The defendant was an animal rights protester who had been convicted under section 2(2) of the 1997 Act of engaging in a course of conduct amounting to harassment of the employees of a company. The District Judge hearing the case made a restraining order against him.
Held: The court rejected the appellant’s primary ground (the appellant being the Director of Public Prosecutions in that case) that the District Judge should have allowed the case to proceed beyond the close of the prosecution case. Having disposed of the appeal the court continued to discuss other grounds finding that the Act was aimed at the protection solely of individuals and that therefore corporate persons could not be the victims of harassment and be granted the person protected by a restraining order: ‘I accept of course that the word ‘person’, unless the contrary intention is shown, is, as Mr Hatton on behalf of the Crown submits, to be understood, by virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978, as including a body of persons corporate or incorporate. But that said, it seems to me that the legislative history to which, in my view, reference can properly be made when construing what is meant by the word ‘person’ in section 1 of the Act, points against person here meaning a corporation. It is to my mind also significant that in section 4(1) the word ‘him’ is used, and in section 5(2) the word ‘victim’ is used.’
Judges:
Rose LJ, Gibbs J
Citations:
[2002] EWHC 1380 (Admin), (2002) 166 JP 545
Links:
Statutes:
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 2(2), Interpretation Act 1978
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Buxton and Others, Regina v CACD 1-Dec-2010
The defendant environmental protesters had been convicted of obstructing a railway. They now appealed against the terms of a restraining order made under the 1997 Act. They said that an order could not be made to protect a limited company.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Sentencing
Updated: 30 July 2022; Ref: scu.347797
