The plaintiff sought possession of two rooms in a house occupied by the defendants separately. The agreements stated that they were licences. The agreements excluded the occupiers between 10:30am and noon on each day. The occupiers claimed to be tenants with protection.
Held: The tenants’ appeal against summary orders for posession were successful, and the cases remitted to the county court for trial. Though such matters dealt largely with the legal assessment of dicuments, that assessment was here against a disputed factual background.
Ralph Gibson LJ said: ‘As I understand the reference to the sham nature of the obligation,’ namely that of sharing the room in common with other persons nominated by the landlord, the House of Lords is there saying, first, that the agreement in that case constituted the grant of exclusive possession; secondly, that the written obligation to share the room was not effective to alter the true nature of the grant; and thirdly, that, on the facts of the case, it should have been clear to the Court of Appeal that the landlord cannot have intended the term as to sharing occupation to be a true statement of the nature of the possession intended to be enjoyed by the ‘licensees.”
Purchas LJ, Ralph Gibson LJ, Nicholls LJ
 EWCA Civ 1,  1 EGLR 80,  52 PandCR 204,  18 HLR 265,  278 EG 618
Rules of the Supreme Court Order 113
Cited – Shell-Mex v Manchester Garages CA 1971
The defendant was allowed to go into occupation of the plaintiff’s premises solely for the purpose of selling the plaintiff’s brands of petrol and the defendants undertook to use every endeavour and due diligence to sell and foster the sale of the . .
Cited – In Re Carne’s Settled Estates 1899
A right to occupy for life, arising by settlement gives to the occupier an equitable interest in the land. . .
Cited – Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen (The ‘Diana Prosperity’) HL 1976
In construing a contract, three principles can be found. The contextual scene is always relevant. Secondly, what is admissible as a matter of the rules of evidence under this heading is what is arguably relevant, but admissibility is not decisive. . .
Cited – Allan v Liverpool Overseers 1874
The court was asked whether a steamship company was liable to be rated in respect of its occupation of sheds which it occupied under a licence from the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board. The court noted that liability for rates fell only on a person . .
Cited – Street v Mountford HL 6-Mar-1985
When a licence is really a tenancy
The document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts. Exclusive occupation was in fact granted.
Held: . .
Cited – Henderson v Law CA 1985
Griffiths LJ discussed the bringing of cases for possession under the summary procedure provided by Order 113: ‘There will obviously be cases in which, although proceedings are started by way of a summary procedure it quickly becomes apparent that a . .
Cited – Shah v Givert 1980
If a landlord seeks to recover possession of property under Order 113, he must take the risk that if the defendant raises an arguable case that he has a tenancy, the matter must go to trial. . .
Cited – Marchant v Charters CA 1977
Lord Denning MR considered the difference between a tenant and a licensee: ‘What is the test to see whether the occupier of one room in a house is a tenant or a licensee? It does not depend on whether he or she has exclusive possession or not. It . .
Cited – Greater London Council v Jenkins 1975
A landlord is entitled to use the summary proceedings under Order 113 if he can demonstrate his right to do so, and the court has no discretion to deny such use merely on the grounds that the proceedings are rapid and summary and that the defendants . .
Cited – Bradley v Baylis CA 1881
The tenant of two rooms, which he took unfurnished at a weekly rent, had the exclusive use of such rooms and a key of the outer door of the house. His landlord had also a key of the outer door, and resided in all the rest of the house, but supplied . .
Cited – Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd CA 1967
Sham requires common intent to create other result
The court considered a claim by a hire-purchase company for the return of a vehicle. The bailee said the agreement was a sham.
Held: The word ‘sham’ should only be used to describe an act or document where the parties have a common intention . .
Cited – Errington v Errington and Woods CA 19-Dec-1951
There was a contract by a father to allow his son to buy the father’s house on payment of the instalments of the father’s Building Society loan.
Held: Denning LJ reviewed the cases and said: ‘The result of all these cases is that, although a . .
Cited – Addiscombe Garden Estates Ltd v Crabbe CA 1957
The trustees of a tennis club took possession of tennis courts and a clubhouse under a lease, and sought a new lease under the 1954 Act. The landlord said that they were only licensees and in any event were not entitled to a new lease since they . .
Cited – A G Securities v Vaughan; Antoniades v Villiers and Bridger HL 10-Nov-1988
In Antoniades, the two tenants occupied an attic, living together. Each had at the same time signed identical agreements purporting to create licences. The landlord had reserved to himself the right to occupy the property and to allow others to . .
These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 31 January 2021; Ref: scu.245285