Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment: 1984

A building had been erected under permission for a ‘weekend and holiday chalet’. In response to an enforcement notice served in relation to an extension to it, the Appellant submitted that the extension was permitted development because the building was in truth a dwelling-house.
Held: Whether it was or was not a dwelling-house was a question of fact. A building that should be described as a ‘dwelling house’ if it ordinarily affords the facilities required for day-to-day existence.’
McCullough J observed: ‘In using a simple word in common usage and leaving it undefined, Parliament realistically expected that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, there would be no difficulty at all in deciding whether a particular building was or was not a dwelling-house. The use in a statute of almost any word in common usage may give rise to difficulties of interpretation in a very small number of cases, but the problems are both fewer and less troublesome than those that are apt to result when the statute defines the word. The good sense of this is such that I do not intend to resolve the issue that arises in this appeal by attempting to define what Parliament left undefined.
The more helpful approach, in my opinion, is to consider a number of buildings that quite clearly are dwelling-houses and others that equally clearly are not and to see whether this throws up any indication of what ought and what ought not to be taken into account.
Consider a building that anyone would acknowledge was a dwelling-house. If it is not being lived in because, for example, the occupants are on holiday or because they have two houses and spend half the year in each, it remains a dwelling-house. Take a common situation where a family has a second house in the country that is only visited at weekends, in the summer months and for a summer holiday. That is clearly a dwelling-house. So the intention to use one’s house, or the practice of using it throughout the year, is not essential.
If a house is empty pending its sale or because its owner cannot, or does not want, to let it, it is still a dwelling-house. So emptiness is not fatal.
If it cannot be occupied because it is flooded, or is undergoing extensive repair, it is still a dwelling-house. So, too, a second home in a remote mountainous district, cut off by snow every winter. So an ability to use it whenever one wants is not an essential either.
Suppose that there is a national emergency and an order is made prohibiting the use of houses in a particular area for the duration of the emergency: they would nevertheless remain dwelling-houses. So even an inability to use a house lawfully does not necessarily prevent it from being a dwelling-house.
Leaving aside extraordinary events like floods and national emergencies and repairs so extensive that the occupant has to move out, is it a characteristic of every dwelling-house that the owner or occupier could live in it permanently if he wanted to? I think not . .
Mr Aitchison has emphasised the ‘dwelling’ in ‘dwelling-house’ and has stressed that to dwell is to remain or reside. Comparatively few of those living in the buildings last mentioned ordinarily stay for long enough to be regarded as residing there. He submits, therefore, that a capacity to provide permanent accommodation is the essential character of a dwelling-house.
In my judgment, however, its more distinctive characteristic is its ability to afford to those who use it the facilities required for day-to-day private domestic existence.
Whether a building is or is not a dwelling-house is a question of fact. In Scurlock v Secretary of State for Wales, the Secretary of State had to decide whether a building that was used partly for residential purposes and partly for business purposes was a ‘dwelling-house’ within the meaning of the Town and Country Planning General Development Order 1973. He adopted a factual approach, and the Divisional Court held that that was right.’

Judges:

McCullough J

Citations:

[1984] P and CR 142

Cited by:

ApprovedMoore v Secretary of State for Environment and New Forest District Council CA 18-Feb-1998
The outbuildings of a large country house had been converted into ten single self-contained units of residential accommodation for the purpose of holiday lettings. Nine of the units were in use by May 1991. In May 1995 the local planning authority . .
CitedMoore v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another CA 18-Sep-2012
An enforcement notice had been issued alleging an unlawful change of use without planning permission of the Appellant’s property from a C3 dwelling to use as commercial leisure accommodation. . .
CitedMoore v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another CA 18-Sep-2012
An enforcement notice had been issued alleging an unlawful change of use without planning permission of the Appellant’s property from a C3 dwelling to use as commercial leisure accommodation. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 16 May 2022; Ref: scu.559398