Mummery J set out the correct approach to interpretation of double taxation agreements as laid down in Fothergill. He said ‘(1) It is necessary to look first for a clear meaning of the words used in the relevant article of the convention, bearing in mind that ‘consideration of the purpose of an enactment is always a legitimate part of the process of interpretation’: per Lord Wilberforce and Lord Scarman. A strictly literal approach to interpretation is not appropriate in construing legislation which gives effect to or incorporates an international treaty: per Lord Fraser and Lord Scarman. A literal interpretation may be obviously inconsistent with the purposes of the particular article or of the treaty as a whole. If the provisions of a particular article are ambiguous, it may be possible to resolve that ambiguity by giving a purposive construction to the convention looking at it as a whole by reference to its language as set out in the relevant United Kingdom legislative instrument: per Lord Diplock.
(2) The process of interpretation should take account of the fact that – ‘The language of an international convention has not been chosen by an English parliamentary draftsman. It is neither couched in the conventional English legislative idiom nor designed to be construed exclusively by English judges. It is addressed to a much wider and more varied judicial audience than is an Act of Parliament which deals with purely domestic law. It should be interpreted, as Lord Wilberforce put it in James Buchanan and Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Limited, [1987] AC 141 at 152, ‘unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad principles of general acceptation’: per Lord Diplock and Lord Scarman.
(3) Among those principles is the general principle of international law, now embodied in art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that ‘a treaty should be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. A similar principle is expressed in slightly different terms in McNair’s The Law of Treaties (1961) p 365, where it is stated that the task of applying or construing or interpreting a treaty is ‘the duty of giving effect to the expressed intention of the parties, that is, their intention as expressed in the words used by them in the light of the surrounding circumstances’. It is also stated in that work that references to the primary necessity of giving effect to the ‘plain terms’ of a treaty or construing words according to their ‘general and ordinary meaning’ or their ‘natural signification’ are to be a starting point or prima facie guide and ‘cannot be allowed to obstruct the essential quest in the application of treaties, namely the search for the real intention of the contracting parties in using the language employed by them’.
(4) If the adoption of this approach to the article leaves the meaning of the relevant provision unclear or ambiguous or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable recourse may be had to ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ including travaux preparatoires: per Lord Diplock referring to art 32 of the Vienna Convention, which came into force after the conclusion of this double taxation convention, but codified an already existing principle of public international law. See also Lord Fraser and Lord Scarman.
(5) Subsequent commentaries on a convention or treaty have persuasive value only, depending on the cogency of their reasoning. Similarly, decisions of foreign courts on the interpretation of a convention or treaty text depend for their authority on the reputation and status of the court in question: per Lord Diplock and per Lord Scarman.
(6) Aids to the interpretation of a treaty such as travaux preparatoires, international case law and the writings of jurists are not a substitute for study of the terms of the convention. Their use is discretionary, not mandatory, depending, for example, on the relevance of such material and the weight to be attached to it: per Lord Scarman.’
Mummery J
[1990] STC 285
Civil Procedure Rules Part 36.21
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd HL 10-Jul-1980
The plaintiff, on arriving at the airport found that his luggage had been lost. The defendant denied liability saying he had not notified his claim within the requisite period.
Held: Elementary justice requires that the rules by which the . .
Appeal from – Petrotrade Inc v Texaco Ltd CA 23-May-2000
Where a defendant failed to beat a claimant’s part 36 offer to settle, but judgment was given summarily the rule did not mean that the defendant was necessarily to be ordered to pay costs on an indemnity basis, and to pay interest. Summary judgment . .
Cited by:
Cited – Revenue and Customs v Smallwood and Another CA 8-Jul-2010
The taxpayers had set up trusts which they said were based in Mauritius allowing them to claim double taxation relief. The Revenue had issued closure notices, confirmed by the SPCT, but overturned by the High Court. The Revenue appealed, saying that . .
Cited – Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd and Another v Revenue and Customs CA 23-May-2013
The company owed very substantial arrears of tax in South Africa. Assets had been transferred to a bank account in London in the name of an associated company. The double taxation treaty with South Africa now provided for mutlual assistance and the . .
Cited – Fowler v Revenue and Customs SC 20-May-2020
The taxpayer, a diver resident in South Africa had undertaken engagements within UK waters and now disputed his liability to Income Tax using a deeming provision in section 5 of the 2005 Act being self employed.
Held: HMRC’s appeal succeeded. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.420677
