Category: Evidence

Dickson Apothecary v L Coldingknows: SCSf 15 Jul 1024

The verity of a libel being referred to a defender’s oath, the Lords found the pursuer could not exclude the defender from deponing, by a horning.
In an action pursued by Thomas Dickson apothecary, contra the L Coldingknows, where the summons being admitted to the pursuer’s probation, and referred to the defender’s oath of verity simpliciter, and at the terms assigned to that effect, the defender offering to depone, Turcu confessed, being rebel. The Lords found, That in this, and the like cases, the pursuer could not exclude the defender to depone, nor obtrude horning against him to debar him, seeing he craved his oath for his probation, and had warned him to compear to give his oath; and therefore could not refuse that whereof he himself had made election, and which was desired by him; and so the horning was not admitted, in respect it was a severe consequence to hold the defender pro confesso upon a libel which might possibly contain more than the defender was worth being so debarred, and there being no other probation; but it is to be adverted, that in all the causes almost, where parties defenders are summoned, this reason may exclude all pursuers to debar the defenders by horning; for it may be alleged, that seeing they are summoned to hear decreets given against them, or else to allege a cause in the contrary; by the same reason, they may say, that seeing he is summoned to allege a cause why the pursuer should not have his intent, he ought not to be debarred by horning to propone lawfully that which by the pursuers summons is permitted to him to do; and in these cases, the defenders not the less may be debarred by hornings.
[1024] Mor 10153
Scotland

Updated: 30 April 2021; Ref: scu.547555

Dickson Apothecary v L Coldingknows: SCS 15 Jul 1024

The verity of a libel being referred to a defender’s oath, the Lords found the pursuer could not exclude the defender from deponing, by a horning.
In an action pursued by Thomas Dickson apothecary, contra the L Coldingknows, where the summons being admitted to the pursuer’s probation, and referred to the defender’s oath of verity simpliciter, and at the terms assigned to that effect, the defender offering to depone, Turcu confessed, being rebel. The Lords found, That in this, and the like cases, the pursuer could not exclude the defender to depone, nor obtrude horning against him to debar him, seeing he craved his oath for his probation, and had warned him to compear to give his oath; and therefore could not refuse that whereof he himself had made election, and which was desired by him; and so the horning was not admitted, in respect it was a severe consequence to hold the defender pro confesso upon a libel which might possibly contain more than the defender was worth being so debarred, and there being no other probation; but it is to be adverted, that in all the causes almost, where parties defenders are summoned, this reason may exclude all pursuers to debar the defenders by horning; for it may be alleged, that seeing they are summoned to hear decreets given against them, or else to allege a cause in the contrary; by the same reason, they may say, that seeing he is summoned to allege a cause why the pursuer should not have his intent, he ought not to be debarred by horning to propone lawfully that which by the pursuers summons is permitted to him to do; and in these cases, the defenders not the less may be debarred by hornings.
[1024] Mor 10153
Scotland

Updated: 28 March 2021; Ref: scu.547555

Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co: 1872

Lord Selborne LC said: ‘It is of the highest importance . . that all communications between a solicitor and a client upon a subject which may lead to litigation should be privileged, and I think the court is bound to consider that . . almost any contract entered into between man and man . . may lead to litigation before the contract is completed. Any correspondence passing between the date of the contract which afterwards becomes the subject of litigation and the litigation itself is, in my opinion, on principle, within the privilege extended to the non-production of communications between solicitors and clients . . it is absolutely essential to the interest of mankind that a person should be free to consult his solicitor upon anything which arises out of a contract which may lead to litigation; that the communications should be perfectly free, so that the client may write to the solicitor, and the solicitor to the client, without the slightest apprehension that those communications will be produced if litigation should afterwards arise on the subject to which the correspondence relates.’
Lord Selborne LC spoke about the discretion available under the law of equity, saying that equity sets out to ‘do more perfect and complete justice’ than would be the result of leaving the parties to their remedies at common law.
References: (1872) LR 14 Eq 477, (1874) LR 9 Ch App 279
Judges: Lord Selborne LC
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Three Rivers District Council and others v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) CA 1-Mar-2004
    The Bank of England had sought assistance from its lawyers to prepare for a private non-statutory enquiry. The claimant sought disclosure of that advice. The defendant bank claimed legal professional privilege.
    Held: Not all advice given by a . .
    ([2004] EWCA Civ 218, , Times 03-Mar-04, Gazette 18-Mar-04, [2004] 3 All ER 168, [2004] QB 916, [2004] 2 WLR 1065)
  • Cited – Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores HL 21-May-1997
    The tenants of a unit on a large shopping centre found the business losing money, and closed it in contravention of a ‘keep open’ clause in the lease. They now appealed from a mandatory injunction requiring them to keep the store open.
    Held: . .
    (Times 26-May-97, , , [1997] UKHL 17, [1997] 2 WLR 898, [1998] AC 1, [1997] All ER 297, [1997] 1 EGLR 52, [1997] CLC 1114, [1997] NPC 79, [1997] EG 81, [1997] 23 EG 141)
  • Cited – Brennan and others v Sunderland City Council Unison GMB EAT 16-Dec-2008
    No Waiver for disclosure of Advice
    EAT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Admissibility of evidence
    The claimant sought disclosure of certain legal advice on the basis that its effect, and a summary of its contents, had been put before the court and . .
    (, [2008] UKEAT 0349 – 08 – 1612, [2009] ICR 479)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.194268

Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 5): ComC 4 Nov 2003

The defendant bank sought protection from disclosure of advice it had received from its solicitors.
Held: To the extent that the communications were for the purpose of seeking advice as to its legal rights and obligations, the communications were protected, but not for communications seeking to obtain advice on the manner of presentation of materials to a private enquiry.
References: [2003] EWHC 2565 (Comm)
Judges: Tomlinson J
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.194259

Sapporo Maru (Owners) v Statue of Liberty (Owners); The Statue of Liberty: HL 1968

There had been a collision between two ships. The plaintiff sought to have admitted in evidence a film of radar echoes recorded by a shore radio station. The defendants argued that evidence produced mechanically and without human intervention was inadmissible hearsay.
Held: The court considered the admission of ‘real evidence’ in the form of plots of a ships course. Every plot involves a margin of error.
Sir Jocelyn Simon P said: ‘If tape recordings are admissible, it seems that a photograph of radar reception is equally admissible – or indeed, any other type of photograph. It would be an absurd distinction that a photograph should be admissible if the camera were operated manually by a photographer but not if it were operated by a trip or clock mechanism. Similarly if evidence of weather conditions were relevant, the law would affront common sense if it were to say that those could be proved by a person who looked at a barometer from time to time, but not by producing a barograph record. So too with other types of dial recordings. Again, cards from clocking-in-and-out machines are frequently admitted in accident cases.’
and ”It is said that the echoes of the two ships involved in this collision appear on the film and that a succession of photographs from the film will throw light on where and how the collision occurred and the responsibility of each ship. Normally this radar and screen are monitored by human agency, but on this occasion – for reasons I was not told, nor needed to be – it was not monitored. The film strip, however, is available. The defendants resist the admissibility of this strip of film on the broad ground that it is a piece of evidence produced purely mechanically without human intervention and as such offends against the hearsay rule. Counsel for the defendants relies on Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) 2 All ER 881; (1965) AC 1001. He has argued robustly that it makes all the difference that no human agency is available to verify or explain what the machine records. The Evidence Act, 1938, does not render this sort of evidence admissible, in his submission.
I am clearly of the opinion that the evidence is admissible, and could, indeed, be a valuable piece of evidence in the elucidation of the facts in dispute. In a case concerned with mechanical recordings by tape recorder, R v Maqsud Ali, R v Ashiq Hussain (1965) 2 All ER 464; (1966) 1 QB 688, the Court of Criminal Appeal, in ruling that the tape recordings were admissible, stated (1965) 2 All ER at p469; (1966) 1 QB at p 701 that it could see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. See also R v Senat, R v Sin (Mar 16, 1968), The Times; 112 Sol Jo 252. Moreover, R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 464; (1966) 1 QB 688 makes it plain that we are not here concerned with evidence admissible under the Evidence Act, 1938, because that Act is not applicable to criminal proceedings. Counsel for the defendants seeks to distinguish R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 464; (1966) 1 QB 688 from the present case on the ground that in the former case the police officer set up a recording machine to overhear part of a recorded conversation and claimed to be able to identify the voices recorded. I should be sorry to think that that was a ground for distinction; for in R v Maqsud Ali
(1965) 2 All ER 464; (1966) 1 QB 688, the language was a dialect of Punjabi, not understandable by Urdu experts, let alone by English police officers. In my view the evidence in question in the present case has nothing to do with the hearsay rule and does not depend on the Evidence Act, 1938.’
References: [1968] 1 WLR 739, [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 277, [1968] 2 All ER 195
Judges: Lord Reid, Sir Jocelyn Simon P
Statutes: Evidence Act 1938
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Applied – Castle v Cross 1984
    First-hand evidence, in this case, a print-out from a device, of what is displayed or recorded on a mechanical measuring device is real evidence admissible at common law.
    ‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume that . .
    ([1984] 1 WLR 1372, [1985] 1 All ER 87)
  • Cited – ‘Bow Spring’, Owners of Ship v ‘Manzanillo Ii’, Owners of Ship CA 28-Jul-2004
    There had been a collision at sea.
    Held: (Addendum) Where the admiralty court sought advice from assessors, modern good practice required that the advice should be disclosed to the parties advisers and that they have opportunity to comment. . .
    (, [2004] EWCA Civ 1007, Times 19-Aug-04)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192207

Regina v Bagshaw, Holmes and Starkey: CA 1984

The defendants were nurses at a mental hospital, charged with assaulting their patients. They complained that the judge had not given the full direction as to the dangers of relying upon the uncorroborated evidence of of unreliable witnesses, they being detained mental patients.
Held: In this case full warnings of the sort requested were essential. The evidence of the witnesses was untreliable, and in the absence of an appropriate warning, the convictions were overturned.
References: [1984] 1 All ER 971, [1984] 1 WLR 477
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Applied – Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester CACD 1972
    . .
    ([1972] CLY 631)
  • Applied – Regina v Kilbourne HL 1973
    The respondent was convicted of sexual offences against two groups of boys. The trial judge directed the jury that they would be entitled to take into account the uncorroborated evidence of the second group as supporting evidence given by the first . .
    ([1973] AC 729, [1973] 1 All ER 440, [1973] 2 WLR 254)

This case is cited by:

  • Not followed – Regina v Spencer; Regina v Smails HL 24-Jul-1986
    The defendants were nurses employed at Rampton secure hospital accused of assaults on patients. The witnesses against them had been inmates. They complained that the judge had failed to direct the jurors about the dangers of relying upon their . .
    ([1987] AC 128, , [1987] UKHL 2, [1986] 3 WLR 348, [1986] 83 Cr App Rep 277, [1986] 2 All ER 928)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.191976

Rex v Baskerville: 1916

References: [1916-17] All ER Rep 38, [1917] 12 CAR 81
Statutes: Perjury Act 1911 4
This case is cited by:

  • Applied – Regina v Beck CACD 1982
    The defendant complained that the judge had failed to direct the jury about the dangers of relying upon the evidence of witnesses who, though not co-defendants, had their own conflicting interests. They also said that corroborative evidence should . .
    ([1982] CLY 563, [1982] 1 WLR 461, [1982] 1 All ER 807)
  • Cited – Regina v Cooper CACD 5-May-2010
    The defendant appealed his conviction for perjury. On being accused of using a mobile phone when driving, he claimed to have been using a hands free system. Evidence later showed that his kit had been fitted only after the date of the alleged . .
    (, [2010] EWCA Crim 979, [2010] WLR (D) 115, , [2010] 2 Cr App R 13, (2010) 174 JP 265, [2010] 1 WLR 2390, [2010] Crim LR 949)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.191974

Regina v Baldry: 1852

References: (1852) 2 Den CC Res 430
Coram: Parke B and Lord Campbell CJ
Ratio: It is not that the law presumes a confession obtained by duress or by promise to be untrue, but from the danger of receiving such evidence judges have thought it better to reject it for the due administration of justice.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ibrahim v The King PC (Bailii, PC, [1914] UKPC 1, [1914] AC 599)
    (Hong Kong) The defendant was an Afghan subject with the British Army in Hong Kong. He was accused of murder. Having accepted the protection of the British Armed forces, he became subject to their laws. In custody, he was asked about the offence by . .
  • Cited – A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) HL (Bailii, [2005] UKHL 71, House of Lords, Times 09-Dec-05, [2005] 3 WLR 1249, [2006] 2 AC 221, [2006] 1 All ER 575, 19 BHRC 441, [2006] UKHRR 225, [2006] HRLR)
    The applicants had been detained following the issue of certificates issued by the respondent that they posed a terrorist threat. They challenged the decisions of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission saying that evidence underlying the . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 22 March 2017
Ref: 184181

Regina v Baldry: 1900

References: 2 Den CC 430
Coram: Parke B
Ratio: (Year?) ‘by the law of England, in order to render a confession admissible in evidence, it must be perfectly voluntary and there is no doubt that any inducement in the nature of a promise or of a threat held out by a person in authority vitiates a confession. The decisions to that effect have gone a long way: whether it would not have been better to have allowed the whole to go to the jury it is now too late to inquire, but I think there has been too much tenderness towards prisoners in this matter. I confess that I cannot look at the decisions without some shame, when I consider what objections have prevailed to prevent the reception of confessions in evidence . . justice and commonsense have too frequently been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ibrahim v The King PC (Bailii, PC, [1914] UKPC 1, [1914] AC 599)
    (Hong Kong) The defendant was an Afghan subject with the British Army in Hong Kong. He was accused of murder. Having accepted the protection of the British Armed forces, he became subject to their laws. In custody, he was asked about the offence by . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 22 March 2017
Ref: 184185

Cotton v James; 30 Jun 1830

References: (1830) 1 B & Ad 128, [1830] EngR 713, (1830) 1 B & Ad 128, (1830) 109 ER 735
Links: Commonlii
Ratio:The burden of proof can shift during the course of a trial. Silence in circumstances in which a party would be expected to answer might convert evidence into proof.
This case cites:

  • See Also – Cotton v James, Gent One & C (Commonlii, [1829] EngR 293, (1829) M & M 273, (1829) 173 ER 1157)
    In trespass for entering plaintiff’s dwelling-house and taking his goods on a plea justifying the trespass by proceedings under a commission of bankruptcy, and replication taking issue on the act of bankruptcy, the defendant is entitled to begn. . .
  • See Also – Cotton v James, Gent One, & C (Commonlii, [1829] EngR 296, (1829) 3 Car & P 505, (1829) 172 ER 522)
    . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Gibbs and others -v- Rea PC (Times 04-Feb-98, Bailii, [1998] UKPC 3, [1998] AC 786)
    (Cayman Islands) The respondent worked for a bank. He disclosed a business interest, but that interest grew in importance to the point where he resigned in circumstances amounting to constructive dismissal. His home and business officers were raided . .
  • See Also – James, Gent, One &C, v Cotton (, Commonlii, [1831] EngR 127, (1831) 7 Bing 266, (1831) 131 ER 103)
    . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 13-Jul-16
Ref: 184695

Steel v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police; 10 Feb 1993

References: Unreported, 10 February 1993
Coram: Beldam, Dillon, and Roch LJJ
Ratio:The plaintiffs sued three police officers for malicious prosecution. Specific discovery of documents relating to the previous misconduct of one of these officers was refused.
Held: Appeal allowed. Confessions were the only evidence against the plaintiffs, who had served their time afer convictions for robbery which were subsequently quashed. They said the confessions were fabricated. Their appeals were allowed after evidence that officers had improperly procured the conviction of other defendants in similar ways. To succeed the plaintiffs had to prove that prosecutions were unfounded. The officers’ state of mind was essential. Documents were sought to be discovered to provide evidence of similar facts in proof of the misconduct the prosecution. Evidence of the officers’ dishonesty went beyond discrediting him as a witness. They showed similar conduct in other cases. The judge refused specific discovery saying it was not similar fact evidence. The matters relied on were not concerned to rebut a defence of accident or coincidence. They did not show system, and they had no direct probative value in relation to the issue in the present case. They were merely attacks on credit, and the plaintiffs already possessed ample evidence for this purpose. The appeal was allowed. At discovery the court lookd to potential rather than actual admissibility. ‘In my view conduct of this kind is so contrary to the expected standard of behaviour of an investigating police officer that, if proved, it is capable of rendering it more probable that the plaintiffs’ alleged confession was not made and proving that D/Sgt Day had no sufficient belief in the grounds of and an improper motive for the prosecution of the plaintiffs.’ For the purpose of specific discovery, it was enough to show ‘sufficient similarity’ (as opposed to a ‘striking similarity’) between the other conduct and the conduct in the present action. He dismissed the ‘mere propensity’ argument in these terms: ‘I consider the significance of the misconduct alleged went beyond mere propensity. All similar fact evidence relating to misconduct on other occasions could be stigmatised as showing a propensity to behave in that fashion, but the allegations in the present case, if accepted, show that on other occasions D/Sgt Day was prepared to pervert the course of justice in a manner which made it more probable that he did so on the occasion in question.’
This case cites:

  • Cited – Regina -v- Boardman HL ([1975] AC 421, [1974] 3 All ER 887, (1975) 60 Cr App R 165, [1974] 3 WLR 673)
    The defendant appealed the admission of similar fact evidence against him. Acts of buggery were alleged by a schoolmaster with boys in which the accused was the passive partner.
    Held: In order to be admissible similar facts must bear a . .
  • Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions -v- P HL ([1991] 93 Crim App R 267, [1991] 2 AC 447, [1991] 3 All ER 337, [1991] 3 WLR 161)
    The defendant faced specimen counts of rape and incest against each of his two daughters. The trial judge refused an application for separate trials in respect of the offences alleged against each daughter. The defendant was convicted.
    Held: . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – O’Brien -v- Chief Constable of the South Wales Police CA (Bailii, [2003] EWCA Civ 1085, Times 22-Aug-03, Gazette 02-Oct-03)
    The claimant sought damages for malicious prosecution, and sought to adduce similar fact evidence. The defendant appealed an order admitting the evidence.
    Held: Comparisons between admission of similar fact evidence in civil and criminal . .
  • Cited – O’Brien -v- Chief Constable of South Wales Police HL (Bailii, [2005] UKHL 26, Times 29-Apr-05, House of Lords, [2005] 2 WLR 1038, [2005] 2 All ER 931, [2005] 2 AC 534)
    The claimant sought damages against the police, and wanted to bring in evidence of previous misconduct by the officers on a similar fact basis. They had been imprisoned and held for several years based upon admissions which they said they had . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 09-Jun-16
Ref: 186051

The ‘Filiatra Legacy’: 1991

References: [1991] 2 Lloyds Reports 337
Coram: Mustill LJ
Ratio The plaintiff had put in evidence under the Civil Evidence Act a statement by a surveyor that he had checked certain cargo tanks to ensure they were empty. At a late stage in the trial the plaintiff sought to say that he had not done so in direct contradiction to the evidence which they had called.
Held: After considering how far the common law prohibited a party from asserting that evidence given in chief by a witness he has called is untruthful and the provisions of the Act, ‘In these circumstances we do not find in the case law or the legislation anything which requires us to hold that the judge had no power to treat the evidence of Captain Bellucci as otherwise than true; and not being so required, we are not ourselves willing to go so far. ‘

Last Update: 22-Mar-16
Ref: 187676

Webb and Hay v The Queen: 1994

References: (1994) 181 CLR 41, (1994) 122 ALR 41, (1994) 68 ALJR 582
Links: Austlii
Coram: Mason C.J. and McHugh J
(Australia) The test of whether a bias was found in a member of court because of personal links is whether such links give rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion on the part of a fair minded and informed member of the public that there might have been such a bias. As to the test laid down in Gough: ‘In considering the merits of the test to be applied in a case where a juror is alleged to be biased, it is important to keep in mind that the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality is necessary to retain confidence in the administration of justice. Both the parties to the case and the general public must be satisfied that justice has not only been done but that it has been seen to be done. Of the various tests used to determine an allegation of bias, the reasonable apprehension test of bias is by far the most appropriate for protecting the appearance of impartiality. The test of `reasonable likelihood’ or `real danger’ of bias tends to emphasise the court’s view of the facts. In that context, the trial judge’s acceptance of explanations becomes of primary importance. Those two tests tend to place inadequate emphasis on the public perception of the irregular incident.

We do not think that it is possible to reconcile the decision in Gough with the decisions of this Court. In Gough, the House of Lords specifically rejected the reasonable suspicion test and the cases and judgments which had applied it in favour of a modified version of the reasonable likelihood test. In Watson, faced with the same conflict in the cases between the two tests, this Court preferred the reasonable suspicion or apprehension test. That test has been applied in this Court on no less than eight subsequent occasions. In the light of the decisions of this Court which hold that the reasonable apprehension or suspicion test is the correct test for determining a case of alleged bias against a judge, it is not possible to use the `real danger’ test as the general test for bias without rejecting the authority of those decisions.
‘Moreover, nothing in the two speeches in the House of Lords in Gough contains any new insight that makes us think that we should re-examine a principle and a line of cases to which this Court has consistently adhered for the last eighteen years. On the contrary, there is a strong reason why we should continue to prefer the reasoning in our own cases to that of the House of Lords. In Gough, the House of Lords rejected the need to take account of the public perception of an incident which raises an issue of bias except in the case of a pecuniary interest. Behind this reasoning is the assumption that public confidence in the administration of justice will be maintained because the public will accept the conclusions of the judge. But the premise on which the decisions in this Court are based is that public confidence in the administration of justice is more likely to be maintained if the Court adopts a test that reflects the reaction of the ordinary reasonable member of the public to the irregularity in question. References to the reasonable apprehension of the `lay observer’, the `fair-minded observer’, the `fair-minded, informed lay observer’, `fair-minded people’, the `reasonable or fair-minded observer’, the `parties or the public’, and the `reasonable person’ abound in the decisions of this Court and other courts in this country. They indicate that it is the court’s view of the public’s view, not the court’s own view, which is determinative. If public confidence in the administration of justice is to be maintained, the approach that is taken by fair-minded and informed members of the public cannot be ignored. Indeed, as Toohey J. pointed out in Vakauta (1989) 167 C.L.R. at p.585 in considering whether an allegation of bias on the part of a judge has been made out, the public perception of the judiciary is not advanced by attributing to a fair-minded member of the public a knowledge of the law and the judicial process which ordinary experience suggests is not the case. That does not mean that the trial judge’s opinions and findings are irrelevant. The fair-minded and informed observer would place great weight on the judge’s view of the facts. Indeed, in many cases the fair-minded observer would be bound to evaluate the incident in terms of the judge’s findings.’
This case cites:

  • Cited – Regina -v- Gough (Robert) HL (Independent 26-May-93, Times 24-May-93, [1993] AC 646, [1993] 2 All ER 727, Bailii, [1993] UKHL 1, [1993] 97 Cr App R 188, [1993] 2 WLR 883)
    The defendant had been convicted of robbery. He appealed, saying that a member of the jury was a neighbour to his brother, and there was therefore a risk of bias. This was of particular significance as the defendant was charged with conspiracy with . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 29-Feb-16 Ref: 183297

George Wright v Sandford Tatham; 7 Jun 1838

References: , [1838] EngR 710, (1838) 5 Cl & Fin 670, (1838) 7 ER 559
Links: Commonlii
On a question of the competence of a party to make a will, letters written to that party by person since deceased, and found (many years after their date) among his papers, are not admissible in evidence without proof that he himself acted upon them.
This case cites:

  • See Also – Wright -v- Doe Dem Sandford Tatham KBD (, Commonlii, [1837] EngR 853, (1837) 7 Ad & E 313, (1837) 112 ER 488)
    The court was asked as to the understanding of th edeceased when he made his will. Letters, found in the house, were produced and the court now asked whether they could be used in evidence.
    Held: such letters were not admissible unless . .
  • See Also – Wright -v- Doe Dem Tatham HL (, Commonlii, [1838] EngR 649, (1838) 4 Bing NC 489, (1838) 132 ER 877)
    In an issue on the sanity of a testator, who made his will in 1825, the devisee offered in evidence the following letters of deceased persons, which were found open, and addressed to testator, with other papers bearing his indorsements, in a . .

Taylor v Chief Constable of Chester; 28 Oct 1986

References: [1986] 1 WLR 1479, Times 28-Oct-1986
Evidence as to the content of a video recording might be admissible even though the tape itself was not made available.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) CACD (Times 17-Oct-02, Bailii, [2002] EWCA Crim 2373, [2003] 1 Cr App R 321, [2003] Crim LR 192)
    The defendants had been seen on video. The prosecution sought to admit, in addition to the video evidence itself, evidence from police officers as to the identity of persons claimed to be shown on the tape. The officers evidence was offered but not . .

Richardson v Fisher; 5 Feb 1823

References: 130 ER 59, (1823) 1 Bing 145, [1823] EngR 355, (1823) 1 Bing 145, (1823) 130 ER 59 (A)
Links: Commonlii
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Ladd -v- Marshall CA ([1954] 1 WLR 1489, [1954] 3 All ER 745, Bailii, [1954] EWCA Civ 1)
    At the trial, the wife of the appellant’s opponent said she had forgotten certain events. After the trial she began divorce proceedings, and informed the appellant that she now remembered. He sought either to appeal admitting fresh evidence or for a . .

Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner and Smith Inc v Raffa; 11 May 2000

References: [2001] 1 LPR 31
Coram: Judge Raymond Jack Q.C
The judge ruled on the admission of admissions made by the defendant at without prejudice meetings. There was acceptance of Mr Raffa’s involvement in the fraud though he raised the question of collaborators. If he did admit at least his involvement, any defence denying that would be dishonest and supporting it would involve perjury. It was the heart of the litigation. In Unilever the court referred to the exclusion of the evidence as a cloak for perjury. That situation would arise here. The admissions were admissible on that basis. It was a very clear case.
This case is cited by:

  • Distinguished – Berry Trade Ltd and Another -v- Moussavi and others CA (Bailii, [2003] EWCA Civ 715, Times 03-Jun-03, Gazette 17-Jul-03)
    A defendant appealed against an order admitting as evidence, records of ‘without prejudice’ conversations.
    Held: Written and oral communications, which are made for the purpose of a genuine attempt to compromise a dispute between the parties, . .
  • Cited – Savings & Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) -v- Fincken CA (Bailii, [2003] EWCA Civ 1630, Times 25-Nov-03, Gazette 15-Jan-04, [2004] 1 WLR 667, [2004] 1 All ER 1125)
    Parties to litigation had made without prejudice disclosures. One party sought to give evidence contradicting the dsclosure, and the other now applied for leave to amend based upon the without prejudice statements to be admitted to demonstrate the . .