Category: Planning

Regina v Bassetlaw District Council ex parte Oxby: Admn 11 Dec 1996

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 344

Links:

Bailii

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v Bassetlaw District Council, Ex parte Oxby CA 11-Dec-1997
Hobhouse LJ stated that ‘if it has been clearly established . . that a planning consent was improperly and invalidly granted, then it should, in principle, be declared to be void’. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.136892

Swan v Secretary of State for Environment; Rhys Evans; Barry George Evans and Rhian Elizabeth Marilyn Jones: Admn 22 Nov 1996

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 266

Links:

Bailii

Citing:

Cited – Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates plc HL 31-Oct-1984
The House was asked whether the 1971 Act permitted the relevant authorities, by resort to their development plans, to support the retention of traditional industries or was the ambit of the Act such as to permit only ‘land use’ aims to be pursued? . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.136814

Hedges and Hedges v Secretary of State for Environment v East Cambridgeshire District Council: Admn 15 Nov 1996

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 240, [1996] EWHC Admin 239

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – The First Secretary of State, Grant Doe, Gregory Yates, Paul Eames v Chichester District Council CA 29-Sep-2004
The appellants challenged a decision to grant planning consent for a private gipsy with mobile homes. The issue was whether the council in refusing permission and in issuing enforcement proceedings, had infringed the applicants human rights. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.136787

Sussex Investments Limited v The Secretary Of State For The Environment, Spelthorne Borough Council: Admn 28 Oct 1996

The plaintiff requested that an enforcement notice should be quashed. Two earlier decision notices had already been quashed. At issue was a houseboat constructed on a floating wooden raft. There was an existing use certificate for a houseboat. Was it a houseboat or floating house? The inspector had taken a definition of houseboat from the dictionary. Could it be a boat without having a boat like shape? There was an existing use certificate for a houseboat. The secretary’s decision had taken account of two associated platforms, but since these could be and indeed had been removed, he should have considered the development without the platforms. That consideration was not capable of being extracted from the decisions, and therefore it was quashed.

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 156

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990

Citing:

Applied – Regina (Westminster City Council) v British Waterways Board HL 1985
The tenant occupied land next to a canal under a lease from the Defendants. The landlord opposed a renewal saying they wished to occupy the land themselves for the purposes of a marina. The tenant said the plan was unrealistic, because it would not . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Sussex Investments Limited v Secretary of State for Environment Spelthorne Borough Council CA 18-Dec-1997
Whether a floating house is a houseboat is not just a question of having a boat-like shape, but is a question of fact and degree. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.136704

T A J Moore v The Secretary of State for the Environment, The New Forest District Council: Admn 25 Oct 1996

The applicant sought to quash an enforcement notice, regarding a change of use from residential to mixed residential and holiday accommodation. The change had taken in respect of several units over a long period of time. The inspector sought to bring them together and by treating them as one unit, he brought the development within the ten year period. The term dwelling-house is not defined in the Act. Can the use of the kind found properly be held to be materially different from the quality of use necessary to constitute use as a single dwelling house? Was this one dwelling house used as ten apartments? The distinction made was valid and the ten year rule correctly applied.

Citations:

[1996] EWHC Admin 146

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 171 (b)(2)

Citing:

Cited – Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment QBD 1982
The Secretary of State could find that a building built under a permission for a weekend and holiday chalet, but to be used only in summer, was a dwelling house. The distinctive characteristic of a dwellinghouse is its ability to afford to those who . .
Cited – Van Dyck v Secretary of State for the Environment CA 1993
The court asked whether the four year enforcement rule applied in respect of subdivision of a larger building to create single dwelling houses or applied only in the case of conversion of a single building to single dwelling houses.
Held: It . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Moore v Secretary of State for Environment and New Forest District Council CA 18-Feb-1998
The outbuildings of a large country house had been converted into ten single self-contained units of residential accommodation for the purpose of holiday lettings. Nine of the units were in use by May 1991. In May 1995 the local planning authority . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 25 May 2022; Ref: scu.136694

Thurrock Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Enviroment, Transport and The Regions ex parte Terry Holding: CA 13 Dec 2000

Where the claimant was not out of time to bring an appeal, or he retained the right of appeal, or the works proposed involved were not new, and no amendment or substitute of a new claim was proposed, the court should exercise its discretion to amend the claim form so that an application for permission to appeal under section 289, should proceed as an application under section 288.

Citations:

Times 20-Dec-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 323

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 288 289, Civil Procedure Rules Part 1.1(1) 1.2 17.4

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning, Litigation Practice

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135643

Berkeley v Secretary of State For The Environment and Others: HL 11 May 2000

The claimant challenged the grant of planning permission for a new football ground for Fulham Football club, saying that an Environmental Impact Assessment had not been obtained, but was required.
Held: Where a planning application if completed would have a substantial effect on the environment, and an environmental impact assessment should have been first obtained, it was not possible to dispense with that assessment and to deem it to have been supplied where it was thought that the assessment would make no difference, or that the authority or secretary of state in fact had all the information which would have been provided. The Directive prescribed a particular procedure which was to be followed. In the absence of at least substantial compliance, the court should not exercise its discretion to validate retrospectively a breach of the Directive, even if satisfied that the result would have been the same.
Lord Bingham set out the Court’s discretion: ‘Even in a purely domestic context, the discretion of the court to do other than quash the relevant order or action where such excessive exercise of power is shown is very narrow. In the Community context, unless a violation is so negligible as to be truly de minimis and the prescribed procedure has in all essentials been followed, the discretion (if any exists) is narrower still: the duty laid on member states by article 10 of the EC Treaty, the obligation of national courts to ensure that Community rights are fully and effectively enforced, the strict conditions attached by article 2(3) of the Directive to exercise of the power to exempt and the absence of any power in the Secretary of State to waive compliance (otherwise than by way of exemption) with the requirements of the Regulations in the case of any urban development project which in his opinion would be likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue of the factors mentioned, all point towards an order to quash as the proper response to a contravention such as admittedly occurred in this case.’
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘A court is therefore not entitled retrospectively to dispense with the requirement of an EIA on the ground that the outcome would have been the same or that the local planning authority or Secretary of State had all the information necessary to enable them to reach a proper decision on the environmental issues. Although section 288(5)(b), in providing that the court ‘may’ quash an ultra vires planning decision, clearly confers a discretion upon the court, I doubt whether, consistently with its obligations under European law, the court may exercise that discretion to uphold a planning permission which has been granted contrary to the provisions of the Directive. To do so would seem to conflict with the duty of the court under article 10 (ex article 5) of the EC Treaty to ensure fulfilment of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Treaty. In classifying a failure to conduct a requisite EIA for the purposes of section 288 as not merely non-compliance with a relevant requirement but as rendering the grant of permission ultra vires, the legislature was intending to confine any discretion within the narrowest possible bounds. It is exceptional even in domestic law for a court to exercise its discretion not to quash a decision which has been found to be ultra vires: see Glidewell LJ in Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1990) 61 P and CR 343, 353. [Counsel for the Respondent] was in my opinion right to concede that nothing less than substantial compliance with the Directive could enable the planning permission in this case to be upheld.’

Judges:

Lord Hoffmann, Lord Bingham

Citations:

Times 07-Jul-2000, [2000] 3 WLR 420, [2001] 2 AC 603, [2000] UKHL 36, [2000] 3 All ER 897

Links:

House of Lords, House of Lords, Bailii

Statutes:

Council Directive 85/337/EEC, Town and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1988 (1988 No 1199), Town and Country Planning Act 1990 288(5)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

At First Instance – Dido Berkeley v Secretary of State for Environment Admn 26-Mar-1997
. .

Cited by:

Cited – Barker v London Borough of Bromley Admn 23-Nov-2001
The claimant challenged the grant of outline permission to develop the Crystal Palace, arguing that no Environmental Assessment had taken place. The need for one depended upon whether the directive had been properly incorporated into English Law. . .
Cited – Bown v Secretary of State for Transport CA 31-Jul-2003
The appeal concerned the environmental effect of the erection of a bridge being part of a bypass. It was claimed that the area should have been designated as a Special Protection Area for Birds (SPA), and that if so it should be treated as such for . .
Cited – Younger Homes (Northern) Ltd v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 26-Nov-2003
The claimant sought to quash a planning decision on the basis that a screening decision had not been made.
Held: Though the procedures within the authority could have been bettered, there was no formal requirement for a screening option to . .
Cited – Pascoe v First Secretary of State and others Admn 27-Sep-2006
The claimant challenged a compulsory purchase order made under the 1993 Act on the grounds of underuse of properties in the area.
Held: The respondent’s decision had been made on the basis that there was underuse of a ‘predominant number’ of . .
Cited – Regina v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex Parte Milne (2) QBD 31-Jul-2000
Developers submitted applications for outline permission for the development of a business park. The applicant sought to quash the grant on the basis that the environmental assessment was insufficiently detailed, and contained reserved matters, and . .
Cited – Edwards, Regina (on the application of) v Environment Agency HL 16-Apr-2008
The applicants sought to challenge the grant of a permit by the defendant to a company to operate a cement works, saying that the environmental impact assessment was inadequate.
Held: The Agency had been justified in allowing the application . .
Cited – Boggis and Another v Natural England CA 20-Oct-2009
Natural England appealed against the quashing of an SSSI.
Held: The notification of an SSSI was not the making of a plan as respects the land affected, but the flagging up of it. The real purpose of the proceedings was to allow the land owners . .
Cited – Walton v The Scottish Ministers SC 17-Oct-2012
The appellant, former chair of a road activist group, challenged certain roads orders saying that the respondent had not carried out the required environmental assessment. His claim was that the road had been adopted without the consultation . .
Cited – Baker v Police Appeals Tribunal Admn 27-Mar-2013
The claimant a former police constable sought judicial review of a decision made by the tribunal, saying that it had had no jurisdiction to make it. The respondent tribunal, having now accepted that it had not had the power it exercised, being then . .
Cited – Champion, Regina (on The Application of) v North Norfolk District Council and Another SC 22-Jul-2015
‘The appeal concerns a proposed development by Crisp Maltings Group Ltd (‘CMGL’) at their Great Ryburgh plant in Norfolk, in the area of the North Norfolk District Council (‘the council’). It was opposed by the appellant, Mr Matthew Champion, a . .
Cited – Dover District Council v CPRE Kent SC 6-Dec-2017
‘When a local planning authority against the advice of its own professional advisers grants permission for a controversial development, what legal duty, if any, does it have to state the reasons for its decision, and in how much detail? Is such a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Environment, Planning, Administrative

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135054

Regina v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex parte Lawrie Plantation Services: HL 24 Jun 1999

The word ‘consideration’ when looked at in the context of planning laws was not to be construed narrowly as valuable consideration as would be the case in contract law, but should be construed purposively, looking at the Act. In this case flats used for employees were being used in a way which contravened the purpose of limiting use by transitory visitors.

Judges:

Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Clyde, Lord Millett

Citations:

Times 12-Jul-1999, [1999] 1 WLR 1415, [1999] 3 ALL ER 929, [1999] UKHL 32

Links:

House of Lords, Bailii

Statutes:

Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1973

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex parte Lawrie Plantation Services Admn 28-Feb-1997
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.135145

Bayliss v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Others: Admn 13 Jun 2013

Appeal against Inspector’s grant of permission for wind farm after a public inquiry.

Judges:

Hickinbottom J

Citations:

[2013] EWHC 1612 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal from – Bayliss v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Others CA 26-Feb-2014
Appeal against dismissal of a challenge to the decision of a planning Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State, who had allowed an appeal by the developer against the planning authority’s refusal of planning permission for the construction of a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Utilities

Updated: 23 May 2022; Ref: scu.510835

Al Wood-Robinson v Secretary of State for Environment and Council of London Borough of Wandsworth: Admn 3 Apr 1998

Citations:

[1998] EWHC Admin 394

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment HL 1980
Issues arose as to a new planning permission for two existing hangars.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The question of the validity of conditions attached to planning permissions will sometimes be a difficult one. To be valid, a condition must be . .
Cited – Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates plc HL 31-Oct-1984
The House was asked whether the 1971 Act permitted the relevant authorities, by resort to their development plans, to support the retention of traditional industries or was the ambit of the Act such as to permit only ‘land use’ aims to be pursued? . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.138515

Regina v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex parte Lawrie Plantation Services: Admn 28 Feb 1997

Citations:

[1997] EWHC Admin 199

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex parte Lawrie Plantation Services HL 24-Jun-1999
The word ‘consideration’ when looked at in the context of planning laws was not to be construed narrowly as valuable consideration as would be the case in contract law, but should be construed purposively, looking at the Act. In this case flats used . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.137144

PS v Royal Borough of Greenwich and Others: Admn 3 Aug 2016

This claim seeks to quash a planning permission granted by the defendant to the interested parties. The defendant had resolved to grant permission at a meeting of its planning board. There was then a referral to the Mayor of London whose delegated officer decided neither to direct refusal nor to take over the application for his own consideration. He stated that it represented EIA development and he had taken into account the environmental information in reaching his decision. There were further s.106 considerations before permission was finally granted.

Judges:

Collins J

Citations:

[2016] EWHC 1967 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 22 May 2022; Ref: scu.567936

William Morrison Supermarkets plc v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Stockton on Tees Borough Council: QBD 11 May 2000

The applicant appealed a refusal of planning permission for a super-store. The inspector said the store would conflict with the development plan and was on balance disadvantageous. The Secretary of State received further representations and allowed for them, but said they had added nothing new.
Held: The Secretary had failed to take properly into account two considerations, the need for such a store, and the removal of the college from the site. The applicant had also been prejudiced by the reception of the representations.

Citations:

Gazette 11-May-2000, [2000] EWHC Admin 331

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.90515

St Paul’s Development Ltd v Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council and another: QBD 31 May 2000

The applicant sought residential use of one plot of land. The authority designated it for employment use, and took land out of the Green belt for housing. After a Unitary Development Plan enquiry, the applicant appealed again, and the inspector made certain findings and recommendations. The Authority went ahead with the UDP.
Held: The Authority had erred in publishing the plan without taking on board the inspectors new findings, and should have considered holding a new enquiry.

Citations:

Times 31-May-2000

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 78, 287

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.89476

Westminster Bank Limited v The Minister for Housing and Local Government, Beverley Borough Council: HL 1971

The Bank’s application for planning permission was refused on the grounds that the development might prejudice the possible future widening of a road. The local authority could have prescribed a building line in accordance with a provision of the Highways Act, 1959, but in that event would have had to pay compensation for the injurious effect on the bank’s land. The bank sought to quash the refusal.
Held: Although the local authority might have proceeded under the Act of 1959 they were entitled to refuse planning permission on the ground stated, even though the result would be to deprive the bank of compensation.
Where a council has two alternative statutory methods of achieving the same objective, it is entitled to adopt the one which imposes the least burden on the public purse.
Lord Dilhorne said: ‘It was strenuously argued for the appellants that the county council, having failed to prescribe such a line under the Highways Act, could not lawfully achieve the [same] result . . by refusing planning permission for all development within [the relevant area]. The validity of this argument depends on whether the county council had been given by Parliament a choice of methods for preventing such development or were bound to exercise their powers under the Highways Acts. The answer to this question, in my opinion, is to be found in section 220 of the Act of 1962’.
The principle that property rights should only be removed without compensation on the use of clear wording in a statute was explained by Lord Reid saying that it flows from the fact that Parliament seldom intends to do that, and that before attributing such an intention we should be sure that it was really intended. However: ‘When we are seeking the intention of Parliament that may appear from express words but it may also appear by irresistible inference from the statute read as a whole. But I would agree that, if there is a reasonable doubt, the subject should be given the benefit of the doubt.’

Judges:

Lord Dilhorne, Lord Reid

Citations:

[1971] AC 508

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1962 220

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Peacock, Re SC 22-Feb-2012
The defendant had been convicted of drugs offences, and sentenced under the 1994 Act. The gains he had made exceeded his then assets. Later he acquired further property honestly, and the Court now considered whether those assets could be taken to . .
Cited – Cusack v London Borough of Harrow SC 19-Jun-2013
The landowner practised from property in Harrow. The former garden had now for many years been used as a forecourt open to the highway, for parking cars of staff and clients. Cars crossed the footpath to gain access, and backing out into the road . .
Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and the Regions and another, ex parte Spath Holme Limited HL 7-Dec-2000
The section in the 1985 Act created a power to prevent rent increases for tenancies of dwelling-houses for purposes including the alleviation of perceived hardship. Accordingly the Secretary of State could issue regulations whose effect was to limit . .
Cited – The Public Law Project, Regina (on The Application of) v Lord Chancellor SC 13-Jul-2016
Proposed changes to the Legal Aid regulations were challenged as being invalid, for being discriminatory. If regulations are not authorised under statute, they will be invalid, even if they have been approved by resolutions of both Houses under the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Local Government

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.453068

Devon County Council v Secretary of State for the Environment: 1990

The court was asked whether an Inspector should have had regard to the changes in ministerial policy which were to lead to the introduction of section 54A of the 1990 Act.
Held: Hutchinson J said (obiter): ‘that the Inspector was not obliged to have regard to section 54A before it came into force . . Her correct course, I consider, was to have regard to current statutory provisions and to the guidance to be derived from any circulars published prior to her decision, in particular [Circular] 14/91. One piece of guidance that circular gave was that current circulars already reflected the spirit of the new provision; another was that section 54A was to be brought into effect about two months after July 25 and that ‘In future it will mean that determination is to be in accordance with the plan unless etc’ This language is, I am satisfied, if anything an encouragement not to give effect to changes dependent wholly on the new section: but it is coupled with encouragement to recognise that existing policy is, matters of nuance apart, broadly consistent with that embodied in the section.’

Judges:

Hutchinson J

Citations:

[1990] JPL 40

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another Admn 7-Feb-2011
The claimant sought judicial review of a statement and letter by the respondent making a material consideration for planning authorities the intended revocation by the Respondent of Regional Spatial Strategies. The effect would be to allow the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.428514

Peacock Homes Ltd v Secretary of State: CA 1984

Citations:

[1984] JPEL 729

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – First Secretary of State v Arun District Council and Another CA 10-Aug-2006
The land-owner had received planning permission to construct an extension to her home subject to a condition that it could be occupied only by a dependant relative. In 1996, she let it to students in breach of the condition. In 1996, te council took . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.245083

Meyrick Estate Management Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: Admn 3 Nov 2005

Judges:

Sullivan J

Citations:

[2005] EWHC 2618 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, New Forest National Park (Designation) Order 2002

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Pascoe v First Secretary of State and others Admn 27-Sep-2006
The claimant challenged a compulsory purchase order made under the 1993 Act on the grounds of underuse of properties in the area.
Held: The respondent’s decision had been made on the basis that there was underuse of a ‘predominant number’ of . .
Appeal from – Meyrick Estate Management Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs CA 1-Feb-2007
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.235406

Regina v Lichfield District Council and Another; Ex Parte Lichfield Securities Ltd: CA 30 Mar 2001

The rules required a judge at trial on a judicial review case to consider the issue of whether there had been any undue delay in bringing the case. Nevertheless, where this issue had already been fully argued at a preliminary hearing, the judge could properly exclude a further attempt to argue the point. The judge’s duties as case manager required him to consider whether new material was to be introduced, or a different aspect was to be put, some relevant matter had been overlooked by the first judge, or he had said that it might be reconsidered at trial.

Citations:

Times 30-Mar-2001, Gazette 26-Apr-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 304

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina v Lichfield District Council Christopher John Nanscawen Williams and ex parte Lichfield Securities Limited Admn 1-Apr-1999
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Judicial Review, Litigation Practice, Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.88537

Regina v Hambleton District Council, Ex Parte Somerfield Stores Ltd: Admn 11 Nov 1998

Permission for an out of town retail centre was set aside, after the council had failed to make proper allowance for need to test for the need for such a centre and to assess properly the impact on the town centre and follow the guidance PPG 6.

Citations:

Gazette 11-Nov-1998, [1998] EWHC Admin 1033

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.86799

O’Byrne v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions and Another: CA 17 Apr 2001

A tenant sought to buy a flat under the right to buy scheme but the flat was in the green belt. The land was held under provisions in the 1938 Act making the sale of any part conditional on the consent of the respondent. The local authority objected, and an inquiry was held. The inspector refused the sale.
Held: The applicant successfully appealed. Having examined in detail the operation of the two inconsistent statutes the majority of the Court of Appeal held that there had been an implied repeal. On the basis that the requirements of the Right to Buy scheme were inconsistent with an impliedly repealed the earlier Act. The later provisions were so inconsistent with an repugnant to the earlier Act that the two could not stand together.
Buxton LJ, dissenting said: ‘The court will not lightly find a case of implied repeal, and the test for it is a high one.’
Laws LJ with whom Thorpe LJ agreed said that the contradiction between the two pieces of legislation must be ‘inescapable’ and that the construction of the later statute must be shown to be the only rational interpretation that is available.

Judges:

Thorpe, Buxton, Laws LJJ

Citations:

Times 17-Apr-2001, Gazette 20-Apr-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 499, [2001] NPC 71, [2002] HLR 30, [2001] 16 EGCS 144

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Housing Act 1985 118, Green Belt (London and Home Counties) Act 1938

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex Parte O’Byrne QBD 8-Jun-2000
A tenant sought to buy a flat under the right to buy scheme but the flat was in the green belt. The local authority objected, and an inquiry was held. The inspector held that the green belt policy itself would not be affected, but a sale would . .
See Also – Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte O’Byrne Admn 20-Aug-1999
It could be proper, when ordering for a third party to be joined in an action for judicial review, to order that the original party should not be responsible for the new party’s costs in any event. Such a power could be derived from the overriding . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions ex parte O’Byrne HL 14-Nov-2002
The applicant sought to exercise her right to buy a property she had occupied of her local authority. It was in the green belt, and the authority declined to sell it until they had obtained authorisation for the sale. The authority appealed an order . .
Cited – Snelling and Another v Burstow Parish Council ChD 24-Jan-2013
The parties disputed the application and interpretation of ancient statues relating to allotments. The land had been appropriated to allotments under the 1945 Act. The Council had argued that it had a power of sale under the 1908 Act subject to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Housing, Planning, Local Government, Housing, Local Government

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85990

Regina (On the Application of Lowther) v Durham County Council and Another: CA 24 May 2001

The landowner sought to alter the fuel it used in a furnace at Thrislington, Durham, to a fuel which was constituted from waste. The council received a second opinion to the effect that the new fuel did not constitute a change in use. The objector appealed.
Held: The council had been properly advised. The fact that a use of material had additional purposes, did not necessarily create a second use for planning permission. It could, but whether it did was a question of fact and degree for the council sub-committee.
Lord Phillips MR referred to the caselaw and said: ‘West Bowers involved deciding whether a particular operation fell into one or both of two specific categories of operation. On the facts the Court of Appeal held that it fell into both. There is no difficulty in following the logic of this conclusion. The facts were such that an objective onlooker when asked what the operation involved might have said ‘digging a reservoir’ or ‘recovering gravel’ or both. The operation had two physical aspects the one the corollary of the other; a hole was dug; gravel was removed. Each aspect fell into a different planning category.
West Bowers recognised that one indivisible process could amount, for planning purposes, to two activities. It does not follow that the different aspects of a process always fall to be categorised as different operations or uses of land for planning purposes. Lord Kingsland did not suggest that disposing of petcoke was a distinct use of the land at Thrislington, although petcoke is a by-product of the oil industry that has all the features of waste, save that its qualities as a source of energy have become appreciated so that it is universally burnt for energy recovery. Lord Kingsland’s contention that disposing of waste is always a separate land use, regardless of the nature or manner of disposal, cannot be derived from West Bowers.’

Judges:

Lord Phillips MR

Citations:

Gazette 07-Jun-2001, Times 22-Jun-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 781, [2002] 1 PandCR 283

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Considered – West Bowers Farm Products v Essex County Council CA 1985
Farmers sought to construct a reservoir for irrigation. To create the reservoir they would have to excavate substantial volumes of sand and gravel which would be sold on. The appellants contended that the extraction of the sand and gravel was an . .

Cited by:

Cited – Roberts and Another v South Gloucestershire Council CA 7-Nov-2002
The landowner appealed against the compensation awarded for the compulsory acquisition of his land for use as a road. The owners had been compensated only for its agricultural value, but said that it should have allowed for its value for minerals . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Environment

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85994

Regina v Tandridge District Council, ex parte Al-Fayed: QBD 27 Jan 1999

A local authority should give great weight to authoritative scientific advice given by statutory bodies such as the Health and Safety Executive and National Radiological Protection Board as to the safety of proposed developments.

Citations:

Times 28-Jan-1999, Gazette 03-Mar-1999, Gazette 27-Jan-1999, [1999] EWHC Admin 31

Links:

Bailii

Citing:

Appealed to – Regina v Tandbridge District Council and Another, Ex Parte Al-Fayed CA 1-Feb-2000
A planning authority disallowed an objection to the erection of a mobile telephone transmitter. Although there had been an omission in the procedure followed by the council, it was clear that it had in fact considered the evidence put forward by the . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Regina v Tandbridge District Council and Another, Ex Parte Al-Fayed CA 1-Feb-2000
A planning authority disallowed an objection to the erection of a mobile telephone transmitter. Although there had been an omission in the procedure followed by the council, it was clear that it had in fact considered the evidence put forward by the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.85586

North Devon District Council v Secretary of State for Environment, D Rottenbury B E Rottenbury: QBD 12 May 1998

A mandatory agricultural occupancy condition was not subject to a continuous breach when cottages were occupied over summer by visitors rather than by agricultural workers as required by the permission.

Citations:

Times 12-May-1998, Gazette 28-May-1998, [1998] EWHC Admin 458

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 288

Agriculture, Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.84341

Moore v Secretary of State for Environment and New Forest District Council: CA 18 Feb 1998

The outbuildings of a large country house had been converted into ten single self-contained units of residential accommodation for the purpose of holiday lettings. Nine of the units were in use by May 1991. In May 1995 the local planning authority issued an enforcement notice alleging a material change of use from residential to mixed use of residential and as ten units of holiday accommodation. If the change of use of each of the units was a change of use to a single dwelling-house the enforcement notice was not served within the four year time-limit in section 171B(2) of the Act.
Held: The conversion of an outhouse on a country estate into ten separate dwellings was not one single conversion with ten year use limitation, but the four year limit applied.
Nourse LJ said: ‘In my judgment, McCullough J’s approach to the meaning of ‘dwellinghouse’ was entirely correct. Although we were not referred to any of the many other decisions on the meaning of that word in other areas of the law, I am confident that an examination of them would reveal no requirement that before a building can be so described it must be occupied as the permanent home of one or more persons or the like. Nor do 10 self-contained units of residential accommodation which would otherwise be properly described as 10 single dwelling houses cease to be used as such because they are managed as a whole for the commercial purpose of holiday or other temporary lettings. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Secretary of State applied an incorrect test in this case and that if he had applied the correct test, he could only have properly concluded that the 10 units are being used as 10 single dwellinghouses within section 171B(2) of the Act.’

Judges:

Nourse, Pill, Thorpe LJJ

Citations:

Times 18-Feb-1998, [1998] EWCA Civ 235, [1998] JPL 877, (1999) 77 P and CR 114, [1998] 2 PLR 65, [1998] NPC 20

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 171B(2)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment QBD 1982
The Secretary of State could find that a building built under a permission for a weekend and holiday chalet, but to be used only in summer, was a dwelling house. The distinctive characteristic of a dwellinghouse is its ability to afford to those who . .
Appeal from – T A J Moore v The Secretary of State for the Environment, The New Forest District Council Admn 25-Oct-1996
The applicant sought to quash an enforcement notice, regarding a change of use from residential to mixed residential and holiday accommodation. The change had taken in respect of several units over a long period of time. The inspector sought to . .
Cited – Van Dyck v Secretary of State for the Environment CA 1993
The court asked whether the four year enforcement rule applied in respect of subdivision of a larger building to create single dwelling houses or applied only in the case of conversion of a single building to single dwelling houses.
Held: It . .
Approved – Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment 1984
A building had been erected under permission for a ‘weekend and holiday chalet’. In response to an enforcement notice served in relation to an extension to it, the Appellant submitted that the extension was permitted development because the building . .

Cited by:

Cited – Moore v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another CA 18-Sep-2012
An enforcement notice had been issued alleging an unlawful change of use without planning permission of the Appellant’s property from a C3 dwelling to use as commercial leisure accommodation. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.83819

Kent County Council v Curtis: QBD 24 Jun 1998

Advertisements placed by a roadway outside a shop were properly found by magistrates not to cause an obstruction, nor to be unsafe or any danger. Magistrates were wrong to seek to alter their decision when stating their case for the divisional court.

Citations:

Gazette 24-Jun-1998, [1998] EWHC Admin 639

Links:

Bailii

Planning, Magistrates

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.82741

J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v South Gloucestershire District Council and Others: CA 29 Mar 2001

Where there was an agreement between an applicant and the planning authority under section 106 of the new Act, with respect the undertaking of work in return for the grant of planning permission, there was no requirement for there to be a direct link between the development and the works. If the agreement was entered into in order to restrict or regulate the development or use of land then it was vires.

Citations:

Times 02-Apr-2001, Gazette 17-May-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 450

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 106

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appealed to – J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another HL 4-Jul-2002
The claimants sought ownership by adverse possession of land. Once the paper owner had been found, they indicated a readiness to purchase their interest. The court had found that this letter contradicted an animus possidendi. The claimant had . .
Cited – Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment HL 1980
Issues arose as to a new planning permission for two existing hangars.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The question of the validity of conditions attached to planning permissions will sometimes be a difficult one. To be valid, a condition must be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Local Government

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.82442

Hughes v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Another: CA 19 Jan 2000

A house had been unused since 1960, and was bought in 1990. It had become delapidated and the applicant wished to rebuild. The applicant was entitled to permission only if he could show the original residential use had not been lost.
Held: The residential use had been abandoned. The test was an objective one, looking at the intention of the owner, the condition of the building, the period of non-use, and whether there had been any other intervening use. ‘Evaluating all four factors, the inspector was, in my judgment, entitled to conclude, as she did, that residential user had been abandoned. That may not have been the intention of Mr Giddings any more than it was the intention of Mr Hughes; but the intentions of the site’s successive owners, although relevant, were not and could not be decisive, because at the end of the day the test must be the view to be taken by a reasonable man with knowledge of all of the relevant circumstances. ‘

Judges:

Kennedy LJ, Thorpe LJ, Mance Lj

Citations:

Gazette 03-Feb-2000, Times 18-Feb-2000, [2000] EWCA Civ 506

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Hartley v Minister of Housing and Local Government CA 1970
A petrol station operated with an area to display and sell cars. Sales stopped in 1961 when the owner died. His son was thought too young and inexperienced son to be involved in car sales. Sales were resumed in 1965 when a new owner acquired the . .
Cited – Castell-y-Mynach Estate v Secretary of State for Wales QBD 1985
A building ceased to be occupied as a dwelling in 1965, and then over a period of years became nearly derelict. Even so, the evidence showed that at no time had the owners intended abandoning the rights of existing use, despite their decision not to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.81524

E v Camden London Borough Council, Ex Parte Williams: QBD 6 Jun 2000

Whether a delay in appealing against a planning decision became so protracted as to bar the challenge was a question of fact according to the circumstances of each case. The six weeks period mentioned in R v Ceredigion County Council ex p McKeown cannot be universally applied. The person may not learn of the permission for some time.

Citations:

Times 06-Jun-2000

Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.80200

Croyden London Borough Council v Gladden and Others: CA 23 Feb 1994

The court could properly grant an interlocutory injunction ordering the removal of a plane (a replica Spitfire) from a roof in breach of planning controls under the Act.

Citations:

Times 23-Feb-1994, Ind Summary 28-Feb-1994, Gazette 27-Apr-1994, [1994] 1 PLR 30

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 55(2)(d) 90 187(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Mid-Sussex District Council v William Charles Boyle QBD 20-Jul-2001
The authority sought an injunction to restrain a breach of planning control by the defendant. Earlier temporary permissions for single caravans had expired, and enforcement notices issued. The defendant had failed to remove multiple vehicles.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79694

Regina (On the Application of Barker and Others) v Waverley Borough Council and Another: CA 20 Apr 2001

A wartime aerodrome had continued to be used as such under a series of temporary permissions. The permission was continued after it was acquired by BAe, on conditions that use was personal to BAe and that it should revert to agricultural use after two years. After announcing the intention to cease the use as an aerodrome, BAe sought and obtained removal of the conditions. The applicant objected because they wanted the land to revert to agricultural uses. The removal of the condition was not so unreasonable as to be irrational, any legitimate expectation as to the reverter was insufficient to displace the other legislative considerations, and the council had not taken into account inadmissible matters. The removal of the condition stood.

Citations:

Gazette 20-Apr-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 566

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment HL 1980
Issues arose as to a new planning permission for two existing hangars.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The question of the validity of conditions attached to planning permissions will sometimes be a difficult one. To be valid, a condition must be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 19 May 2022; Ref: scu.79592

Burgemeester En Wethouders Van Haarlemmerlied En Spaarnwoude v Gedeputerde Staten Van Noord-Holland: ECJ 9 Sep 1998

Where a development which might have significant environmental impact was proposed it was necessary to ensure that an environmental impact assessment had been carried out. It was not open to member states to exempt some types of development.

Citations:

Gazette 09-Sep-1998, C-81/96, Wcj/Cfi Bulletin 16/98, 28

Statutes:

Council Directive 90/313/EEC Freedom of Access to information on the environment.

Environment, European, Planning

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78743

British Railways Board v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another: HL 29 Oct 1993

Permission had been given for residential development of land provided that access was provided. The access specified was to be over land owned by the council. It was known that the Council would not allow such access. The land owner sought an order that the permission should stand but without the condition. The Secretary had dismissed the appeal on the ground that the proposed Grampian condition in respect of access did not have a reasonable prospect of being fulfilled within the period for commencing development under the permission.
Held: The fact alone that a planning permission was subject to a condition which was unlikely to be satisfied did not mean that the permission was ineffective. The Secretary of State may however maintain as a matter of policy that there should be at least reasonable prospects of the action in question being performed within the time limit imposed by the permission. Referring to section 29(3) ‘The owner of the land to which the application related might object to the grant of planning permission for reasons which might or not be sound on planning grounds. If his reasons were sound on planning grounds no doubt the application would be refused. But if they were unsound, the mere fact that the owner objected and was unwilling that the development should go ahead could not in itself necessarily lead to a refusal. The function of the planning authority was to decide whether or not the proposed development was desirable in the public interest. The answer to that question was not to be affected by the consideration that the owner of the land was determined not to allow the development so that permission for it, if granted, would not have reasonable prospects of being implemented. That did not mean that the planning authority, if it decided that the proposed development was in the public interest, was absolutely disentitled from taking into account the improbability of permission for it, if granted, being implemented. For example, if there were a competition between two alternative sites for a desirable development, difficulties of bringing about implementation on one site which were not present in relation to the other might very properly lead to the refusal of planning permission for the site affected by the difficulties and the grant of it for the other. But there was no absolute rule that the existence of difficulties, even if apparently insuperable, had to necessarily lead to refusal of planning permission for a desirable development. A would-be developer might be faced with difficulties of many different kinds, in the way of site assembly or securing the discharge of restricted covenants. If he considered that it was in his interests to secure planning permission notwithstanding the existence of such difficulties, it was not for the planning authority to refuse it simply on their view of how serious the difficulties were.
In the present case British Rail had applied for a planning permission which would cover their own land and also land belonging to Hounslow. Hounslow’s land was to be the site of the access road which they sought. The proposed condition related simply to the stage which construction of the access road had to have reached before the construction of the houses started and before the houses were occupied. The condition, if imposed, would not derogate from the planning permission if granted. So the position is British Rail had applied for planning permission affecting land not in their ownership, a common state of affairs specifically contemplated by the Act. The proposed condition did not relate to land outside the ambit of the permission applied for. Even if it had done, the relevant considerations would be the same as those to be applied where an application for planning permission relates to land not in ownership of the applicant. If the condition was of a negative character and appropriate in the light of sound planning principles, the fact that it appeared to have no reasonable prospects of being implemented did not mean that the grant of planning permission subject to it would be irrational in the Wednesbury sense so that it would be unlawful to grant it. If it was irrational to grant planning permission subject to a condition which had no reasonable prospects of being implemented then it had to be no less irrational to refuse planning permission on the ground that a desirable condition had no reasonable prospects of implementation and therefore could not be imposed. In truth, neither course was irrational. What was appropriate depended on the circumstances and was to be determined in the exercise of the discretion of the planning authority. But the mere fact that a desirable condition appeared to have no reasonable prospects of fulfilment did not mean that planning permission must necessarily be refused. Something more is required before that could be the correct result.’

Judges:

Lord Keith

Citations:

Times 29-Oct-1993, [1994] JPL 32

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1971 29(3)

Citing:

Cited – Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment HL 1981
The grant of a temporary planning permission did not operate to cancel an existing established use. A planning condition requiring removal of hangars was invalid because it did not fairly or reasonably relate to the permitted development. The grant . .
Cited – Jones v Secretary of State for Wales and Ogwr District Council CA 1990
The court adopted as a principle that a Grampian condition could only be imposed if there was a reasonable prospect of compliance within the time limit imposed on the permission. . .
Cited – Grampian Regional Council v City of Aberdeen District Council 1984
The extinguishment of a private right is not a proper matter for a condition attached to a planning permission, even though a negative condition preventing development until a highway has been stopped up is unobjectionable. . .
Cited – Grampian Regional Council v Secretary of State for Scotland HL 1983
The House endorsed the practice of imposing negative conditions in planning consents, upholding the validity of a condition that the development of the site could not commence until the road on the western boundary of the site had been closed by a . .

Cited by:

Cited – Douglas John Merritt v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions and Mendip District Council Admn 5-Aug-1999
The applicant appealed refusal of planning permission for residential development of a small plot of land. The said that the inspector had wrongly rejected the application of a Grampian condition on the basis that it would not be fulfilled and also . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78631

Bromley London Borough Council v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions and Others: QBD 19 Jul 2001

The applicants sought permission to build a national centre for travelling showmen within the green belt. They argued that there was a very special need for such a facility. And that a search had revealed no suitable alternative location. The inspector agreed. He found the development would harm the green belt, but that the very special circumstances outweighed that harm. The Secretary of State confirmed the decision. The authority appealed, but the appeal was unsuccessful. Though the Secretary of State had not explicitly dealt with doubts expressed by the inspector as to the search methodology used, his decision did not need to refer to each part of the inspector’s decision.

Citations:

Gazette 19-Jul-2001

Planning

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78670

Bridle v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and the Regions: QBD 16 Nov 2000

The landowner had applied for and had been refused change of use from an agricultural building to residential land. He subsequently applied for similar permission in respect of a goat shed. The council failed to determine his application, and the inspector refused it. He alleged a failure to take proper account of the relevant development plan, and that ongoing unauthorised residential use of the property had gone beyond the point at which enforcement could be effected. It was held that the development plan remained in draft only, and enforcement proceedings had begun within the time required and remained extant.

Citations:

Gazette 16-Nov-2000

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 171B

Citing:

See Also – Bridle v Secretary of State for Environment and Chelmsford District Council Admn 3-Mar-1999
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78578

Bracken v East Hertfordshire District Council: QBD 11 May 2000

An enforcement notice was served on the land owner alleging change of use from agricultural to the storage of building materials and waste and agriculture. The plan incorrectly included the applicant’s house. The applicant challenged the enforcement notice, but failed before the magistrates and on a case stated. The error did not mean that the enforcement notice ceased to be such, and could have been dealt with by other procedures.

Citations:

Gazette 11-May-2000

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 179(2)

Agriculture, Planning

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78536

Belmont Riding Centre Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and the Regions and Another: QBD 26 Oct 2000

The land owner applied for permission to upgrade an indoor riding centre. The Secretary of State upheld the inspector’s decision. The claimant’s appeal was dismissed. The inspector had become seriously ill during the inquiry, and had delayed its completion, but he had considered properly the change of emphasis between outdoor and indoor activity, the intensification of use, and the particular character of the claimant’s proposals. The Inspector’s failure to repeat every item of evidence did not suggest that he had forgotten any of it, and he had properly considered and rejected the applicant’s arguments.

Citations:

Gazette 26-Oct-2000

Planning

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.78326

Pilkington v Secretary of State for the Environment: QBD 1973

A planning permission was granted to build a bungalow on part of the land, site ‘B’, subject to a condition it should be the only house to be built on the land. He built the bungalow. Later the owner discovered the existence of an earlier permission to build a bungalow and garage on another part of the same land, site ‘A’. That permission contemplated the use of the rest of the land as a smallholding. He began to build the second bungalow, when he was served with an enforcement notice alleging a breach of planning control.
Held: The two permissions could not stand in respect of the same land, once the development sanctioned by the second permission had been carried out. The effect of building on site ‘B’ was to make the development authorised in the earlier permission incapable of implementation. The bungalow built on site ‘B’ had destroyed the smallholding: and the erection of two bungalows on the site had never been sanctioned.
Lord Widgery said: ‘For this purpose I think one looks to see what is the development authorised in the permission which has to be implemented. One looks first to see that full scope of that which has been done or can be done pursuant to the permission which has been implemented. One then looks at the development which was permitted in the second permission, now sought to be implemented, and one asks oneself whether it is possible to carry out the development proposed in that second permission, having regard to that which was done or authorised to be done under the permission which has been implemented.’

Judges:

Lord Widgery

Citations:

[1973] 1 WLR 1527, (1973) 25 P and CR 508

Cited by:

Approved – Hoveringham Gravels v Chiltern District Council CA 1977
. .
Cited – Robert Hitchins Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v Worcesteshire County Council and Others Admn 18-Nov-2014
A planning permission was granted with an agreement under section 106. A second permission was later granted. The court was now asked whether the section 106 agreement applied also to the second permission.
Held: As a matter of law, the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.538890

Horsham District Council v The Secretary of State for the Environment: CA 1991

The council had refused planning permission for a petrol station and restaurant nearby an area of outstanding natural beauty, designated as a strategic gap in the county structure plan. The inspector had allowed the appeal, finding that the development would not detract from the purposes of policy ENV 6, which required the maintenance of such gaps. The Council said he had not given reasons for this finding.
Held: The Council’s appeal succeeded. An inspector should have regard to the development plan and other material considerations, giving reasons which demonstrated his understanding of the plan. The policy required compelling reasons for any development within the strategic gap. The inspector had ignored that requirement.

Judges:

Nolan LJ

Citations:

(1991) 63 P and CR 219, [1992] 1 PLR 81

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council SC 21-Mar-2012
The company challenged the grant of planning permission for a competitor to open a new supermarket within 800 metres of its own, saying that the Council had failed to apply its own planning policies, which required preference of suitable sites not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.452984

Regina v Bishop’s Stortford Football Club and others: CACD 2006

Citations:

[2006] EWCA Crim 3098

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

see also – Basso and Another v Regina CACD 19-May-2010
The defendants had been convicted of offences of failing to comply with planning enforcement notices (and fined andpound;10.00), and subsequently made subject to criminal confiscation orders. The orders had been made in respect of the gross income . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Crime

Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.416019

Anscomb v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions: QBD 22 Feb 2001

The claimant sought to object to an inspector’s decision to allow erection of a telecommunications mast. The failure of the inspector to consider potential health risks was not open to criticism because the claimant’s papers had made no reference to such risks. A technical report which might have been considered had not been submitted, and the claimant’s objection on human rights grounds failed inter alia on the grounds that the decision had been issued before the Act came into effect.

Citations:

Gazette 22-Feb-2001

Statutes:

Human Rights Act 1998 6(1) 7(1)(b) 22(4), Town and Country Planning Act 1990 288

Planning, Human Rights

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.77804

Allied London Property Investment Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another: QBD 8 Mar 1996

The applicant appealed the dismissal by the respondent of their application to the council for an extension of the time allowed for approval of reserved matters.
Held: The appeal was granted. The reason for the delay had been a lack of interest in the proposed development, but when an application was made under the section, the inspector should only have considered the question of the conditions to which the permission was subject, and as at the time he considered the issue. He should not have considered new planning policies which had come into effect since the outline permission was granted. The authority had to consider the acceptability of the existing and proposed conditions, and could not revisit the question of whether the development was itself acceptable in principle. The power to vary planning consent conditions was not to be used to challenge the grant itself.

Judges:

Lockhart-Mummery QC

Citations:

Times 28-Mar-1996, (1996) 72 PandCR 327

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 73(2)

Planning

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.77761

Alnwick District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Another: QBD 8 Sep 1999

Where a grant of permission had been reversed, leaving the planning authority liable to pay substantial compensation, such compensation could not be taken account of when reversing the permission. Financial consequences were only a material consideration when they related to the use and development of the land itself. In this case the compensation was not a material consideration.

Citations:

Gazette 08-Sep-1999

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 70(2)

Planning

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.77765

Regina (O’Brien) v Basildon District Council: Admn 2006

There is no inherent restriction on the powers in section 178 to prevent a planning authority using them for the purposes of evicting people using land for a residential purpose in breach of an enforcement notice which had taken effect. It would not always be disproportionate to use them for that purpose. The court set out the legislative context of section 178, and section 187B which enables a planning authority to apply for an injunction to prevent breaches of planning control whether or not an enforcement notice had taken effect or had even been issued.

Judges:

Ouseley J

Citations:

[2006] EWHC 1346 Admin

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 178

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Lisa Smith, Regina (on the Application of) v South Norfolk Council Admn 10-Nov-2006
The claimant gypsies had bought and moved onto land in Norfolk and stayed there in breach of planning enforcement notices. The inspector upheld the notices, but advised the Council of the difficulties in finding sites and had stayed enforcement for . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.245988

Stringer v Ministry of Housing and Local Government: 1970

The material considerations to be allowed for by the local authority in exercising its planning functions are considerations of a planning nature, ‘all considerations relating to the use and development of land are considerations which may, in a proper case, be regarded as planning considerations’. Though a private individual may not have any right of action against the local authority they can take his interests into account. Whether a particular consideration is material in a particular case will depend on the circumstances.

Judges:

Cooke J

Citations:

[1970] 1 WLR 1281

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v Lam and Others (T/a ‘Namesakes of Torbay’) and Borough of Torbay CA 30-Jul-1997
The claimant sought damages after the planning authority allowed the first defendant to conduct a manufacturing business in the course of which spraying activities took place which caused them personal injuries and loss of business.
Held: The . .
Approved – Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment HL 1980
Issues arose as to a new planning permission for two existing hangars.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The question of the validity of conditions attached to planning permissions will sometimes be a difficult one. To be valid, a condition must be . .
Cited – Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another Admn 7-Feb-2011
The claimant sought judicial review of a statement and letter by the respondent making a material consideration for planning authorities the intended revocation by the Respondent of Regional Spatial Strategies. The effect would be to allow the . .
Cited – Regina (Holding and Barnes plc) v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions; Regina (Alconbury Developments Ltd and Others) v Same and Others HL 9-May-2001
Power to call in is administrative in nature
The powers of the Secretary of State to call in a planning application for his decision, and certain other planning powers, were essentially an administrative power, and not a judicial one, and therefore it was not a breach of the applicants’ rights . .
Cited – Cherkley Campaign Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v Longshot Cherkley Court Ltd Admn 22-Aug-2013
The campaign company sought judicial review of a decision by the respondent granting permission to develop nearby land as a golf course.
Held: The application succeeded. The Secretary of State in preserving the effect of certain policies had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.225324