The Secretary of State could find that a building built under a permission for a weekend and holiday chalet, but to be used only in summer, was a dwelling house. The distinctive characteristic of a dwellinghouse is its ability to afford to those who use it the facilities required for day-to-day private domestic existence. McCullough J rejected the suggestion that a building which had that characteristic ceased to be a dwellinghouse because it was occupied only for a part or parts of the year or at infrequent or irregular intervals or by a series of different persons. With no statutory definition of a dwelling house it was a building affording the facilities required for day-to-day private domestic existence. The actual use of the building is not itself conclusive. A building which had that characteristic did not cease to be such for being occupied only for part of the year or intervals or by different persons. The Secretary argued: ‘(i) Neither the description of the building in the permission as a ‘weekend holiday chalet’ nor the imposition of a condition restricting its use to certain months of the year has any effect on the question whether the building erected in pursuance of the permission is a ‘dwelling-house’ for General Development Order purposes. (ii) The dictionary definition of ‘dwelling-house’ is not the criterion. (iii) The criterion is whether, as a question of fact, the building is constructed or adapted for use as a dwelling-house as normally understood, that is to say, as a building that provides for the main activities of ‘day-to-day domestic existence.’ (iv) The absence of a bathroom and inside toilet does not necessarily prevent a building that is used for residential purposes from being a dwelling-house. (v) Having regard to the accommodation and facilities provided, the building, as originally constructed, could be said to provide for the main activities of ‘day-to-day domestic existence’.’
The court did not define ‘dwelling house’ for the purposes of the Order. It was helpful to consider a number of buildings that quite clearly were dwelling houses and others equally clearly that were not, and to see whether this threw up any indication of what ought and what ought not to be taken into account. The court set out cases where what was clearly a dwelling house when erected was then left unoccupied, made unlawful to occupy or put to other than ordinary domestic use in a number of ways. One example was something which even after a change in the manner of use would still remain a dwelling house: ‘Take a holiday cottage subject to time-share with a number of owners each enjoying the right to occupy it for two particular weeks each year, that would still be a dwelling-house.’ This contrasted with hotels, holiday camps and hostels which would not be dwelling houses. The characteristic common to those which were dwelling houses were ‘all are buildings that ordinarily afford the facilities required for day-to-day private domestic existence’.
That was not the totality of the test any more than did the Secretary of State had in the decision letter which Mr Justice McCullough was examining. It is not merely that the building should have been created so that it ordinarily afforded the facilities required for day to day private domestic existence, but it was also necessary that it should be so used.
Judges:
McCullough J
Citations:
[1982] 47 P and CR 142, Times 10-Nov-1982
Statutes:
Town and Country Planning General Order 1977 (1977 No 289) Sch 1 Class 1 Art 3
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – T A J Moore v The Secretary of State for the Environment, The New Forest District Council Admn 25-Oct-1996
The applicant sought to quash an enforcement notice, regarding a change of use from residential to mixed residential and holiday accommodation. The change had taken in respect of several units over a long period of time. The inspector sought to . .
Cited – Regina (on the application of Lee) v First Secretary of State and another Admn 3-Sep-2003
The landowner had placed two caravans within a barn, and occupied them. The planning authority issued enforcement proceedings, and he sought a certificate of lawful development.
Held: The fact that the caravans were not connected to the . .
Overruled – Pennell v Payne CA 1995
The operation of the break clause in a lease will (in the absence of provision to the contrary) have the effect of terminating not just the lease but also the underlease, and any inferior sub-tenancies. . .
Cited – Moore v Secretary of State for Environment and New Forest District Council CA 18-Feb-1998
The outbuildings of a large country house had been converted into ten single self-contained units of residential accommodation for the purpose of holiday lettings. Nine of the units were in use by May 1991. In May 1995 the local planning authority . .
Cited – Baker v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions Admn 26-Jan-2001
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Planning
Updated: 06 August 2022; Ref: scu.182320
