Category: Family

Official Solicitor v News Group Newspapers: FD 1994

There had been a conviction of a nurse for multiple murders. The defendant was approached by a third party and published evidence taken from children’s proceedings.
Held: The defendant was guilty of contempt.

Judges:

Connell J

Citations:

[1994] 2 FLR 174

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Kent County Council v The Mother, The Father, B (By Her Children’s Guardian); Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) FD 19-Mar-2004
The council had taken the applicant’s children into care alleging that the mother had harmed them. In the light of the subsequent cases casting doubt on such findings, the mother sought the return of her children. She applied now that the hearings . .
Cited – Kelly (A Minor) v British Broadcasting Corporation FD 25-Jul-2000
K, aged 16, had left home to join what was said to be a religious sect. His whereabouts were unknown. He had been made a ward of court and the Official Solicitor was appointed to represent his interests. He had sent messages to say that he was well . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Media, Family, Contempt of Court

Updated: 03 February 2022; Ref: scu.194850

X v Dempster: FD 9 Nov 1998

The columnist Nigel Dempster had written that the mother in forthcoming proceedings relating to a child was a bad mother.
Held: The article was a contempt of court. Such an allegation required proof to the criminal standard. At common law the publisher had no liability in contempt without knowledge. Contempt applied as regards wards of court where the publication related to the children rather than the proceedings: ‘[E]vents in the lives of the children in the present case which are already in the public domain or which do not relate to the proceedings can be the subject of publication.’
The court set out rules for what could be published despite the existence of an order of wardship. There is no common law restraint on identification of parties to Children Act proceedings.

Judges:

Wilson J

Citations:

[1999] 1 FLR 894

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – In re F (otherwise A ) (A Minor) (Publication of Information) CA 1977
An allegation of contempt was made in proceedings related to the publication by a newspaper of extracts from a report by a social worker and a report by the Official Solicitor, both prepared after the commencement and for the purpose of the wardship . .
Cited – Re W (Wards) (Publication of Information) FD 1989
An injunction was given to prohibit wards of court being named during the Cleveland child abuse inquiry. A summary of what has been said in court and written before hand in statements and reports are as much prohibited from publication as are direct . .
Cited – Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers plc HL 1991
Damages were awarded for a breach of statutory duty where the claimant had suffered loss or damage by reason of the breach. The publication at issue went beyond reporting and ‘it reached deeply into the substance of the matter which the court had . .

Cited by:

Cited – Kent County Council v The Mother, The Father, B (By Her Children’s Guardian); Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) FD 19-Mar-2004
The council had taken the applicant’s children into care alleging that the mother had harmed them. In the light of the subsequent cases casting doubt on such findings, the mother sought the return of her children. She applied now that the hearings . .
Cited – Pelling v Bruce-Williams, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening CA 5-Jul-2004
The applicant sought an order that his application for a joint residence order should be held in public.
Held: Though there was some attractiveness in the applicant’s arguments, the issue had been fully canvassed by the ECHR. The time had come . .
Cited – British Broadcasting Company v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council and X and Y FD 24-Nov-2005
Application was made by the claimant for orders discharging an order made in 1991 to protect the identity of children and social workers embroiled in allegations of satanic sex abuse. The defendant opposed disclosure of the names of two social . .
Cited – Kelly (A Minor) v British Broadcasting Corporation FD 25-Jul-2000
K, aged 16, had left home to join what was said to be a religious sect. His whereabouts were unknown. He had been made a ward of court and the Official Solicitor was appointed to represent his interests. He had sent messages to say that he was well . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Contempt of Court

Updated: 03 February 2022; Ref: scu.194851

X v X (Y and Z intervening): FD 9 Nov 2001

The court considered an agreement under which the quid pro quo for the payment of a sum of money was a husband’s agreement not to defend his wife’s petition for divorce grounded on his behaviour (even though he believed that he had grounds for divorcing her for adultery) and his agreement also to give her a Jewish religious divorce – a Get.
Held: Munby J said: ‘A number of the factors in play are simply unquantifiable on any objective basis. How is a secular judge to evaluate the combination of the get and a decree based on the husband’s conduct rather than the wife’s adultery for a family apparently exercised by the possible religious and social ramifications? How am I to put a price on the cost to the husband of a divorce obtained by his wife against him on the ground of his behaviour rather than a divorce obtained by him on the ground of her adultery? . . There are no means by which a secular judge, who may himself be an adherent of the same or a different faith or of no faith at all, can evaluate, let alone attribute some pecuniary value to, something as personal and of such religious significance as a get.’ The husband had fulfilled his side of the bargain and it would have been grotesquely unfair if the wife were able now to walk away with the two things she desired whilst wholly avoiding her obligations under the agreement.

Judges:

Munby J

Citations:

[2002] 1 FLR 508, [2002] Fam Law 98, [2001] EWHC 11 (Fam)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Commerzbank Ag v Price-Jones CA 21-Nov-2003
The respondent had received a bonus of andpound;250,000. His employers wrote to him in error increasing it. He later chose to stay rather than take redundancy because he now expected the full amount. He resisted an order for restitution. The . .
Cited – Radmacher (Formerly Granatino) v Granatino SC 20-Oct-2010
The parties, from Germany and France married and lived at first in England. They had signed a pre-nuptial agreement in Germany which would have been valid in either country of origin. H now appealed against a judgment which bound him to it, . .
Cited – S v S FD 14-Jan-2014
The court was asked to approve a settlement reached under the IFLA arbitration scheme.
Held: The order was approved, but the court took the opportunity to give guidance. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 03 February 2022; Ref: scu.188272

El-Farargy v El Farargy and others: CA 15 Nov 2007

The court gave its reasons for setting aside a decision of the judge not to recuse himself from an ancillary relief application, having made prejudicial remarks during a pre-trial hearing.
Held: The judge’s remarks were at such a level as to justify his recusal. They were inexcusable. As an attempt to lighten the proceedings, they overstepped the mark.
Ward LJ said: ‘It is an embarrassment to our administration of justice that recusal applications, once almost unheard of, are now so frequently coming to this Court in ways that do none of us any good. It is, however, right that they should. The procedure for doing so is, however, concerning. It is invidious for a judge to sit in judgment on his own conduct in a case like this but in many cases there will be no option but that the trial judge deal with it himself or herself. If circumstances permit it, I would urge that first an informal approach be made to the judge, for example by letter, making the complaint and inviting recusal. Whilst judges must heed the exhortation in Locabail not to yield to tenuous or frivolous objections, one can with honour totally deny the complaint but still pass the case to a colleague. If a judge does not feel able to do so, then it may be preferable, if it is possible to arrange it, to have another judge take the decision, hard though it is to sit in judgment of one’s colleague, for where the appearance of justice is at stake, it is better that justice be done independently by another rather than require the judge to sit in judgment of his own behaviour.’.

Judges:

Ward LJ, Mummery LJ, Wilson LJ

Citations:

[2007] EWCA Civ 1149

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Abegaze v Shrewsbury College of Arts and Technology CA 20-Feb-2009
In 2000 the claimant succeeded in his claim for discrimination, but had not pursued his remedy. He now appealed against a refusal to allow him to take it further. He had initially failed to pursue the matter for ill health. He later refused to . .
Cited – Griffiths v Griffiths (Decision On Recusal) FD 9-Dec-2021
Held: Refused . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 03 February 2022; Ref: scu.261312

Hussain v Parveen: FC 3 Sep 2021

Two preliminary and potentially dispositive issues in relation to a talaq, or Islamic divorce.

Judges:

Mrs Justice Arbuthnot

Citations:

[2021] EWFC 73

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Family

Updated: 03 February 2022; Ref: scu.668486

CC v NC: FD 3 Mar 2014

Application for maintenance pending suit

Judges:

Mr Justice Mostyn

Citations:

[2014] EWHC 703 (Fam)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Family

Updated: 02 February 2022; Ref: scu.523782

Weldon v Weldon (No 1): 27 Nov 1883

The duty of the Court to issue an attachment for non-obedience of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is the same since the Divorce Acts as it was before.
It is not a sufficient compliance by a husband with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights that he has provided his wife with a suitable establishment and sufficient income.
It is the duty of married persons to live together and that this duty should be enforced by the Court unless it could be shown that the complaining party had been guilty of some matrimonial offence for which a judgment authorising living apart might have been obtained by the other.
Sir James Hannen, President cited the words of Blackstone: ‘The suit for restitution of conjugal rights is brought whenever either the husband or wife is guilty of the injury of subtraction or lives separate from the other without any sufficient reason, in which case they will be compelled to come together again, if either party be weak enough to desire it, contrary to the inclination of the other.’

Judges:

Sir James Hannen, President

Citations:

[1883] UKLawRpPro 57, 1883-1884) LR 9 PD 52, (1883) 9 PD 52

Statutes:

Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 22

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset CA 13-May-1988
Claim by a wife that she has a beneficial interest in a house registered in the sole name of her husband and that her interest has priority over the rights of a bank under a legal charge executed without her knowledge. The case raises a point of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 30 January 2022; Ref: scu.655160

MS v PS: ECJ 9 Feb 2017

ECJ (Judgment) Reference for a preliminary ruling – Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 – Article 41(1) – Recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations – Enforcement of a decision in a Member State – Application submitted directly to the competent authority of the Member State of enforcement – National legislation requiring recourse to be had to the Central Authority of the Member State of enforcement

Citations:

ECLI:EU:C:2017:104, [2017] EUECJ C-283/16

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

European

Family

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.573940

Stocker v Stocker: CA 24 Mar 2015

Application for leave to appeal

Judges:

Blake J

Citations:

[2013] EWCA Civ 628

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See Also – Stocker v Stocker QBD 10-Jun-2015
The claimant alleged defamation by his former wife in a post on facebook. The posting and associatedeEmails were said falsely to have accused him of serious abuse, and that the accusations had undermined his relationship with his new partner.
See Also – Stocker v Stocker QBD 29-Jan-2016
Application on pre-trial review . .
See Also – Stocker v Stocker CA 12-Feb-2018
Defamation proceedings after divorce.
Sharp LJ said this about the use of dictionaries as a means of deciding the meaning to be given to a statement alleged to be defamatory: ‘The use of dictionaries does not form part of the process of . .
See Also – Stocker v Stocker SC 3-Apr-2019
The parties had been married and divorced. Mrs S told M S’s new partner on Facebook that he had tried to strangle her and made other allegations. Mrs S now appealed from a finding that she had defamed him. Lord Kerr restated the approach to meaning . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.550178

AB v FC: FD 19 Dec 2016

Application by W for financial relief on divorce after a short marriage (with one young child) during which there was no property acquired.

Judges:

Roberts J

Citations:

[2016] EWHC 3285 (Fam), [2017] WLR(D) 24

Links:

Bailii, WLRD, FLW

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Family

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.573708

LS v PS: FC 23 Dec 2021

Application by an intervener in financial remedy proceedings for disclosure of material and information which is currently subject to ‘without prejudice’ privilege. The intervener, Q, is a corporate entity which provides litigation funding to parties involved in family and probate proceedings. It has lent funds to LS, the applicant wife in these financial remedy proceedings. Her debt to Q with accrued interest currently stands at almost pounds 1 million. For these purposes the precise figure matters not although it represents a significant debt in the context of the financial remedy case which was agreed to be informed by an assessment of the wife’s needs as opposed to a full sharing claim.

Judges:

The Honourable Mrs Justice Roberts

Citations:

[2021] EWFC 108

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Family

Updated: 29 January 2022; Ref: scu.671048

Scatliffe v Scatliffe: PC 12 Dec 2016

British Virgin Islands – Appeal against financial relief order made on divorce. The husband questioned whether the judge had made a proper re-division of the family assets, and in particular whether property inherited by the husband was to be treated as ‘non-matrimonial property’.

Judges:

Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lord Carnwath

Citations:

[2016] UKPC 36, [2016] WLR(D) 665

Links:

Bailii, WLRD

Jurisdiction:

Commonwealth

Family

Updated: 28 January 2022; Ref: scu.573100

Loggie v Loggie: FC 27 Jan 2022

Applicant’s application in Form D11 that the respondent do indemnify her in respect of pounds 65,603.60 she owes to her former solicitors.

Judges:

Mr Justice Mostyn

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Family, Costs

Updated: 28 January 2022; Ref: scu.671623

Grant v Edwards and Edwards: CA 24 Mar 1986

A couple were not married but lived together in Vincent Farmhouse in which the plaintiff claimed a beneficial interest on separation. The female partner was told by the male partner that the only reason for not acquiring the property in joint names was because she was involved in divorce proceedings and that, if the property were acquired jointly, this might operate to her prejudice in those proceedings. The title was in the defendants’ names with no express evidence of agreement her to have a beneficial interest. She had to establish a common intention acted upon by her, that she should have a beneficial interest. Equity would then not allow the defendant to deny that interest and would construct a trust to give effect to it. Two matters were need for a constructive trust. A common intention that each should have a beneficial interest. Without express words intention can be inferred from circumstances. The claimant has acted to his detriment on the basis of that common intention, with a sufficient link between the common intention and the conduct relied upon. This requires there to have been conduct on which the claimant could not reasonably have been expected to embark unless he was to have an interest in the property. (Browne-Wilkinson): ‘I suggest that in other cases of this kind, useful guidance may in the future be obtained from the principles underlying the law of proprietary estoppel which in my judgment are closely akin to those laid down in Gissing v Gissing [1971] A.C. 886. In both, the claimant must to the knowledge of the legal owner have acted in the belief that the claimant has or will obtain an interest in the property. In both, the claimant must have acted to his or her detriment in reliance on such belief. In both, equity acts on the conscience of the legal owner to prevent him from acting in an unconscionable manner by defeating the common intention. The two principles have been developed separately without cross-fertilisation between them: but they rest on the same foundation and have on all other matters reached the same conclusions.’
Mustill LJ said: ‘(1) The law does not recognise a concept of family property, whereby people who live together in a settled relationship ipso facto share the rights of ownership in the assets acquired and used for the purposes of their life together. Nor does the law acknowledge that by the mere fact of doing work on the asset of one party to the relationship the other party will acquire a beneficial interest in that asset.
(2) The question whether one party to the relationship acquires rights to property the legal title to which is vested in the other party must be answered in terms of the existing law of trusts. There are no special doctrines of equity, applicable in this field alone.
(3) In a case such as the present the inquiry must proceed in two stages. First, by considering whether something happened between the parties in the nature of bargain, promise or tacit common intention, at the time of the acquisition. Second, if the answer is ‘Yes,’ by asking whether the claimant subsequently conducted herself in a manner which was (a) detrimental to herself, and (b) referable to whatever happened on acquisition. (I use the expression ‘on acquisition’ for simplicity. In fact, the event happening between the parties which, if followed by the relevant type of conduct on the part of the claimant, can lead to the creation of an interest in the claimant, may itself occur after acquisition. The beneficial interests may change in the course of the relationship.)
(4) For present purposes, the event happening on acquisition may take one of the following shapes. (a) An express bargain whereby the proprietor promises the claimant an interest in the property, in return for an explicit undertaking by the claimant to act in a certain way. (b) An express but incomplete bargain whereby the proprietor promises the claimant an interest in the property, on the basis that the claimant will do something in return. The parties do not themselves make explicit what the claimant is to do. The court therefore has to complete the bargain for them by means of implication, when it comes to decide whether the proprietor’s promise has been matched by conduct falling within whatever undertaking the claimant must be taken to have given sub silentio. (c) An explicit promise by the proprietor that the claimant will have an interest in the property, unaccompanied by any express or tacit agreement as to a quid pro quo. (d) A common intention, not made explicit, to the effect that the claimant will have an interest in the property, if she subsequently acts in a particular way.
(5) In order to decide whether the subsequent conduct of the claimant serves to complete the beneficial interest which has been explicitly or tacitly promised to her the court must decide whether the conduct is referable to the bargain, promise or intention. Whether the conduct satisfies this test will depend upon the nature of the conduct, and of the bargain, promise or intention.
(6) Thus, if the situation falls into category (a) above, the only question is whether the claimant’s conduct is of the type explicitly promised. It is immaterial whether it takes the shape of a contribution to the cost of acquiring the property, or is of a quite different character.’
Mustill LJ continued: ‘(7) The position is the same in relation to situations (b) and (d). No doubt it will often be easier in practice to infer that the quid pro quo was intended to take the shape of a financial or other contribution to the cost of acquisition or of improvement, but this need not always be so. Whatever the court decides the quid pro quo to have been, it will suffice if the claimant has furnished it.
(8) In considering whether there was a bargain or common intention, so as to bring the case within categories (b) and (d) and, if there was one, what were its terms, the court must look at the true state of affairs on acquisition. It must not impute to the parties a bargain which they never made, or a common intention which they never possessed.
(9) The conduct of the parties, and in particular of the claimant, after the acquisition may provide material from which the court can infer the existence of an explicit bargain, or a common intention, and also the terms of such a bargain or intention. Examining the subsequent conduct of the parties to see whether an inference can be made as to a bargain or intention is quite different from examining the conduct of the claimant to see whether it amounts to compliance with a bargain or intention which has been proved in some other way. (If this distinction is not observed, there is a risk of circularity. If the claimant’s conduct is too readily assumed to be explicable only by the existence of a bargain, she will always be able to say that her side of the bargain has been performed.)’

Nourse LJ, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C, Mustill LJ
[1986] 1 Ch 638, [1986] 2 All ER 426, [1986] 3 WLR 114, [1986] EWCA Civ 4, [1986] Fam Law 300, [1987] 1 FLR 87
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Gissing v Gissing HL 7-Jul-1970
Evidence Needed to Share Benefical Inerests
The family home had been purchased during the marriage in the name of the husband only. The wife asserted that she had a beneficial interest in it.
Held: The principles apply to any case where a beneficial interest in land is claimed by a . .
Cited – Pettitt v Pettitt HL 23-Apr-1969
A husband and wife disputed ownership of the matrimonial home in the context of the presumption of advancement.
Lord Reid said: ‘These considerations have largely lost their force under present conditions, and, unless the law has lost its . .
Cited – Crabb v Arun District Council CA 23-Jul-1975
The plaintiff was led to believe that he would acquire a right of access to his land. In reliance on that belief he sold off part of his land, leaving the remainder landlocked.
Held: His claim to have raised an equity was upheld. The plaintiff . .

Cited by:
Cited – Stoeckert v Geddes (Appeal No 66 of 1998) PC 13-Dec-1999
PC Jamaica The claimant claimed against the estate of her former partner. Though not married they had lived together for many years, and she claimed there had been an express understanding that she would receive . .
Cited – Roy Green v Vivia Green PC 20-May-2003
PC (Jamaica) The claimant sought a declaration that he was entitled to one half of the marriage assets on divorce. They had each acquired various properties and assets both in Jamaica and the USA. The judge at . .
Applied – Equity and Law Home Loans Ltd v Prestidge CA 1992
A house was bought in the name of one partner in an unmarried couple. It was subject to a mortgage, and the non-owner contributed a capital sum. The landowner later remortgaged for a larger sum, but without the partner’s consent. The landowner then . .
Cited – Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset HL 29-Mar-1990
The house had been bought during the marriage but in the husband’s sole name. The plaintiff’s charge secured the husband’s overdraft. The bank issued possession proceedings. Mr Rosset had left, but Mrs Rosset claimed, as against the bank an interest . .
Cited – Hyett v Stanley and others CA 20-Jun-2003
The couple had lived together at the property without being married for several years. The house was held in the man’s sole name, and after his death she sought a half share in it. It was established that she had been told she should have a half . .
Cited – Yaxley v Gotts and Another CA 24-Jun-1999
Oral Agreement Creating Proprietory Estoppel
The defendant offered to give to the Plaintiff, a builder, the ground floor of a property in return for converting the house, and then managing it. They were friends, and the oral offer was accepted. The property was then actually bought in the name . .
Cited – Wayling v Jones CA 2-Aug-1993
The plaintiff and defendant were in a homosexual relationship. The plaintiff worked for the defendant for nominal expenses against his repeated promise to leave the business to him in his will. A will was made to that effect, but the defendant sold . .
Cited – Oxley v Hiscock CA 6-May-2004
The parties were not married, but had brought together their resources to purchase a home in the name of one of them. Nothing had been said about the respective shares on which the property was to be held.
Held: The shares were to be assessed . .
Cited – Stokes v Anderson CA 1991
The claimant had made two payments, amounting together to andpound;12,000, towards the acquisition of the one half share of the defendant’s ex-wife in the net equity (valued at andpound;90,000) in a house in which the claimant and the respondent . .
Cited – Springette v Defoe CA 1-Mar-1992
Property was purchased in joint names, but with no express declaration of the beneficial interests. The couple had lived together for a short time as joint tenants of the local authority. They were able to purchase at a substantial discount from the . .
Cited – Midland Bank v Cooke and Another CA 13-Jul-1995
Equal equitable interest inferrable without proof
The bank sought to enforce a charge given by the husband to secure a business loan. The property was purchased from the husband’s and his family’s resources and the loan, and was in his name. There had been no discussion or agreement between husband . .
Cited – Banner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments and Another CA 10-Feb-2000
Competing building companies agreed not to bid against each other for the purchase of land. One proceeded and the other asserted that the land was then held on trust for the two parties as a joint venture.
Held: Although there was no formal . .
Cited – Cobbe v Yeomans Row Management Ltd and Others ChD 25-Feb-2005
Principles for Proprietary Estoppel
A developer claimed to have agreed that upon obtaining necessary planning permissions for land belonging to the respondents, he would purchase the land at a price reflecting its new value. The defendant denied that any legally enforceable agreement . .
Cited – Strover and Another v Strover and Another ChD 10-May-2005
Insurance policies had been taken out by the partners in a firm. The surviving family of one and the remaining partners contested ownership. The policy was held in part for the benefit of the family. The premiums had been paid from partnership . .
Cited – Strover and Another v Strover and Another ChD 10-May-2005
Insurance policies had been taken out by the partners in a firm. The surviving family of one and the remaining partners contested ownership. The policy was held in part for the benefit of the family. The premiums had been paid from partnership . .
Cited – Van Laethem v Brooker and Another ChD 12-Jul-2005
The claimant asserted an interest in several properties by virtue of a common intention constructive trust or by proprietary estoppel. The parties had been engaged to be married.
Held: ‘A [constructive] trust arises in connection with the . .
Cited – Stack v Dowden HL 25-Apr-2007
The parties had cohabited for a long time, in a home bought by Ms Dowden. After the breakdown of the relationship, Mr Stack claimed an equal interest in the second family home, which they had bought in joint names. The House was asked whether, when . .
Cited – Tackaberry and Another v Hollis and others ChD 13-Nov-2007
A house had been purchased in 1982 by one member of a large family. Other family members now disputed whether the land was held in trust for them. A constructive trust was asserted.
Held: The claimants had failed to establish that a . .
Cited – Jones v Kernott SC 9-Nov-2011
Unmarried Couple – Equal division displaced
The parties were unmarried but had lived together. They now disputed the shares in which they had held the family home. It had been bought in joint names, but after Mr Kernott (K) left in 1993, Ms Jones (J) had made all payments on the house. She . .
Cited – Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset CA 13-May-1988
Claim by a wife that she has a beneficial interest in a house registered in the sole name of her husband and that her interest has priority over the rights of a bank under a legal charge executed without her knowledge. The case raises a point of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Trusts

Updated: 27 January 2022; Ref: scu.182238

Harris v Harris; Harris v Attorney General: FD 21 May 2001

The applicant had been committed for ten months for contempt, being in breach of family court injunctions. He applied to be released after two months on the basis that the unserved balance of the sentence be suspended. The court held that it had the power to do this, even in the absence of any direct authority. It should use its powers in such a way as to maximise compliance with court orders, and that could best be achieved in this way in this circumstance. It is important that the in a free society parents who feel aggrieved at their experiences of the family justice system should be able to express their views publicly about what they conceive to be failings on the part of individual judges or failings in the judicial system. ‘The freedom to publish things which judges might think should not be published is all the more important where the subject of what is being said is the judges themselves. Any judicial power to punish such publications requires the most cogent justification. Even more cogent must be the justification for giving the judges a power of prior restraint.’ and ‘a judge, although it may be that on occasions he can legitimately exercise the functions of an aedile, is no censor’.

Munby J
Gazette 19-Jul-2001, Times 06-Aug-2001, [2001] 3 WLR 765, [2001] 2 FLR 895, [2002] Fam 253
Rules of the Supreme Court Order 52 rule 7(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
See also – Harris v Harris CA 1-Jul-2001
The first instance court had acceded to the husband’s application for downward variation of the wife’s periodical payments to andpound;9,000 per annum and to the wife’s application substituting a lump sum of andpound;120,000 for the future . .

Cited by:
Overruled – Harris v Harris CA 8-Nov-2001
On an application by a contemnor to be purged of his contempt, the judge could only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Not Yet.’ It was not right to add further complexity to release the contemnor, but with some further part of his sentence suspended. The . .
See also – Harris v Harris CA 1-Jul-2001
The first instance court had acceded to the husband’s application for downward variation of the wife’s periodical payments to andpound;9,000 per annum and to the wife’s application substituting a lump sum of andpound;120,000 for the future . .
Cited – Regina (Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health and Others Admn 18-Apr-2002
The claimant challenged the Order as regards the prescription of the morning-after pill, asserting that the pill would cause miscarriages, and that therefore the use would be an offence under the 1861 Act.
Held: ‘SPUC’s case is that any . .
Cited – Symes v Phillips and others CA 19-May-2005
The applicant was in contempt of court. He successfully appealed a sentence of two years imprisonment, with the sentence being reduced to one year. Legally aided, he sought his costs from the claimant. The claimant replied that their part was only . .
Cited – Norfolk County Council v Webster and others FD 1-Nov-2006
The claimants wished to claim that they were victims of a miscarriage of justice in the way the Council had dealt with care proceedings. They sought that the proceedings should be reported without the children being identified.
Held: A judge . .
Cited – In re S-C (Children) v H-C CA 28-Jan-2010
The appellant appealed against an order finding her in contempt of court for breach of a court order. The finding had been made in the absence of the parties. She had reported to the police a distorted version of a medical report in the children . .
Cited – Balli, Re Contempt of Court Act 1981 (No. 2) ChD 15-Jul-2011
The defendant litigant had been found guilty of contempt in the face of court and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. The contemnor now sought to purge his contempt.
Held: The sentence had been imposed as punishment and not to seek to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contempt of Court, Family

Updated: 27 January 2022; Ref: scu.135264

Father v Mother: FD 22 May 2020

Application by the father for the summary return to Australia of two children: A, aged 8 years and 11 months, and B, aged 5 years and 7 months. The children had both lived in Australia prior to April 2019. The facts of the case is that the mother is British; the father holds Australian and European passports but has, I believe, lived in Australia all his life.

Mrs Justice Lieven
[2020] EWHC 1964 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 27 January 2022; Ref: scu.655243

Practice Guidance (Transparency In The Family Courts): FD 16 Jan 2014

The court gave guidance on the new practice in publishing judgments by default, and for arrangements for anonymisation of appropriate parties.

Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division
[2014] EWHC B3 (Fam), [2014] EMLR 22, [2014] 1 FLR 733, [2014] 1 WLR 230, [2014] 2 FCR 226
Bailii
Administration of Justice Act 1960 12
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Committal for Contempt of Court (Practice Guidance) COP 3-May-2013
The court gave guidance on the practice to be followed on applications for committal for contempt of court in the Court of Protection, particularly as to the requirements for decisions to be made in public. . .
See Also – Practice Guidance (Transparency In The Court of Protection) CoP 16-Jan-2014
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Litigation Practice, Family

Updated: 26 January 2022; Ref: scu.520129

King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v T and Others: FD 30 Sep 2014

Child T suffered life threatening and incpacitating damage after birth after a sudden acute cardio-respiratory deterioration and required mechanical ventilation. The parents, accepting the medical reports did not agree to the withdrawal of ventilation systems which would lead to his death, and ‘The only sensation that he is capable of responding to seems to be pain and the deep suction several times a day produces that reaction. This repeated suction is therefore both invasive and painful.’
Held: ‘the mechanical ventilation is only just sustaining life with no other benefit. When I consider his best interests holistically, the life support confers little benefit as it prolongs all the likely discomfort and possible pain and increases the probability of further infection leading to further invasive treatment and complications which will itself contribute to further physical deterioration without any real hope of restoring his health. His brain injuries are so profound, so catastrophic and the likelihood of further deterioration to his brain from hydrocephalus and the probability of lung infection and injury with continued ventilation all add to the conclusion that on balance not only is there no benefit, but in fact there is a strong probability of further pain, suffering and deterioration. Very sadly and with great reluctance I grant permission to withdraw the mechanically assisted ventilation.’

Russell J
[2014] EWHC 3315 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family, Health

Updated: 26 January 2022; Ref: scu.537591

Murphy v Murphy: FD 4 Jul 2014

The parties had compromised most parts of their ancillary relief claim, but not all, settling capital claims, but not issues as to whether maintenance should be stepped down, and should be limited in time to the period of education of the children.
Held: The part settlement left the court in an uncomfortable situation, because the issues settled and not settled were interrelated. The court could not reliably predict when the wife would be able to find work. There was provision already for what would happen if she did, and the court therefore declined to make any step down provision. The question of what her position would be as the children reached independence was even more a matter of mere speculation.

Holman J
[2014] EWHC 2263 (Fam)
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 23(1)(a) 25A(2)
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 26 January 2022; Ref: scu.534042

NLW v ARC: FD 13 Jan 2012

The former wife sought leave to appeal against an ancillary relief order made by consent. The husband did not attend.
Held: The new rules intended to align family procedures with the CPR as applies for appeals to the Court of appeal. ‘The test on granting permission to appeal is set out in rule 30.3(7) and is this: permission to appeal may be given only where (a) the court considers the appeal would have a real prospect of success, or (b) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.’ It was granted in this case.

Mostyn J
[2012] EWHC 55 (Fam), [2012] 2 FLR 129
Bailii
Family Procedure Rules 2010 30(7)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Dellal v Dellal and Others FD 1-Apr-2015
The families disputed a claim under the 1975 Act. The defendants now sought summary dismissal of the claim. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family

Updated: 26 January 2022; Ref: scu.450567

In re S (Adult patient) (Inherent jurisdiction: Family life); Sheffield City Council v S: FD 2002

A court could only grant an order permitting treatment despite the absence of an adult patient’s consent by virtue of the doctrine of necessity.
Munby J said: ‘in our multi-cultural and pluralistic society the family takes many forms . . The fact is that many adults and children, whether through choice or circumstance, live in families more or less removed from what until comparatively recently would have been recognised as the typical nuclear family. But – and this is the point – the family, whatever form it takes, is the bedrock of our society and the foundation of our way of life.’

Munby J
[2003] 1 FLR 292, [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – E v Channel Four, News International Ltd and St Helens Borough Council FD 1-Jun-2005
The applicant sought an order restraining publication by the defendants of material, saying she did not have capacity to consent to the publication. She suffered a multiple personality disorder. She did herself however clearly wish the film to be . .
Cited – In re PS (an Adult), Re; City of Sunderland v PS by her litigation friend the Offcial Solcicitor and CA; Re PS (Incapacitated or Vulnerable Adult) FD 9-Mar-2007
The patient an elderly lady with limited mental capacity was to be returned from hospital, but her daughter said she was to come home. The local authority sought to prevent this, wanting to return her to a residential unit where she had lived for . .
Cited – In re PS (an Adult), Re; City of Sunderland v PS by her litigation friend the Offcial Solcicitor and CA; Re PS (Incapacitated or Vulnerable Adult) FD 9-Mar-2007
The patient an elderly lady with limited mental capacity was to be returned from hospital, but her daughter said she was to come home. The local authority sought to prevent this, wanting to return her to a residential unit where she had lived for . .
Cited – G v E and Others CoP 26-Mar-2010
E Was born with and still suffered severe learning difficulties. The court was asked as to the extent of his capacity to make decisions, and as to where he should live, with a family member, the carer or with the local authority, which had removed . .
Cited – JO v GO and Others; re PO; Re O (Court of Protection: Jurisdiction) CoP 13-Dec-2013
Jurisdiction of the Court of Protection
PO, a lady in her late eighties lacked capacity to decide her own care. She had been habitually resident in Hertfordshire. Her daughters now challenged their brother who had moved her to a care home in Scotland when he himself moved there. An . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Health, Family, Human Rights

Updated: 26 January 2022; Ref: scu.223065

Chief Constable and Another v YK and Others: FD 6 Oct 2010

The court gave directions in Forced Marriage Protection order applications. An order had been made at the request of the police on behalf of A, and the court had declined to discharge it on A’s own application.
Held: Special advocates were not needed in this case; ‘there is nothing that a special advocate could do which cannot properly be done by the judge.’. There was a risk of serious harm, and an associated powerful argument for non-disclosure. The purpose of the Act was protective, and an order might properly be made ex parte, and the protective capacity of itself my be sufficient to justify non-disclosure. The court needed to acknowledge the balance between protecting the applicants and giving fair hearings to others affected, and also the need to respect the cultural norms of other societies. The court was asked ‘how is it possible to achieve a fair hearing (i.e. comply with ECHR Article 6) if parts of the evidence which it is necessary for parties to know in order to enable them to meet allegations made against them cannot safely be revealed to them on the ground that disclosure of the information or its source is likely to identify the informant (and thus place him or her at risk)?’ The judge had requested the Attorney General to appoint a special advocate to deal with cl;osed material, but this had been refused.
The approach taken by the Act was wide ranging and robust, and ‘There is, moreover, nothing in the Act to stop the court acting on hearsay evidence, or information provided to it by the police which has not been disclosed to the respondents.’

Sir Nicholas Wall P
[2010] EWHC 2438 (Fam)
Bailii
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, European Convention on Human Rights 6
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – AM v Local Authority and Another; Re B-M (Care Orders) CA 16-Mar-2009
The father sought leave to appeal against care orders made in respect of his three children. The family were Pakistani Pathan muslims. There had been disputes and violence within the extended family. One family member sought protection but was now . .
Cited – In re K FD 2005
. .
Cited – In Re SK (Proposed Plaintiff) (an Adult by way of her Litigation Friend) FD 2004
The court considered an application for a forced marriage protection order.
Held: Singer J said that the court’s inherent jurisdiction is ‘sufficiently flexible . . to evolve in accordance with social needs and social values.’ . .
Cited – In Re K (Infants); Official Solicitor v K HL 2-Jan-1963
The House considered the propriety of a tribunal chairman seeing material not placed before the parties. This was a wardship case.
Held: Where the interests of the parents and the child conflicted, ‘the welfare of the child must dominate’.
Cited – In Re K (Infants) CA 2-Jan-1963
The court discussed the need for those appearing before tribunals to be given sufficient access to all the material placed before the judge. Upjohn LJ said: ‘It seems to be fundamental to any judicial inquiry that a person or other properly . .
Cited – Regina v H; Regina v C HL 5-Feb-2004
Use of Special Counsel as Last Resort Only
The accused faced charges of conspiring to supply Class A drugs. The prosecution had sought public interest immunity certificates. Special counsel had been appointed by the court to represent the defendants’ interests at the applications.
Cited – Roberts v Parole Board HL 7-Jul-2005
Balancing Rights of Prisoner and Society
The appellant had been convicted of the murder of three police officers in 1966. His tariff of thirty years had now long expired. He complained that material put before the Parole Board reviewing has case had not been disclosed to him.
Held: . .
Cited – Re D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality) HL 1-Sep-1995
The House considered whether it was right for a tribunal to see and rely upon papers not disclosed to the parties. Lord Mustill said: ‘a first principle of fairness that each party to a judicial process shall have an opportunity to answer by . .
Cited – Re B (Disclosure to other parties) FD 2001
There was a dispute as to whether one of the fathers involved in the proceedings should have access to certain documents, including psychiatric reports, relating to the mother, her husband and the children. Munby J considered the effect of human . .
Cited – Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB; Same v AF HL 31-Oct-2007
Non-derogating control orders – HR Compliant
MB and AF challenged non-derogating control orders made under the 2005 Act, saying that they were incompatible with their human rights. AF was subject to a curfew of 14 hours a day, wore an electronic tag at all times, could not leave a nine square . .
Cited – Al Rawi and Others v The Security Service and Others CA 4-May-2010
Each claimant had been captured and mistreated by the US government, and claimed the involvement in and responsibility for that mistreatment by the respondents. The court was asked whether a court in England and Wales, in the absence of statutory . .
Cited – Malik v Manchester Crown Court and others; Re A Admn 19-Jun-2008
The claimant was a journalist writing about terrorism. He had interviewed a man with past connections with Al-Qaeda, and he now objected to a production order for documents obtained by him in connecion with his writings. The court had acted on . .
Cited – A Local Authority v A Mother and Others FD 3-Jul-2009
The court considered the limiting of disclosure of evidence in care proceedings where this was thought necessary to protect the safety of witnesses. . .
Cited – In re T (Wardship: Impact of Police Intelligence) FD 2009
The police had obtained intelligence that the imprisoned father of a ward had taken out a contract to murder the child’s mother. As a consequence they took the child and his mother into police protection, which they threatened to withdraw if the . .
Cited – Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF AN and AE (No 3) HL 10-Jun-2009
The applicants complained that they had been made subject to non-derogating control orders as suspected terrorists, but that the failure to inform them of the allegations or evidence against them was unfair and infringed their human rights. The . .
Cited – Murungaru v Secretary of State for the Home Department and others CA 12-Sep-2008
The claimant was a former Kenyan minister. He had been visiting the UK for medical treatment. His visas were cancelled on the basis that his presence was not conducive to the public good. Public Interest Immunity certificates had been issued to . .
Approved – H v L and R FD 7-Dec-2006
A male litigant in person wished to cross-examine a young adult woman whom he was alleged to have abused sexually when she was a child. The young woman in question was a borderline anorexic and a suicide risk. In criminal proceedings, section 34A of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Litigation Practice, Human Rights

Updated: 26 January 2022; Ref: scu.424946

Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council v M and Others: FC 25 Oct 2016

Rotherham had made a teenage girl a ward of court and had obtained interim injunctions that four named men should not associate with her. It alleged that they had been sexually exploiting her. None of the four came to be charged with any offence but two had been arrested and remained on police bail. Rotherham decided that it would not be able to substantiate allegations against any them and applied for the injunctions to be discharged. Rotherham also sought an indefinite extension of interim reporting restriction orders against identification not only of the girl but also of the four men. Times Newspapers Ltd, also the first respondent to the present appeal, opposed extension of the orders insofar as they related to the four men.
Held: The application was granted.
Cobb J said: ‘I next ask myself what is the public interest in naming these four men in the press as persons against whom injunction proceedings were once brought, interim injunctions (without evidence being tested) once made, but in respect of whom in the end no findings were sought, let alone made. In my judgment there is no, or if any, negligible, such public interest . . On the other hand, there is a substantial risk that, given the strength of feeling in Rotherham and elsewhere about those who engage in child sexual exploitation and similar offences, they would be perceived to be perpetrators or likely perpetrators, and pilloried and/or targeted in their communities if they were known to have been under suspicion in this way.’
He quoted from a leading article in The Times: ‘False rape and abuse accusations can inflict terrible damage on the reputations, prospects and health of those accused. For all the presumption of innocence, mud sticks.’
He concluded that the restriction orders against identification of the men should be continued indefinitely: ‘I have reached the firm conclusion that there is no true public interest in naming the four associated males, against whom, in the end, no findings have been sought or made. [Their] article 8 rights . . would be in my judgment significantly violated were they to be publicly exposed in the media as having been implicated to a greater or lesser degree, but not proved to be engaged, in this type of offending.’

Cobb J
[2016] EWHC 2660 (Fam), [2016] 4 WLR 177
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others SC 19-Jul-2017
No anonymity for investigation suspect
The claimant had been investigated on an allegation of historic sexual abuse. He had never been charged, but the investigation had continued with others being convicted in a high profile case. He appealed from refusal of orders restricting . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Media, Human Rights

Updated: 24 January 2022; Ref: scu.570772

T v T: FD 28 Jan 2013

The husband applied to show cause why a financial agreement should not be made on order of the court. The wife resisted his application. She applied for a financial remedy and wanted a full trial.

Parker J
[2013] EWHC B3 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 24 January 2022; Ref: scu.472648

TT, Regina (on The Application of) v The Registrar General for England and Wales: FD 25 Sep 2019

Where an individual, who was born female, undergoes gender transition and becomes legally recognised as male before going on to conceive, carry and give birth to a child, with the result that the parent who has given birth is legally a man rather than a woman. The question posed to this court is: Is that man the ‘mother’ or the ‘father’ of his child?

The Rt Hon Sir Andrew Mcfarlane
President of the Family Division
[2019] EWHC 2384 (Fam), [2019] WLR(D) 526, [2020] 1 FLR 676, [2020] Fam 45, [2019] HRLR 17, [2020] 1 FCR 114, [2019] 3 WLR 1195
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales

Administrative, Family

Updated: 24 January 2022; Ref: scu.648668

Case O (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008): FD 13 Sep 2016

The court considered another case where documentation forming an integral part of the process of settling the parentage of a child born through procedures regulated by the Acts and which now required a formal order confirming parentage.

Sir James Munby
[2016] EWHC 2273 (Fam)
Bailii
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008
England and Wales

Family

Updated: 23 January 2022; Ref: scu.569423