Category: Family

S v S (Ancillary Relief: Consent Order): FD 4 Mar 2002

An order for ancillary relief had been made by consent. Later the House of Lords issued a judgment which changed the law which had been the basis of the decision to accept the settlement. The wife now sought to set aside the consent order, and appealed refusal to allow this.
Held: The four tests in Barder still applied. A mistake of law was not a supervening event which would make a consent order void ab initio. A foreseeable event was not a supervening event. In this case there was neither the promptness, nor the evidence that the change was so significant as to make it necessary to set aside the consent order. ‘It is my opinion that the House of Lords decision is specific to the law of restitution and was not intended to apply across the board of every branch of Law’ and ‘mistake of law as a vitiating factor ab initio has no place in consent orders for ancillary relief. In any event there would be public policy considerations against setting aside a consent order on such a basis by reason of the floodgates opening for all the orders made in the last quarter of a century or more. The principle that there should be an end to litigation must prevail.’
Bracewell J said: ‘The authorities cited before me demonstrate that the grounds for setting aside a consent order fall into two categories. (1) cases in which it is alleged there was at the date of the order an erroneous basis of fact eg misrepresentations or misunderstanding as to the position or assets. (2) cases in which there has been a material or unforeseen change in circumstances after the order so as to undermine or invalidate the basis of the consent order, as in Barder v Barder [1988] AC 20, and known as a supervening event.
In many of the decided authorities, contractual terms such as ‘fraud’ and ‘misrepresentation’ are used, but it is important to remember that court orders for financial provisions in matrimonial proceedings derive their authority not from the agreement of the parties but from the approval of the court and the resulting consent order: see Jenkins v Livesey [1985] AC 424 and Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] 2 All ER 386.’

Mrs Justice Bracewell
Gazette 11-Apr-2002, [2002] 3 WLR 1372, [2003] Fam 1, [2002] 1 FLR 992, [2002] IDS Pensions Law Reports 219
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Barder v Barder; Barder v Caluori HL 1988
Later Event no ground to appeal from consent order
The matrimonial home had been owned jointly by the husband and wife. In divorce proceedings, an order was made by consent that the husband should transfer his interest in the home to the wife within 28 days. Before the order had been executed, the . .
Distinguished – Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL 29-Jul-1998
Right of Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake
Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
Cited – Jenkins v Livesey (formerly Jenkins) HL 1985
The parties had negotiated through solicitors a compromise of ancillary relief claims on their divorce. They agreed that the house should be transferred to the wife in consideration of her release of all other financial claims. The wife however . .
Cited – Xydhias v Xydhias CA 21-Dec-1998
The principles of contract law are of little use when looking at the course of negotiations in divorce ancillary proceedings. In the case of a dispute the court must use its own discretion to determine whether agreement had been reached. Thorpe LJ . .

Cited by:
Cited – Margaret Brennan v Bolt Burdon, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co QBD 30-Oct-2003
The claimant had sought relief for the injury to her health suffered by condition of her flat. The legal advisers had settled the matter, thinking that the claim had not been timeously served. The defendant appealed an order that the compromise was . .
Approved – Ram, Regina (on the Application Of) v Parole Board Admn 12-Jan-2004
The claimant had won an action for damages against the respondent. He was however released on licence, and subsequently became unlawfully at large. The question was whether the damages continued to be payable to him. The defendant insisted that the . .
Cited – Brennan v Bolt Burdon and Others, London Borough of Islington, Leigh Day and Co CA 29-Jul-2004
The claimant sought damages for injury alleged to have been suffered as tenant of a house after being subjected to carbon monoxide poisoning, and also from her former solicitors for their delay in her claim. The effective question was whether the . .
Cited – The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Jonkler and Another ChD 10-Feb-2006
The applicant had given an undertaking to the court to secure discontinuance of company director disqualification procedings. He now sought a variation of the undertaking.
Held: The claimant had given an undertaking, but in the light of new . .
Cited – Williams v Thompson Leatherdale (A Firm) and Another QBD 10-Nov-2008
The claimant sought damages from her legal advisers. They had allowed her to settle an ancillary relief application knowing that the case of White v White had been referred to the House of lords, and the settlement proved to have been on . .
Cited – Community Care North East (A Partnership) v Durham County Council QBD 29-Apr-2010
ccne_durhamCA10
The parties had settled their dispute and sealed it in a Tomlin Order. The court now asked as to its power to vary such an order. The order required the defendant to reopen a tendering process, but other tenderers now objected, and the council felt . .
Cited – Rapisarda v Colladon (Irregular Divorces) FC 30-Sep-2014
The court considered applications to set aside some 180 petitions for divorce on the grounds that they appeared to be attempts to pervert the course of justice by wrongfully asserting residence in order to benefit from the UK jurisdiction.
Family, Litigation Practice

Updated: 02 January 2022; Ref: scu.170041

AF v SF: FD 1 Mar 2019

Application by AF for financial remedies following the breakdown of her marriage to SF.

Mr Justice Moor
[2019] EWHC 1224 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 02 January 2022; Ref: scu.639735

Sargsyan v Azerbaijan: ECHR 16 Jun 2015

ECHR Article 1
Jurisdiction of states
Jurisdiction of Azerbaijan as regards a disputed area near Nagorno-Karabakh on the territory of Azerbaijan
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Respect for home
Respect for private life
Impossibility for an Armenian citizen displaced in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to gain access to his home and relatives’ graves: violation
Article 13
Effective remedy
Lack of effective remedy in respect of loss of homes or property by persons displaced in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: violation
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
Positive obligations
Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1
Peaceful enjoyment of possessions
Possessions
Azerbaijan’s failure to take measures to secure property rights of an Armenian citizen displaced in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: violation
Facts – The applicant died after lodging his complaint with the Court. Two of his children pursued the application on his behalf.
The applicant and his family, ethnic Armenians, used to live in the village of Gulistan, in the Shahumyan region of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (‘the Azerbaijan SSR’), where he had a house and a plot of land. According to his submissions, his family was forced to flee from their home in 1992 during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (‘the NKAO’) was an autonomous province landlocked within the Azerbaijan SSR. In 1989 the NKAO had a population of approximately 77% ethnic Armenians and 22% ethnic Azeris. The Shahumyan region shared a border with the NKAO and was situated north of it. According to the applicant, prior to the conflict, 82% of the population of Shahumyan were ethnic Armenians. Armed hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh started in 1988. In September 1991 – shortly after Azerbaijan had declared its independence from the Soviet Union – the Regional Council of the NKAO announced the establishment of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ (‘NKR’), consisting of the territory of the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum in December 1991 – boycotted by the Azeri population – in which 99.9% of those participating voted in favour of the secession of the NKR from Azerbaijan, the ‘NKR’ reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that, the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993, ethnic Armenian forces had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO as well as seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. The conflict resulted in hundreds of thousands of internally-displaced people and refugees on both sides. In May 1994 the parties to the conflict signed a cease-fire agreement, which holds to this day. Negotiations for a peaceful solution have been carried out under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However, no final political settlement of the conflict has so far been reached. The self-proclaimed independence of the ‘NKR’ has not been recognised by any state or international organisation. Prior to their accession to the Council of Europe in 2001, Armenia and Azerbaijan both gave undertakings to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly, committing themselves to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Shahumyan, where Mr Sargsyan’s family lived, did not form part of the NKAO, but was later claimed by the ‘NKR’ as part of its territory. In 1991 special-purpose militia units of the Azerbaijan SSR launched an operation in the region with the stated purpose of ‘passport checking’ and disarming local Armenian militants in the region. However, according to various sources, the Azerbaijan SSR militia units used the official purpose as a pretext to expel the Armenian population from a number of villages in the region. In 1992, when the conflict escalated into war, the Shahumyan region came under attack by Azerbaijani forces. The applicant and his family fled Gulistan following heavy bombing of the village. He and his wife subsequently lived as refugees in Yerevan, Armenia.
In support of his claim that he had lived in Gulistan for most of his life until his forced displacement, the applicant submitted a copy of his former Soviet passport and his marriage certificate. He also submitted, in particular, a copy of an official certificate (‘technical passport’), according to which a two-storey house in Gulistan and more than 2,000 square metres of land were registered in his name, photographs of the house, and written statements from former officials of the village council and former neighbours confirming that he had had a house and a plot of land in Gulistan.
Law
(a) Preliminary objections
(i) Exhaustion of legal remedies at domestic level – In view of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – having regard to the fact that there were no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and that borders were closed – there could be considerable practical difficulties in the way of a person from one country in bringing legal proceedings in the other. The Government of Azerbaijan had failed to explain how the legislation on the protection of property would apply to the situation of an Armenian refugee who wished to claim restitution or compensation for the loss of property left behind in the context of the conflict. They had not provided any example of a case in which a person in the applicant’s situation had been successful before the Azerbaijani courts. The Government had thus failed to prove that a remedy capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints was available.
Conclusion: preliminary objection dismissed (fifteen votes to two).
(ii) Jurisdiction and responsibility of Azerbaijan – Given that the village of Gulistan was situated on the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan – a fact which was not in dispute between the parties – under the Court’s case-law, the presumption applied that Azerbaijan had jurisdiction over the village. It was therefore for the Government to show that exceptional circumstances existed, which would limit their responsibility under Article 1 of the Convention. Gulistan and the Azerbaijani military forces were located on the north bank of a river, while the ‘NKR’ positions were located on the south bank. On the basis of the material before the Court it was not possible to establish whether there had been an Azerbaijani military presence in Gulistan – although there were a number of indications – throughout the period falling within its temporal jurisdiction, namely from April 2002, when Azerbaijan ratified the Convention, until the present. It was significant to note, however, that none of the parties had alleged that the ‘NKR’ had any troops in the village.
The Court was not convinced by the respondent Government’s argument that, since the village was located in a disputed area, surrounded by mines and encircled by opposing military positions, Azerbaijan had only limited responsibility under the Convention. In contrast to other cases in which the Court had found that a State had only limited responsibility over part of its territory due to occupation by another State or the control by a separatist regime, it had not been established that Gulistan was occupied by the armed forces of another State.
Taking into account the need to avoid a vacuum in Convention protection, the Court did not consider that the respondent Government had demonstrated the existence of exceptional circumstances of such a nature as to qualify their responsibility under the Convention. In fact, the situation at stake in the instant case was more akin to the situation in Assanidze v. Georgia (71503/01, 8 April 2004, Information Note 63) in that, from a legal point of view the Government of Azerbaijan had jurisdiction as the territorial state and full responsibility under the Convention, while they might encounter difficulties at a practical level in exercising their authority in the area of Gulistan. Such difficulties would have to be taken into account when it came to assessing the proportionality of the acts or omissions complained of by the applicant.
Conclusion: preliminary objection dismissed (fifteen votes to two).
(b) Merits
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: The Court’s case-law had developed a flexible approach regarding the evidence to be provided by applicants who claimed to have lost their property and home in situations of international or internal armed conflict. A similar approach was reflected in the UN ‘Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons’ (Pinheiro Principles).
In the instant case, the applicant had submitted a technical passport established in his name and relating to a house and land in Gulistan, including a detailed plan of the house. It was not contested that a technical passport was, as a rule, only issued to the person entitled to the house and thus constituted, in the Court’s view, prima facie evidence that he had held title to the house and the land, which had not convincingly been rebutted by the Government. Moreover, the applicant’s submissions as to how he had obtained the land and permission to build a house were supported by statements from a number of family members and former villagers. While those statements had not been tested in cross-examination, they were rich in detail and demonstrated that the people concerned had lived through the events described. Last but not least, the Court had regard to the circumstances in which the applicant had been compelled to leave when the village had come under military attack. It is hardly astonishing that he had been unable to take complete documentation with him. Accordingly, taking into account the totality of the evidence presented, the Court found that the applicant has sufficiently substantiated his claim that he had a house and a plot of land in Gulistan at the time of his flight in 1992.
In the absence of conclusive evidence that the applicant’s house had been completely destroyed before the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Azerbaijan, the Court proceeded from the assumption that it still existed though in a badly damaged state. In conclusion, there was no factual basis for the Government’s objection ratione temporis.
Under the Soviet legal system, there was no private ownership of land, but citizens could own residential houses. Plots of land could be allocated to citizens for special purposes such as farming or the construction of individual houses. In such cases, the citizen had a ‘right of use’, limited to the specific purpose, which was protected by law and could be inherited. There was therefore no doubt that the applicants’ rights in respect of the houses and land represented a substantive economic interest. Having regard to the autonomous meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant’s right to personal property of the house and his ‘right of use’ in respect of the land constituted ‘possessions’ under that provision.
While the applicant’s forced displacement from Gulistan fell outside the Court’s temporal jurisdiction, the Court had to examine whether the respondent Government had breached his rights in the ensuing situation, which continued after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Azerbaijan.
Currently, more than one thousand individual applications lodged by persons who had been displaced during the conflict were pending before the Court, slightly more than half of them being directed against Armenia and the remainder against Azerbaijan. While the issues raised fell within the Court’s jurisdiction as defined in Article 32 of the Convention, it was the responsibility of the two States involved to find a political settlement of the conflict. Comprehensive solutions to such questions as the return of refugees to their former places of residence, repossession of their property and/or payment of compensation could only be achieved through a peace agreement. Indeed, prior to their accession to the Council of Europe, Armenia and Azerbaijan had given undertakings to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through peaceful means. The Court could not but note that compliance with the above accession commitment was still outstanding.
The instant case was the first in which the Court had had to rule on the merits of a complaint against a State which had lost control over part of its territory as a result of war and occupation, but which at the same time was alleged to be responsible for refusing a displaced person access to property in an area remaining under its control.
The Court examined the applicant’s complaint with a view to establishing whether the respondent Government had complied with their positive obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and whether a fair balance between the demands of the public interest and the applicant’s fundamental right of property had been struck. The applicant’s complaint raised two issues, firstly whether the respondent Government were under an obligation to grant him access to his house and land in Gulistan, and secondly whether they were under a duty to take any other measures to protect the applicant’s property right and/or to compensate him for the loss of its use.
International humanitarian law did not appear to provide a conclusive answer to the question whether the Government were justified in refusing the applicant access to Gulistan. Having regard to the fact that Gulistan was situated in an area of military activity and at least the area around it was mined, the Court accepted the Government’s argument that refusing civilians, including the applicant, access to the village was justified by safety considerations. However, as long as access to the property was not possible, the State had a duty to take alternative measures in order to secure property rights – and thus to strike a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests concerned – as was acknowledged by the relevant international standards issued by the United Nations (Pinheiro Principles) and the Council of Europe. The Court would underline that the obligation to take alternative measures did not depend on whether or not the State could be held responsible for the displacement itself.
The fact that peace negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE were ongoing – which included issues relating to displaced persons – did not free the respondent Government from their duty to take other measures, especially having regard to the fact that the negotiations had been ongoing for over twenty years. It would therefore be important to establish a property claims mechanism which would be easily accessible and provide procedures operating with flexible evidentiary standards to allow the applicant and others in his situation to have their property rights restored and to obtain compensation for the loss of the enjoyment of their rights. While the Government of Azerbaijan had had to provide assistance to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons – namely those Azerbaijanis who had had to flee from Armenia and from Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts – the protection of that group did not exempt the Government entirely from its obligations towards Armenians such as the applicant who had had to flee as a result of the conflict. In that connection, the Court referred to the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 3 of the above-mentioned Pinheiro Principles.
In conclusion, the impossibility for the applicant to have access to his property in Gulistan without the Government taking any alternative measures in order to restore his property rights or to provide him with compensation had placed an excessive burden on him. There had accordingly been a continuing violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Conclusion: violation (fifteen votes to two).
Article 8 of the Convention: The applicant’s complaint encompassed two aspects: lack of access to his home in Gulistan and lack of access to the graves of his relatives. Having regard to the evidence submitted by Mr Sargsyan (namely a copy of his former Soviet passport and his marriage certificate, and a number of witness statements), the Court found it established that he had lived in Gulistan for the major part of his life until being forced to leave; he thus had had a ‘home’ there. His prolonged absence could not be considered to have broken the continuous link with his home. Furthermore, as the applicant must have developed most of his social ties in Gulistan, his inability to return to the village also affected his ‘private life’. Finally, the applicant’s cultural and religious attachment with his late relatives’ graves in Gulistan might also fall within the notion of ‘private and family life’.
The Court referred to its findings under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and held that the same considerations applied in respect of the applicant’s complaint under Article 8. The impossibility for him to have access to his home and to his relatives’ graves in Gulistan without the Government taking any measures in order to address his rights or to provide him at least with compensation, had placed a disproportionate burden on him. There had accordingly been a continuing violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
Conclusion: violation (fifteen votes to two).
Article 13 of the Convention: The respondent Government had failed to prove that a remedy capable of providing redress to the applicant in respect of his Convention complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success was available. Moreover, the Court’s findings under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention related to the State’s failure to create a mechanism which would allow him to have his rights in respect of property and home restored and to obtain compensation for the losses suffered. There was therefore a close link between the violations found under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 on the one hand and the requirements of Article 13 on the other. There had accordingly been a continuing breach of Article 13 of the Convention.
Conclusion: violation (fifteen votes to two).
Article 41: reserved.

40167/06 – Grand Chamber Judgment, [2015] ECHR 588, 40167/06 – Legal Summary, [2015] ECHR 652
Bailii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights

Human Rights, Family, Land

Updated: 01 January 2022; Ref: scu.549227

Soulsbury v Soulsbury: CA 10 Oct 2007

The claimant was the first wife of the deceased. She said that the deceased had promised her a substantial cash sum in his will in return for not pursuing him for arrears of maintenance. The will made no such provision, and she sought payment from the estate. It was argued that the agreement was unenforceable.
Held: The executors’ appeal failed. The agreement was binding on the husband’s estate. Mrs Soulsbury had done everything she should have done to perform her part of the bargain, and it remained enforceable.

Ward LJ, Longmore LJ, Smith LJ
[2007] EWCA Civ 938 – 2, [2007] EWCA Civ 969, Times 14-Nov-2007, [2008] Fam Law 13, [2007] 3 FCR 811, [2007] WTLR 1841, [2008] 1 FLR 90, [2008] 2 WLR 834, [2008] Fam 1
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Xydhias v Xydhias CA 21-Dec-1998
The principles of contract law are of little use when looking at the course of negotiations in divorce ancillary proceedings. In the case of a dispute the court must use its own discretion to determine whether agreement had been reached. Thorpe LJ . .
Cited – Hyman v Hyman 1929
The husband had left the wife for another woman. Adultery by the husband was not a ground for divorce absent aggravating circumstances, such as incest. The parties had entered into a deed of separation under which the husband had paid two lump sums . .
Cited – Bennett v Bennett CA 1952
The wife sued for arrears of maintenance payments payable under a deed in consideration for which the wife covenanted not to proceed with the prayers in the petition for maintenance, to consent to their being dismissed, and not to present any . .
Cited – Goodinson v Goodinson 1954
W covenanted that for so long as the weekly payments of maintenance for herself and the child were punctually made, she would not commence or prosecute any matrimonial proceedings against the husband. The husband fell in arrears and she claimed the . .
Cited – Edgar v Edgar CA 23-Jul-1980
H and W separated and in 1976, without any pressure H and at the instigation of W, signed a deed of separation negotiated through solicitors. H agreed to purchase a house for W, to confer on her capital benefits worth approximately andpound;100,000, . .
Cited – Sutton v Sutton 1984
The husband and his wife agreed that in consideration, inter alia, of the wife consenting to the husband divorcing her on the ground of two years’ separation and consent, he would transfer the matrimonial home to her, and she would take over . .
Cited – Smallman v Smallman CA 1972
An order was sought under the 1882 Act to decide the shares in which the family home was to be held. An overall agreement had been negotiated in correspondence between solicitors that W should have a half share in the proceeds of sale of the . .
Cited – Gould v Gould CA 1970
H told W he would pay her pounds 15 a week as long as he had it. She issued a writ claiming payment of arrears of maintenance due.
Held: The agreement was unenforceable, since it was not sufficiently certain.
Lord Denning MR (dissenting) . .
Cited – Merritt v Merritt CA 1970
H and W owned their house jointly. When H left for another woman, he signed an agreement to pay Mrs Merritt a monthly sum, and eventually to transfer the house to her if Mrs M kept up the monthly mortgage payments. When the mortgage was paid off Mr . .
Cited – de Lasala v de Lasala PC 4-Apr-1979
No Revisiting of Capital Claim after Compromise
(Hong Kong) Where capital claims are compromised in a once-for-all court order they cannot be revisited or reissued in the absence of a substantial mistake. Capital orders are ‘once-for-all orders’. The legal effect of the order derives not from the . .
Cited – Minton v Minton HL 1979
Establishing Clean Break on Divorce
The House set out the principles for establishing a ‘clean break’ financial settlement on a divorce. Once a capital claim in a divorce has been given effect in a court order, the court does not have jurisdiction to vary it. Lord Scarman said: ‘Once . .
Cited – Jenkins v Livesey (formerly Jenkins) HL 1985
The parties had negotiated through solicitors a compromise of ancillary relief claims on their divorce. They agreed that the house should be transferred to the wife in consideration of her release of all other financial claims. The wife however . .
Cited – Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co CA 7-Dec-1892
Unilateral Contract Liability
The defendants advertised ‘The Carbolic Smoke Ball,’ in the Pall Mall Gazette, saying ‘pounds 100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by . .
Cited – Errington v Errington and Woods CA 19-Dec-1951
There was a contract by a father to allow his son to buy the father’s house on payment of the instalments of the father’s Building Society loan.
Held: Denning LJ reviewed the cases and said: ‘The result of all these cases is that, although a . .
Cited – Kelley v Corston CA 20-Aug-1997
The plaintiff employed the defendant barrister to pursue her claim for ancillary relief in divorce. She sought to recover damages for his alleged negligence.
Held: A barrister’s immunity from suit for negligence in advocacy extends to . .
Cited – Pagnan SpA v Feed Products Ltd ChD 1987
An agreement can be enforceable as an agreement on main terms only, with the detailed terms to be agreed later. Bingham J said: ‘The Court’s task is to review what the parties said and did and from that material to infer whether the parties’ . .
Cited – Amey v Amey FD 1992
H and W ran a public house held in H’s name. W left for another man. A clean break settlement was agreed under which H was to pay W andpound;120,000 in full and final settlement of all her claims and a draft note of order was to be placed before the . .
Cited – Peacock v Peacock FD 1991
The court considered its ability to vary a consent order, made in 1982 on the divorce, which provided for the sale of the matrimonial home ten years later in 1992 and for the equal division of the proceeds of sale. Periodical payments were to be . .

Cited by:
Cited – Warwick (Formerly Yarwood) v Trustee In Bankruptcy of Clive Graham Yarwood ChD 13-Sep-2010
The trustee sought to have set aside as an unlawful preference, the payment of 75% of the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home to the bankrupt’s wife, saying that the payment had been made after the presentation of the petition. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Wills and Probate

Updated: 01 January 2022; Ref: scu.259769

Akhmedova v Akhmedov and Others: FD 21 Apr 2021

‘following their divorce, a wife seeks to recover that which is owed to her from a husband and his proxies who, it is alleged, have done all they can to put monies beyond her reach. ‘

Mrs Justice Knowles
[2021] EWHC 545 (Fam), [2021] 4 WLR 88
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 31 December 2021; Ref: scu.663798

McTaggart v McTaggart: 8 Apr 1987

Family Court of Australia – The court was asked as to the treatment of a lottery win on a divorce.
Held: The prize was a windfall enuring to the benefit of both parties. Mullane J said: ‘My view is that these arguments are misconceived. The $500,000 was a windfall. It is nothing more. It was not the fruit of some labour or skill of the husband. It was not a contribution by him to the matrimonial property. The courts have declined to recognise windfalls during the marriage as contributions by one of the parties . . I do not accept that the lottery winnings should be treated as a contribution by either party. I do not accept that they should be treated differently to any other matrimonial property acquired by the parties during the marriage.’

Mullane J
(1988) FLC 91-920, [1987] FamCA 39
austlii
Australia
Cited by:
Cited – S v AG (Financial Remedy: Lottery Prize) FD 14-Oct-2011
The court considered how to treat a lottery win of andpound;500,000 in the context of an ancillary relief application on a divorce.
Held: The answers in such cases must be fact specific. ‘In the application of the sharing principle (as opposed . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 31 December 2021; Ref: scu.445485

M v M: FC 25 Jan 2015

Mrs M’s application for financial orders following the parties’ separation in 2008 after a long marriage from which there are no dependant minor children.

Wildblood QC HHJ
[2015] EWFC B63
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.548015

Arbili v Arbili: CA 22 May 2015

Appeals from financial remedy proceedings involving an attack upon the exercise of the judge’s discretion. One appeal challenges the division of assets made following judgment, the other the procedure adopted in a subsequent hearing at which the appellant husband sought directions in his application to set aside the financial order on the basis of the alleged material non disclosure by the respondent wife and the wife’s application for summary dismissal of that claim.

Macur DBE LJ, Sir Bernard Rix
[2015] EWCA Civ 542
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.547069

G v G: FD 24 Apr 2015

(financial remedies, privilege, confidentiality) W wished to re-open finacial remedy prodeedings embodied in a court consent order. She wished to allege non-disclosure by H of two substantial family trusts. He said that she had known of what she wanted to allege almost three years before and that her delay defeated the claim. She in turn wished to have excluded as subject to legal privilege the contents of an email.

Roberts J
[2015] EWHC 1512 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – ZS v FS (Application To Prevent Solicitor Acting) FD 24-Oct-2017
Discosure of Confidences must be at risk
H sought to restrain W’s solicitors from acting. The firm was one of six firms approached to consider representing H, and he now said that certain matters had been diviluged to the firm.
Held: The legal principles were clear, and it was for H . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Legal Professions

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.547086

B v B: FD 28 Nov 2014

Cross-appeals by an appellant husband (H) and respondent wife (W) against parts of a raft of final orders made following a three day hearing of W’s application for financial remedy orders. The

Roberts J
[2014] EWHC 4545 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.547106

Y v Y (Financial Remedy: Marriage Contract): FD 27 Jun 2014

Application by a wife for financial remedy orders. It is made in the context of a long marriage in respect of which Decree nisi was pronounced in May 2013, some 22 years after its celebration. The parties married in June 1991, having by then lived together for two years. Three children were born during the course of the marriage. Two of the children are now in their early twenties and one is 15 years old.

Roberts J
[2014] EWHC 2920 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.547093

ZA v AS: FD 31 Jul 2014

‘cross-applications for financial remedies. Unusually, they are brought, by consent, pursuant to Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (‘the 1984 Act’), although both parties are agreed that I should approach the case in exactly the same way as if I was hearing a normal application for financial provision.’

Moor J
[2014] EWHC 2630 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.547096

Newcastle City Council v PV and Another: CoP 26 Mar 2015

This judgment considers the role of the Court of Protection in connection with applications to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (‘CICA’). In particular, it looks at cases in which the CICA requires a trust to be created in order to exclude any possibility that the assailant may benefit from the compensation award. These cases arise almost exclusively in the context of domestic violence, where the assailant is a family member.

Lush SJ
[2015] EWCOP 22
Bailii

Personal Injury, Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.546275

S v AG (Financial Remedy: Lottery Prize): FD 14 Oct 2011

The court considered how to treat a lottery win of andpound;500,000 in the context of an ancillary relief application on a divorce.
Held: The answers in such cases must be fact specific. ‘In the application of the sharing principle (as opposed to the needs principle) matrimonial property will normally be divided equally (see para 14(iii) of my judgment in N v F). By contrast, it will be a rare case where the sharing participle will lead to any distribution to the claimant of non-matrimonial property. Of course an award from non-matrimonial property to meet needs is a common place, but as Wilson LJ has pointed out we await the first decision where the sharing principle has led to an award from non-matrimonial property in excess of needs.’ W’s suggestion that she had not won the money was unsustainable,and her use of it to purchase a property for the family to live in made it a family asset. Nevertheless, the marriage continued after that point for only a short time. It was right that H should receive some, but rather less than 50%. Order accordingly.

Mostyn J
[2011] EWHC 2637 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Anastasio v Anastasio 1981
(Australia) The court considered the treatment of a lottery win within consideration of ancillary relief on divorce. The parties had only lived together for 14 months, and both had worked throughout.
Held: Though a mathematical approach would . .
Cited – K v L CA 13-May-2011
H’s appeal against an ancillary relief order for payment of lump sum allowing clean break.
Held: Wilson LJ said: ‘a special contribution arises in circumstances in which a spouse’s contribution, direct or indirect, to the creation of . .
Cited – N v F FD 11-Mar-2011
The court was asked the ‘vexed’ question of how the court should, when exercising its powers to award ancillary relief, reflect, if at all, the property that H had brought into the marriage back in 1993. . .
Cited – McTaggart v McTaggart 8-Apr-1987
Family Court of Australia – The court was asked as to the treatment of a lottery win on a divorce.
Held: The prize was a windfall enuring to the benefit of both parties. Mullane J said: ‘My view is that these arguments are misconceived. The . .
Cited – Vaughan v Vaughan CA 31-Mar-2010
H had been paying maintenance to W for many years after the divorce. W now appealed against an order revoking the arrangement without providing a capital sum to replace it. H’s health had declined, and also his earnings.
Held: W’s appeal . .
Cited – Practice Guidance: McKenzie Friends (Civil and Family Courts) 2010
. .
Cited – Charman v Charman (No 4) CA 24-May-2007
The court considered what property should be considered in an ancillary relief claim on divorce, and said: ‘To what property does the sharing principle apply? The answer might well have been that it applies only to matrimonial property, namely the . .
Cited – FS v JS FD 10-Nov-2006
Ancillary relief.
Held: The circumstances, in particular the bringing of very substantial assets to the marriage by the husband were sufficient to justify an award departing from equality in his favour (60%/40%). . .
Cited – Holmes v Holmes 1990
(Australia) Cohen J considered the distribution of assets (in particular a lottery win) on divorce, saying: ‘Yet, ignoring any contribution to the price of the winning ticket, this part of the winnings was brought into the pool of family assets by . .
Cited – Zyk v Zyk 15-Dec-1995
Austlii (Family Court of Australia) Property Settlement – Global or asset by asset approach – Treatment of lottery winnings The wife appealed against orders for the alteration of the property interests. The . .
Cited – White v White HL 26-Oct-2000
The couple going through the divorce each had substantial farms and wished to continue farming. It had been a long marriage.
Held: Where a division of the assets of a family would satisfy the reasonable needs of either party on an ancillary . .
Cited – Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane HL 24-May-2006
Fairness on Division of Family Capital
The House faced the question of how to achieve fairness in the division of property following a divorce. In the one case there were substantial assets but a short marriage, and in the other a high income, but low capital.
Held: The 1973 Act . .
Cited – Cowan v Cowan CA 14-May-2001
When considering the division of matrimonial assets following a divorce, the court’s duty was, within the context of the rules set down by the Act, to impose a fair settlement according to the circumstances. Courts should be careful not to make . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.445469

Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General Pentru Imigrari and Others: ECJ 5 Jun 2018

Reference for a preliminary ruling – Citizenship of the Union – Article 21 TFEU – Right of Union citizens to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States – Directive 2004/38/EC – Article 3 – Beneficiaries – Family members of the Union citizen – Article 2(2)(a) – Definition of ‘spouse’ – Marriage between persons of the same sex – Article 7 – Right of residence for more than three months – Fundamental rights

[2018] EUECJ C-673/16, 45 BHRC 401, [2018] 2 FLR 1253, [2019] 1 WLR 425, [2018] WLR(D) 333, [2019] INLR 1, [2018] Imm AR 1314, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385
Bailii
European
Citing:
Request – Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General Pentru Imigrari and Others ECJ 17-Mar-2017
Citizenship of the Union – Fundamental rights – Freedom of establishment – Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties : Application . .
Opinion – Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General Pentru Imigrari and Others ECJ 11-Jan-2018
(Opinion) Reference for a preliminary ruling – Citizenship of the Union – Directive 2004/38/EC – Article 2(2)(a) – Concept of ‘spouse’ – Right of citizens of the Union to move and reside within the territory of the Union – Marriage between persons . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.654514

Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General Pentru Imigrari and Others: ECJ 17 Mar 2017

Citizenship of the Union – Fundamental rights – Freedom of establishment – Principles, objectives and tasks of the Treaties : Application

C-673/16, [2017] EUECJ C-673/16
Bailii
European
Cited by:
Request – Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General Pentru Imigrari and Others ECJ 11-Jan-2018
(Opinion) Reference for a preliminary ruling – Citizenship of the Union – Directive 2004/38/EC – Article 2(2)(a) – Concept of ‘spouse’ – Right of citizens of the Union to move and reside within the territory of the Union – Marriage between persons . .
Request – Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General Pentru Imigrari and Others ECJ 5-Jun-2018
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Citizenship of the Union – Article 21 TFEU – Right of Union citizens to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States – Directive 2004/38/EC – Article 3 – Beneficiaries – Family members of the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 29 December 2021; Ref: scu.601007

Zaiet v Romania: ECHR 24 Mar 2015

ECHR Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Annulment of adoption order, 31 years after its issue and at the request of the adoptee’s sister: violation
Facts – The applicant was adopted at the age of 17. Her adoptive mother had another adopted daughter. Following the death of the mother, in 2003 the two sisters were jointly granted title to land which had previously been unlawfully expropriated from their family. Pursuant to an action brought by the applicant’s sister, in 2004 a county court declared the applicant’s adoption null and void. This decision was upheld on appeal in 2005.
Law – Article 8: The annulment of the adoption order, 31 years after it had been issued and 18 years after the death of her adoptive mother, amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life. According to the law in force at the material time, after an adoptee obtained full legal capacity, only he or she could seek annulment of the adoption. However, the appeal court did not raise this objection during the proceedings. It was thus doubtful whether the measure applied by the authorities had been in accordance with the law. Moreover, the annulment of the applicant’s adoption did not serve the interests of either the adopted child or the adoptive mother. The main consequence of the annulment was the disruption of the applicant’s family tie with her already deceased mother and the loss of her inheritance rights to the benefit of her sister. Taking into account that the annulment proceedings had been brought by the latter in order to keep the inherited land for herself, it was doubtful whether the impugned decisions pursued a legitimate aim.
As to whether the measure had been necessary in a democratic society, the Court recalled that where the existence of a family tie had been established the State must in principle enable it to be maintained. Splitting up a family was an interference of a very serious order and had to be supported by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations, not only in the interests of the child but also with respect to legal certainty.
In the present case, the domestic courts had annulled the applicant’s adoption on the ground that its only aim had been the furtherance of the patrimonial interests of the adoptive mother and the applicant, not to ensure a better life for the applicant. However, the legal provisions governing adoption were primarily aimed at benefiting and protecting children. In this context, the annulment of an adoption was not envisaged as a measure against the adopted child and could not be interpreted in the sense of disinheriting an adopted child. Moreover, under the domestic law only the adopted child could challenge the validity of the adoption after obtaining full legal capacity. If subsequent evidence revealed that a final adoption order was based on fraudulent or misleading evidence, the interests of the child should remain paramount in establishing a process to deal with any damage caused to the adoptive parent as a result of the wrongful order. Therefore, the domestic courts’ decision had not been supported by relevant and sufficient reasons justifying such interference with the applicant’s family life.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
The Court also found, unanimously, a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Article 41: EUR 30,000 in respect of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

44958/05 – Legal Summary, [2015] ECHR 419
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8.1

Human Rights, Adoption, Family

Updated: 29 December 2021; Ref: scu.546120

ABC v PM and Another: FC 5 Mar 2015

The parties were involved in substantial ancillary relief disputes. W now complained that H had charged his only asset within the jurisdiction, the house in which she lived, to secure his legal fees. She had already asserted a claim against it within the proceedings. The Court had already found that H had failed to disclose substantial offshore assets. H now appealed against an order stting the charge aside.

Moor J
[2015] EWFC 32
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
Citing:
Cited – Robinson v Robinson (Practice Note) CA 2-Jan-1982
The husband was a serving soldier who had had various postings abroad. The wife returned home, where she discovered that she was pregnant. He followed her home, but she left him, and applied for maintenance. The justices found that she had deserted . .
Cited – Kemmis v Kemmis (Welland and Others Intervening) CA 1988
H had mortgaged the matrimonial home to release funds to support his lifestyle. The bank knew about the family circumstances and the mortgage was set aside at first instance. W applied to have the charge set aside.
Held: The application . .
Cited – Kremen v Agrest FD 15-Oct-2010
Application as to payment of funds held where the payer was a fugitive from justice, owing sums in maintenance to the claimant. W applied for an order setting aside a charge granted by H over property. In previous hearing the court had found that H . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 29 December 2021; Ref: scu.545898

SJ v Belgium: ECHR 19 Mar 2015

The applicant alleged that her expulsion to Nigeria would expose her to a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and would infringe her right to respect for her private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. She also complained of the lack of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention.

Dean Spielmann, P
70055/10 – Grand Chamber Judgment, [2015] ECHR 318, [2015] ECHR 547
Bailii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 3 8 13

Human Rights, Immigration, Family

Updated: 29 December 2021; Ref: scu.545066

Bryson v Somervill: SCS 17 Nov 1565

Anent the action pursued by Janet Bryson against Janet Somervill, and William Sharer, her son, for a spulzie committed by umquhil David Sharer, her husband, and herself, and their son being in company with them; it was alleged for the said William, That in time of the said spulzie committed by his father and mother, he was within the age of twelve years, and but alleged to be in company with his said father; and so not being doli capax, et in patria potestate, non potuit contrahere obligationem.-It was alleged by the said pursuer, that the said William was past ten years, and therefore might be called for the said spulzie, because he was doli capax, quia in proxima erat pubertati et malitia potuit supplere aetatem; neither the woman nor he could be excused, by the man being father to the boy, and husband, quia omnes in pari delicto parem paenam sustineant, et cum hisce actio ex maleficio orietur, omnes tenebat.-It was alleged by the said William, because the said pursuer alleged him to be of ten years and not fourteen, therefore he should be assoilzied: Whilk allegeance of the said pursuer was repelled; and the allegeance of the said defender admitted; and the said defender assoilzied frae the spulzie, for the causes foresaid.-It was alleged by the said Janet Somervill, That she should be assoilzied frae the said spulzie, because it was alleged in the pursuer’s libel, that umquhil David Sharer her husband, and she in company with him, committed the said spulzie; so on noways should she be called after his decease, she neither being called after as heir, or executrix to him, but allenarly upon her own deed, done in company with her own husband in his time, he being her principal head: Which allegeance of the said Janet, defender, was admitted, and she affoilzied frae the said spulzie. The like was practiced before, in my Lady Crawfurd’s case, who being pursued for the spulzie of, was absolved, because her husband was there; and my Lady Ratie, pursued by ane Bruce, was absolved for the samen reason. See Husband and Wife.

[1565] Mor 1703
Bailii

Scotland, Crime, Family

Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.544216

Barbara Logan v Roger Wod: SCS 26 Mar 1561

The husband has just action and cause of seeking partising and divorcement, gif his wise committis adulterie, be committing the use of her body, to ony other man, induring the time of the marriage. Bot the husband may not part with his wife, or seek to be divorcit fra hir, be ressoun of adulterie committed be hir, gif he in likewise, hes given the use of his bodie to ony uther in adulterie, and ester the committing thereof, na wayis was reconcilit to his wife thereanent.

[1561] Mor 339
Bailii

Scotland, Family

Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.543997

Janet Auchinlech v James Stewart: SCS 18 Dec 1540

Quhen ony man and his wife are simpliciter partit and divorcit be the authority of the Judge Ordinar, for adulterie, or ony other trespass committed be the man, the hail tocher-gude, and all that was ressavit be the man fra the woman, by vertue of the matrimonie contractit betwix thame, aucht to be restorit to the woman, with the prosseits thairof, ester the giving of the sentence of divorce betwix thame.

[1540] Mor 339
Bailii

Scotland, Family

Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.543981

B v B: FD 20 Jan 2015

Appeal by the husband in financial relief proceedings against an order running to seven pages plus a two page Schedule. The aspect of the order concerned on this appeal is that which effectively (although not in form) shared between the parties (60% to the husband and 40% to the wife) certain shares belonging to the husband. The form of that part of the District Judge’s order was by way of an order for a lump sum or series of lump sums as and when those shares should come to be realised.

Bodey J
[2015] EWHC 210 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.543959

Gozum v Turkey: ECHR 20 Jan 2015

Article 8
Positive obligations
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Respect for private life
Lacuna in Turkish law on the replacement of the first name of the biological mother of one of the unmarried adoptive mother on personal documents of the adopted child: violation
In fact – In May 2007 the applicant, single adoptive mother, could not register his name in place of that of the biological mother of the paperwork for her child.
In November 2007, the district court dismissed the action on the basis of its in part that his request had no legal basis. She appealed on points of law. In March 2009, while his appeal was pending, legislative reform opened the possibility for an adoptive single mother to have his name in the place of that of the biological mother. In November 2009, the Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the first instance judgment by a judgment which remained silent on this reform.
In November 2010, the applicant obtained the formalization of his name as the mother of the child.
Law – Article 8: This case concerns an aspect of the problems encountered by those who wish to achieve a single-parent adoption and, given the particular judicial response to this problem, the Court considers it appropriate to analyze it as a case concerning the positive obligations of the State to ensure effective respect for private and family life through its legislative, executive and judicial.
At the relevant time, the Turkish civil law recognized these people the right to give their family name to their adopted child, but provided no legal framework regarding the recognition of the first name of the adoptive parent as the natural parent.
In the search for balance between the different interests of the biological mother of the child and the adoptive family, and the general interest, the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation, but in all assumptions, the best interests of the child must come first. The margin of appreciation coincides with the discretion that was allegedly given to the civil courts in the reconciliation of different personal interests underlying the parent adoptions. But neither the trial judges nor those of Cassation did not it would be noted the way that the applicant had drawn interpretative standards under Article 1 st of the Civil Code, which commanded them to fill this failure in the law, it was, to protect competing interests related to the adoption of the child. In addition, there are in the contested decisions any evidence that would convince that in this case the said judges are employed to conduct an assessment focused on the particular circumstances of this case, much less concerned with the preservation the best interests of the child in question.
The balance that the Turkish legislature intended household demanded that we should grant special importance to the positive obligations under Article 8. To this end, to be effective, would have had the protection referred be placed in a frame clearly established in the domestic legal order, to enable to assess the proportionality of restrictions to fundamental rights or order ‘intimate’ which were recognized on the applicant by Article 8 knowing that the incomplete and non motivated the appreciation of the domestic courts on the exercise of these rights – as in this case – could not meet an acceptable margin of appreciation.
So in terms of single-parent adoptions, the Turkish civil law legal loophole that had touched the people in the situation of the applicant whose application was part of a legal sphere that the Turkish Parliament did certainly not planned and supervised so as to strike a fair balance between the general interest and the competing interests of individuals.
Therefore the protection of civil law, as it was designed at the relevant time, could not be considered adequate in relation to the positive obligations to be contributed by the respondent State under Article 8 of the Convention.
Conclusion : violation (unanimously).

4789/10 – Legal Summary, [2015] ECHR 184
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8

Human Rights, Family

Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.542943

In re Capita Translation and Interpreting Ltd: FC 2 Feb 2015

Several sets of proceedings had begun, for which interpreters were required. The company had contracted to supply translaters, but had failed to do so leaving the cases to be postponed. The court now considered an application for costs wasted by the parties to the proceedings.
Held: Granted.

Sir James Munby
[2015] EWFC 5
Bailii

Family, Costs

Updated: 28 December 2021; Ref: scu.542925

Kruskic And Others v Croatia (Dec): ECHR 25 Nov 2014

ECHR Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Refusal of claim by grandparents for custody of their grandchildren: inadmissible
Facts – The first and second applicants were the grandparents of the third and fourth applicants, who were born in 2006 and 2005 respectively. In 2008 the children’s mother and in 2011 their father left the household where they had lived with the four applicants. Litigation ensued between the grandparents and the father concerning custody of and access to the children. The domestic courts ultimately granted custody to the father, who had been living with the children since 2013
Law
Article 34 – Locus standi of the third and fourth applicants: The children’s parents had never been deprived of parental responsibility nor were the children ever placed under the guardianship of their grandparents or otherwise formally entrusted to them. Furthermore, as of December 2013 the children were represented in the domestic proceedings by a guardian ad litem. Given the findings of the domestic courts, the grandparents had, at least arguably, a conflict of interest with their grandchildren. Thus, in the particular circumstances of the case the grandparents were not entitled to lodge an application on behalf of their grandchildren.
Conclusion: inadmissible (incompatible ratione personae).
Article 8: There could be ‘family life’ between grandparents and grandchildren where there were sufficiently close family ties between them. In the instant case, the grandparents had lived with their grandchildren for seven and eight years respectively and the relations between them thus constituted ‘family life’ protected under Article 8. However, in normal circumstances the relationship between grandparents and grandchildren was different in nature and degree from the relationship between parent and child and thus by its very nature generally called for a lesser degree of protection. The right of grandparents to respect for their family life with their grandchildren primarily entailed the right to maintain a normal relationship through contacts between them. However, such contacts generally took place with the agreement of the person exercising parental responsibility and was thus normally at the discretion of the child’s parents.
In situations where children were left without parental care, grandparents could under Article 8 also be entitled to have their grandchildren formally entrusted into their care. However, the circumstances of the present case could not give rise to such a right because it could not be argued that the grandchildren had been abandoned by their father, who was away for only a month and a half while leaving them in the care of their grandparents. Since Article 8 could not be construed as conferring any other custody-related right on grandparents, the decisions of the domestic courts in the custody proceedings had not amounted to interference with their right to respect for their family life.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
(See also Bronda v. Italy, 22430/93, 9 June 1998; G.H.B. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 42455/98, 4 May 2000; Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], 39221/98 and 41963/98, 13 July 2000, Information Note 20; and Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, 16318/07, 27 April 2010, Information Note 129. See also the Factsheets on Protection of minors, Children’s rights, and Parental rights)

10140/13 – Legal Summary, [2014] ECHR 1441
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8

Human Rights, Children, Family

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.542464

Radmacher v Granatino: CA 3 Oct 2008

The parties, both foreign nationals, had signed a prenuptial contract in Germany before their marriage in England. It had provided that on a divorce neither could claim against the other. The wife had very substantial assets, the husband had few. She now sought leave to appeal.
Held: Leave was granted.

Wilson LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1304
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Application for leave – Radmacher v Granatino CA 2-Jul-2009
Husband and wife, neither English, had married in England. Beforehand they had signed a prenuptial agreement in Germany agreeing that neither should claim against the other on divorce. The wife appealed against an order to pay a lump sum to the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.279976

Robinson v Robinson (Practice Note): CA 2 Jan 1982

The husband was a serving soldier who had had various postings abroad. The wife returned home, where she discovered that she was pregnant. He followed her home, but she left him, and applied for maintenance. The justices found that she had deserted him, and that her behaviour was ‘gross and obvious misconduct’ and reduced her maintenance award accordingly. She appealed from a refusal of the divisional court to vary the order.
Held: Her appeal was dismissed. The justices had found behaviour sufficient to offend a reasonable man’s sense of justice if not allowed to affect the order. Referring to West v West, Waller LJ said: ‘There is, however, an important point of difference in that in West v. West the judge found that the husband had to accept a share of the responsibility for the breakdown or failure to start the marriage, although by far and away the greater burden was on the wife. In the present case the husband was said to be blameless. In my opinion there is very little to choose between them. For the husband to be blameless is an unusual feature and the fact that the marriage broke down in just over four years does not make the case so different when this feature is taken into account. This is not the kind of case that Ormrod J. refers to when he says in Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] Fam. 72, 80B: ‘ generally speaking, the causes of breakdown are complex and rarely to be found wholly or mainly on one side…”

Waller LJ
[1983] Fam 52, [1982] 2 WLR 146
Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978 2(1)(a) 3(1)(g)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Wachtel v Wachtel CA 8-Feb-1973
The court described the 1969 and 1970 Acts as ‘a reforming statute designed to facilitate the granting of ancillary relief in cases where marriages have been dissolved . . We regard the provisions of sections 2,3, 4 and 5 of the Act of 1970 as . .
Cited – West v West 1977
. .

Cited by:
Cited – McGladdery v McGladdery CA 21-Jul-1999
A husband having been ordered to transfer his shares in a private company to his wife, found that she had breached the undertaking she had given as part of the order, and had used her majority shareholding to dispose of company assets out of the . .
Cited – Kyte v Kyte CA 22-Jul-1987
The parties disputed an ancillary relief claim on their divorce. The husband had been suicidally depressed. The wife had committed adultery over a long time and also assisted her husband’s failed suicide. The husband now sought to rely upon her . .
Cited – Xydhias v Xydhias CA 21-Dec-1998
The principles of contract law are of little use when looking at the course of negotiations in divorce ancillary proceedings. In the case of a dispute the court must use its own discretion to determine whether agreement had been reached. Thorpe LJ . .
Cited – ABC v PM and Another FC 5-Mar-2015
The parties were involved in substantial ancillary relief disputes. W now complained that H had charged his only asset within the jurisdiction, the house in which she lived, to secure his legal fees. She had already asserted a claim against it . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.223618

Akhmedova v Akhmedov and Others: FD 17 Oct 2019

[2019] EWHC 2732 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Akhmedova v Akhmedov and Others FD 2-Oct-2019
. .

Cited by:
See Also – Akhmedova v Akhmedov and Others FD 12-Jun-2020
applications:
a) an application for disclosure by the Applicant Wife against the Tenth Respondent; and
b) an application by the Tenth Respondent for (i) disclosure from the Applicant Wife in respect of her litigation funding arrangements . .
See Also – Akhmedova v Akhmedov and Others FD 14-Aug-2020
. .
See Also – Akhmedova v Akhmedov and Others FD 28-Oct-2020
Without notice application by the wife for a search order against the tenth respondent. . .
See Also – Akhmedova v Akhmedov and Others FD 4-Nov-2020
Return date of the search order and forensic imaging order granted without notice . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 25 December 2021; Ref: scu.648672

Manic v Lithuania: ECHR 13 Jan 2015

The applicant alleged the passivity of the public authorities in enforcing a judicial decision defining his rights of contact with his child. He alleged, in particular, that the actions by the Lithuanian authorities and courts in respect of his right to have contact with his son were in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

Guido Raimondi, P
46600/11 – Chamber Judgment, [2015] ECHR 20
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8

Human Rights, Family

Updated: 25 December 2021; Ref: scu.541376

Elberte v Latvia: ECHR 13 Jan 2015

ECHR Article 3
Degrading treatment
Emotional suffering caused by removal of tissue from the applicant’s deceased husband’s body without her knowledge or consent: violation
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for private life
Lack of clarity in domestic law on consent of close relatives to tissue removal from dead body: violation
Facts – Following the death of the applicant’s husband in a car accident, tissue was removed from his body during an autopsy at a forensic centre and sent to a pharmaceutical company in Germany with a view to creating bio-implants, pursuant to a State-approved agreement. When the body was returned to the applicant after the completion of the autopsy its legs were tied together. The applicant only learned of the removal of the tissue two years later, in the course of a criminal investigation into allegations of wide-scale illegal removal of organs and tissues from cadavers. However, no prosecutions were ever brought as the time-limit had expired.
Law – Article 8: The domestic authorities’ failure to secure the legal and practical conditions to enable the applicant to express her wishes concerning the removal of her deceased husband’s tissue constituted an interference with her right to respect for private life.
As to the lawfulness of that interference, the question was whether the domestic legislation was formulated with sufficient precision and afforded adequate legal protection against arbitrariness in the absence of relevant administrative regulation.
As to the first aspect, the domestic authorities had disagreed over the scope of the domestic legislation, with the forensic centre and security police considering there existed a system of ‘presumed consent’ while the investigators thought that the Latvian legal system relied on the concept of ‘informed consent’ with removal permissible only with the consent of the donor (during his or her lifetime) or of the relatives. By the time the security police accepted the prosecutors’ interpretation and decided that the applicant’s consent had been required, they were out of time to bring a criminal prosecution.
This disagreement among the authorities inevitably indicated a lack of sufficient clarity. Indeed, although Latvian law set out the legal framework for consenting to or refusing tissue removal, it did not clearly define the scope of the corresponding obligation or the discretion left to experts or other authorities in this regard. The Court noted that the relevant European and international materials on this subject attached particular importance to establishing the relatives’ views through reasonable enquiries. The principle of legality likewise required States to ensure the legal and practical conditions for implementation of their laws. However, the applicant had not been informed how and when her rights as closest relative could be exercised or provided with any explanation.
As to whether the domestic law afforded adequate legal protection against arbitrariness, it had been important, given the large number of people from whom tissue had been removed, for adequate mechanisms to be put in place to balance the relatives’ right to express their wishes against the broad discretion conferred on the experts to carry out removals on their own initiative, but this was not done. In the absence of any administrative or legal regulation on the matter, the applicant had been unable to foresee how to exercise her right to express her wishes concerning the removal of her husband’s tissue.
Consequently, the interference with her right to respect for her private life was not in accordance with the law within the meaning of Article 8 – 2.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 3 (substantive aspect): The applicant’s suffering had gone beyond that inflicted by grief following the death of a close family member. The applicant had had to face a long period of uncertainty, anguish and distress as to which organs or tissue had been removed, and the manner and purpose of their removal. Following the initiation of the general criminal investigation, the applicant had been left for a considerable period of time to anguish over the reasons why her husband’s legs had been tied together when his body was returned to her for burial. Indeed, she had discovered the nature and amount of tissue that had been removed only during the proceedings before the European Court.
The lack of clarity in the regulatory framework as regards the consent requirement could only have intensified her distress, regard being had to the intrusive nature of the acts carried out on her husband’s body and the failure of the authorities themselves during the criminal investigation to agree on whether or not they had acted lawfully when removing tissue and organs from cadavers.
Finally, no prosecution had ever been brought for reasons of prescription and uncertainty over whether the authorities’ acts could be considered illegal. The applicant had thus been denied redress for a breach of her personal rights relating to a very sensitive aspect of her private life, namely the right to consent or object to the removal of tissue from her dead husband’s body.
In the specialised field of organ and tissue transplantation, it was common ground that the human body had to be treated with respect even after death. Indeed, international treaties including the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and the Additional Protocol had been drafted to safeguard the rights of organ and tissue donors, living or deceased. Moreover, respect for human dignity formed part of the very essence of the European Convention. Consequently, the suffering caused to the applicant had undoubtedly amounted to degrading treatment.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 16,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

Paivi Hirvela, P
61243/08 – Chamber Judgment, [2015] ECHR 1, 61243/08 – Legal Summary, [2015] ECHR 211
Bailii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8

Human Rights, Family

Updated: 25 December 2021; Ref: scu.541369

Hromadka And Hromadkova v Russia: ECHR 11 Dec 2014

ECHR Article 8
Positive obligations
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Failure to take all necessary measures to enable father and daughter to maintain and develop family life with each other in international abduction case: violation
Facts – The first applicant, a Czech national, married a Russian national in 2003. The couple settled in the Czech Republic and in 2005 had a daughter, the second applicant. Two years later the wife started divorce proceedings and both she and the first applicant sought custody of the child. In 2008, while the proceedings were still pending, the wife took the child to Russia without the first applicant’s consent. Shortly afterwards a Czech city court granted the first applicant temporary custody, but his request to the Russian courts to recognise and enforce the Czech court’s decision was rejected. His further application to the Russian courts for access was also discontinued. In 2011 a Czech district court issued a final judgment granting the first applicant custody. Shortly afterwards the applicants lost all contact with each other and at the time of the European Court’s judgment the first applicant was still unaware of his daughter’s whereabouts. In 2012 the first applicant’s request to a Russian court to recognise and enforce the final custody judgment was dismissed.
Law – Article 8: Since the second applicant had been ‘wrongfully’ removed and retained in Russia by her mother, Article 8 of the Convention required the Russian authorities to ‘take action’ and assist the applicant in being reunited with his child.
(a) Lack of necessary legal framework in Russia for securing prompt response to international child abduction between removal of the child and termination of the child-custody proceedings – The Czech court’s decision granting temporary custody to the first applicant pending the outcome of the divorce proceedings had not been enforceable in Russia because of its interim nature. The first applicant had also been prevented from having the contact arrangements with his daughter formally determined by the Russian courts until the end of the proceedings before the Czech court. In the absence of an agreement between the parents, the regulatory legal framework in Russia at the material time had thus not provided practical and effective protection of the first applicant’s interests in maintaining and developing family life with his daughter, with irremediable consequences on their relations. By failing to put in place the necessary legal framework to secure a prompt response to international child abduction at the time of the events in question, the respondent State had failed to comply with its positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
(b) Refusal by the Russian court to recognise and enforce the final custody order – The Court reiterated that the national authorities’ duty to take measures to facilitate reunion was not absolute. A change in relevant circumstances, in so far as it had not been caused by the State, could exceptionally justify the non-enforcement of a final child-custody order. The second applicant had lived in the Czech Republic with both her parents for three years until her mother took her to Russia. Since her departure from the Czech Republic the child had had very limited contact with her father until they eventually lost all contact in 2011. Since 2008 she had settled in her new environment in Russia and her return to her father’s care would have run contrary to her best interests, as the first applicant also admitted. Therefore, the Russian court’s decision not to recognise and enforce the Czech court’s judgment of 2011 had not amounted to a violation of Article 8.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(c) Other measures taken by the Russian authorities after June 2011 – Since 2011 the mother had been in hiding with the second applicant. The Russian authorities had thus been required to establish the mother’s whereabouts if the first applicant was to maintain family ties with his daughter, but the police had been slow to act and had not made full inquiries. The first applicant’s attempts to involve other domestic authorities in assisting him to establish contact with his daughter had been thwarted by the impossibility of locating her. The Russian authorities had thus failed to take all the measures that could have been reasonably expected of them to enable the applicants to maintain and develop family life with each other.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 12,500 to the first applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage; finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the second applicant.
(See also Maumousseau and Washington v. France, 39388/05, 6 December 2007, Information Note 103; Hokkanen v. Finland, 19823/92, 23 September 1994; Kosmopoulou v. Greece, 60457/00, 5 February 2004, Information Note 61; X v. Latvia [GC], 27853/09, 26 November 2013, Information Note 168; and see generally the Factsheet on International child abductions)

22909/10 – Chamber Judgment, [2014] ECHR 1374, 22909/10 – Legal Summary, [2014] ECHR 1443
Bailii, Bailii LS
European Convention on Human Rights 8-1

Human Rights, Family

Updated: 24 December 2021; Ref: scu.540020

Henry Kismoun v France: ECHR 5 Dec 2013

ECHR Article 8
Positive obligations
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Respect for private life
Refusal to permit change of name requested with a view to unifying family surname: violation
Facts – The applicant was listed in the civil status register under his mother’s surname, Henry. He has dual nationality, Algerian through his father and French through his mother; both of his parents are now deceased. He was abandoned by his mother at the age of three, together with his brother and sister. The father took them in, and in 1961 moved them to Algeria. The applicant was always called Kismoun by his father, family and friends. It was under this surname that he was educated in Algeria from 1963 to 1970 and that he carried out his military service there from 1975 to 1977. It is also under this name that he is currently listed in the Algerian civil status register. In 1977 the applicant attempted to re-establish contact with his mother through the French Consulate in Algiers, which informed him that she did not wish to make contact. He also learned on that occasion that he was registered in France as Christian Henry, and not Cherif Kismoun, as in Algeria. The applicant sought to rectify that situation, but his appeals were unsuccessful, including one to the Minister of Justice, who dismissed his request by a decision of December 2003.
Law – Article 8
(a) Applicability – The issue of the choice or change of the surnames and forenames of natural persons fell within the scope of this provision, given that the surname and forename concerned the individual’s private and family life.
(b) Merits – The Minister of Justice’s decision amounted to a refusal to change a surname which was perfectly consistent with the applicant’s identification under French law, and to replace it with a very different surname. It followed that this case concerned the issue of the State’s positive obligations.
The Minister of Justice had partly based his decision in respect of the applicant’s request to change the surname ‘Henry’ on a lack of evidence concerning the mother’s absence of interest. However, no examination had been conducted into the applicant’s specific reasons for wishing to use the surname ‘Kismoun’. The applicant had merely been informed that his possible use of that surname, which, he submitted, reflected his origins, was insufficient to denote the requisite legal interest. The national courts had subsequently never explained how the applicant’s request, which contained personal and individual reasons capable of being taken into consideration in examining the merits of an affective argument, conflicted with a public order necessity.
The reasoning put forward by the Minister of Justice in relation to the surname Henry did not constitute an adequate response to the applicant’s request, in that it attached no weight to the fact that he was seeking to be known under a single surname. In reality, the applicant was asking the national authorities to recognise the identity he had developed in Algeria, of which the surname Kismoun was one of the key elements. He wished to be registered under only one surname, namely that which he had used since childhood, in order to put an end to the inconvenience caused by his registration under two different identities in the French and Algerian civil status registers. The surname, as the principle means of identifying an individual within society, was part of the core considerations relevant to the right to respect for private and family life. The Court also emphasised, as the Court of Justice of the European Union had done, the importance for an individual of having a single surname. However, it was to be noted that it appeared from the reasoning in the decisions by which the national authorities had rejected the applicant’s request that they had not taken into account the identity-related aspect of his request, and, in so doing, had failed to balance the public interest at stake against the applicant’s overriding interest. In those circumstances, the decision-making process concerning the change in surname had not afforded the protection of the applicant’s interests safeguarded by Article 8 of the Convention.
Conclusion: violation (unanimous).
Article 46: The national authorities had not given appropriate weight to the applicant’s interest in having a single name. The Court consider that it was not required to indicate to the respondent State the measures to be taken, given that various methods could be envisaged to remedy the violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
Article 41: EUR 4,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

32265/10 – Chamber Judgment, [2013] ECHR 1236, 32265/10 – Legal Summary, [2013] ECHR 1367
Bailii, Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8

Human Rights, Family

Updated: 24 December 2021; Ref: scu.539937

H v H: CA 2 Dec 2014

Appeal against ancillary relief order for a lump sum payment to the wife of andpound;400,000 to be paid by the husband upon the termination of a joint lives periodical payments order which would occur on his retirement.

Moore-Bick, Kitchin, Ryder LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 1523
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 24 December 2021; Ref: scu.539568

An NHS Trust v Child B and Others: FD 1 Aug 2014

Emergency application brought by An NHS Trust concernig B, a very young child who sustained injuries in an accident. B sustained severe burns to several parts of his body in an accident which was dealt with very expeditiously by his mother. Both parents were Jehovah’s witnesses, and the Trust wished to supply a blood transfusion.

Moylan J
[2014] EWHC 3486 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family, Health

Updated: 24 December 2021; Ref: scu.539460

SB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (BB) (Bereavement and Death Benefits : Bereavement Payments): UTAA 22 Oct 2014

The claimant made a claim for bereavement benefit on 22 May 2013 following the death of the deceased on 11 March 2012. She appealed through her representative against the decision that she was not entitled to bereavement benefit because the marriage between the deceased and the claimant on 7 January 1986 (in Sairi in the Kotli District of Azad Kashmir and which had resulted in the birth of three children) could not be accepted as valid for social security purposes and accordingly bereavement benefit was not payable to her

West UTJ
[2014] UKUT 495 (AAC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Benefits, Family

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.539097

Colborne v Colborne: CA 20 Nov 2014

This appeal concerns the division of capital assets on divorce and also the costs order made at the end of the ancillary relief proceedings. It turns on its own facts and does not give rise to any issues of principle.

Black, Burnett LJJ, Ouseley J
[2014] EWCA Civ 1488
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538967

Jeunesse v The Netherlands (Legal Summary): ECHR 3 Oct 2014

ECHR Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Refusal to grant residence permit on ground of family life despite existence of exceptional circumstances: violation
Facts – The applicant, a Surinamese national, entered the Netherlands in 1997 on a tourist visa and continued to reside there after her visa expired. She married a Dutch national and they had three children. The applicant applied for a residence permit on several occasions, but her requests were dismissed as she did not hold a provisional residence visa issued by the Netherlands mission in her country of origin. In 2010 she spent four months in detention with a view to deportation. She was eventually released because she was pregnant.
Law – Article 8: The Court recalled its well-established case-law that, when family life was created at a time when the persons involved were aware that the immigration status of one of them was such that the persistence of that family life within the host State would from the outset be precarious, the removal of the non-national family member would constitute a violation of Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances. The applicant’s situation in the respondent State had been irregular since she had outstayed her tourist visa. Having made numerous unsuccessful attempts to regularise her residence status in the Netherlands, she had been aware – well before she commenced her family life in that country – of the precariousness of her situation.
As to the existence of exceptional circumstances, all the members of the applicant’s family were Dutch nationals entitled to enjoy family life with each other in the Netherlands. Moreover, the applicant’s position was not comparable to that of other potential migrants in that she had been born a Dutch national but had lost that nationality involuntarily in 1975 when Suriname became independent. Her address had always been known to the domestic authorities, who had tolerated her presence in the country for 16 years. Such a lengthy period had actually enabled her to establish and develop strong family, social and cultural ties in the Netherlands. The Court further noted that the applicant did not have a criminal record and that settling in Suriname would entail hardship for her family. Nor had the domestic authorities paid enough attention to the impact on the applicant’s children of the decision to deny their mother a residence permit. They had also failed to take account of or assess evidence as to the practicality, feasibility and proportionality of denying her residence in the Netherlands. Viewing these factors cumulatively, the Court concluded that the circumstances of the applicant’s case were indeed exceptional. Accordingly, a fair balance had not been struck between the personal interests of the applicant and her family in maintaining their family life in the Netherlands and the public order interests of the Government in controlling migration.
Conclusion: violation (fourteen votes to three)
Article 41: EUR 1,714 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; claim in respect of pecuniary damage dismissed.
(See also Butt v. Norway, 47017/09, 4 December 2012; Nunez v. Norway, 55597/09, 28 June 2011, Information Note 142)

12738/10 – Legal Summary, [2014] ECHR 1309
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8Jeunn
Human Rights
Citing:
Judgment – Jeunesse v The Netherlands ECHR 3-Oct-2014
(Grand Chamber) Although the applicant had married and had three children while her immigration status in the Netherlands was precarious, there were exceptional circumstances such that a fair balance had not been struck between the competing . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Family

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538925

Chai v Peng (1): FD 17 Oct 2014

Bodey J
[2014] EWHC 3519 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 13-Mar-2014
Application for further maintenance pending suit. . .
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 1-May-2014
The court was severely critical of the practice in divorce proceedings of uissuing a petition for divorce but then not serving it for some time. Holman J referred to a colourful metaphor deployed by leading counsel for the husband: ‘To file [a . .

Cited by:
See Also – Chai v Peng (2) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .
See Also – Chai v Peng CA 12-Jun-2015
Application to adjourn full hearing of appeal. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Estoppel

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538865

Chai v Peng (2): FD 17 Oct 2014

Bodey J
[2014] EWHC 3518 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 13-Mar-2014
Application for further maintenance pending suit. . .
See Also – Chai v Peng FD 1-May-2014
The court was severely critical of the practice in divorce proceedings of uissuing a petition for divorce but then not serving it for some time. Holman J referred to a colourful metaphor deployed by leading counsel for the husband: ‘To file [a . .
See Also – Chai v Peng (1) FD 17-Oct-2014
. .

Cited by:
See Also – Chai v Peng CA 12-Jun-2015
Application to adjourn full hearing of appeal. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Jurisdiction

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538864

Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: ECJ 4 Mar 2010

ECJ Right to family reunification – Directive 2003/86/EC – Concept of ‘recourse to the social assistance system’ – Concept of ‘family reunification’ – Family formation

J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, P
[2010] EUECJ C-578/08
Bailii
Directive 2003/86/EC
European
Citing:
Opinion – Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken ECJ 10-Dec-2009
ECJ Opinion – Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – Right to family reunification Meaning of ‘recourse to the social assistance system’ Relevance of date of family relationship. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 23 December 2021; Ref: scu.538693

Newman (Number 2): FD 17 Oct 2014

Further application by Council in proceedings for committal of defendant for alleged contempt of court. The defendant having not committed any further breaches, the Council withdrew the second application with the consent of the court.
Held: Given the improvement it was right to take the unusual course of deferring sentence to see whether the defendant continued with his compliance in which case a committal may not be required.

Sir James Munby P FD
[2014] EWHC 3399 (Fam)
Bailii

Family, Contempt of Court

Updated: 22 December 2021; Ref: scu.537740