Tag: Criminal Sentencing

Kahar, Regina v: CACD 17 May 2016

Prosecutors choice of charge is his not the courts

The Court gave guidance on sentencing for offences under s5 of the 2006 Act.
Held: It was not for the court to say that more specific offences could have been charged and should have been charged: ‘As a matter of constitutional principle, it is generally for the prosecutor to decide what charge to prefer. Whatever may have been the purpose of Parliament, the offence under s.5 is clearly on its ordinary language wide enough to cover conduct that might otherwise be charged as conspiracy or even attempt to commit particular offences’
The court set out five general principles: ‘(i) conduct threatening democratic government and the security of the state was particularly serious; (ii) the purpose of sentence would be to punish, deter and incapacitate but rehabilitation was unlikely to play a part; (iii) in accordance with section 143(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the sentencer had to consider the offender’s culpability (usually extremely high), and any harm which the offence caused, had been intended to cause, or might foreseeably have caused; (iv) the starting point was the sentence that would have been imposed if the intended act(s) had been carried out; (v) when relevant, it was necessary to distinguish between a primary intention to endanger life and a primary intention to cause serious damage to property, with the most serious offences generally being those involving an intended threat to human life.’

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, CJ
[2016] EWCA Crim 568, [2016] WLR(D) 267
Bailii, WLRD
Terrorism Act 2006
England and Wales

Criminal Sentencing, Criminal Practice

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.564458

Regina v Dobson and Norris: CCC 4 Jan 2012

CCC (Central Criminal Court) The Offence
The murder of Stephen Lawrence on the night of 22nd April 1993 was a terrible and evil crime. Recently the Lord Chief Justice described it as a ‘murder which scarred the conscience of the nation.’
A totally innocent 18 year old youth on the threshold of a promising life was brutally cut down in the street in front of eye witnesses by a racist thuggish gang. You were both members of that gang. I have no doubt at all that you fully subscribed to its views and attitudes. The covert Footscray DVD with its disgusting and shocking scenes and the nature of the attack itself convince me of that.
This crime was committed for no other reason than racial hatred. You did not know Stephen Lawrence or Duwayne Brooks. Neither of them had done anything to harm, threaten or offend you in any way, apart from being black and making their way peaceably to the bus-stop on their way home.
At least one of your group was armed with a lethal knife that night. I am sure you were aware of that. The Footscray tapes, although recorded in 1994, reveal the sort of people you were and associated with in 1993. They reveal not only violent racist attitudes but also a casual and accepting attitude to the carrying and use of knives. They reveal a group acceptance of the use of knives to threaten or harm black people.
The brief but co-ordinated nature of the attack by your group confirms that view. A racist taunt, followed by a group charge towards the two young black men, and then the swallowing up of Stephen Lawrence, surrounded and put to the ground by all of you, shows a deliberately concerted attack. A knife was used to stab him with blows aimed to vulnerable parts of the body: once when he was upright at the start of the attack; the second when he was on the ground whilst the rest of you were gathered round aiming blows or kicks to put him or keep him on the ground.
The evidence does not prove so that I could be sure that either of you had a knife, but the person who used it did so with your knowledge and approval. That is apparent from the brief nature of the attack in which those who were unarmed did not themselves inflict blows or kicks of sufficient gravity to leave injury or involve themselves in a sustained attack as they would if this was a conventional plan to beat up. The attack lasted in the region of 10 seconds and then the whole group moved off together as one making its escape. I take the view that, in the circumstances, it does not matter that the knife was not in your hands.
The cohesive nature of the group tells its story. It is not as if, for example, one person unexpectedly did something that no one else expected or approved of. You, Dobson, repeatedly lied to keep Norris’ name away from the police, a clear example of group loyalty.
Whilst the attack on Stephen Lawrence himself clearly could not have been pre-meditated since it was a chance encounter, I cannot accept that a crime of this type simply arose on the spur of the moment. The way in which the attack took place strongly suggests to me that your group, if not actively seeking out a victim, was prepared, if opportunity arose, to attack in the way in which you did.
Stephen Lawrence is not the only victim of this crime. His family, (two parents, a brother and a sister), whose victim impact statements I have read, have been most grievously affected. So has his friend Duwayne Brooks. Of that I have no doubt.
Neither of you has shown the slightest regret or remorse. Each of you has lied to the court. I do not punish you for that, but this is not a case where there is any mitigation available for contrition.
As to other potential mitigation, it is urged upon me that I should make allowance on the basis that this was a murder involving an intention to cause grievous bodily harm rather than an intention to kill. That is a recognised mitigating factor. However in this case it is not a factor to which I can attach much weight although I accord it some. The reasons for this are that (i) there was premeditation in the sense I have explained, (ii) the carrying and use of a deadly weapon was part of what was contemplated, (iii) even if you did not positively intend death to result, you intended very serious injury and were in reality utterly indifferent as to whether death resulted or not, (iv) death was an obvious risk in this sort of attack. This is not a case where the division between the two forms of intent is a wide one. Accordingly, the weight to be attached is not great. See R v PETERS [2005] EWCA Crim 605 at paragraphs 13-16.
You are both now in your mid 30’s but I have to look at you as you were at the time of the crime. Both of you were undoubtedly streetwise at the time of the December 1994 Footscray tapes. I believe they reflect how you were in 1993. There is nothing I have seen or been told which suggests to me that either of you was particularly immature, easily led or otherwise disadvantaged in April 1993. There is no suggestion that psychiatric or other reports are needed for either of you.
Sentencing Framework
The sentencing framework is clear. All parties, after consideration of the relevant legal provisions are agreed. In short, the law dictates that I must sentence you by reference to your age and maturity at the time of the crime. I cannot sentence you as the mature men you now are. In addition I must sentence you in accordance with the practice in force before the coming into force of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which now governs sentencing for more modern murders.
In modern times an adult committing this crime would be facing a life sentence with a starting point for a minimum term of around 30 years. That is the effect of the provisions of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. That same Act by contrast fixes the starting point for sentencing where the offender was under 18 at the time of committing the offence at 12 years.
I am also required by Schedule 22 Paragraph 10(a) of the same Act not to pass a heavier penalty than would have been imposed before that Act came into force. So, I must follow sentencing practice as it was before the 2003 Act. As is made clear by the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction [2004] 1WLR 2251, (issued by the then Lord Chief Justice and dealing with sentencing for murders committed before 18th December 2003), the starting point for an adult for an offence of this type would be around 15/16 years.
It may be, therefore, that the resultant sentences are lower than some might expect, but the law as laid down by Parliament must be applied and I am constrained by it.
The Sentences
I will of course apply the law faithfully, but recognising that it is for the trial judge to determine the period he considers appropriate within the legal framework and guidance. See S 269 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
The gravity of this case is in my view of a different order from, for example, a murder committed by one individual upon another as a result of some sudden quarrel. There was a degree of general premeditation; it was a racist crime driven by hatred; it involved a gang of like-minded attackers; a lethal weapon was employed and known in advance to be carried; the victim was completely blameless and helpless. The high level of public interest in this case is at least in part a reflection of the abhorrence felt by right-thinking people at the nature of this crime. This, too, should be reflected in the sentence.
This is an offence which calls for an upward adjustment in the starting point because of the aggravating features referred to above. Such an increase is in line with observations in R v SULLIVAN and Others [2004] EWCA Crim 1762, and R v PETERS (Supra). In this case, were an adult involved and facing sentence for this crime based on pre-2003 Act sentencing practice, I would envisage a minimum term of around 18 years. I must, however, reflect the fact that both of you were under 18 at the time. I shall adopt a starting point of 12 years and then adjust it to reflect the aggravating features and such mitigation as exists in you cases.
In each case, and as a reflection of the fact that the offender was under 18 at the time, I must impose a sentence of Detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure. See S 90 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. This form of sentence is, for practical purposes, the same as a life sentence passed on an adult. See S 277 Criminal Justice Act 2003.
Next, I must fix the minimum term to be served in each case. This is the period which must be served before an offender can be released by the Parole Board. This is a real-time period and is not reduced in the way that ordinary sentences of imprisonment are. It is what it says, a minimum term of the length stated. There is no guarantee of release once the term is served. An offender will only be released if, on the basis of a stringent assessment by the Parole Board at that time, he is deemed no longer to pose a risk to the public. Otherwise he will remain in prison.
After release, whenever that is, an offender is not free of his sentence. He will remain subject to licence for the rest of his life and may be recalled to prison at any time.
Gary Dobson, you are now 36; at 17 years and 10 months you were very nearly 18 when you murdered Stephen Lawrence. You are serving a 5 year sentence for drug supply offences. It would be unjust to grant you credit for any time spent in custody awaiting trial on this matter. I therefore decline to grant you any credit for time already spent in custody pursuant to S 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In addition, there is no just reason why you should be able effectively to write off the remainder of the custodial element of the drug supply sentence, so I will increase the minimum term for this offence to prevent you receiving an undeserved benefit. I take note of two positive reports from HMP Belmarsh.
Taking account of all the circumstances referred to above, the sentence of the court for the murder of Stephen Lawrence is one of Detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure. I specify a minimum term to be served of 15 years and 2 months.
David Norris, you are now 35 years old. You were 16 years and 8 months old at the time of the offence. Since 1993 you have been in trouble for dishonesty and in 2002 you received 12 months imprisonment for Racially Threatening Words or Behaviour. This confirms my view, (and no doubt that of the jury), that you were a violent racist in 1993.
You were just over a year younger than Dobson. I shall make allowance for that in fixing the minimum term, but not a great deal since there is nothing to suggest that you were anything other than a full member of your gang with any age differences being less relevant than the fact of membership, participation and identification with its aims. I do not regard delay as a mitigating factor. That, and hostility towards yourself and your family, arises from your own actions.
Taking account of all the circumstances in your case, the sentence of the court for the murder of Stephen Lawrence is one of Detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure. I specify a minimum term to be served of 14 years and 3 months. Pursuant to S 240 Criminal Justice Act 2003, I direct that 483 days representing all time spent on remand since 9th September 2010 be credited towards the minimum term. Any arithmetical error may be corrected administratively.

Treacy J
[2012] EWHCA Crim B1
Bailii, Judiciary
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Regina v Dobson CACD 18-May-2011
Retrial After Acquittal – New Scientific Evidence
The court heard an application for the quashing of a verdict of not guilty and the retrial of a defendant for the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. Other defendants previously acquitted were not to be tried, but a defendant not previously tried . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Sentencing

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.450183

Ahmad, Regina v: SC 18 Jun 2014

The court considered the proper approach for the court to adopt, and the proper orders for the court to make, in confiscation proceedings where a number of criminals (some of whom may not be before the court) had between them acquired property or money as a result of committing an offence for which all or only some of them had been convicted in the trial which led to the proceedings. They challenged the decision of the Court of Appeal that each of the appellants should be separately liable for the whole of that amount.
Held: The appeals were allowed. Though the state should make double recovery each defendant was liable for the entire amount.

Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Hughes, Lord Toulson
[2014] UKSC 36, [2014] 4 All ER 767, [2014] WLR(D) 264, [2014] Crim LR 756, [2014] 3 WLR 23, [2014] Lloyd’s Rep FC 547, [2014] 2 Cr App R (S) 75, UKSC 2012/0082
Bailii, SC Summary, SC, WLRD, Bailii Summary
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Criminal Justice Act 1988
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Ahmad and Another v Regina CACD 2-Mar-2012
The defendants appealed against confiscation orders each for more than andpound;92 million said to have been derived from a substantial fraud.
Held: The appeals succeeded. Sums which had been paid into banks as the result of a purported sale . .
Cited – Crown Prosecution Service v Jennings HL 14-May-2008
The appellant appealed against the refusal to discharge a restraint order under the 1988 Act. The sum found to have been obtained in the later trial vastly exceeded the sum the defendant said had ever come within his control or benefit.
Held: . .
Cited – Olubitan v Regina CACD 7-Nov-2003
The defendant appealed against a confiscation order. He had used a company to defraud suppliers on the continent of substantial sums. He said that his involvement in the conspiracy was only toward the later end and that he had received no benefit in . .
Cited – May, Regina v HL 14-May-2008
The defendant had been convicted of involvement in a substantial VAT fraud, and made subject to a confiscation order. He was made subject to a confiscation order in respect of the amounts lost to the fraud where he was involved, but argued that the . .
Cited – Phillips v United Kingdom ECHR 5-Jul-2001
Having been convicted of drug trafficking, an application was made for a confiscation under the 1994 Act. On the civil balance of proof, and applying the assumptions under the Act, an order was made. The applicant claimed that his article 6 rights . .
Cited – Silcock and Another, Regina v CACD 29-Jan-2004
The defendants had been found guilty of conspiracy to deliver counterfeit notes. They now appealed against sentence and confiscation orders. The notes were high quality and denomination dollar notes, with probable total face values of many millions. . .
Cited – Grayson and Barnham v The United Kingdom ECHR 23-Sep-2008
Each applicant had been subject to confiscation in criminal proceedings relating to drugs offences. They complained that the legislation had reversed the burden of proof.
Held: ‘it was not incompatible with the notion of a fair hearing in . .
Cited – Regina v Clipston CACD 4-Mar-2011
Confiscation proceeding are themselves broadly criminal in nature. The judge can decide issues on the balance of probabilities, compel the defendant to disclose documents, draw adverse inferences from the absence of evidence, and rely on hearsay . .
Cited – Regina v Ascroft CACD 2003
. .
Cited – Crown Prosecution Service v Jennings HL 14-May-2008
The appellant appealed against the refusal to discharge a restraint order under the 1988 Act. The sum found to have been obtained in the later trial vastly exceeded the sum the defendant said had ever come within his control or benefit.
Held: . .
Cited – Waya, Regina v SC 14-Nov-2012
The defendant appealed against confiscation orders made under the 2002 Act. He had bought a flat with a substantial deposit from his own resources, and the balance from a lender. That lender was repaid after he took a replacement loan. He was later . .
Cited – Harvey, Regina v CACD 3-Jul-2013
The defendant had been convicted of handling and receiving stolen goods. He now appealed from a confiscation order made under the 2002 Act. The defendant having admitted to benefiting from a criminal lifestyle, the court had to decide to what . .

Cited by:
Cited – Harvey, Regina v SC 16-Dec-2015
Police had discovered quantities of stolen goods at the appellant’s business premises. He was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and confiscation order made. He now appealed from the inclusion in that order of sums of VAT which had already been . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Sentencing

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.526728

Regina v Canavan, Kidd, Shaw: CACD 10 Jul 1997

A sentencing court cannot take into account factors neither admitted by nor proved against the defendant. The cases sought to be allowed for by the Crown were representative but unadmitted counts. It offended a fundamental principle of sentencing for the defendant to be sentenced not only for the four specific offences of which he has been convicted after a trial, but also for other offences of which the four were specimens; offences of which the defendant had been neither convicted, nor to which he had pleaded guilty nor agreed to have taken into consideration.
Lord Bingham LCJ said: ‘[The defendant] may be sentenced only for an offence proved against him (by admission or verdict) or which he has admitted and asked the court to take into consideration when passing sentence: see Anderson [1978] A.C. 964. If, as we think, these are basic principles underlying the administration of the criminal law, it is not easy to see how a defendant can lawfully be punished for offences for which he has not been indicted and which he has denied or declined to admit.’

Lord Bingham LCJ
Times 21-Jul-1997, Gazette 17-Sep-1997, [1997] EWCA Crim 1773, [1998] 1 Cr App R(S) 243, [1998] 1 Cr App R 79, [1998] 1 All ER 42, [1998] 1 WLR 604, 151201, [1997] Crim LR 766
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Huchison CACD 1972
For the judge to form his own judgment of the evidence he has heard on the extent of the offending conduct beyond the instances specified in individual counts is to ‘deprive the appellant of his right to trial by jury in respect of the other alleged . .
Cited – Regina v Anderson; Anderson v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 1978
A defendant may be sentenced only for an offence proved against him (by admission or verdict) or which he has admitted and asked the court to take into consideration when passing sentence. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Willoughby CACD 5-Nov-1998
Appeal against conviction dismissed. Appeal against sentence for offences of false imprisonment, indecent assault and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The sentences were life imprisonment for the offence of false imprisonment, with . .
Cited – Tovey and Another v Regina CACD 9-Mar-2005
Each defendant appealed sentences where he had committed a series of offences and the sentence had been for specimen acts.
Held: When choosing representative offences a prosecutor should be careful to try to give the court a proper picture of . .
Cited – Clifford, Regina v CACD 7-Nov-2014
The defendant appealed against his sentence to eight years imprisonment on 8 counts of indecent assault. The offences occurred between 1977 and 1984.
Held: Each of the victims was young and vulnerable and the assaults had had continuing . .
Cited – Hartley, Regina v CACD 12-May-2011
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Sentencing

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.151228

HM Solicitor General v Cox and Another: QBD 27 May 2016

Applications for committal of the defendants for having taken photographs of court proceedings when their friend was being sentenced for murder and publishing them on Facebook. The SG urged that the offences had aggravating features taking the matter beyond the offence under section 41 of the 1925 Act.
Held: The appeal failed. The offence had been committed. Section 41 of the 1925 Act did not remove the possibility of a charge of contenpt of court for taking photographs in court.
Whilst it was pssible that a person taking photographs might not have the necessary mens rea for the offence: ‘A person cannot defend himself by evidence that, ignorant of the criminal law and unaware of the prohibition on photography, he could not intend to interfere with the administration of justice. If there were no signs prohibiting the taking of photographs in the part of the building where the act takes place or prohibiting the use of mobile phones in court, and there may be none say in canteens, the court could not be left powerless to deal with the risk created to the administration of justice as a result of ignorance of the criminal law on the part of the person whose acts create or risk creating the interference. The same applies to publication of illegally taken photographs in the Facebook postings.
Where the act which constitutes a contempt in the face of the court, or one closely akin to such a contempt, is not a crime, the deliberate breach of a court order of which he has notice will be sufficient. It is not necessary that the person additionally intended by his breach to interfere with the administration of justice, though for the reasons we have set out and which were considered in Dallas, it will generally readily be inferred that such an intention is established. It does not matter in principle whether the order is specific, as in a judge’s direction to a jury on internet searches, or general, as in the public notices in court buildings. The latter are there, either reflecting the criminal law, or, where not, expressing what every judge requires and relies on to let the public and participants know what is required for the administration of justice. Where a person knows of the court order and deliberately breaches it, he knows that the prohibition which he breaches was put in place to prevent interference with the course of justice. Therefore, the questions whether the breach was knowing and deliberate and whether it was intended to interfere with the course of justice amount to the same question, even if the person may not have realised or understood quite how the administration of justice could be interfered with. He would know that it would be put at risk.’

Thomas LCJ L, Ouseley J
[2016] EWHC 1241 (QB), [2016] EMLR 22, [2016] 2 Cr App R 15
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 1925 41
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd HL 1-Feb-1979
The appellants were magazines and journalists who published, after committal proceedings, the name of a witness, a member of the security services, who had been referred to as Colonel B during the hearing. An order had been made for his name not to . .
Cited – Attorney-General v Newspaper Publishing plc CA 1987
The court explained the common law basis of the law of contempt of court. Lloyd LJ said: ‘Since the test of contempt is not a breach of the order but interference with the administration of justice, it follows that at common law a contempt may be . .
Cited – Attorney-General v Sport Newspapers Ltd QBD 24-May-1991
The newspaper was accused of disclosing details of the previous convictions of an absconded suspect in a murder investigation, despite a prior warning from the police that any such publication would be likely to prejudice future criminal . .
Cited – Schot and Another, v Regina CACD 12-May-1997
Jurors, after retirement refused to deliver a verdict claiming personal reasons. The were summoned to court to answer charges of contempt of court. Explaining the contempt proceedings that the jurors faced, the trial judge said: ‘[I]n so far as . .
Cited – Regina v Vincent D (Contempt of Court: Illegal Photography) CACD 2004
The appellant was the brother of the defendant in a major drugs trial, which involved a protected witness. He took a photograph in the canteen area, and another from the public gallery facing towards the witness box, witness and bench. The quality . .
Cited – Robertson and Another v Her Majesty’s Advocate HCJ 7-Nov-2007
Gough, ‘the naked rambler’, argued that his desire to appear naked in court, an act which he characterised as a fundamental freedom, was not an act calculated to offend the authority and dignity of the court; in order for his naked appearance to . .
Cited – Attorney General v Dallas Admn 23-Jan-2012
The A-G, using RSC Order 52, sought a finding that the defendant was in contempt when, as a juror she had conducted internet research about the case, revealing her results to other jury members.
Held: She was in contempt. She had deliberately . .
Cited – HM Attorney General v Davey Admn 29-Jul-2013
The Attorney general sought the committal of the defendants for contempt of court alleging their misbehaviour as jurors. One had posted to a facebook account about the trial and lied about it to the judge. The second, in a different trial, had . .
Cited – HM Attorney General v Davey Admn 29-Jul-2013
The Attorney general sought the committal of the defendants for contempt of court alleging their misbehaviour as jurors. One had posted to a facebook account about the trial and lied about it to the judge. The second, in a different trial, had . .
Cited – Morris v Crown Office CA 1970
The applicants had been engaged in a calculated and coordinated campaign of disruption of the court.
Held: ‘The archaic description of these proceedings as ‘contempt of court’ is in my view unfortunate and misleading. It suggests that they are . .
Cited – Dallas v The United Kingdom ECHR 11-Feb-2016
Test for contempt was accessible and foreseeable.
The applicant had been convicted of contempt of court in that whilst acting as a juror, and in defiance of an explicit direction from the judge had researched the defendant in the internet, and passed on her findings to other jurors.
Held: the . .

Cited by:
Cited – HM Attorney General v Yaxley-Lennon QBD 9-Jul-2019
Application by Her Majesty’s Attorney General for an order committing the respondent to prison for contempt of court. . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contempt of Court, Crime, Criminal Sentencing

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.564987

In re Peters: CA 1988

After the defendant was arrested for drugs offences a restraint order was made to prevent dissipation of his assets. Orders were made to vary the restraint to allow payment of his sons school fees, and in family proceedings for a payment to his wife. The Commissioners of Customs and Excise appealed the latter order.
Held: The purpose of a restraint order was to preserve assets so that any confiscation order could be satisfied. Some payments might be allowed but not so as to prejudice the purpose of the restraint. Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR: ‘The Act itself is terminologically complex, but the legislative intention and the broad scheme whereby that intention is to be achieved are reasonably clear. The intention is that no one convicted of drug trafficking offences shall be allowed to retain any part of the proceeds of his crime. The broad scheme involves the making of confiscation orders at the time of sentencing and of prior protective orders. The latter are designed to prevent an accused rendering a confiscation order inappropriate or nugatory by disposing of his assets between the time when an information is about to be laid against him and the making of a confiscation order in the event of conviction.’
Lord Justice Mann said: ‘There is, in the light of section 13(2) no room for the intrusion of sympathy.’

Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR, Mann LJ
[1988] 1 QB 871, [1988] 3 WLR 182, [1988] 3 All ER 46
Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 8(1)(5) 13(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – In re X (Restraint Order: Payment out) QBD 22-Apr-2004
A restraint order had been made in respect of the defendant’s assets pending trial. Application was made to release a sum to pay the defendant’s company debts.
Held: A payment could be made only where the the realisable value of the property . .
Cited – Regina v Stannard CACD 1-Nov-2005
The defendant had been convicted of offences in which he had operated to purchase companies and use false debentures to evade corporation tax. Compensation had been sought under the 1988 Act. It was argued that the confiscation order should be . .
Cited – Stodgell v Stodgell FD FD 18-Jul-2008
The parties were involved in ancillary relief proceedings. At the same time the husband was in prison after having hidden earnings from his business, and was subject to an unsatisfied confiscation order. The guardian had had doubts about the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice, Criminal Sentencing

Leading Case

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.199327

Docherty, Regina v: SC 14 Dec 2016

After conviction on his own admission for wounding with intent, and with a finding that he posed a threat to the public, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for public protection. Such sentences were abolished with effect from the day after his conviction. He said that the court had failed to apply the principle of lex mitior.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘English practice recognises lex mitior in its ordinary form, namely the principle that an offender should be sentenced according to the law and practice prevailing at the time of his sentence, subject to not exceeding the limits (ie in England normally the maximum) provided for at the time the offence was committed.’
The lex mitior represents a norm of a different order from the principle of no punishment without law. Whilst the lex gravior principle is a fundamental and essential condition of freedom, lex mitior: ‘expresses a choice that reflects the development of a social process in the context of criminal law. It circumscribes the scope of criminal law by preserving benefits accruing to defendants as a result of substantive laws subsequent to the commission of the offence and applicable while the case was pending.’ Whereas lex gravior prohibits applying to a case a rule which was not the law when the acts under judgment were committed, lex mitior, when it operates, actually requires such a rule to be applied.
‘There is a very clear difference between (1) a principle which prevents a court from imposing a penalty above and outside the range currently provided for by the State as appropriate to the crime and (2) a principle which requires the court to seek out and apply the most favourable rule which has existed at any intervening time since the offence was committed, even if it has since been abandoned. The first would fall within the rationale of confining the court to a range currently considered appropriate for the offence; the latter would not. The difference between the two is not adverted to, still less explored, in the judgment in Scoppola. It is, accordingly, by no means clear that the court intended to expand its incorporation of lex mitior into article 7 by including the latter proposition.’
‘Sentencing legislation and practice may well go up and down as public policy is held by legislators to change, or current responsible views on particular offending are perceived by courts to develop. But there is no injustice to a defendant to be sentenced according either to the law as it existed at the time of his offence or, if more lenient, according to the law as it exists when he is convicted and sentenced. To insist that a defendant should not be sentenced on a basis now authoritatively regarded as excessive is one thing. It is quite another to say that he should be sentenced according to a practice which did not obtain when he committed the offence and does not obtain now, merely because for some time in the interim, however short, a different practice was adopted which has now been abandoned as wrong.’
and ‘the new regime was not in force for his case. It was the subject of legitimate phased introduction. . lex mitior does not entitle Docherty to anticipate the statutory commencement of LASPO. The case made on his behalf was . . that he ought to have been sentenced to EPP. That exposes the flaw in the argument, for it would seek to insist on the benefit of (accelerated) removal of one part of the old regime (IPP) whilst at the same time claiming the preservation of another part of it (EPP).’
Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes
[2016] UKSC 62, UKSC 2014/0207, [2017] 1 Cr App R (S) 31, [2017] 1 WLR 181, [2017] 4 All ER 263, [2016] WLR(D) 667
Bailii, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary, WLRD
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, European Convention on Human Rights 791)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – James, Wells and Lee v The United Kingdom ECHR 18-Sep-2012
ECHR Article 5-1
Deprivation of liberty
Failure to provide the rehabilitative courses to prisoners which were necessary for their release: violation
Facts – By virtue of section 225 of the . .
Cited – Berlusconi (Law Relating To Undertakings) 2 ECJ 3-May-2005
Company law – Article 5 of the EEC Treaty (subsequently Article 5 of the EC Treaty, in turn Article 10 EC) and Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty (subsequently Article 54(3)(g) of the EC Treaty, in turn, after amendment, Article 44(2)(g) EC) – First . .
Cited – Lang and Others, Regina v CACD 3-Nov-2005
In each case the defendant had commited violent or sexual offences and were caught by the new mandatory sentencing provisions, and been made subject to life imprisonment, or detention for public protection, or an extended sentence.
Held: The . .
Cited – Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) HL 10-Jul-2003
The respondent appealed against a finding that the provision which made a loan agreement completely invalid for lack of compliance with the 1974 Act was itself invalid under the Human Rights Act since it deprived the respondent of its property . .
Cited – Uttley, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 30-Jul-2004
In 1995 the defendant was sentenced to twelve years for rapes committed in 1983. He complained that the consequences of the later sentence were adverse because of the 1991 Act. He would now serve three quarters of the sentence rather than two . .
Cited – Uttley v United Kingdom ECHR 29-Nov-2005
. .
Cited – Secretary of State for Justice v James HL 6-May-2009
The applicant had been sentenced to an indefinite term for public protection, but the determinate part of his sentence had passed with no consideration as to whether his continued detention was required.
Held: The post tariff detention was not . .
Cited – Scoppola v Italy (No 2) ECHR 17-Sep-2009
(Grand Chamber) The applicant murdered his wife on 2 September 1999; the offence was punishable by life imprisonment. On 18 February 2000, he agreed to be tried under a summary procedure. It lacked some of the safeguards of a full trial but carried . .
Cited – Regina v DP CACD 2013
The court considered an offence committed before 3 April 2005 when the CJA 2003 came into effect, and was sentenced before 3 December 2012 when new sentencing rules came into effect changing the 2003 rules.
Held: The Court upheld a sentence of . .
Cited – Saunders and Others v Regina CACD 28-Jun-2013
Appeals against sentence a non mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
Held: There may be cases where a discretionary life sentence is justified for an offence outside Schedule 15 if its gravity and the danger presented by the defendant are . .
Cited – Burinskas, Regina v, (Attorney General’s Reference (No 27 of 2013)) CACD 4-Mar-2014
Effect upon sentencing of amendments to dangerous offender provisions . .
At CACD – Docherty, Regina v CACD 18-Jun-2014
The defendant appealed against his sentence to a term of imprisonment for public protection on his admission of wounding with intent. The sentencing system applied was replaced on the day following sentencing, and he said that the court should have . .
Cited – Haney and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for Justice SC 10-Dec-2014
The four claimants, each serving indeterminate prison sentences, said that as they approached the times when thy might apply for parol, they had been given insufficient support and training to meet the requirements for release. The courts below had . .
Cited – Boakye and Others, Regina v CACD 3-Apr-2012
The defendants appealed their sentences for importation of class A drugs. They had acted as drugs mules. New guidelines were due to take effect which be expected to have led to shorter sentences. The court was asked whether such new standards could . .
Cited – Zaprianov v Bulgaria ECHR 6-Mar-2003
ECHR ‘Article 7 does not guarantee the right to have a subsequent and favourable change in the law applicable to an earlier offence.’ . .
Cited – Le Petit v United Kingdom ECHR 5-Dec-2000
(Admissibility) . .
Cited – Coeme and others v Belgium ECHR 22-Jun-2000
The mischief that Article 7 is designed to prevent is the imposition by the State of (i) criminal liability for an act which did not attract such liability at the time it was committed or (ii) a penalty greater than the maximum permitted when the . .
Cited – Maktouf and Damjanovic v Bosnia And Herzegovina ECHR 18-Jul-2013
(Grand Chamber) The effect of the change was to alter the range for the defendant Maktouf (an accomplice) from 1-15 to 5-20 years. For the defendant Damjanovich (a principal) the range was altered from 5-15 to 10-20. Maktouf was expressly sentenced . .

Cited by:
Cited – Stott, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice SC 28-Nov-2018
The prisoner was subject to an extended determinate sentence (21 years plus 4) for 10 offences of rape. He complained that as such he would only be eligible for parole after serving two thirds of his sentence rather than one third, and said that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 October 2021; Ref: scu.572396

Regina v Davies: CACD 30 Dec 1994

A sentencing judge should explicitly allow for all time spent on remand when sentencing, though time spent in custody before probation order was not to be set off as time served after re-sentencing procedure on breach of probation.
Ind Summary 13-Feb-1995, Times 30-Dec-1994
Criminal Justice Act 1967 67
England and Wales

Updated: 22 October 2021; Ref: scu.86513

Stott, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for Justice: Admn 15 Feb 2017

The claimant committed ten rapes. He was sentenced to 21 years with four years extended sentence. He claimed it was discriminatory since he would lose a right to early release.
Held: The High Court dismissed his claim, but granted a certificate permitting Mr Stott to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.
Sir Brian Leveson P QBD, William Davis J
[2017] EWHC 214 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Stott, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice SC 28-Nov-2018
The prisoner was subject to an extended determinate sentence (21 years plus 4) for 10 offences of rape. He complained that as such he would only be eligible for parole after serving two thirds of his sentence rather than one third, and said that . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 October 2021; Ref: scu.575300

McInerney, Keating v Regina: CACD 18 Dec 2002

The defendants appealed against their sentences for domestic burglary. The court took the opportunity to provide new guideline sentences for standard domestic burglaries.
Held: The sentencing advisory panel had issued new guidance, supported by scientific survey. Public opinion was one, but only one of several factors. The court should also look at the costs of a sentence, and its effectiveness. A domestic burglar, who might previously have received a sentence of eighteen months or less, should receive a non-custodial sentence involving effective punishment, and an attempt to address any underlying cause of the behaviour including addiction. The court gave lists describing what would be considered a standard burglary, and of aggravating and other features.
Mr Justice Silber The Lord Chief Justice Of England &Amp; Wales Mr Justice Grigson
Times 20-Dec-2002, [2002] EWCA Crim 3003, [2003] 1 Cr App R 627
Bailii
Theft Act 1968 9(1)(a)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Revisited in – Brewster, Regina v CACD 27-Jun-1997
The court reviewed sentencing levels for domestic burglary. Such cases must always be very serious, but individual cases varied almost infinitely. After a trial an adult defendant could expect a sentence of three years’ imprisonment for burglary of . .
Cited – Saw and Others, Regina v CACD 16-Jan-2009
The defendants appealed against sentences imposed for domestic burglaries.
Held: The court should properly allow for the effect of the burglary on the particular victim. Fuller guidance was awaited from the Sentencing Guidelines Council, but . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.178525

Regina v Balfour Beatty Rail Infrastructure Services Ltd: CACD 5 Jul 2006

The defendant appealed against a fine of 10 million pounds for its failings in maintaining track which led to the train crash at Hatfield.
Held: The company’s contract was substantial. Positive steps were to be taken by all concerned in a company to ensure compliance with Health and Safety duties. Management would be encouraged to satisfy its duties if the fine was of sufficient size to affect shareholders. Where an individual employee was at fault, and the danger did not arise from a fault in the management system, a deterrent sentence was not appropriate, but here there had been a serious systemic failure in management. The fine was out of proportion to that imposed on the co-defendant, Railtrack plc, to reduce it to a proportionate level would remove the deterrent effect, and the fine was reduced therefore to 7.5 million pounds.
Lord Phillips CJ, Nelson, Silber JJ
[2006] EWCA Crim 1586, Times 18-Jul-2006, [2007] Bus LR 77, [2007] ICR 354
Bailii
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 3(1)
England and Wales

Updated: 22 August 2021; Ref: scu.243065

Qureshi, Regina v, Attorney General’s Reference no 7 of 2008: CACD 22 Apr 2008

The factual nexus between the offender’s conduct in preparation for giving effect to that intention and the future commission of the intended act(s) of terrorism will be a significant factor in determining the ultimate sentence for a s.5 offence
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers LCJ, Pitchford, Dobbs JJ
[2008] EWCA Crim 1054
Bailii
Terrorism Act 2006 5
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Dart and Others v Regina CACD 31-Oct-2014
dart_rCAcD1410
The defendants had been convicted on guilty pleas of offences under the 2006 Act. Dart had been sentenced to a six year term and a five year extended sentence. Other received shorter and longer sentences as appropriate. They now applied for leave to . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 03 August 2021; Ref: scu.330980

Regina v Alfonso; Regina v Sajid; Regina v Andrews: CACD 9 Sep 2004

The defendants appealed sentences for supplying drugs. They were first time defendants, addicts caught selling drugs to police officers, and with no established stocks of drugs for sale.
Held: A short prison sentence was appropriate. A drug treatment and testing might be appropriate for some defendants. Whilst none of the defendants fell precisely within the group identified, the sentences were adjusted.
Rose LJ, Owen J, Mitting J
Times 14-Oct-2004
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Regina v Twisse CACD 7-Nov-2000
There was no need for the Court of Appeal to notify the Sentencing Advisory Panel under the Act unless it intended to give sentencing guidelines across a wide field. A proper sentence for a defendant shown to be a dealer in class A drugs at street . .
Cited – Regina v McKeown and Others (Attorney-General’s Reference Nos 13 to 18 of 2004) CACD 7-Jul-2004
The Attorney-General appealed sentences imposed on the defendants for supplying heroin.
Held: The offences involved all the aggravating factors for such cases. Drugs had been sold near schools though children not specifically targeted. The . .
Approved – Regina v Dhajit CACD 1999
Sentencing guidelines for supply of drugs. . .
Cited – Attorney-General’s Reference (No 64 of 2003) CACD 20-Nov-2003
The attorney general sought re-assessment of the defendant’s sentence of a Drug treatment and testing order.
Held: When considering a Drug Treatment and Testing Order, the court should consider: the realistic possibility that such orders may . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.218844

Guraj, Regina v: SC 14 Dec 2016

The defendant had pleaded to charges of possession of drugs with intent to supply. He was sentenced, but then the prosecutor was 14 months’ late serving its notice with regard to the confiscation order under section 16. The crown now appealed against the defendant’s successful appeal from the confiscation order as made.
Held: The judge had applied the correct test, and: ‘In this case it is not suggested that any unfairness at all has befallen the defendant in consequence of the irregularities which occurred. There was no obstacle to the making of the confiscation order, and it ought to have been made. The Crown’s appeal must be allowed and the order restored.’
Confiscation orders are enforced by the magistrates as if they were Crown Court fines.
Lord Neuberger, President, Lord Mance, Lord Reed, Lord Hughes, Sir Declan Morgan
[2016] UKSC 65, [2016] WLR(D) 673, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 117, [2017] 1 WLR 22, [2017] 1 Cr App R (S) 32, [2017] Crim LR 320, UKSC 2015/0152
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 16, Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005
The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .
Cited – Regina v Keith Ross CACD 13-Mar-2001
The defendant having pleaded guilty to a serious drugs offence now appealed a confiscation order. He claimed that he had been misled that the prosecution would not request an inquiry for this purpose, and during the course of the hearing the . .
Cited – Palmer, Regina v CACD 11-Oct-2002
The defendant appealed against a very substantial confiscation order. The prosecution had served notices under sections 71 and 72(1), but the section 72(1) notice was invalid. The judge allowed a second notice to be served, and the case to be . .
Cited – Regina v Knights and Another HL 21-Jul-2005
The defendants had been convicted of offences involving dealing with goods on which customs duty had not been paid. After conviction a timetable was set for sentencing and for confiscation proceedings. The House considered the making of the . .
Appeal from – Guraj, Regina v CACD 6-Mar-2015
The defendant appealed against a confiscation order made on his plea to charges of possession of drugs with intent to supply. The Crown had served its statement under section 16 of the 2002 Act, but it was 14 months’ late. . .
Cited – Regina v Donohoe CACD 28-Jul-2006
The defendant appealed against the making of a confiscation order, saying that the court had erred in the procedure for forfeiting drugs.
Held: The appeal failed. The section contained an express prohibition against making both a forfeiture . .
Cited – Regina v Iqbal; Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office (RCPO) v Iqbal CACD 3-Feb-2010
The RCPO appealed against refusal of permission to continue their application for a confiscation order. The defendant had been convicted of conspiracy to supply class A drugs, but said that the application was now out of time.
Held: The appeal . .
Cited – Crown Prosecution Service v Neish CACD 6-May-2010
The defendant faced confiscation proceedings. The judge gave instructions to the listing office to give a later date for the hearing. The defendant said that the delay took the case out of the court’s jurisdiction to make an order.
Held: The . .
Cited – Waya, Regina v SC 14-Nov-2012
The defendant appealed against confiscation orders made under the 2002 Act. He had bought a flat with a substantial deposit from his own resources, and the balance from a lender. That lender was repaid after he took a replacement loan. He was later . .
Cited – Regina v Johal CACD 19-Apr-2013
The defendant appealed against a confiscation order made on his conviction for possession of a Class B controlled drug. There had been considerable delays in the completion of the process, and it had exceeded the two year limit. The appellant argued . .

Cited by:
Cited – McCool, Regina v SC 2-May-2018
The appellants complained that the recovery order made against them in part under the transitional provisions were unlawful. They had claimed benefits as single people but were married to each other and for a house not occupied. The difficulty was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.572397

Regina v Ahmed: CACD 8 Feb 2000

The appellant had pleaded guilty to three offences of conspiracy to defraud by inflating invoices for goods supplied. The first of those offences took place at a time between January 1995 and October 2006; the second between January 1995 and June 2007; and the third between January 1997 and 30 November 2007. Section 16(5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, which was the statute under which the confiscation orders were sought, provided: ‘Section 1 . . shall not apply in the case of any proceedings against any person where that person is convicted in those proceedings of an offence which was committed before the commencement of that section.’
The section came into force on 1 November 1995. In each of the otter cases there were overt acts committed in pursuance of the existence of the relevant conspiracy both before and after that date, 1st November 1995. Counsel’s submission was that as the conspiracies in Counts 1 and 2 ran from 1st January 1995, the offences in Counts 1 and 2 were being committed both before and after 1st November 1995. That being so in these proceedings the appellant was ‘convicted . . of an offence which was committed before [1st November 1995]’. It followed that the judge had the discretion to make an order in the full agreed sum of pounds 40,000 or a lesser sum or none at all.’
Lord Justice Kennedy, Mr Justice Goldring and Sir Charles McCullough
Unreported, 8 February 2000, 9905818X4
Criminal Justice Act 1988 71
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – McCool, Regina v SC 2-May-2018
The appellants complained that the recovery order made against them in part under the transitional provisions were unlawful. They had claimed benefits as single people but were married to each other and for a house not occupied. The difficulty was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.182380

Simpson v Regina: CACD 23 May 2003

The appellant challenged a confiscation order made on his conviction of VAT fraud. It was argued that one could not be made unless a proper notice had been given, and none of the offences occurred before 1995. On the assumption that section 1 of the 1995 Act was not in force, did the fact that the notice served by the prosecution was not in the form required by section 72, CJA 1988 mean that the court had no jurisdiction to make a confiscation order?
Held: The court had sat with 5 judges to consider the decision in Sekhon. The rules as to precedent reflect the practice of the courts and have to be applied bearing in mind that their objective is to assist in the administration of justice. The law was misunderstood and misapplied in Palmer. The court applied Sekhon and found that it had jurisdiction to make the order. Having considered the evidence put before the judge, his conclusions as to the resources available to the defendant were not to be criticised. The provisions concerning postponement were directory only.
Lord Woolf CJ: ‘The rules as to precedent reflect the practice of the courts and have to be applied bearing in mind that their objective is to assist in the administration of justice. They are of considerable importance because of their role in achieving the appropriate degree of certainty as to the law. This is an important requirement of any system of justice. The principles should not, however, be regarded as so rigid that they cannot develop in order to meet contemporary needs. ‘
Lord Justice Kennedy Mr Justice Mitchell Mrs Justice Hallett Mr Justice Pitchers Lord Chief Justice Of England And Wales
[2003] EWCA Crim 1499, Times 26-May-2003, Gazette 10-Jul-2003, [2004] QB 118, [2003] 3 WLR 337, [2003] Cr App R 36, [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 24, [2003] 2 Cr App R 36, [2003] 3 All ER 531
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 1988 71, Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 16(5)(c)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Sekhon, etc v Regina CACD 16-Dec-2002
The defendants appealed against confiscation orders on the basis that in various ways, the Crown had failed to comply with procedural requirements.
Held: The courts must remember the importance of such procedures in the fight against crime, . .
Disapproved – Palmer, Regina v CACD 11-Oct-2002
The defendant appealed against a very substantial confiscation order. The prosecution had served notices under sections 71 and 72(1), but the section 72(1) notice was invalid. The judge allowed a second notice to be served, and the case to be . .
Cited – In re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd CA 1990
The court gave guidelines for the periods of disqualification to be applied for company directors under the Act. The maximum period of ten years should be reserved for only the most serious of cases. Periods of two to five years should apply to . .
Cited – Young v The Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd CA 28-Jul-1944
Court of Appeal must follow Own Decisions
The claimant was injured and received compensation. He then sought to recover again, alleging breach of statutory duty by his employers.
Held: The Court of Appeal was in general bound to follow its own previous decisions. The court considered . .
Cited – Mirehouse v Rennell 1833
Parke B described how the elements of a common law offence are to be distilled from the cases in which the relevant principles have been set out: ‘Our common-law system consists in the applying to new combinations of circumstances those rules of law . .
Cited – Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) HL 1966
The House gave guidance how it would treat an invitation to depart from a previous decision of the House. Such a course was possible, but the direction was not an ‘open sesame’ for a differently constituted committee to prefer their views to those . .
Cited – Regina v Merriman CACD 1973
Although the criminal division of the Court of Appeal is not so strictly bound by its own previous decisions as is the civil division, its liberty to depart from precedent which it is convinced was erroneous is restricted to cases where the . .
Cited – Regina v Gould CACD 1968
Diplock LJ said: ‘In its criminal jurisdiction, which it has inherited from the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Court of Appeal does not apply the doctrine of stare decisis with the same rigidity as in its civil jurisdiction. If upon due consideration . .
Cited – Critchell v Lambeth Borough Council CA 1957
The court considered conflicting interpretations of Acts: It would be wrong for the court to introduce into a matter already in all conscience complicated enough, and made complicated by imperfections of drafting, refinements and narrow distinctions . .
Cited – Regina v Copeland CACD 2002
The court considered the necessary of any postponment of a dermination of a confiscation order.
Held: The court rejected the contention that the postponement order must specify the period of postponement. It was pointed out that the word used . .
Cited – Regina v Newsome CACD 1970
The court was dealing with the question of a guideline judgment on sentence. There was good reason to adopt a flexible approach. The discretion to depart from a previous precedent was not to be exercised lightly and we endorse that restrictive and . .

Cited by:
Cited – Regina v R (Sentencing: Extended licences) CACD 25-Jul-2003
The imposition of an extended period of licence in respect of offences committed before 1992 did not infringe the defendant’s human rights. The defendant had been convicted of offences from 1976 and 1982. The commencement date for the 1991 Act was 1 . .
Cited – Goodyear, Karl, Regina v CACD 19-Apr-2005
The defendant complained that he had pleaded guilty to a charge of corruption on the basis of an indication from the judge that he would not receive a custodial sentence. Having pleaded guilty he had then been sentenced to a six months prison . .
Cited – Regina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005
The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .
Cited – Gazette Media Company Ltd. and Others, Regina (on the Application Of) v Teeside Crown Court CACD 26-Jul-2005
The claimants appealed an order restricting their reporting of a criminal case so as to identify the defendant.
Held: Orders preventing the naming of a defendant in order to protect associated children are unlikely to enhance any child . .
Cited – James, Regina v; Regina v Karimi CACD 25-Jan-2006
The defendants appealed their convictions for murder, saying that the court had not properly guided the jury on provocation. The court was faced with apparently conflicting decision of the House of Lords (Smith) and the Privy Council (Holley).
Cited – In re Hill and Others (Restraint Order) CACD 20-Dec-2005
The Revenue appealed against discharge of a restraint order. The discharge had been on the basis that some of the offences under investigation (perpetrating a fraud on the revenue) took place before the 2002 Act came into effect.
Held: The . .
Cited – Rowe v Regina CACD 15-Mar-2007
The defendant had been convicted of possessing articles for terrorist purposes, namely a notebook with notes setting out how to construct a mortar bomb in his handwriting. There was also a coded list of potential targets.
Held: The decision in . .
Cited – McCool, Regina v SC 2-May-2018
The appellants complained that the recovery order made against them in part under the transitional provisions were unlawful. They had claimed benefits as single people but were married to each other and for a house not occupied. The difficulty was . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.182379

Regina v Burgess: CACD 28 Nov 2000

Where the court considered making a deprivation order, it may be inevitable that the effect will be different on different defendants. Although the court might want to treat defendants equally, that could only be taken so far. It must frequently arise that there are differences between defendants in financial circumstances, and the provision in this case by one defendant of a vehicle used by all defendants created an imbalance. A deprivation order would lead to an imbalance, but it remained a fair and proper decision, despite the existence of a joint venture.
Times 28-Nov-2000
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 43
England and Wales

Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.88397

Attorney General v Associated Newspapers Ltd and News Group Newspapers Ltd: Admn 19 Jul 2011

The court considered the sentence for contempt of court by the defendant newspapers (Daily Mail and The Sun) in their online publication of a photograph which had not been cropped in the way required to avoid the prejudice complained of.
Held: Though in one case the photograph had been removed after only a few hours, each defendant was ordered to pay a fine of pounds 15,000 and the A-G’s costs summarily assessed.
Moses LJ, Owen J
[2011] EWHC 1894 (Admin)
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Attorney General v ITV Central Ltd Admn 15-Jul-2008
The Attorney General sought a finding of contempt against the defendant television company in respect of its reporting of a criminal trial. The defendant in the trial faced a charge of murder. The company broacast to the region on the morning of the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 July 2021; Ref: scu.441965

Regina v G (Sex Offence: Registration): CACD 26 Jan 2000

Where a court came to sentence a defendant for an offence which would make him liable for registration on the Sex Offenders Register, the judge should avoid confusion, by dealing explicitly with the issue, including the need to register, and the period of registration.
Times 26-Jan-2000
Sex Offenders Act 1997
England and Wales

Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.85264

Regina v Kelly; R v Sandford: CACD 29 Dec 1998

The words of the Act imposing mandatory sentences save in exceptional cases are clear, and the word ‘exceptional’ has accepted meanings which are not to be extended by reference to the Convention on Human Rights. Mandatory life sentences were confirmed.
‘We must construe ‘exceptional’ as an ordinary, familiar English adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.’
Times 29-Dec-1998, [1999] 2 Cr App R(S) 178
Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 2
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – S, Regina v CACD 25-Feb-2002
Appeal against sentence for rape, as the result of a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Life sentence imposed because of historic serious violence. The court was asked what were ‘exceptional circumstances’ so as to allow a non-life . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.85339

Regina v Rock (Sentencing Remarks); 2 Jun 2016

Links: JUSTICIARY
Coram: HHJ McCreath
Ratio:Southwark Crown Court – The defendant was convicted on five counts of downloading indecent images of children. The images whilst serious were not of the worst kind. The defendant had already attended courses as to his behaviour.
Held: He was made subject to an order restricting his use of the internet other than with a machine which would record his activity.

Last Update: 21-Jun-16
Ref: 565710

Regina v Piggott; 2 Dec 1994

References: Unreported transcript 2 November 1994
Ratio The offender had pleaded guilty to two offences of robbery. He sought to rely on information he had provided to the police in mitigaion. At a hearing before the sentencing judge on 4 November 1993, the police provided the court with a text. At a further hearing on 24 November 1993, defence counsel indicated that there was further relevant material not set out in the text. Prosecuting counsel said he did not know if there was any more information. The judge adjourned sentence for 14 days to enable the defence to put matters before the prosecution. When the case was listed for sentence, there was no new material and the judge proceeded to sentence. The offender appealed and was granted leave on the basis that he had provided material to the court which, if confirmed by the police, would be relevant to sentence. The court directed that the prosecution attend on the appeal and that it should put itself in a position where it could confirm or not confirm the material put forward by the offender. When the appeal was brought on for hearing, no more information had been provided; after argument, the court directed that any relevant information be provided. When the court next sat for the hearing of the appeal, information was provided that broadly confirmed the matters that the offender had sought to have confirmed before the trial judge.
Held: The court was critical of the position taken by the police. It observed: ‘More important the sentencing judge was not made aware of matters of potential relevance to his sentencing decision when the interests of justice required that he should have been given the information now available to this court.
The position facing police officers in the present context is never straight forward and requires careful judgment. However, we reject any suggestion that the decision whether to provide a text or not is simply a matter for the discretion of the police. In principle, if a defendant seeks to put material before the court by way of mitigation, which the court will not begin to consider unless confirmed in writing by the prosecution authority, then accurate information in the appropriate form confirming or refuting, in whole or in part, the assertions made by or on behalf of the defendant should be made available to the sentencing court by the prosecution.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – AXN -v- The Queen CACD (Bailii, [2016] EWCA Crim 590)
    The defendant argued that geater note should have been taken on his sentencing to allow for the assistance he had given to the police after his arrest.
    Held: the current accepted practice is that the tesxt of the letter from the police to the . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 28-May-16
Ref: 564848

The Queen v Johns (TS); 7 Feb 1980

References: (1980) 143 CLR 108, [1980] HCA 3
Links: Austlii
Coram: Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ
High Court of Australia – Criminal Law (N.S.W.) – Accessory before the fact – Liability – Possible consequences of venture planned with principal in first degree – Sentence of accessory – Whether judge may impose sentence of less duration than life – Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.), ss. 19, 346, 442 (1).
The appellant had been convicted of murder and assault with intent to rob. His role was to drive the principal offender, W, to a rendezvous with a third man, D. The appellant was to wait at the rendezvous while the other two men robbed a known receiver of stolen jewellery. Afterwards the appellant was to take possession of the proceeds and hide them in return for a share. The appellant knew that W was carrying a pistol, and W told him that he would not stand for any nonsense if he met any obstacle during the robbery. In the event the victim resisted and W shot him dead.
The judge had directed the jury that the appellant and D would be guilty if the act constituting the offence committed was within the contemplation of the parties as an act done in the course of the venture on which they had embarked. It was argued on the appellant’s behalf that while this was an appropriate direction in the case of D, who was present and therefore a principal in the second degree, it was a misdirection in the case of the appellant, who was an accessory before the fact. It was submitted that in his case it was necessary for the jury to conclude that it was a likely or probable consequence of the way in which the crime was to be committed that the gun would be discharged so as to kill the deceased.
Held: The High Court unanimously rejected the argument that any distinction was to be drawn between the liability of a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact. There was no reason as a matter of legal principle why such a distinction should be drawn. They also said: ‘The narrow test of criminality proposed by the applicant is plainly unacceptable for the reason that it stakes everything on the probability or improbability of the act, admittedly contemplated, occurring. Suppose a plan made by A, the principal offender, and B, the accessory before the fact, to rob premises, according to which A is to carry out the robbery. It is agreed that A is to carry a revolver and use it to overcome resistance in the unlikely event that the premises are attended, previous surveillance having established that the premises are invariably unattended at the time when the robbery is to be carried out. As it happens, a security officer is in attendance when A enters the premises and is shot by A. It would make nonsense to say that B is not guilty merely because it was an unlikely or improbable contingency that the premises would be attended at the time of the robbery, when we know that B assented to the shooting in the event that occurred.
In the present case there was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the applicant gave his assent to a criminal enterprise which involved the use, that is the discharge, of a loaded gun, in the event that [the victim] resisted or sought to summon assistance. We need not recapitulate the evidence to which we have already referred. The jury could therefore conclude that the common purpose involved resorting to violence of this kind, should the occasion arise, and that the violence contemplated amounted to grievous bodily harm or homicide.’
Last Update: 29-Feb-16 Ref: 560305

Judgment of Death As Pronounced On Earl Ferrers By The Lord High Steward (Lord Henley); 18 Apr 1670

References: [1670] EngR 33, (1670) 2 Eden 384, (1670) 28 ER 947
Links: Commonlii
Laurence, Lord Ferrers, His Majesty, from his royal and equal regard to justice, and his steady attention to our constitution (which hath endeared him in a wonderful manner to the universal duty and affection of his subjects) hath commanded this inquiry to be made, upon the blood of a very ordinary subject, against your Lordship a peer of this realm. Your Lordship hath been arraigned; hath pleaded and put yourself on your peers, and they (whose judicature is founded and subsists in wisdom, honor and justice) have unanimously found your Lordship guilty of the felony and murder charged in the indictment.
It is usual, my Lord, for courts of justice before they pronounce the dreadful sentence ordained by the law, to open to the prisoner the nature of the crime of which he is convicted ; not in order to aggravate or afflict, but to awaken the mind to a due attention to, and consideration of the unhappy situation into which he hath brought himself.
My Lord, the crime of which your Lordship is found guilty, murder, is incapable of aggravation; and it is impossible but that during your Lordship’s long confinement, you must have reflected upon it, represented to your mind in its deepest shades, and with all its train of dismal and detestable consequences.
As your Lordship hath received no benefit, so you can derive no consolation from that refuge you seemed almost ashamed to take under a pretended insanity ; since it hath appeared to us all, from your cross examination of the King’s witnesses, that you recollected the minutest circumstances of facts and conversations to which you and the witnesses only could be privy, with the exactness of a memory more than ordinarily sound : it is therefore as unnecessary as it would be painful to me, to dwell longer on a subject so black and dreadful.
It is with much more satisfaction that I can remind your Lordship, that though
from the present tribunal before which you now stand, you can receive nothing but strict and equal justice ; yet, you are soon to appear before an Almighty Judge, whose unfathomable wisdom is able, by means incomprehensible to our narrow capacities, to reconcile justice with mercy.

Regina v Patel; 7 Nov 2014

Links: Judiciary
Coram: Singh J
Crown Court at Southwark. Remarks of Singh J on the sentencing of the defendant for acquiring a biological toxin, namely Abrin. A first package had been obained via a website, but was discarded. He sought a second package, but by then the seller had been arrested and US police conducted negotiations and he in turn was arrested.
Held: This was the first time an offence under the section of the Act had come for sentencing. 3 years was imposed.
Statutes: Biological Weapons Act 1974 1

Richard Thompson v Regina: CACD 26 Mar 2004

References: [2004] EWCA Crim 669, Times 16-Apr-2004
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Justice Thomas
The defendant had been convicted of offences of possessing a large number of indecent images of children.
Held: In such cases, the prosecution should frame the charges following the classification in R v Oliver, with a small number of representative charges out of each category with a comprehensive charge for the balance. The defence should be given adequate time and facilities to check the classifications. It should be clear whether it was alleged that any image was a true or a pseudo image. In this case, and allowing for the mitigation available, the sentence was too long.
Statutes: Criminal Justice Act 1988 160(1) 160(2A)
This case cites:

  • Cited – Regina -v- Oliver etc CACD (Times 06-Dec-02, [2002] EWCA Crim 2766, [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 15, Bailii)
    The defendants appealed their sentences for possession and distribution of indecent images of children. The court gave detailed sentencing guidelines for the offences. Distinctions were made for the gradations of pornography, from erotic posing . .