenant ‘for the duration of the war’
Held: The term was uncertain, and therefore no lease was created.
Lord Green MR said: ‘The intention was to create a tenancy and nothing else. The law . .

Cited by:

OverruledPrudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body and Others HL 16-Jul-1992
The parties signed a memorandum of agreement to let a strip of land from 1930 until determined as provided, but the only provision was that the lease would continue until the land was needed for road widening and two months’ notice was given. The . .
CitedBerrisford v Mexfield Housing Co-Operative Ltd SC 9-Nov-2011
The tenant appealed against an order granting possession. The tenancy, being held of a mutual housing co-operative did not have security but was in a form restricting the landlord’s right to recover possession, and the tenant resisted saying that it . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.259628

Family Management v Gray: 1980

Premises had been sub-let under full repairing leases and the disrepair which was the subject of the landlord’s action against the head tenant was due to breaches by the sub-tenants of their repairing obligations, who had by the term date of the head lease applied for new tenancies under the 1954 Act.
Held: There was no difference between the rental value of the properties in repair and their value out of repair. The reversion had to be valued subject to the rights of the sub-tenants to renew, and they could not, when renewing, pray in aid their own breaches of covenant in order to reduce the rent.
Events subsequent to the end of the lease, but operative or potential at that time might be allowed for when asessing the losses suffered.

Citations:

[1980] 1 EGLR 46

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 18(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedLyndendown Ltd v Vitamol Ltd CA 6-Jul-2007
At the end of the lease, the subtenant had failed to comply with his obligation to repair the property, leaving the head tenant liable to the landlord. The landlord had issued a letter which forgave the tenant from his obligations.
Held: The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.259146

Booth v Thomas: CA 1926

A landlord, whose predecessor in title had enclosed a natural stream in an artificial culvert which was incapable of retaining it, was held liable to the tenant for injury suffered by the demised premises as a result of the outflow of water consequent upon the culvert falling into disrepair.
Held: Without finding it necessary to decide whether liability arose on other grounds also, considered that it arose under an express covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in the lease. A mere act of omission on the part of a landlord is capable of constituting a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, if, but only if, there is a duty to do something.

Judges:

Sir Ernest Pollock MR, Sargant LJ

Citations:

[1926] Ch 397

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedWestminster (Duke of) and others v Guild CA 30-Mar-1983
The landlord brought an action for non-payment of rent. The tenant sought to set off a failure by the landlord to repair the building of which his flat was part and which failure had caused him loss. The landlord said that it had no express duty to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.259566

Sara and Hossein Asset Holdings Ltd v Blacks Outdoor Retail Ltd: CA 13 Nov 2020

This appeal concerns the construction of a provision in a commercial lease under which the landlord’s certificate of the total cost of services provided under the lease, and the service charge payable by the tenant, is conclusive in the absence of manifest or mathematical error or fraud. The courts below held that the certificate was conclusive as to the cost incurred in providing the services but not as to whether such services fell within the scope of services for which the landlord was entitled to charge under the lease.

Judges:

Lord Justice David Richards

Citations:

[2020] EWCA Civ 1521

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.655664

Lie v Mohile: CA 9 May 2014

Preliminary issue in proceedings under Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 – short point on the construction of section 41A of the Act and in particular as to whether one of two existing partners who were both the tenants of the relevant holding under the existing lease is entitled to make an application for a new tenancy under section 24 of the 1954 Act.

Judges:

Patten LJ

Citations:

[2014] EWCA Civ 728

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 41A

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.538182

Newman v Slade: KBD 1926

A notice to quit given by reference to a calendar week (excluding the day on which it was sent, but including the day on which it is received) was effective, unless a contrary intention was shown.

Citations:

[1926] 2 KB 328, [1926] 42 TLR 607, [1926] 70 Sol Jo 738

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.245891

Regina v London Borough Croydon ex parte Toff: 1988

The tenant having left the property, the landlord relet them.
Held: The act of the landlord meant it would be inequitable to hold the lease to continue.

Citations:

[1988] 20 HLR 576

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedZionmor v Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Islington CA 10-Oct-1997
The council appealed a finding that the claimant, a secure tenant, had not surrendered his tenancy. He had sought to exercise his right to buy the property, but was said to have left the premises before the lease was completed. The property was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.245882

Dellhold Estates (UK) Pty Ltd v Lindsey Trading Properties Inc: 1994

The word ‘premises’ in s 46(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 means the subject matter of the letting and the section applied to an agricultural holding which included a dwelling house. S 48 of the Act was governed by s 46(1) which applied it ‘to premises which consist of or include a dwelling’.

Citations:

[1994] 17 EG 148

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 46(1), Protection from Eviction Act 1977 5

Cited by:

CitedNational Trust for Places of Historic Interest Or Natural Beauty v Knipe and Knipe CA 15-May-1997
The tenancy was of an agricultural holding, with protection under the 1986 Act. It had 350 acres of pasture, and two farmhouses. The tenants covenanted not to use the holding for any purpose other than agriculture, to farm it in accordance with the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.245853

Gisborne v Burton: CA 1988

The land-owner held an agricultural holding. He wanted to let it but, in doing so, to deprive the tenant of the benefit of the statutory regime giving security of tenure. So he let the property to his wife, and his wife granted a sub-tenancy to the defendant. The freeholder subsequently died and his personal representatives wanted to recover possession. They served notice to quit on the wife determining her tenancy. She refrained from serving any counternotice, nor did he serve any notice to quit on the sub-tenant. The personal representatives, after the expiry of the notice to quit, claimed possession from the sub-tenant.
Held: The tenancy to the wife was a sham, a pretence without any reality. They held that the sub-tenant was in reality a tenant holding directly from the landlord to whom he had, for years, been paying his rent. No notice to quit had been served on the sub-tenant, so his agricultural tenancy continued. The notice to quit served on the wife was so much waste of paper.
(Ralph Gibson LJ, dissenting) The tenancy granted to the wife was not a sham, but was a reality, and should be treated on that footing.

Judges:

Ralph Gibson LJ

Citations:

[1988] 3 All ER 760, [1989] QB 390, [1988] 3 WLR 921

Statutes:

Agricultural Holdings Act 1986

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBelvedere Court Management Ltd v Frogmore Developments Ltd CA 24-Oct-1995
Landlords had sold flats to Frogmore without serving a section 5 notice under the 1987 Act. Prior to receipt of a purchase notice, Frogmore granted certain leases in the block of flats to another party.
Held: The agreements were upheld, and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.245014

Gray v Owen: 1910

Even if one of the parties to a tenancy is acting under a mistake, there can be a surrender of a tenancy by law, provided that the mistake is not induced by the fraud of the other.

Citations:

[1910] 1 KB 622

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRysaffe Trustee Company (CI) Ltd and Another v Ataghan Ltd and others ChD 8-Aug-2006
Complex family trusts had been created over many years. Various documents were now disputed, and particularly the extent of land demised by a lease, and whether a surender of a lease had occurred. Landslides had disturbed the boundaries of the land. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.245078

Dixon v Allgood: HL 1987

The applicant tenant occupied property originally a pair of semi-detached derelict cottages and six acres of land. He successively reconstructed each cottage, initially living in one of them and sub-letting the other; constructed a five door garage building; and then obtained vacant possession of the sub-let cottage and opened up the dividing wall to make the two cottages one dwelling house. He applied to acquire the freehold of the house and premises under the 1967 Act. To succeed, he needed to show that his tenancy was at a low rent under the original section 4 of the Act. He could do this if his rent was compared with a rateable value which included the garages, but not if the rateable value of the garages was excluded.
Held: By virtue of section 4(1)(a) of the 1967 Act, the ‘appropriate day’ was to be determined under section 25(3) of the 1977 Act in relation to ‘the house in question’, i.e. the cottages excluding the garages. There was a clear difference between the provisions of section 1(1) of the 1967 Act entitling the tenant to purchase ‘the house and premises’, and those of section 4(1)(a), requiring the appropriate day to be determined in relation to a dwelling house ‘consisting of the house in question’. By section 4(1), the appropriate day was determined by reference to the first day on which the dwelling house as a single hereditament or as two or more hereditaments had first appeared in the valuation list. That was 6 February 1967, the first day on which the second of the two cottages had first appeared, separately from the first cottage, on the valuation list after its conversion. Lord Templeman: ‘[Counsel for Mr Dixon] also submitted that ‘the house’ did not come into existence until 1977 when the two cottages were converted into one house and that 1977 was, therefore, the appropriate day and that the house [presumably and premises] then consisted of three hereditaments comprised of the two cottages and the garages. But section 4(1)(a) of the Act of 1967, read in conjunction with section 25(1) of the Act of 1977, requires the appropriate day to be the day when ‘the house’, consisting of two cottages and no more, was first rated and that day was 6 February 1967. A tenant of two semi-detached houses, each rated at andpound;50 on 25 March 1965, could not by inserted communicating doors between the two houses and converting them into one house, rated in 1987 at andpound;150, alter the appropriate day or increase the rateable value for the purposes of the Act of 1967. In the present case, ‘the house’ created by the tenant in 1977 consisted of two hereditaments rated for the first time by 6 February 1967.

Citations:

[1987] 1 WLR 1689

Statutes:

Leasehold Reform Act 1967 25(3)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedNeville v Cowdray Trust Ltd and Another CA 5-May-2006
The applicant claimed the right to purchase the freehold reversion for her home. The defendant said it was not held under a low rent so as to qualify, since the rent exceeded the rateable value as assessed. The rating list had been altered meantime . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.242427

Reeves v Pope: CA 1914

The potential landlord agreed with the proposed tenant to build a hotel by a date, and the tenant agreed to take a lease when it was ready. The building was late in completion. The tenant took the lease but without prejudice to his claim for damages. The landlord then mortgaged its interest to the claimant. The tenant sought to set its damages claim off against the rent due to the mortgagee for periods since the date of the mortgage. The mortgage took effect under the common law as a conveyance, subject to the mortgagee’s obligation to reconvey once the mortgage debt was paid off. The mortgagee had the legal title to the land.
Held: The tenant’s claim for a set-off failed. A transferee of the reversion is entitled to recover the rent in his own right, and therefore an equitable right of set-off which could have been raised in the case of a normal equitable assignment of a chose in action (including one which would now be recognised as a legal assignment by virtue of section 136) cannot be invoked.
Lord Reading CJ said: ‘It is perfectly plain that we are not dealing here with the right to set-off against the assignment of a chose in action, in which event quite different principles apply. . . ‘But that is not the real question in this case. The whole point depends upon whether or not Mr Crawford is right in saying that his client would be entitled to set off this claim, notwithstanding that it is not an interest in land. That is the whole matter in dispute. If what his client had was an interest in land which he desired to set off against the mortgagees in possession, no doubt the cases which he has quoted are in point as authorities for that proposition; but the moment it is ascertained that in this case the claim is not an interest in land, but if established is merely a right to damages against the mortgagor for breach of an agreement made in respect of, or in connection with, the land’.
Buckley LJ said that the tenant’s argument that the right to future rent which had been transferred was a chose in action was ‘wholly misconceived’ and that the mortgagees were not assignees of the rent: ‘The mortgagees were entitled, as mortgagees, to the reversion expectant on the determination of the lease under which the defendant held, and as such mortgagees they were entitled in their own right to enforce payment of the arrears of rent. They were not assignees of the rent; they were persons claiming to enforce payment of rent as entitled thereto as mortgagees; they could have distrained for the rent.’
‘Then it was said that there was a right of set-off by reason of the fact that the damages in question were damages arising from a breach of contract to do something upon the land within a time.
‘Now that, I conceive, is wholly a misconception. The doctrine is this – that whether there be a purchaser or mortgagee (it does not matter which) and the purchaser or mortgagee finds a tenant in possession, he is bound to assume that the tenant in possession has some interest in the land . . [The damages gained under the building agreement] were not any incumbrance on the land, and the right to them was no estate or interest in any way in the land. The damages in question, therefore, are not within the principle which is to be found in and perfectly indisputably established by the cases which have been cited to us’.

Judges:

Lord Reading CJ, Buckley LJ, Phillimore LJ

Citations:

[1914] 2 KB 284

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedEdlington Properties Limited v J H Fenner and Co Limited CA 22-Mar-2006
The landlord had assigned the reversion of the lease. There was an outstanding dispute with the tenant defendant who owed arrears of rent, but sought to set these off against a claim for damages for the landlord’s failure to construct the factory in . .
ApprovedNational Provincial Bank Limited v Ainsworth HL 1965
The significance of the distinction between occupation and rights was that although the deserted wife was in actual occupation of the former matrimonial home, the quality of her rights was not such as to be capable of amounting to an overriding . .
ExplainedRe Arrows Ltd (No 3) ChD 1992
Hoffmann explained the case of Reeves v Pope: ‘The reasoning of the Court of Appeal was that a mortgagee or transferee of a property subject to a lease does not become entitled to the rents . . as an assignee [of] a chose in action by the original . .
CitedLotteryking Ltd v AMEC Properties Ltd ChD 1995
The tenant sought to prevent the sale of the landlord’s reversion until the lessor’s repairing obligations had been met. One of the grounds was that on a sale the tenant’s right of set-off would not pass.
Held: An order was refused. Lightman . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.242645

Pfeiffer GmbH v Arbuthnot Factors Limited: 1988

Section 136 by its terms preserves the equitable rule that the debtor can rely on any rights of set-off which arose before he had notice of assignment .

Citations:

[1988] 1WLR 150

Statutes:

Law of Property Act 1925 136

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedEdlington Properties Limited v J H Fenner and Co Limited CA 22-Mar-2006
The landlord had assigned the reversion of the lease. There was an outstanding dispute with the tenant defendant who owed arrears of rent, but sought to set these off against a claim for damages for the landlord’s failure to construct the factory in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.242644

Tetley v Chitty: 1986

A local council had granted planning permission to a go-kart club to develop a go-kart track on land owned by the authority, and had granted the club a seven year lease to use it for that express purpose.
Held: The council were held liable in nuisance for noise arising from the use of the track. A clause in the lease requiring the tenant not to commit a nuisance did not excuse the Council landlord.

Citations:

[1986] 1 ALL ER 663

Cited by:

CitedLMS International Ltd and others v Styrene Packaging and Insulation Ltd and others TCC 30-Sep-2005
The claimants sought damages after their premises were destroyed when a fire started in the defendants neighbouring premises which contained substantial volumes of styrofoam. They alleged this was an unnatural use of the land.
Held: To . .
CitedCoventry and Others v Lawrence and Another (No 2) SC 23-Jul-2014
Consequential judgment. Mr Coventry had been found liable in the principle judgment in nuisance to the appellant neighbours. The Court was now asked as to several matters arising. First, to what extent were the defendants’ landlords liable to the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance

Updated: 07 May 2022; Ref: scu.230984

Morgan v Fear: HL 1907

Two adjoining tenants held of the same landlord. One enjoyed access and use of light over the adjoing tenanted premises for a period in excess of twenty years and without interruption.
Held: An absolute right of light was acquired as against the other tenant and against his successors in title, and also the landlord.

Citations:

[1907] AC 425, 76 LJ Ch 660, 51 Sol Jo 702

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromFear v Morgan CA 1906
. .

Cited by:

CitedMidtown Ltd v City of London Real Property Company Ltd ChD 20-Jan-2005
Tenants occupied land next to land which was to be developed after compulsory acquisition. The tenants and the landlords asserted a right of light over the land, and sought an injunction to prevent the development. The developer denied that any . .
CitedCGIS City Plaza Shares 1 Ltd and Another v Britel Fund Trustees Ltd ChD 13-Jun-2012
The claimants asserted a right of light either by prescription or under lost modern grant. The defendants argued that alterations in the windows arrangements meant that any prescription period was restarted.
Held: ‘the Defendant is not correct . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Land

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.222582

Goodrich v Paisner: HL 1956

By a tenancy agreement, the landlord of a dwelling house let to the tenant, on a weekly tenancy, four unfurnished rooms on the first floor of the house together with the use in common with the landlord of the back bedroom on the first floor and the use, in common with the landlord and others authorised by her and of the bathroom and lavatories. After the death of the landlord, the respondents, her successors in title, determined the tenancy by a notice to quit, but the tenant refused to deliver up possession. In an action by the respondents for possession of the four unfurnished rooms, the tenant claimed that she was entitled to the protection of Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Acts 1922 to 1939, because the rooms were let as a separate dwellings within the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act 1920 section 12(2). The respondents contended that as the tenant had the right to share a living room with the landlord, the premises let to her were not let as a separate dwelling, within section 12(2), because the words in the tenancy agreement, ‘the use in common with the landlord of the back bedroom’, were too vague to constitute a right to share part of the dwelling sufficient to exclude the operation of the Rent Restrictions Acts, or created merely a right to the exclusive use of the room from time to time, and did not involve such an evasion of privacy as would exclude the Acts.
The House considered the interpretation of the phrase let as a ‘separate’ dwelling. Lord Reid said: ‘No court is entitled to substitute its words for the words of the Act.
But a court can and must decide what is the appropriate test in a particular case and, when the Court of Appeal has laid down a test, that test ought to be followed in all cases which do not present substantial relevant differences . . [T]hat does not mean that the words used by the Court of Appeal are to be treated as if they were words in an Act of Parliament. In substantially different circumstances they are only a guide, and not a rule.’

Judges:

Lord Reid

Citations:

[1957] AC 65, [1956] 2 All ER 176, [1956] 2 WLR 1053, 100 Sol Jo 341

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedUratemp Ventures Limited v Collins HL 11-Oct-2001
Can a single room within a hotel comprise a separate dwelling within the 1988 Act and be subject to an assured tenancy?
Held: A single room can be a dwelling. Each case must be interpreted in its own light as a question of fact, but respecting . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.221451

Norwich Union Life Insurance v British Railways Board: 1987

The court made reference to the ‘torrential style of drafting which has been traditional for many years’ among draftsmen of covenants in leases. ‘The use of ordinary language to convey meaning often involves subtle discriminations which for most people are intuitive rather than capable of lucid explanation. An explanation of why ordinary English words in a particular context convey a given meaning is frequently more likely to confuse than to enlighten. Perhaps this is what judges mean when they say that questions of construction are often matters of impression.’

Judges:

Hoffmann J

Citations:

[1987] 2 EGLR 137

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedGLN (Copenhagen) Southern Ltd v Tunbridge Wells Borough Council CA 27-Aug-2004
Neighbouring plots included covenants to use and not to use the land as cinemas. A proposed development would have used the land which had to be so used as an access for the new cinema proposed. The claimant sought to rely upon the Act to enforce a . .
CitedOceanic Village Ltd v United Attractions Ltd, Shirayama ChD 9-Dec-1999
The tenant sought an injunction against its neighbour and landlord to prevent it letting an adjoining property without a restriction similar to the one in its own lease. The claimants sought reassurance from the defendant tenants of the adjoining . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.220500

Turner and Bell v Searles (Stanford-le-Hope) Limited: 1977

The landlord opposed the grant of a new tenancy. The business tenancy was an oral one, and he opposed renewal on the ground that the tenant was operating in breach of planning controls.
Held: An illegal use is a reason connected with the tenant’s use and management of the holding and is a clear reason why the tenant ‘ought not’ to be granted a new tenancy under the 1954 Act..

Citations:

[1977] 33 P and CR 208

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(g)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedFowles v Heathrow Airport Ltd ChD 15-Feb-2008
The landlord had opposed the tenant’s application to renew his tenancy, and the tenant also claimed title to additional land by adverse possession. The tenant asserted various business uses, some of which the landlord denied. The landlord went into . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.216659

Moss v Mobil Oil Co Ltd: 1988

The section required a notice to relate to all the property comprised in the lease. One part of the freehold had been sold off.
Held: In this case the lease had in effect let two properties, and could be construed as two separate lease, and the landlord was able to serve a s25 notice in respect of one only.

Citations:

[1988] 1 EGLR 71

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 25

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.216629

Meah v Sector Properties: 1974

The landlord served his section 25 notice, amnd the tenant his 26 counter-notice. The tenant did not in fact issue his court application until some two years later.
Held: A landlord’s waiver of the time limits for beginning court proceedings could only extend until the expiry of the relevant notices. After that point, the lease had terminated and the issue became one of jurisdiction. The court had none.

Citations:

[1974] 1 All ER 1074

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.216646

Pearson v Alyo: CA 1990

Effect of mistake in notice given under the Act.

Judges:

Nourse LJ

Citations:

[1990] 1 EGLR 114

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedMorrow v Nadeem 1981
In a notice served pursuant to s25 of the 1954 Act the landlord was described as the individual who was effectively the sole shareholder and director of landlord company, rather than the landlord company itself.
Held: The landlord’s notice was . .

Cited by:

CitedLay and others v Ackerman and Another CA 4-Mar-2004
Notices had been served by tenants under the Acts. The properties were on a large estate where the freeholds had been divided and assigned to different bodies, and there were inconsistencies in identifying the landlords. The landlords served a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.214629

Lewisham Borough Council v Roberts: CA 1949

The council sought to exercise its powers under the Act to take possession of part of the defendant’s property.
Held: Denning LJ said: ‘It is necessary to consider the nature of the power to requisition land. It is only a power to take possession of land. It is not a power to acquire any estate or interest in any land . . Once possession is taken the Crown can exercise all the powers incident to possession, such as to license other people to use the premises; . . but it cannot grant a lease or create any legal interest in the land in favour of any other person, because it has itself no estate in the land out of which to carve any interest.’
Jenkins J rejected an argument that the principle was one of delegation: ‘I think this contention is based on a misconception of the relationship between a minister and the officials in his department. A minister must perforce, from the necessity of the case, act through his departmental officials, and where as in the Defence Regulations now under consideration functions are expressed to be committed to a minister, those functions must, as a matter of necessary implication, be exercisable by the minister either personally or through his departmental officials; and acts done in exercise of those functions are equally acts of the minister whether they are done by him personally, or through his departmental officials, as in practice, except in matters of the very first importance, they almost invariably would be done. No question of agency or delegation . . seems to me to arise at all.’

Judges:

Denning LJ

Citations:

[1949] 2 KB 608

Statutes:

Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust HL 24-Jun-1999
The claimant sought to oblige the respondent to repair his flat under the 1988 Act. The respondent replied that the arrangement was a licence only, and not protected under the Act.
Held: The housing association had a temporary licence to . .
CitedCastle v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 24-Jan-2014
The defendant appealed from his conviction for having driven in excess of a variable speed limit on the motorway. He said that the Order under which the speed limit had been imposed was irregular. . .
CitedBourgass and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court considered the procedures when a prisoner is kept in solitary confinement, otherwise described as ‘segregation’ or ‘removal from association’, and principally whether decisions to keep the appellants in segregation for substantial periods . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Land, Constitutional

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.199979

Street v Mountford: CA 1985

An occupier who has been granted exclusive possession, may nevertheless be a licensee if, in the agreement: ‘there is mentioned the clear intention of both parties that the rights granted are to be merely those of of a personal right of occupation and not those of a tenant.’ and ‘It seems to me that, if the defendant is to displace the express statement of intention embodied in the declaration, she must show that the declaration was either a deliberate sham or at least an inaccurate statement of what was the true substance of the real transaction agreed between the parties; …”

Judges:

Slade LJ

Citations:

[1985] 4 P and CR

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal fromStreet v Mountford HL 6-Mar-1985
When a licence is really a tenancy
The document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts. Exclusive occupation was in fact granted.
Held: . .
CitedNational Car Parks Ltd, Regina (on the Application of) v Trinity Development Company (Banbury) Ltd CA 18-Oct-2001
The land owner appealed a decision that the claimant was a tenant of its premises. It had granted what was described as a licence to the claimant, but stated explicitly that the claimant’s servants should not in any way impeach the land-owner’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.197764

9 E.4. 35: 1469

Report of an action of right for land which then half way through seems to become a report of a quite different action of trespass or of nuisance in which there is one relevant speech by NEEDHAM, J. If a man erect a building to the nuisance of my house I can remain on my land or in my house and demolish his building and I will without doubt be able to justify this; so in this case the defendant will not be punished for the demolition of the building or uprooting of the stakes, but as to the entry into his land the action is not brought for the entry etc. and so etc. But it seems to me that the entry is not allowable for if I lease land to someone for a term of years in which there is a mine of tin, iron or lead or coal and I enter and take the tin, iron etc, the termor ought not to punish me for this taking for he is not entitled to this tin etc. It is likewise for great trees. But for entry onto the land and trampling down of the earth he may punish me.
DANBY, C.J. It is doubtful whether if the law gives you the trees or the tin and you cannot take them without entering your entry is not lawful.
NEEDHAM, J. It is folly on the part of the lessor to make such a lease. . .

Citations:

[1469] [Co. Litt. 53b: (p)]

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedDayani v London Borough of Bromley TCC 25-Nov-1999
LA Tenant liable for permissive waste
The local authority was tenant of properties which it sub-licensed to homeless persons for three years was liable for having allowed the properties to deteriorate. It was claimed that they were liable for permissive waste as tenants for a fixed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.196987

5 E. 4. 100: 1465

A writ of waste was brought alleging that waste had been committed in respect of a building etc. and also in respect of wood, namely certain trees. And in the count in respect of the trees he counted that the defendant cut down the trees and sold them. With respect to the building he pleaded that he had committed no waste; with respect to the cutting down of the wood, namely the trees, the defendant pleaded justification because at the time of the making of the lease the building was ruinous in the ‘grunsels’ of the building and so the defendant cut down the trees to repair the building and with the said trees he erected the ‘grundsels’ of the building.
Littleton. That is no plea because he does not respond to our action, namely the sale to which an answer ought to have been given, because if he cut the trees to make repairs and sold them before he did so the cutting cannot be justified; and so it is necessary to answer with respect to the sale as well as to the cutting.
Catesby. Although we sold the trees that is no wrong in us when we made repairs with them for now the sale is not material when repair has been made with these trees; for if I waste a building and knock it down and before an action of waste is sued against me I make another and better building I will not be punished for the waste so that, although the defendant made the said sale because it is not denied that he made repairs with them it will not be called waste because of the repair.
NEEDHAM, J. The cutting of the trees to make repairs with them is well done but if he makes the sale before the repairs are made with the wood, namely of the trees, yet the sale made beforehand is wrong and waste and however the lessee gets these trees back by gift or purchase or otherwise and make repairs of a building that is included in the lease even if this excuses the waste of the building it does not excuse the waste of the wood.
DANBY, C.J. By the sale of the trees there is at once waste even if he afterwards recovers the same trees by gift, exchange or sale or otherwise and repairs of the building are made with them yet this does not excuse the waste that was previously made by the sale because the cutting of the wood to make repairs is not justifiable nor will such cutting ever excuse the waste committed unless repairs were actually made with them, because even if he cut the trees intending to make repairs with them and then the lessee puts them to his own use or sell or give them or lets them rot or perish and does not put them into repairs that is waste and once it is accounted waste it cannot be purged by the subsequent repair. And this situation is not like to the situation alleged where a building is knocked down by the lessee and a new building erected before action commenced for there is no waste if this building is as good as the other. But that is not the case here because even if the waste of the house is excused by the repair made with the trees so that in respect of the building it is true that no waste has been committed yet where trees were growing and cut and sold that is waste even if the trees were used in the repair of the building, so that the waste of the building is excused by this but where the trees were growing is waste because no new trees are growing there and so this was initially waste through the sale and so at all times afterwards it will be regarded as waste for the repair of the building with them only excuses that waste but if there had been no sale then the cutting of the wood and the repair made with it of the building, then the waste of the house and the wood is excused by the repair made and so in the case before of a declaration of the cutting of the trees and the sale of this wood this is waste and cannot be excused afterwards and so the sale is material.
Catesby. If you bring an action against me for land such as an assize or the like and I plead in bar that the plaintiff enfeoffed such a one in fee simple without any condition whose estate I have it is a perfectly good title for the plaintiff to say that he enfeoffed him on such a condition etc. and because of the breach of conditions he entered and was seised until the defendant disseised him, that is sufficient without responding or saying also that I did not enfeoff him simply without any condition, for those words are merely surplus and nugatory and are not material. And thus it seems that in the case of waste the sale shown is not material etc.
NEEDHAM, J. That is not so but it is material in this action here as the action and declaration is made. And, sir, your plea is not incompatible with his declaration, namely that you cut the trees to make repairs and before doing so you sold them and then took them back or made repairs and this repair made after the wrong does not excuse the waste.
And then this matter was well argued in court: whether the count was good on this point and material. And it was held by the better opinion of the court that it is and it was good enough because the statute is that no-one is allowed to make waste, sale or destruction etc. And also the prothonotary Comberford said to the court that it is the common form of declaration on a writ of waste for sale of wood to enter ‘by sale or by burning’ and so in the declaration before-mentioned by the common form it is good to show the cutting of the wood and the sale. And yet it is not a traverse nor a plea that he did not sell the trees but it is necessary to answer on the waste as by saying ‘no waste committed’ or otherwise to justify the waste by reason of the repair made with the trees and that he did not sell them where he justifies by reason of repair as before. So the defendant must answer over for otherwise he does not respond to the action of the plaintiff as alleged in his declaration for the same is material etc.
NEEDHAM, J. In the writ of waste it is the plaintiff’s choice in declaring the waste of the wood whether to allege just the waste committed as by cutting down a wood and showing how many trees without saying anything of sale or to declare the cutting of the wood and also the sale and where the sale is alleged by the declaration that must be answered for that is more specific waste than where no sale is mentioned for where there is no mention in the declaration of sale there is no need to answer to it but only to justify the cutting of the trees for repairs without saying any more provided repairs have been made.
Catesby. If the sale is material then it is necessary to say to whom he made the sale for a declaration ought to be specific.
DANBY, C.J. There is no need because it is sufficient to say as has been said without more and when you traverse him by saying that you cut the trees and made repairs with them and you did not sell them it is enough for his part to say by way of replication that you sold them to such a one or such a one. Just as is true of a release pleaded without showing where specifically it was made in bar and when the plaintiff traverse this it will be time enough for the defendant to say your deed was made at such a place and thus before.
Catesby. For a release pleaded by way of bar the norm has been as you say but for other matter in deed like an arbitration or accord it is necessary to show the place and the year and day specifically and so here it with specifying to whom the same was made.
CHOKE, J. The action and the declaration seem sufficient to show the waste by specifying the cutting of oak trees and their sale and this is a double cause of action and as pleading has been made this has to be coupled with a denial of the sale; but it is not a sufficient plea to deny the sale even though it would be a good plea to say no waste committed, just as in various other actions which have double matter though the action is a single one. As where you take my animals and then kill them I can have a general action if I wish alleging that you took my animals by force so as to recover my damages thereby. And so, if I wish, I can subsequently have a special action on my case because you took my animals with force and killed them and it is not enough for the defendant to say that he did not take them but he must respond to the killing though if he wishes to plead not guilty of the whole trespass this will answer the whole action. So too in various other cases it is at the plaintiff’s election to have a general action or a special one and an answer has to be given in accordance with what the action alleges. So too can the plaintiff act in this case of waste as it seems. And as for the sale it does not seem necessary to show to whom it was made for in some cases the certainty may be shown after the tender of issue as in formedon where the tenant pleads the warranty of the ancestor of the demandant with assets against which the plaintiff will say that nothing has descended to him. It will be enough now for the tenant to say assets at such a place. And in some cases the issue or the plea will be put without certainty for if I plead joint-tenancy on the part of the plaintiff or demandant I will not be driven to show by whose gift or feoffment because I am a stranger to that, though on my own part it would be different. So in this case the plaintiff alleges waste committed by the defendant through the cutting of the trees and their sale and this is enough for the plaintiff as he is a stranger to this act of the defendant and so there is no need on his part to show to whom and so the count seems good enough etc.
And MOYLE, J. being in court it seemed to him that it was necessary to show to whom the sale was made as in an action of account for receipt by the defendant at the hands of others the plaintiff has to show by whose hands at his own peril and otherwise the continuance was good even though he is a stranger to the defendant’s actions
DANBY, C.J. As to your case, Catesby, of a feoffment pleaded simply without any condition these words ‘simply without condition’ are not material but void because by common understanding a feoffment is prima facie simple, so the plaintiff has no need to answer these words. But in this case the sale is material for even if cutting to make repairs is justifiable prima facie yet if he then sell them after having had this intention the cutting is not now lawful. And if the count had only been in general form of waste committed by cutting down wood and had shown which trees and the defendant had justified the cutting down for repairs it would have been a good replication for the plaintiff to say that he made no repairs, if he wished, or otherwise to say that he sold them, for if he did not make repairs or sold them he is chargeable with waste. And even though the plaintiff has all his matter in his declaration the count is none the worse for this nor bad but good. And the common form is thus as the prothonotary has told us.
MOYLE, J.. This is a surprising case where someone in his declaration includes all his matter and it is not laudable to include in his action the substance of the bar and of the possible replication to it nor is a writ having such content good as it seems.
DANBY, C.J. Truly they will not here change the form nor their form either for you or for me because it may happen that something inappropriate will ensue from the change, particularly where the form is in accordance with reason as this action is just as several actions are double in themselves etc.
Littleton. If they will not help us we see in respect of the plea pleaded in the manner it is that we are not bound in law to respond.
DANBY, C.J. (to Catesby). Despatch the matter one way or another.
And then Catesby said I will gladly despatch the matter: either the declaration is good or I will make a ‘jeofaile’ if it is not.
DANBY, C.J. If it is thus it is to your advantage and you will not be prejudiced however it comes out, for this matter appears etc.
Catesby. We cut the trees and made repairs to the building with them (and showed how) and we did not sell them etc.
Littleton. With your permission we wish to imparl on this.
And in this same plea it was shown by NEEDHAM, J. that uprooting of underwood or thorns is waste and ought to be specially declared. And also of the roots of trees so that the shoots cannot grow or leaving the close open so that animals enter and destroy the shoots and that is also special waste etc.
MOYLE, J. For shoots wasted in this way one will have a special writ of waste etc.
DANBY, C.J. That is not the case but the declaration needs to specify this and not otherwise etc.
Catesby. If the declaration in a writ of waste for wood is as is said by ‘selling or burning’ then if the case is such that the lessee cut these trees and did not sell them or burn them in his house but allowed them to lie in his house or on the ground and did not make repairs with them or if he gave them away if this matter of the sale or burning is material then the tenant (the lessee) must answer it as by pleading that he cut the trees for repairs and made repairs and that he did not sell or burn them, it will be found against the plaintiff if he traverse the sale or burning because in truth they are and were cut for repairs and no repair was made or sale or burning but the defendant gave them freely to another or allowed them to lie on the ground etc.
DANBY, C.J. The plaintiff will assist himself perfectly well in your case by saying that he made no repairs and so his action will be maintainable without having to respond or maintain the sale or burning, because both causes are waste. Also where the lessee cuts trees to make repairs and does so with them he can justify this cutting if repairs were made and otherwise not but the lessee will pay the wages and the salaries of the workmen at his own cost and is not to cut wood or take other such profits and sell them and with the money from the sale pay the costs of his repairs (and this was granted by two or three in the court of the Justices and the serjeants).
Jenney. In an assize for rent if the plaintiff wishes to make a title in his plaint as by showing that he has the rent by a grant or otherwise as he can if he wishes it is no plea against this to say ‘outside his fee, judgment whether without showing other title’ because the plaint contained in itself a title. But where the plaint is general and says nothing of a grant of the rent nor how the rent came to him there it is a good plea to say ‘outside his fee, judgment if the action lies without showing title’; there it is a good plea because no title was contained in it before. So in a writ of waste if the plaintiff wishes he can his declaration of wood cut ‘and by sale or burning etc.’ and then it is necessary to speak and answer to this for even though he says that he cut the trees to make repairs and made repairs it is not enough without answering on the same. But if the writ of waste be general as it can be as it seems of waste in a wood and cutting down trees without talking of any sale, then it is enough to justify the cutting down for repairs and that he did do so etc.

Citations:

[1465] [Co.Litt. 53a (p)]

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedDayani v London Borough of Bromley TCC 25-Nov-1999
LA Tenant liable for permissive waste
The local authority was tenant of properties which it sub-licensed to homeless persons for three years was liable for having allowed the properties to deteriorate. It was claimed that they were liable for permissive waste as tenants for a fixed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 06 May 2022; Ref: scu.196986