Category: Adoption

Y and Z (Separation of Siblings): FC 9 Dec 2020

‘The decision is that the siblings are to be placed for adoption together and are not to be separated. If, after about four months from today’s date, it has not been possible to find a suitable adoptive placement for the siblings together, then they should be placed separately with contact between them being at least six times a year. I intend to make a full care order for Y and a placement for each child provided that Brighton and Hove City Council changes its care plan as required. I am not making a defined contact order but might do so in the adoption proceedings.’

His Honour Judge Ahmed
[2020] EWFC B59
Bailii
England and Wales

Children, Adoption

Updated: 19 January 2022; Ref: scu.671005

AMDK v NA: FD 6 Mar 2020

Application for the recognition, pursuant to common law, of an adoption order made in Uganda. As I will later describe, the child concerned was found abandoned on the roadside in Uganda in 2014. Despite extensive enquiries and investigation in Uganda at the time, the genetic parents or wider family of that child have never been ascertained.

Mr Justice Holman,
(Sitting Throughout In Public)
[2020] EWHC 1548 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Adoption

Updated: 18 January 2022; Ref: scu.655224

Re M (Adoption: International Adoption Trade): FD 7 Mar 2003

A baby was for all practical purposes waved through immigration control because it had been adopted, with judicial sanction, in the United States of America and the adoption was accordingly recognised in this country. The adoption was a disaster for the child.

Munby J
[2003] 1 FLR 1111, [2003] EWHC 219 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Singh v Entry Clearance Officer New Delhi CA 30-Jul-2004
The applicant, an 8 year old boy, became part of his Indian family who lived in England, through an adoption recognised in Indian Law, but not in English Law. Though the adoption was genuine, his family ties had not been broken in India. The family . .
Cited – Regina (Charlton Thomson and Others) v Secretary of State for the Department of Skills and Education Admn 4-Jul-2005
The claimants complained of the respondent’s decision to suspend temporarily but without notice all further inter-country adoptions from Cambodia.
Held: There were proper concerns about a major humanitarian crisis for orphaned children and for . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption

Updated: 04 January 2022; Ref: scu.200328

Re CB (A Child): CA 6 Aug 2015

P was the child of now separated women. P was born in the UK but taken by one parent to Pakistan. The other parent now appealed from refusal of her request for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction or wardship to support her application for contact for contact with P. The court considered whether, having left with her mother who had a settled intention of remaining in Pakistan, CB would lose he habitual residence here upon so leaving.
Held: The appeal failed. Hogg J had been entitled to hold that on leaving the UK, B had lost her English habitual residence. Although the attenuation, or even the ultimate loss, of her relationship with the appellant would be a real detriment to B, the circumstances were not so exceptionally grave as to justify exercise of the inherent jurisdiction by reference to her nationality.
Although there was no direct evidence to substantiate the appellant’s asserted inability to present her case to the courts of Pakistan, the court surveyed general material about the attitude of society there to same-sex relationships. The issue of sexual relations between women was unexplored territory in law, there was in Pakistan pervasive societal and state discrimination, social stigma, harassment and violence against both gay men and lesbian women, together with a lack of effective protection by the state against the activities of non-state actors. The Court proceeded on the unchallenged basis that courts in Pakistan would be unlikely to recognise that the appellant had any relationship with B which would entitle her to relief and that therefore she would have no realistic opportunity to advance her claim there.

Sir James Munby P, Black, Vos LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 888, [2016] 2 WLR 487, [2015] WLR(D) 364, [2015] Fam Law 1339
Bailii, WLRD
Adoption and Children Act 2002
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – London Borough of Merton v LB FD 19-Dec-2014
The court considered applications in the case of a proposed adoption of a child LB. The mother, Latvian, and the Latvian authorities opposed the application, saying that the child’s future should be settled in Latvia. CB had been taken into care . .
See Also – LB v London Borough of Merton and Another CA 1-May-2013
. .

Cited by:
Cited – Re B (A Child) SC 3-Feb-2016
Habitual Residence of Child not lost
(Orse In re B (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening)) The Court considered the notion of habitual residence. The British girl with same sex parents had been taken to Pakistan, and her mother here sought her return. The . .
Cited – Re B (A Child) SC 3-Feb-2016
Habitual Residence of Child not lost
(Orse In re B (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening)) The Court considered the notion of habitual residence. The British girl with same sex parents had been taken to Pakistan, and her mother here sought her return. The . .
Cited – In Re N (Children) SC 13-Apr-2016
The Court considered whether the future of two little girls, aged four and two years, should be decided by the courts of this country or by the authorities in Hungary. Both children were born in England and lived all their lives here. But their . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, International

Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.551020

A Local Authority v XYZ (No 2): FC 3 Jul 2015

Care proceedings and an application for a placement order in relation to a young boy, Y. He is coming up to seven months old.

Moor J
[2015] EWFC 70
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – A Local Authority v XYZ (No 1) FC 1-Jul-2015
Care proceedings and an application for a placement order in relation to a young boy, Y, six months old. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Adoption

Updated: 03 January 2022; Ref: scu.551003

London Borough of Merton v LB: FD 19 Dec 2014

The court considered applications in the case of a proposed adoption of a child LB. The mother, Latvian, and the Latvian authorities opposed the application, saying that the child’s future should be settled in Latvia. CB had been taken into care under section 20 after findings of lack of care.

Moylan J
[2014] EWHC 4532 (Fam)
Bailii
Children Act 1989 20
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – LB v London Borough of Merton and Another CA 1-May-2013
. .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Re CB (A Child) CA 6-Aug-2015
P was the child of now separated women. P was born in the UK but taken by one parent to Pakistan. The other parent now appealed from refusal of her request for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction or wardship to support her application . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, International

Updated: 01 January 2022; Ref: scu.549759

Re S (A Child): CA 15 May 2015

Mother’s appeal against the making of a placement order in respect of her son, D, almost 2 years of age. D, the youngest of her ten children, was removed for a second time from the mother’s care and not returned but had supervised and positive contact with his mother. His two oldest siblings were in long term foster care. His seven immediate elder siblings had all been adopted.

Kitchin, Macur LJJ, Sir Bernard Rix
[2015] EWCA Civ 489
Bailii
England and Wales

Adoption

Updated: 30 December 2021; Ref: scu.546828

Zaiet v Romania: ECHR 24 Mar 2015

ECHR Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Annulment of adoption order, 31 years after its issue and at the request of the adoptee’s sister: violation
Facts – The applicant was adopted at the age of 17. Her adoptive mother had another adopted daughter. Following the death of the mother, in 2003 the two sisters were jointly granted title to land which had previously been unlawfully expropriated from their family. Pursuant to an action brought by the applicant’s sister, in 2004 a county court declared the applicant’s adoption null and void. This decision was upheld on appeal in 2005.
Law – Article 8: The annulment of the adoption order, 31 years after it had been issued and 18 years after the death of her adoptive mother, amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life. According to the law in force at the material time, after an adoptee obtained full legal capacity, only he or she could seek annulment of the adoption. However, the appeal court did not raise this objection during the proceedings. It was thus doubtful whether the measure applied by the authorities had been in accordance with the law. Moreover, the annulment of the applicant’s adoption did not serve the interests of either the adopted child or the adoptive mother. The main consequence of the annulment was the disruption of the applicant’s family tie with her already deceased mother and the loss of her inheritance rights to the benefit of her sister. Taking into account that the annulment proceedings had been brought by the latter in order to keep the inherited land for herself, it was doubtful whether the impugned decisions pursued a legitimate aim.
As to whether the measure had been necessary in a democratic society, the Court recalled that where the existence of a family tie had been established the State must in principle enable it to be maintained. Splitting up a family was an interference of a very serious order and had to be supported by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations, not only in the interests of the child but also with respect to legal certainty.
In the present case, the domestic courts had annulled the applicant’s adoption on the ground that its only aim had been the furtherance of the patrimonial interests of the adoptive mother and the applicant, not to ensure a better life for the applicant. However, the legal provisions governing adoption were primarily aimed at benefiting and protecting children. In this context, the annulment of an adoption was not envisaged as a measure against the adopted child and could not be interpreted in the sense of disinheriting an adopted child. Moreover, under the domestic law only the adopted child could challenge the validity of the adoption after obtaining full legal capacity. If subsequent evidence revealed that a final adoption order was based on fraudulent or misleading evidence, the interests of the child should remain paramount in establishing a process to deal with any damage caused to the adoptive parent as a result of the wrongful order. Therefore, the domestic courts’ decision had not been supported by relevant and sufficient reasons justifying such interference with the applicant’s family life.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
The Court also found, unanimously, a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Article 41: EUR 30,000 in respect of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

44958/05 – Legal Summary, [2015] ECHR 419
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8.1

Human Rights, Adoption, Family

Updated: 29 December 2021; Ref: scu.546120

SM (Algeria) v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section: CA 4 Nov 2015

The Entry Clearance Officer appealed from a decision that a child assigned to be under guardianship under the Islamic ‘kefalah’ system in her own country was to be treated on the basis that she did fall within the definition of ‘extended family member’ under regulation 8. The case was therefore returned to the Secretary of State for her to exercise the discretion conferred upon her by regulation 12(2)(c).
Held: The ECO’s appeal succeeded. The real question was not whether S fell within the definition of ‘family member’ in regulation 7 or the definition of ‘extended family member’ in regulation 8. Rather, it was whether she was a ‘direct descendant’ within the definition of ‘family member’ in article 2.2(c) of the Citizens Directive; or alternatively whether she fell within ‘any other family members, . . , who, in the country from which they have come, are dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen having the primary right of residence . . ‘ in article 3.2(a). The Directive permitted Member States to restrict the forms of adoption which they would recognise for the purpose of article 2.2(c). Not having been adopted in a manner recognised by UK law, S could not fall within that article; and that being so, those restrictions could not be undermined by recognising that she might fall within article 3.2(a).

Laws, Kitchin, Christopher LJJ
[2015] EWCA Civ 1109, [2016] Imm AR 239, [2015] CN 1756
Bailii
Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1003)
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – IM240192005 (Unreported) AIT 12-Feb-2007
Reconsideration of the appeal of the appellant, a citizen of India, against the decision of the respondent on 12 March 2004 refusing her entry clearance to the United Kingdom as an adoptive child.
Held: The case was ordered to be reviewed. . .
Cited – MN (India) v Entry Clearance Officer (New Delhi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 5-Feb-2008
The Court set out four avenues for entry to the UK provided by the Rules in respect of a child adopted or intended to be adopted from abroad. . .

Cited by:
Appal from (CA) – SM (Algeria) v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section SC 14-Feb-2018
The Court was asked two questions, first as to its jurisdiction according to the meaning of an ‘EEA Decision’ within the 2006 Regulations, and second as to the position under the Directive of a child who is a third country national but has been . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Adoption, European

Updated: 27 December 2021; Ref: scu.554279

Re R (A Child): CA 16 Dec 2014

The mother appealed agaiinst a decision that her child, already subject of a care order, should be released for adoption. She asserted that the judge had failed to conduct the welfare analysis in a manner which was compatible with the guidance

Sir James Munby P, McFarlane, Floyd LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 1625
Bailii
England and Wales

Adoption

Updated: 24 December 2021; Ref: scu.539988

MN (India) v Entry Clearance Officer (New Delhi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 5 Feb 2008

The Court set out four avenues for entry to the UK provided by the Rules in respect of a child adopted or intended to be adopted from abroad.

Lord Justice Ward,
Lord Justice Keene,
And,
Lord Justice Wilson
[2008] EWCA Civ 38, [2010] 2 FLR 87
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – SM (Algeria) v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section CA 4-Nov-2015
The Entry Clearance Officer appealed from a decision that a child assigned to be under guardianship under the Islamic ‘kefalah’ system in her own country was to be treated on the basis that she did fall within the definition of ‘extended family . .
Cited – SM (Algeria) v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section SC 14-Feb-2018
The Court was asked two questions, first as to its jurisdiction according to the meaning of an ‘EEA Decision’ within the 2006 Regulations, and second as to the position under the Directive of a child who is a third country national but has been . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Adoption

Updated: 22 December 2021; Ref: scu.264102

In re P (A Child): CA 15 Aug 2014

The court considered the proper approach to a proposed step-parent adoption. The step-father now appealed against refusal of an order.
Held: The application succeeded. When the adoption application was considered, the court had to be satisfied that each parent or guardian of the child either consented to the making of the adoption order, or that that individual’s consent should be dispensed with. In determining whether or not to dispense with parental consent, the child’s welfare throughout his or her lifetime had to be the court’s paramount consideration.

Moore-Bick, McFarlane, Briggs LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 1174, [2014] WLR(D) 381
Bailii, WLRD
Adoption and Children Act 2002 47(2), European Convention on Human Rights 8
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Soderback v Sweden ECHR 28-Oct-1998
ECHR Sweden – adoption of a child granted to mother’s husband, without the consent of the natural father (Chapter 4, section 6, of the Parental Code)
ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
Not disputed that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption, Human Rights

Updated: 20 December 2021; Ref: scu.536352

Z v Y (Revocation of Adoption Order): FD 31 Mar 2021

Application by the biological father, (‘Z’), under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to revoke an adoption order in relation to X, now aged 4 years. The other parties to the application, namely the local authority, the adopters and the children’s guardian all oppose the application.

Mrs Justice Theis DBE
[2021] EWHC 1153 (Fam)
Bailii
England and Wales

Adoption

Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.663795

FAS v Bradford Metropolitan District Council and Another: FD 13 Mar 2015

Application by FAS to adopt her first cousin once removed, MW. The application sought a convention adoption order, which is misconceived as Pakistan, MW’s homeland, is not a party to the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Inter-country Adoption. It has therefore been treated as an application for a mainstream adoption and Holman J granted leave under section 42(6) Adoption and Children Act 2002 (‘ACA’) for the adoption application to proceed.

Mostyn J
[2015] EWHC 622 (Fam), [2015] WLR(D) 128
Bailii, WLRD
Adoption and Children Act 2002 42(6)
England and Wales

Adoption

Updated: 06 December 2021; Ref: scu.544301

re G (A Child): CA 8 Apr 2014

McFarlane LJ said: ‘In most child care cases a choice will fall to be made between two or more options. The judicial exercise should not be a linear process whereby each option, other than the most draconian, is looked at in isolation and then rejected because of internal deficits that may be identified, with the result that, at the end of the line, the only option left standing is the most draconian and that is therefore chosen without any particular consideration of whether there are internal deficits within that option.
The linear approach, in my view, is not apt where the judicial task is to undertake a global, holistic evaluation of each of the options available for the child’s future upbringing before deciding which of those options best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child’s welfare.
A further concern about the linear model is that a process which acknowledges that long-term public care, and in particular adoption contrary to the will of a parent, is ‘the most draconian option’, yet does not engage with the very detail of that option which renders it ‘draconian’ cannot be a full or effective process of evaluation. Since the phrase was first coined some years ago, judges now routinely make reference to the ‘draconian’ nature of permanent separation of parent and child and they frequently do so in the context of reference to ‘proportionality’. Such descriptions are, of course, appropriate and correct, but there is a danger that these phrases may inadvertently become little more than formulaic judicial window-dressing if they are not backed up with a substantive consideration of what lies behind them and the impact of that on the individual child’s welfare in the particular case before the court. If there was any doubt about the importance of avoiding that danger, such doubt has been firmly swept away by the very clear emphasis in Re B on the duty of the court actively to evaluate proportionality in every case.
In mounting this critique of the linear model, I am alive to the fact that, of course, a judgment is, by its very nature, a linear structure; in common with every other linear structure, it has a beginning, a middle and an end. My focus is not upon the structure of a judge’s judgment but upon that part of the judgment, indeed that part of the judicial analysis before the written or spoken judgment is in fact compiled, where the choice between options actually takes place. What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared, side by side, aga

Sullivan, McFarlane, Lewison LJJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 432
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – In re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening) HL 11-Jun-2008
Balance of probabilities remains standard of proof
There had been cross allegations of abuse within the family, and concerns by the authorities for the children. The judge had been unable to decide whether the child had been shown to be ‘likely to suffer significant harm’ as a consequence. Having . .
Cited – In re Dellow’s Will Trusts; Lloyd’s Bank v Institute of Cancer Research ChD 1964
Husband and wife, having made mutual wills each leaving their estate to the other, had been found dead in their home from coal gas poisoning. The court asked what was required to displace the presumption that the husband, the older of the two, had . .
Cited – Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) SC 12-Jun-2013
B had been removed into care at birth. The parents now appealed against a care order made with a view to B’s adoption. The Court was asked as to the situation where the risks were necessarily only anticipated, and as to appeals against a finding of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption

Updated: 02 December 2021; Ref: scu.523623

Re S (Placement Order: Revocation): CA 7 Oct 2008

The circuit judge had been wrong to hold that a child placed with foster parents who were actively considering whether to apply to adopt him had been placed with them for adoption. Thorpe LJ said clearly that a child could not be said to be placed with the foster carers for adoption until the local authority had approved the match of the child with them and had resolved to leave him with them in their fresh capacity as prospective adopters.

Thorpe LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1333, [2009] 1 FLR 503, [2009] PTSR CS9, [2009] Fam Law 100
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Coventry City Council v PGO and Others CA 22-Jun-2011
The children had been placed with short term fosterers. On adopters being found, the fosterers themselves applied to adopt the children. The court was asked whether a county court judge had power to injunct the authority not to remove the children . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Children, Adoption

Updated: 30 November 2021; Ref: scu.341650

Pla and Puncernau v Andorra: ECHR 8 Aug 2011

Execution – The court was asked to interpret a testamentary provision and as to the right of an adopted son to inherit from his grandmother under her will.
When a child is adopted under a full adoption procedure, the child is in the same legal position as a biological child of his or her parents in all respects, including property rights. Any interpretation of a will should endeavour to ascertain the testator’s intention without overlooking the importance of interpreting the testamentary provision in compliance with domestic law and the Convention. In this case the applicant had been discriminated against when the High Court in Andorra had interpreted the testamentary provision of the grandmother’s will as including only the biological sons (violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention).

Execution of the judgment
[2011] ECHR 1575, 69498/01
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8 14
Human Rights
Citing:
Judgment – Pla and Puncernau v Andorra ECHR 13-Jul-2004
A will made by a widow in 1939, left certain property to her son Francesc-Xavier, as tenant for life, with a stipulation that he was to leave this inheritance to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage, failing which the estate was to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Adoption, Wills and Probate

Updated: 28 November 2021; Ref: scu.519437

Sookhan v The Childrens Authority of Trinidad and Tobago: PC 7 Oct 2021

(Trinidad and Tobago) Application by S for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of either a failure by the Children’s Authority of Trinidad and Tobago to consider or alternatively a positive decision of the appellant not to consider, the respondent’s application to be placed on the list of suitable persons for the adoption of children.

Lord Briggs,
Lady Arden ,
Lord Stephens
[2021] UKPC 29
Bailii
England and Wales

Adoption

Updated: 27 November 2021; Ref: scu.670114

YC v The United Kingdom: ECHR 13 Mar 2012

The court spelt out the stark effects of the proportionality requirement in its application to a determination that a child should be adopted.

4547/10 – Chamber Judgment, [2012] ECHR 3005
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights 8
Citing:
Cited – Johansen v Norway ECHR 7-Aug-1996
The court had to consider a permanent placement of a child with a view to adoption in oposition to the natural parents’ wishes.
Held: Particular weight should be attached to the best interests of the child, which may override those of the . .
Cited – Kearns v France ECHR 10-Jan-2008
The claimant, whilst pregnant, travelled from Ireland to, and gave birth in France, to use their system of anonymous registration. She wanted the child adopted, and, following the birth, the system whereby she could request the return of the child . .
Statement of Facts – YC v The United Kingdom ECHR 21-Jul-2010
Statement of facts . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Adoption

Updated: 20 November 2021; Ref: scu.515354

Re B-S (Children): CA 14 Jun 2013

Application for leave to appeal – mother had been refused consent to be heard to resist adoption application – leave granted

McFarlane LJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 813
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Leave – Re B-S (Children) CA 17-Sep-2013
The mother had been refused leave to oppose her child’s adoption. She now appealed.
Held: A court facing such an application faced two questions: Has there been a change in circumstances? If not, that is the end of the matter. If yes, then the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Adoption

Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.515002