The defendant had been involved in a road accident in which the plaintiff’s son had died, and had been convicted of careless driving. The plaintiff as the personal representative of his son sued for damages for negligence, seeking to rely on the conviction as prima facie evidence that the defendant was driving carelessly at the time. The judge rejected the conviction as evidence but found for the plaintiff on other grounds.
Held: On the defendant’s appeal the plaintiff claimed that the judge had been wrong to reject the conviction as such prima facie evidence. Relevance is the main consideration determining whether or not evidence is admissible. The conviction was inadmissible on two grounds; first, that the opinion of the court exercising the criminal jurisdiction as evidenced by the certificate of conviction was not relevant; second, as hearsay evidence it did not comply with the best evidence rule.
As to the first ground: ‘In truth, the conviction is only proof that another court considered that the defendant was guilty of careless driving. Even were it proved that it was the accident that led to the prosecution, the conviction proves no more than what has just been stated. The court which has to try the claim for damages knows nothing of the evidence that was before the criminal court. It cannot know what arguments were addressed to it, or what influenced the court in arriving at its decision. Moreover, the issue in the criminal proceedings is not identical with that raised in the claim for damages. Assume that evidence is called to prove that the defendant did collide with the plaintiff, that has only an evidential value on the issue whether the defendant, by driving carelessly, caused damage to the plaintiff. To link up or identify the careless driving with the accident, it would be necessary in most cases, probably in all, to call substantially the same evidence before the court trying the claim for personal injuries, and so proof of the conviction by itself would amount to no more than proof that the criminal court came to the conclusion that the defendant was guilty. It is admitted that the conviction is in no sense an estoppel, but only evidence to which the Court or a jury can attach such weight as they think proper, but it is obvious that once the defendant challenges the propriety of the conviction the court, on the subsequent trial, would have to retry the criminal case to find out what weight ought to be attached to the result. It frequently happens that a bystander has a complete and full view of an accident. It is beyond question that, while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but, in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not. The well recognised exception in the case of scientific or expert witnesses depends on considerations which, for present purposes, are immaterial. So, on the trial of the issue in the civil court, the opinion of the criminal court is equally irrelevant.’ Evidence of a prior conviction was not admissible in separate proceedings to establish the truth of the underlying allegation.
[1943] KB 587
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Levey, Regina v CACD 27-Jul-2006
The defendant appealed against his conviction of manslaughter of his baby son. He said that a family court had previously investigated the same allegations and had explicitly found itself unable to say which of himself and the mother were . .
Not applicable – Regina v Kordansinski CACD 7-Nov-2006
The defendant objected to the admission against him of documents of his convictions for similar sexual offences in Poland.
Held: So far as the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn ever applied in criminal cases, it was not disapplied by section 99 of . .
Cited – Simms v Conlon and Another CA 20-Dec-2006
Solicitors within a practice sued each other, and one wished to plead the fact of a finding of professional misconduct.
Held: The defendant’s appeal succeeded. It was not an abuse for the appellant to continue to assert his innocence, and the . .
Cited – Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v Aaron and others CA 16-Oct-2008
In asking a court to order the disqualification of a company director, the Secretary of State may call in evidence findings of the Financial Services Authority as to misconduct, but no those of the Financial Services Ombudsman. The rule in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.244675
