Category: Transport

North Star Shipping Ltd and others v Sphere Drake Insurance Plc and others: ComC 22 Apr 2005

[2005] EWHC 665 (Comm), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 76, [2005] 2 CLC 238
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – North Star Shipping Ltd. and others v Sphere Drake Insurance Plc and others ComC 27-Oct-2004
. .

Cited by:
Appeal from – North Star Shipping Ltd and others v Sphere Drake Insurance Plc and others CA 7-Apr-2006
A claim was made under a marine insurance policy for damage caused to a vessel by an explosion. Underwriters alleged that they were entitled to avoid the policies for (inter alia) non-disclosure of the existence of criminal proceedings in Greece . .
Cited – Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others v Atlasnavios-Navegacao Lda SC 22-May-2018
The vessel had been taken by the authorities in Venezuela after drugs were found to have been attached to its hull by third parties. Six months later it was declared a constructive total loss. The ship owners now sought recovery of its value from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.224563

Royal Greek Government v Minister of Transport (The Ann Stathatos): 1949

The ship had been chartered, but the crew refused to sail without an escort, in war conditions. The charterer sought to be excused liability under a clause making allowance for ‘insufficiency of crew’.
Held: The presumption against surplusage is of little value in the interpretation of commercial contracts. Devlin J said: ‘A charter-party is built up of clauses generally agreed in the trade; and when they are added to or varied from time to time, as not infrequently they are, I doubt that the commercial draftsmen pay much attention to overlapping or that they are afraid of repetition. Secondly, the argument based on superfluity, which, as has often been said, is of little value in the construction of commercial documents, is hardly applicable at all to Clause 13. Whatever construction is put upon Clause 9, the second part of Clause 13 is, from a lawyer’s point of view, superfluous. All that it is saying legally is that the charterer is responsible for breach of the charter-party or for negligence’ and ‘if [the owner] is to surrender his freedom of choice and put his master under the orders of the charterer, there is nothing unreasonable in his stipulating for a complete indemnity in return.’
The existence of an exceptions clause is itself likely to affect what falls to be regarded as dominant, proximate or relevant; and that this is because ‘the whole of what one might call the area naturally appurtenant to the excepted event must be granted to it’.
Devlin J
[1949] 83 Ll Rep 228
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Royal Greek Government v Minister of Transport CA 2-Jan-1949
The charterers had ordered the vessel to sail but her crew refused to do so, except in convoy, because of the war. A dispute arose as to whether, the charterers’ order to sail having been disobeyed, the vessel was off-hire.
Held: The appeal . .
Cited – Total Transport Corporation v Arcadia Petroleum Ltd (‘the Eurus’) CA 18-Nov-1997
Arcadia chartered the Eurus, and had succeeded in their application for an award in arbitration proceedings against Total. The award had been reversed, and they now appealed against that order. The parties disputed whether the amount was an award of . .
Cited – Petroleo Brasileiro Sa v Ene Kos 1 Ltd (‘The MT Kos’) SC 2-May-2012
The MT Kos had been chartered by the appellants. The respondents failed to make payments, and notice was given to withdraw the vessel. The contract said that such a notice was without prejudice to any claim. At the time, the vessel was laden. The . .
Cited – Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others v Atlasnavios-Navegacao Lda SC 22-May-2018
The vessel had been taken by the authorities in Venezuela after drugs were found to have been attached to its hull by third parties. Six months later it was declared a constructive total loss. The ship owners now sought recovery of its value from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.462284

Sunport Shipping Limited, Prometheus Maritime Corporation, Celestial Maritime Corporation, Surzur Overseas Limited v Tryg-Baltica International (UK) Ltd (Formerly Know As Colonia Baltica Insurance Ltd) and others: CA 24 Jan 2003

(The ‘Kleovoulos of Rhodes’) A large quantity of cocaine was discovered by divers behind a grille in a sea chest at the vessel’s discharge port, Aliveri – having been placed there by unknown third persons at the load port in Colombia, South America. The crew were ultimately acquitted of any involvement, but the vessel’s detainment lasted so long that she could be and was declared a constructive total loss under clause 3. The insurance policy incorporated standard provisions which excluded cover for ‘loss damage arising from detainment by reason of infringement of any customs or trading regulations.’ The ship was detained and the insurers refused payment.
Held: The term ‘customs regulations’, in a marine insurance law, had to be construed widely enough to include rules allowing the detention of a ship for contravention of controlled drugs and other prohibited goods laws.
Clarke LJ described the Hooley Hill Rubber principle as: ‘essentially a principle of construction. Thus the court is trying to ascertain the intention of the parties in using the expression deployed in the contract. Where a contract has been professionally drawn, as in the case of the Institute Clauses, the draftsman is certain to have in mind decisions of the courts on earlier editions of the clause. Such decisions are part of the context or background circumstances against which the particular contract falls to be construed. If the draftsman chooses to adopt the same words as previously construed by the courts, it seems to me to be likely that, other things being equal, he intends that the words should continue to have the same meaning.’
Mr Justice Scott Baker, Lord Justice Clarke, Lord Justice Peter Gibson
Times 03-Feb-2003, [2003] EWCA Civ 12, Gazette 20-Mar-2003, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 586, [2003] 1 LLR 138, [2003] Lloyds Rep IR 349
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Sunport Shipping Limited, Prometheus Maritime Corporation, Celestial Maritime Corporation, Surzur Overseas Limited v Tryg-Baltica International (UK) Limited, C N R Atkin ComC 27-Feb-2002
A claim was made under a marine insurance policy. The policy incorporated the Institute War and Strikes Clauses, Hulls-Time of 1/10/83, and included a clause ‘loss damage . . arising from . . Detainment . . by reason of infringement of any customs . .
Cited – Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright (The Anita) CA 1971
The burden is on Underwriters to bring themselves within an exclusion clause they seek to rely on.
Lord Denning distinguished between what might be described as justified or ‘connected’ political interference on the one hand and unjustified or . .
Cited – Re Hooley Hill Rubber and Royal Insurance Co CA 1920
When interprting a contract, it is assumed that the draftsman works with a view to certainty of sense and standardisation of terms. Bankes LJ said: ‘Courts should be chary in interfering with the interpretation given to a well-known document and . .

Cited by:
Cited – Bedfordshire Police Authority v Constable and others ComC 20-Jun-2008
The authority insured its primary liability for compensation under the 1886 Act through the claimants and the excess of liability through re-insurers. The parties sought clarification from the court of the respective liabilities of the insurance . .
Cited – Bedfordshire Police Authority v Constable CA 12-Feb-2009
The police had responded to a riot at Yarlswood detention centre. They had insurance to cover their liability under the 1886 Act, but the re-insurers said that the insurance did not cover the event, saying that the liability was for statutory . .
Cited – Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others v Atlasnavios-Navegacao Lda SC 22-May-2018
The vessel had been taken by the authorities in Venezuela after drugs were found to have been attached to its hull by third parties. Six months later it was declared a constructive total loss. The ship owners now sought recovery of its value from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.178796

Handelsbanken v Dandridge and others: CA 30 Apr 2002

The Aliza Glacial

Construction of two standard clauses in the Institute War and Strikes Clauses Hulls-Time, 1983 edition. Potter LJ treated the vessel’s loss, following the owners’ refusal to meet an outrageous ransom demand by a terrorist organisation, as outside the scope of a loss by ‘any financial cause’ in clause 4.1.7.
Lord Justice Potter
[2002] EWCA Civ 577, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 421, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 39
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others v Atlasnavios-Navegacao Lda SC 22-May-2018
The vessel had been taken by the authorities in Venezuela after drugs were found to have been attached to its hull by third parties. Six months later it was declared a constructive total loss. The ship owners now sought recovery of its value from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.171232

Atlasnavios-Navegacao, Lda v Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others: CA 1 Aug 2016

(The B Atlantic) The court was asked whether Flaux J was right to find that the owners of a ship were entitled to be indemnified by the insurers in respect of the constructive total loss of the vessel under war insurance after detention ‘by reason of infringement of any customs . . regulations’
Held: The appeal succeeded. There was no foundation for the implied limitation. Clause 4.1.5 operated to exclude liability.
Laws, Christopher Clarke LJJ, Sir Timothy Lloyd
[2016] EWCA Civ 808, [2016] WLR(D) 456, [2016] 2 CLC 349, [2017] 1 WLR 1303, [2016] Lloyd’s Rep IR 565, [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 351, [2017] 1 All ER (Comm) 401
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales
Citing:
Preliminary Issues ComC – Atlasnavios-Navegacao, Lda v Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others ComC 29-Mar-2012
Trial of preliminary issues in an action in which the Claimant claims under its war risks insurance for the constructive total loss of the vessel ‘B Atlantic’ (‘the Vessel’). Between 7 and 12 August 2007 the Vessel loaded a cargo of coal at . .
At ComC – Atlasnavios-Navegacao, LDA v Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others ComC 8-Dec-2014
The claimant’s vessel and its crew had been detaiined after illegal drugs were found to be attached to its hull in port in Venezuala by ship crew members. The ship owners asserted effective total loss. . .

Cited by:
At CA – Navigators Insurance Company Ltd and Others v Atlasnavios-Navegacao Lda SC 22-May-2018
The vessel had been taken by the authorities in Venezuela after drugs were found to have been attached to its hull by third parties, Six months later it was declared a constructive total loss. The ship owners now sought recovery of its value from . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.567828

Didymi Corporation v Atlantic Lines and Navigation Co Inc ‘The Didymi’: CA 1988

A contract contained a clause covering the rate of hire of a 5 year time charter: ’30(1) The … speed and fuel consumption of the vessel as stipulated in this charter-party are representations by the owners. Should the actual performance of the vessel taken on an average basis throughout the duration of this charter-party show any failure to satisfy one or more of such representations, the hire shall be equitably decreased by an amount to be mutually agreed between owners and charterers …’ The Court asked whether this provided sufficient certainty to give rise to a binding obligation, a substantive obligation of the parties, rather than a procedural question of how the substantive right might be determined. It was argued that the clause was not enforceable, because it was an agreement to agree.
Held: The substantive obligation was sufficiently spelt out by the reference to ‘equitably’ and that the provision for mutual agreement was no more than procedural mechanics.
Bingham LJ
[1988] 2 Lloyds Rep 108
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton HL 1982
The grantors of an option, which contained a machinery for fixing the price, had refused to appoint a valuer and that made it impossible for the contractual machinery for the valuation of the option price to work. The House of Lords held that the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Davies Middleton and Davies Ltd v Toyo Engineering Corporation CA 29-Aug-1997
Parties to a dispute agreed a way of resolving issues before arbitration. One party then sought to say that the agreement was void for uncertainty, being an agreement to agree.
Held: The agreement merely set a mechansim for resolving the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.188392

Sheffield District Railway co v Great Central Railway Co: 1911

(Rail and Canal Commissioners) The Sheffield District Railway agreed (in a contract appended to a special Act of Parliament, with the Lancashire, Derbyshire and East Coast Railway for the operation of a short line with two stations by means of which traffic gained access to Sheffield. The Derbyshire was originally a competitor of the Great Central Railway which had many more stations and arranged for goods to be carted to and from its own stations rather than being left to use the stations of its competitors. The Derbyshire subsequently amalgamated with the Great Central Railway which took over the operation of the Sheffield on terms including an obligation to ‘use their best endeavours to develop the through and local traffic on and over the Railways’ of Sheffield. After the amalgamation, the Great Central continued to act as it had before, with the result that goods which could have been taken to or from one of the Sheffield’s stations were instead taken to or from one of the Great Central’s stations. The Sheffield complained that the Great Central was in breach of the obligation to use its best endeavours to develop its traffic.
Held: The defendant had taken on a quasi fiduciary position towards the plaintiff, which was akin to that of a bailiff or agent, and were obliged to treat the plaintiff no owrse than they would themselves.
The words imposed on the Great Central an obligation to leave no stone unturned, within the bounds of reason, to develop the Sheffield’s traffic. The object of the endeavours was not too uncertain to be capable of enforcement. An obligation to use ‘best endeavours’ does not require the person who undertakes it to go beyond the bounds of reason, he or she is required to do all that can reasonably be done in the circumstances to achieve the contractual object (but no more).
Lawrence J
(1911) 27 TLR 451, (1911) Ty and Can Tr Cas 299
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Midland Land Reclamation Ltd, Leicestershire County Council v Warren Energy Ltd TCC 20-Jan-1997
Claim of set-off . .
Cited – Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd and others CA 13-Jul-2004
. .
Cited – Trustees Ltd v Papakyriacou and Another CA 27-Oct-2009
The parties disputed the excessive use of a right of way by the defendant’s tenants. The claimant appealed against rejection of its claim of trespass. . .
Cited – EDI Central Ltd v National Car Parks Ltd SCS 20-Jan-2012
. .
Cited – Jet2Com Ltd v Blackpool Airport Ltd CA 2-Apr-2012
. .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.545179

Foy v Hertfordshire County Council: CA 1 May 1990

The council owned land over which a public right of way existed. For many years, the path had been part of land used from time to time for the storage of chippings. The plaintiff had complained that it was a highway.
Held: The Council’s appeal failed. The fact that a highway may be obstructed from time to time does mean that it ceases to be a highway. Whether the highway was in fact obstructed unlawfully would have to be tested in different proceedings.
Lloyd LJ said: ‘In this case we are concerned with a small triangle of land at Wilstone Green near Tring in Hertfordshire. It is shown well on a plan annexed to the amended defence of the Hertfordshire County Council at page 9 of the bundle. The triangle in question measures 40 feet from A to B, 120 feet from B to C and 120 feet from A to C. For many years the triangle has been used by the County Council, as highway authority, for the storage of stone chippings for the maintenance of the highway. The question before us is whether the triangle forms part of the highway’
Lloyd LJ, Bedlam LJ
Times 04-May-1990
England and Wales

Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.537763

Koleje Mazowieckie (Judgment): ECJ 8 Jul 2021

Reference for a preliminary ruling – Rail transport – Distribution of rail infrastructure capacity and pricing of rail infrastructure – Directive 2001/14 / EC – Article 4, paragraph 5 – Pricing – Article 30 – National control body responsible for ensuring compliance infrastructure charges to this directive – Contract for the use of an infrastructure concluded between the infrastructure manager and a railway undertaking – Incorrect transposition – State liability – Claim for damages – Prior referral to the national control body
C-120/20, [2021] EUECJ C-120/20
Bailii
European

Updated: 22 July 2021; Ref: scu.664375

Western Digital Corporation and others v British Airways plc: QBD 23 Jul 1999

A claim under the Convention could be brought by the consignor or the consignee, in either case as named on the waybill or by the person to whom delivery was ordered by the consignor. The owner of the goods had no standing to make a claim save to the extent that he was so named.
Times 23-Jul-1999
Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International Air Transport 1929
England and Wales

Updated: 21 July 2021; Ref: scu.90412

Evans and Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andrea Merzario Ltd: CA 1976

The defendants had carried previously goods aboard ship for the plaintiffs. This time, they were asked for and gave an oral re-assurance to the plaintiffs that the goods would be carried below deck. This did not happen and the goods were swept overboard.
Held: The collateral promise overrode the printed conditions. The carrier could not rely on his usual exceptions (including a limitation of liability to andpound;50 per ton) The oral undertaking that the goods would be carried under deck amounted to a collateral contract.
Lord Denning said: ‘The judge held there was no contractual promise that these containers should be carried under deck. He thought that, in order to be binding, the initial conversation ought to be contemporaneous; and that here it was too remote in point of time from the actual transport. Furthermore, that, viewed objectively, it should not be considered binding. The judge quoted largely from the well known case of Heilbut Symons and Co. v. Buckleton [1913] AC 30, in which it was held that a person is not liable for damages in innocent misrepresentation; and that the courts should be slow to hold that there was a collateral contract. I must say that much of what was said in that case is entirely out of date . . But even in respect of promises as to the future, we have a different approach nowadays to collateral contracts. When a person gives a promise or an assurance to another, intending that he should act on it by entering into a contract, and he does act on it by entering into the contract, we hold that it is binding.’ and ‘it seems to me plain that Mr Spano gave an oral promise or assurance that the goods in this new container traffic would be carried under deck. He made the promise in order to induce Mr Leonard to agree to the goods being carried in containers. On the faith of it, Mr Leonard accepted the quotations and gave orders for transport. In those circumstances the promise was binding. There was a breach of that promise and the forwarding agents are liable – unless they can rely on the printed conditions.’
Roskill LJ said: ‘The real question, as I venture to think, is not whether one calls this an assurance or a guarantee, but whether that which was said amounted to an enforceable contractual promise by the defendants to the plaintiffs that any goods thereafter entrusted by the plaintiffs to the defendants for carriage from Milan to the United Kingdom via Rotterdam and thence by sea to England would be shipped under deck.’
Lord Denning MR, Roskill and Geoffrey Lane LJJ
[1976] 1 WLR 1078, [1976] 2 All ER 930
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Heilbut Symons and Co v Buckleton HL 11-Nov-1912
In an action of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of warranty, the plaintiff founded on a conversation between himself and the defendants’ representative. In this conversation the plaintiff said-‘I understand that you are bringing . .
Cited – Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd CA 3-Mar-1965
When a person gives a promise or an assurance to another, intending that he should act on it by entering into a contract, and he does act on it by entering into the contract, it is binding.
Lord Denning MR said of a collateral warranty: . .

Cited by:
Cited – Frans Maas (Uk) Ltd v Samsung Electronics (Uk) Ltd ComC 30-Jun-2004
A large volume of mobile phones were stolen from a warehouse. The owner claimed damages from the bailee. The defendant said that standard terms applied limiting their responsibility to value calculated by weight.
Held: There was a bailment . .
Cited – Brikom Investments v Carr 1979
A reversioner can grant rights in respect of covenants in the lease which bind reversioners by way of a collateral contract. When a person makes a representation intending that another should act on it: ‘It is no answer for the maker to say: ‘You . .
Cited – Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd SC 16-May-2018
The parties disputed whether a contract (licence to occupy an office) had been varied by an oral agreement, where the terms prohibited such.
Held: The ‘no oral variation’ clause applied. Such clauses were in common commercial use and served a . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 July 2021; Ref: scu.181085

Lucena v Craufurd: HL 29 Jun 1808

Commissioners were authorized by a commission granted in pursuance of a statute, to take into their possession ships and goods belonging to subjects of the United Provinces, which had been or might be detained in or brought into the ports of this kingdom, and to manage, sell, and dispose of the same to the best advantage, according to such instructions as they should receive from the king in council; before any declaration of war against the United Provinces, one of his majesty’s ships took several Dutch East Indiamen, and carried them into St. Helena. The commissioners, with the assent of the Lords of the Treasury, insured them at and from St. Helena to London. War was soon after declared against the United Provinces, and the ships were finally condemned as prize to his majesty, ‘as having belonged, when taken, to subjects of the United Provinces, since became enemies.’ Upon a loss happening, the commissioners declared on the policy, and averred the interest to be in the king, and held that the action well lay.
[1808] EngR 262, (1808) 1 Taunt 325, (1808) 127 ER 858
Commonlii
Marine Insurance Act 1745
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Lucena v Craufurd CEC 1802
Enemy ships which had been captured were insured for their return to England. A claim arose. The insurance provider said that the claim failed under the 1745 Act as a wager since the claimant had no insurable interest in the ships.
Held: . .
See Also – Lucena v Craufurd HL 1806
Before the declaration of war, against the United Provinces, His Majesty’s ships took possession of several ships belonging to Dutch East India men, and took them to St Helena. The Commissioners then insured the ships for their journey from St . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.238201

Brimnes, the Tenax Steamship Co v Brimnes, Owners of: CA 23 May 1974

The ship’s owners sent a telex to the charterers at 5.45 pm on 2 April 1970 withdrawing the vessel for late payment of the hire charge. The charterers’ normal business hours ended at 6.00 pm. The telex was not seen until the morning of 3 April, although it had arrived in the charterers’ office at 5.45 pm on 2 April.
Held: The charterer’s appeal failed. It was deemed received before close of business on the 2nd. A contract may be terminated by one party without the other party being actually aware of the communication of the termination. The contract is terminated at the time when notice of the termination would ‘in the normal course of business’ have come to the other party’s attention on its arrival.
Megaw LJ said: ‘if a notice arrives at the address of the person to be notified, at such a time and by such a means of communication that it would in the normal course of business come to the attention of that person on its arrival, that person cannot rely on some failure of himself or his servants to act in a normal businesslike manner in respect of taking cognisance of the communication so as to postpone the effective time of the notice until some later time when it in fact came to his attention.’
Cairns LJ observed: ‘In my opinion, the general rule is that notice must reach the mind of the charterer or of some responsible person on his behalf. There must clearly be exceptions to this rule: for example, if the charterer or his agent deliberately keeps out of the way, or refrains from opening a letter with a view to avoiding the receipt of notice. How much further than this do exceptions go? I feel little doubt that if an office were closed all day on an ordinary working day, though without any thought of a notice of withdrawal arriving, such a notice delivered by post on that day must be regarded as then received.’
Edmund Davies LJ, Megaw LJ, Cairns LJ
[1974] EWCA Civ 15, [1975] QB 929, [1974] 3 All ER 88
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal From – Brimnes, The Tenax Steamship Co v Brimnes, Owners of 1973
. .

Cited by:
Distinguished – Gisda Cyf v Barratt CA 2-Jul-2009
The employer wrote to the employee on 29 November 2006 informing her of her dismissal, the letter arrived on the 30th, and she read it on the 4th of December. The employer appealed against a finding that the effective date of dismissal was the date . .
Cited – Gisda Cyf v Barratt SC 13-Oct-2010
The parties disputed the effective date of termination of the claimant’s employment. Was it the date on which the letter notifying her was sent, or was it on the day she received it. She had been dimissed without notice, and the date was the date on . .
Cited – Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Haywood SC 25-Apr-2018
Notice of dismissal begins when received by worker
The court was asked: ‘If an employee is dismissed on written notice posted to his home address, when does the notice period begin to run? Is it when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post? Or when it was in fact . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.262728

Brimnes, The Tenax Steamship Co v Brimnes, Owners of: 1973

Brandon J
[1973] 1 WLR 386
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal From – Brimnes, the Tenax Steamship Co v Brimnes, Owners of CA 23-May-1974
The ship’s owners sent a telex to the charterers at 5.45 pm on 2 April 1970 withdrawing the vessel for late payment of the hire charge. The charterers’ normal business hours ended at 6.00 pm. The telex was not seen until the morning of 3 April, . .
Mentioned – Gisda Cyf v Barratt CA 2-Jul-2009
The employer wrote to the employee on 29 November 2006 informing her of her dismissal, the letter arrived on the 30th, and she read it on the 4th of December. The employer appealed against a finding that the effective date of dismissal was the date . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 July 2021; Ref: scu.372327

Staatsanwaltschaft Koln and Bundesamt Fur Guterverkehr (Judgment): ECJ 8 Jul 2021

Reference for a preliminary ruling – Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 – Article 1 (5) (d) – Article 8 – International carriage of goods by road from one Member State to another Member State – Transport of cabotage resulting from this international transport on the territory of the latter Member State – Restrictions – Requirement for a Community license and, where applicable, a transport authorization – Exceptions – Cabotage transport following international transport for own account – Conditions
C-937/19, [2021] EUECJ C-937/19, ECLI: EU: C: 2021: 555
Bailii
European

Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.664382

Aer Lingus v Commission: ECFI 5 Feb 2015

ECJ (Judgment) State aid – Irish tax on air passengers – Lower rate for destinations no more than 300 km from Dublin – Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery – Advantage – Selective nature – Identification of the beneficiaries of the aid – Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 – Obligation to state reasons
T-473/12, [2015] EUECJ T-473/12, ECLI:EU:T:2015:78
Bailii
European

Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.542285

Anklagemyndigheden v VAS Shipping (Opinion): ECJ 10 Jun 2021

Reference for a preliminary ruling – Articles 49 and 54 TFEU -Freedom of establishment – Obligation under national law for third-country crew members of vessels flying the flag of that Member State to obtain a work permit – Exception for vessels in international traffic which do not enter ports of the Member State more than 25 times in a year – Vessel owned by a national of another Member State – Non-discriminatory – Concept of ‘restriction’ – Overriding reasons in the general interest – Stability of labour market – Proportionality
ECLI:EU:C:2021:474, C-71/20, [2021] EUECJ C-71/20_O
Bailii
European
Cited by:
Opinion – VAS Shipping (Judgment) ECJ 8-Jul-2021
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Articles 49 and 54 TFEU – Freedom of establishment – National legislation requiring third-country nationals employed on a vessel flying the flag of a Member State to be in possession of a work permit in that . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 July 2021; Ref: scu.664355

VAS Shipping (Judgment): ECJ 8 Jul 2021

Reference for a preliminary ruling – Articles 49 and 54 TFEU – Freedom of establishment – National legislation requiring third-country nationals employed on a vessel flying the flag of a Member State to be in possession of a work permit in that Member State – Exception for ships which do not call at Member State ports more than 25 times during a period of one year – Restriction – Article 79 (5) TFEU – National rules to fix the entry volumes of nationals from third countries, from third countries, to the territory of the Member State concerned in order to seek employment there as a salaried or self-employed person
[2021] EUECJ C-71/20
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Opinion – Anklagemyndigheden v VAS Shipping (Opinion) ECJ 10-Jun-2021
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Articles 49 and 54 TFEU -Freedom of establishment – Obligation under national law for third-country crew members of vessels flying the flag of that Member State to obtain a work permit – Exception for vessels in . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 13 July 2021; Ref: scu.664392

Hick v Raymond and Reid: HL 1893

The House was asked whether the consignee of a cargo was in breach of a contractual obligation to discharge the relevant vessel within a reasonable time, that is to say, a single obligation to do something within a reasonable time, rather than an obligation to do a number of things, where there was a single cause of delay, namely a strike of dockworkers, over which the consignee had no control and the effect of which, while it lasted, was to prevent totally performance of the obligation.
Held: Lord Herschell: ‘The bills of lading in the present case contained no such stipulation [as to time for performance], and, therefore, in accordance with ordinary and well-known principles the obligation of the respondents was that they should take discharge of the cargo within a reasonable time. The question is, has the appellant proved that this reasonable time has been exceeded? This depends upon what circumstances may be taken into consideration in determining whether more than a reasonable time was occupied . . The appellant’s contention is, that inasmuch as the obligation to take discharge of the cargo, and to provide the necessary labour for that purpose, rested upon the respondents, the test is what time would have been required for the discharge of the vessel under ordinary circumstances, and that, inasmuch as they have to provide the labour, they must be responsible if the discharge is delayed beyond that period. The respondents on the other hand contend that the question is not what time would have been necessary or what time would have been reasonable under ordinary circumstances, but what time was reasonable under existing circumstances, assuming that, in so far as the existing circumstances were extraordinary, they were not due to any act or default on the part of the respondents. My Lords, there appears to me to be no direct authority upon the point, although there are judgments bearing on the subject to which I will presently call attention. I would observe, in the first place, that there is of course no such thing as a reasonable time in the abstract. It must always depend upon circumstances. Upon ‘the ordinary circumstances’ say the learned counsel for the appellant. But what may without impropriety be termed the ordinary circumstances differ in particular ports at different times of the year. As regards the practicability of discharging a vessel they may differ in summer and winter. Again, weather increasing the difficulty of, though not preventing, the discharge of a vessel may continue for so long a period that it may justly be termed extraordinary. Could it be contended that in so far as it lasted beyond the ordinary period the delay caused by it was to be excluded in determining whether the cargo had been discharged within a reasonable time? It appears to me that the appellant’s contention would involve constant difficulty and dispute, and that the only sound principle is that the ‘reasonable time’ should depend on the circumstances which actually exist. If the cargo has been taken with all reasonable despatch under those circumstances I think the obligation of the consignee has been fulfilled. When I say the circumstances which actually exist, I, of course, imply that those circumstances, in so far as they involve delay, have not been caused or contributed to by the consignee. I think the balance of authority, both as regards the cases which relate to contracts by a consignee to take discharge, and those in which the question what is a reasonable time has had to be answered when analogous obligations were under consideration, is distinctly in favour of the view taken by the Court below.’ Lord Watson: ‘When the language of a contract does not expressly, or by necessary implication, fix any time for the performance of the contractual obligation, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time. The rule is of general application, and is not confined to contracts for the carriage of goods by sea. In the case of other contracts the condition of reasonable time has been frequently interpreted; and has invariably been held to mean that the party upon whom it is incumbent duly fulfils his obligation, notwithstanding protracted delay, so long as such delay is attributable to causes beyond his control, and he has neither acted negligently nor unreasonably.’
Lord Watson said: ‘When the language of a contract does not expressly, or by necessary implication, fix any time for the performance of a contractual obligation, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time. The rule is of general application, and is not confined to contracts for the carriage of goods by sea. In the case of other contracts the condition of reasonable time has been frequently interpreted; and has invariably been held to mean that the party upon whom it is incumbent duly fulfils his obligation, notwithstanding protracted delay, so long as such delay is attributable to causes beyond his control, and he has neither acted negligently nor unreasonably.’
Lord Herschell LC
[1893] AC 22
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Astea (UK) Ltd v Time Group Ltd TCC 9-Apr-2003
The question of whether a reasonable time has been exceeded in performance of a contract is ‘a broad consideration, with the benefit of hindsight, and viewed from the time at which one party contends that a reasonable time for performance has been . .
Cited – Peregrine Systems Ltd v Steria Ltd CA 14-Mar-2005
The claimant provided computer software to the defendants. The defendants appealed dismissal of their defences arguing that the system had failed.
Held: No repudiatory breach was established, and moreover Steria had elected to affirm the . .
Cited – Shawton Engineering Ltd v Dgp International Ltd (T/A Design Group Partnership) and Another CA 18-Nov-2005
There had been a very substantial construction project, in which certain facets of design were sub-contracted and sub-contracted again to the parties. There were substantial delays and a sub-contractor purported to terminate the contract for failing . .
Cited – Coulson v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd QBD 21-Dec-2011
coulson_NIQBD2011
The claimant had been employed by the defendant as editor of a newspaper. On leaving they entered into an agreement which the claimant said required the defendant to pay his legal costs in any action arising regarding his editorship. The defendant . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.223517

Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance plc (The Moonacre): 1992

S, a retired businessman, had bought a vessel and insured it in his name, but registered it in the name of company, R. In the winter, the boat was laid up, but occupied by a workman who maintained it and kept it secure. The boat was destroyed by a fire. The insurers argued that S had no insurable interest in the vessel, albeit by agreement with R he was entitled to exclusive use and control of the vessel. They also argued that it was used as a houseboat which was covered by an exclusion, and further that there had been non-disclosure on renewal of a theft from the boat, and that the signature on the application had been misrepresented as that of the insured.
Held: The insurance claim was dismissed. The theft was not sufficiently serious to necessitate disclosure. The false signature would have undermined the claim.
The boat was off-risk whilst being used as a houseboat, even if by a crew member.
The broker was liable to S, as it was the professional duty of a non-specialist broker to advise that the underwriters be told if anyone was living in the vessel and the broke should not have provided the misleading signature.
The agreement enabled the Judge to distinguish Macaura because S had an insurable interest in the vessel as he would benefit from its preservation and suffer loss of a valuable benefit if it were lost or destroyed.
There was no third category of contracts of insurance which were not wagering contracts but were unenforceable for want of an insurable interest. The 1906 Act expressly provides that an interest at the time of loss is necessary but not at the time the insurance is effected (section 6).
Mr A D Colman QC
[1992] 2 Lloyds Rep 501, [1993] CLY 3614
Marine Insurance Act 1906 6
England and Wales
Citing:
Distinguished – Macaura v Northern Assurance Company Limited HL 1925
Macaura owned the large majority of shares in a limited company, trading in timber. The company also owed him substantial sums. He kept on the insurance of timber and other assets within the business but in his own name. When he came to claim, his . .

Cited by:
Cited – Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada and Another: Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd v Feasey ComC 17-May-2002
The fact that there was more than one insurance policy in place for the same interest would not preclude a claim under one of them. A mutual underwriting group insured members against personal injury and so forth through ‘lineslip’ policies. The . .
Approved – Glengate-KG Properties Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd and Others CA 12-Jan-1996
NU the insurer of a consequential loss insurance policy, appealed against the decision, on a claim brought by G, the owners of a property under redevelopment, which had suffered a fire as to G’s resultant loss of rental income from the property. The . .
Cited – GE Frankona Reinsurance Ltd v CMM Trust No.1400 (the ‘Newfoundland Explorer’) AdCt 22-Mar-2006
The owner sought to claim under his insurance policy. The yacht was, in the policy warranted to be fully crewed at all times. The owner had left the boat to return a few hours later when it was found on fire.
Held: The insurance claim failed. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 11 July 2021; Ref: scu.184481

Craig v Brunsgaard, Kjosterud and Co: SCS 7 Feb 1896

Jurisdiction sustained in an action against a foreign shipowner where an interval of three months had been allowed to elapse between the use of arrestments jurisdictionis fundand causa and the service of the summons.
Opinion that the arrestment did not create a nexus, and that it was immaterial that the ship arrested had left the jurisdiction before the action was raised.
Opinions reserved as to what would constitute unreasonable delay in following up the arrestments, such as to entitle the person against whom they had been used to equitable relief.
[1896] SLR 33 – 348
Bailii
Scotland

Updated: 11 July 2021; Ref: scu.612596

Dry Bulk Handy Holding Inc and Another v Fayette International Holdings Ltd and Another: CA 14 Mar 2013

The court was asked ‘Is a shipowner entitled to demand payment to himself of freight under his bill of lading when that contract stipulates for payment to another party, provided that he makes his demand before the freight has been paid to that other party?’
Held: The direct contractual relationship brought about between the owners and the shippers is inconsistent with the owner’s entitlement to require payment of the contractual remuneration being contingent upon default by a third party.
Pill, Toulson, Tomlinson LJJ
[2013] EWCA Civ 184, [2013] 2 All ER (Comm) 295, [2013] 1 CLC 535, [2013] 1 WLR 3440, [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 38
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 09 July 2021; Ref: scu.471734

Lucena v Craufurd: CEC 1802

Enemy ships which had been captured were insured for their return to England. A claim arose. The insurance provider said that the claim failed under the 1745 Act as a wager since the claimant had no insurable interest in the ships.
Held: 184480 said: ‘It would be a strange thing if freight could not be the subject of protection by an instrument which had its origin from commerce and was introduced for the very purpose of giving security to mercantile transactions. It is a solid substantial interest ascertained by contract and arising from labour and capital employed for the purpose of commerce.’ and ‘The insurance of profits ascertained by positive contract may be equally just and reasonable, and is hardly to be distinguished in principle from the case of freight . . A mere speculation on profit is not insurable.’
Chambre J
(1802) 3 Bos and P 75, [1802] EngR 21, (1802) 3 Bos and Pul 75, (1802) 127 ER 42
Commonlii
Marine Insurance Act 1745
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Lucena v Craufurd HL 1806
Before the declaration of war, against the United Provinces, His Majesty’s ships took possession of several ships belonging to Dutch East India men, and took them to St Helena. The Commissioners then insured the ships for their journey from St . .
See Also – Lucena v Craufurd HL 29-Jun-1808
Commissioners were authorized by a commission granted in pursuance of a statute, to take into their possession ships and goods belonging to subjects of the United Provinces, which had been or might be detained in or brought into the ports of this . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 July 2021; Ref: scu.238200

Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v Chrismas (‘The Kyriaki’): QBD 26 Aug 1992

When a party seeks to add a new defendant by the amendment of a writ, that amended writ must be served within the applicable limitation period. For limitation purposes the assured’s cause of action arose at the date of the CTL casualty, that a notice of abandonment was not an essential ingredient of that cause of action but rather a notification of an election between two alternative quantums of damage.
Hirst J
[1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 137, Times 26-Aug-1992
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Kastor Navigation Co Ltd and Another v AGF M A T and others (‘Kastor Too’) ComC 4-Dec-2002
The claimant ship owner and its mortgagee sued the defendant insurer after the loss of the insured vessel, through fire. The insurers replied that the damage by fire was so extensive that the vessel was beyond repair when she sank, and was therefore . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 July 2021; Ref: scu.251754

Varano v Air Canada: QBD 17 May 2021

The Claimant sought compensation from the defendant airline in the fixed sum of 600 Euros in respect of a delayed flight in April 2016. The claim was brought pursuant to Article 7 of Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding, or cancellation, or long delay of flights.
Geraint Webb QC
[2021] EWHC 1336 (QB)
Bailii
Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of 11 February 2004 7
England and Wales

Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.663348

The ‘Branken Moor’–(Richards): 2 May 1837

Claim of a Deal boatman (intervening in a salvage cause) rejected ; and, on appeal, affirmed. In a case involving great risk, and where the salvors were numerous, and the property of the value of 10,500 pounds, — 2000 pounds awarded.
[1837] EngR 689, (1837) 3 Hag Adm 373, (1837) 166 ER 444
Commonlii
England and Wales

Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.313806

Golden Fleece Maritime Inc and Another v St Shipping and Transport Inc: CA 23 May 2008

The ships let under charter failed to comply with the Marine Pollution Convention which made it not possible for the charterer to fulfill its contract. The owners appealed against a finding that they were liable to the charterers.
Held: The appeal failed. Though the wording used was strange, on any reading the ship was not compliant.
Longmore LJ, Sir Anthony Clarke MR, Collins LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 584, Times 10-Jun-2008, [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 119, [2008] 1 CLC 861
Bailii
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Golden Fleece Maritime Inc and Another v St Shipping and Transport Inc Comc 2-Aug-2007
Ship owners were liable in damages to their charterer who was unable to fulfil its contracts because the ships did not comply with the Marine Pollution Convention. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.267999

Corocraft Ltd v Pan American Airways Inc: 1969

In the event of inconsistency between the French and English versions of the Convention, the French text prevails.
Donaldson J
[1969] 1 QB 616
Warsaw-Hague Convention
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Z (Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference) HL 19-May-2005
The defendants appealed their convictions for being members of proscribed organisations. They were members of the ‘Real IRA’, but only the IRA was actually proscribed.
Held: The appeals failed. In construing an Act of Parliament it may be of . .
Cited – Fujitsu Computer Products Corp and others v Bax Global Inc and others ComC 9-Nov-2005
A substantial number of hard disk drives were to be transported by the defendants by air. They were stolen. The defendant sought to limit its liability onder the Act. The claimant said it had been an inside job within Bax. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 26 March 2021; Ref: scu.225200

Jebsen v East and West India Dock Co: CCP 1874

delay caused by a charterer in discharging cargo caused the shipowner to lose passengers whom he had contracted to carry but he was able to take the same passengers in another of his vessels.
Held: The shipowners’ damages were not to be reduced on that account.
(1874) LR 10 CP 300
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co v Underground Electric Railways Co (London) Limited HL 1912
The plaintiffs purchased eight steam turbines from the defendants. They later proved defective, and the plaintiffs sought damages. In the meantime they purchased replacements, more effective than the original specifications. In the result the . .
Cited – Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel SAU (Formerly Travelplan SAU) of Spain ComC 21-May-2014
The former owners of the ‘New Flameno’ appealed from an arbitration award. A charter of the vessel had been repudiated with two years left to run. The owners chose to sell. They made a substantial profit over the price they would have received after . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 February 2021; Ref: scu.642150

Ali Shipping Corporation v Sour Brodogradevna Industrija ‘Jozo Lozovina-Mosor: CA 19 Dec 1996

[1996] EWCA Civ 1258
Bailii
Citing:
See Also – Ali Shipping Corporation v Sour Brodgradevina Industrija ‘Jozo Lozovina – Mosor’ and Others ComC 18-Sep-1997
Arbitration – confidentiality – implied term – no term implied because not necessary to make contract work. Ali refused injunction against yard to restrain it from disclosing evidence and reasons in award between Ali and yard to other buyers in the . .

Cited by:
See Also – Ali Shipping Corporation v Sour Brodgradevina Industrija ‘Jozo Lozovina – Mosor’ and Others ComC 18-Sep-1997
Arbitration – confidentiality – implied term – no term implied because not necessary to make contract work. Ali refused injunction against yard to restrain it from disclosing evidence and reasons in award between Ali and yard to other buyers in the . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 December 2020; Ref: scu.141126

Larrinaga Steamship Co Ltd v The King: HL 1944

The vessel, discharging at St. Nazaire, was ordered by charterers to return to Cardiff. Despite severely deteriorating weather conditions a Sea Transport Officer instructed the vessel to sail on completion of discharge to Quiberon Bay to join a convoy bound for the Bristol Channel. The master protested but complied. The vessel grounded and suffered damage. The owners claimed against the Crown as charterers, contending that the damage had resulted from the charterers’ order to return to Cardiff.
Held: A ship owner’s underwriters would be entitled to be subrogated to his claim for indemnity against a charterer in respect of losses caused by the master’s compliance with the charterer’s orders as to the employment of the ship, under a standard term of a charterparty.
Lord Wright said: ‘The view of the judge was that what he described as the ‘sailing orders to Quiberon Bay to be obeyed forthwith . .’ were orders as to employment within cl. 9. With the greatest respect, I cannot agree with that view. These sailing orders which the judge found were given were, in my opinion, merely dealing with matters of navigation, in regard to carrying out the orders to proceed to Cardiff’.
Lord Porter said: ‘Three answers to this argument have been made by the respondent. (1) That though an order specifying the voyage to be performed is an order as to employment, yet an order as to the time of sailing is not. That order, it is contended, is one as to navigation, or, at any rate, not as to employment. My Lords, this distinction seems to me to be justified: an order to sail from port A to port B is in common parlance an order as to employment, but an order that a ship shall sail at a particular time is not an order as to employment because its object is not to direct how the ship shall be employed, but how she shall act in the course of that employment. If the word were held to include every order which affected not the employment itself but any incident arising in the course of it almost every other liability undertaken by the charterer would be otiose, since the owners would be indemnified against almost all losses which the ship would incur in prosecuting her voyages.’
and ‘(2) The second answer of the respondents was that even if it were conceded that orders to sail in a storm were orders in respect of which an indemnity is due, they must still be orders of the charterers as charterers and such as under this charterparty they are entitled to give. The mere instruction to sail may be such an order, but such an instruction leaves it to the discretion of the master who is responsible for the safety of his ship to choose the time and opportunity for starting on his voyage. I know of no right on the part of a charterer to insist that the safety of the ship should be endangered by sailing at a time when seamanship requires her to stay in port.’
Lord Findlay, LC suggested that, although the parties in Krell v Henry may have contracted in the expectation that the procession would take place, it was difficult to see why the happening of the procession was the basis of the contract.
References: [1944] KB 124, [1945] AC 246
Judges: Lord Findlay LC, Mackinnon LJ and Lords Wright and Porter
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Criticised – Krell v Henry CA 1903
    A contract to rent rooms for two days and from which the coronation processions of King Edward VII were to be viewed was frustrated when the processions were cancelled on the days the rooms were taken for because the contract was ‘a licence to use . .
    ([1903] 2 KB 740, [1900-3] All ER 20)

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Caledonian North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd and Others HL 7-Feb-2002
    Substantial personal injury claims had been settled following the Piper Alpha disaster. Where a contractual indemnity had been provided under a contract, and insurance had also been taken out, but the insurance had not been a contractual . .
    (, Times 13-Feb-02, , [2002] UKHL 4, [2002] 1 LLR 553, [2002] Lloyds Rep IR 261, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 321, 2002 SLT 278, [2002] CLC 741, 2002 SC (HL) 117, [2002] BLR 139, 2002 SCLR 346, 2002 GWD 6-178)
  • Cited – Petroleo Brasileiro Sa v Ene Kos 1 Ltd (‘The MT Kos’) SC 2-May-2012
    The MT Kos had been chartered by the appellants. The respondents failed to make payments, and notice was given to withdraw the vessel. The contract said that such a notice was without prejudice to any claim. At the time, the vessel was laden. The . .
    (, [2012] UKSC 17, [2012] 2 WLR 976, , UKSC 2010/0157, , )

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.191167

Seabord Offshore Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport (The Safe Carrier): HL 25 Mar 1994

The House was asked whether a ship manager was legally responsible for the acts of the ship’s chief engineer under s31(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which imposed a duty on the manager to take all reasonable steps to secure that the ship was operated in a safe manner. The prosecution had failed because the case had not been presented at trial before the Justices in a manner which enabled them to consider whether the manager had failed to take all reasonable steps. It was too late to argue on appeal that there had been a failure to establish adequate systems for securing that the ship did not go to sea before the chief engineer had sufficient opportunity to familiarise himself with its machinery and equipment.
Held: The Act does not impose vicarious liability on the owners of ships for the omissions of their reasonably and properly instructed agents or employees.
Lord Keith of Kinkel showed his distaste for the imposition of absolute liability: ‘It would be surprising if by the language used in section 31 [of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988] Parliament had intended that the owner of a ship should be criminally liable for any act or omission by any officer of the crew or member of the crew which resulted in unsafe operation of the ship, ranging from a failure by the managing director to arrange repairs to a failure by the bosun or cabin steward to close portholes.’
References: Independent 24-Mar-1994, Gazette 11-May-1994, Times 25-Mar-1994, [1994] 2 All ER 99, [1994] 1 WLR 541
Judges: Lord Keith of Kinkel
Statutes: Merchant Shipping Act 1988 31
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.89078

Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves and Company Ltd and others: Comm 7 Nov 2003

References: [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm), [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 481, [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 38
Links: Bailii
Coram: The Honourable Mr Justice Colman
Ratio: One party sought a declaration that arbitrators should have no jurisdiction to determine claims for commission said to be due to the Respondent chartering brokers.
Held: Because he has in effect become a statutory assignee of the promisee’s right of action against the promisor and because, by reason of the underlying policy of section 1(4), he is confined to the means of enforcement provided by the contract to the promisee, namely arbitration. He is to be treated as standing in the shoes of that promisee for the purpose only of the enforcement of the substantive term. In this case, the scope of the disputes covered by the arbitration agreements was wide enough to embrace a dispute between owners and charterers about payment of the brokers’ commission, and they fell to be resolved by arbitration.
Statutes: Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 1(4), Arbitration Act 1996 67
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Robertson v Wait ((1853) 8 Ex 299)
    . .
  • Cited – Les Affreteurs Reunis SA v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd HL ([1919] AC 801)
    With regard to Robertson -v- Wait: ‘My Lords, so far as I am aware, that case has not before engaged the attention of this House, and I think it right to say plainly that I agree with that decision and I agree with the reasoning, shortly as it is . .
  • Cited – The Jordan Nicholev ([1990] 2 Lloyds Rep 11)
    The court was asked as to the position resulting from the assignment of a contract including an arbitration clause: ‘Where the assignment is the assignment of the cause of action, it will, in the absence of some agreement to the contrary include as . .
  • Cited – The Padre Island ([1984] 2 Lloyds Rep 408)
    The 1930 Act creates a statutory assignment of any rights of action in a case where the assured has become bankrupt or been wound up, the party to whom the benefit of a right of action under the liability insurance contract has been transferred may . .
  • Cited – T W Thomas and Co Ltd v Portsea Steamship Co Ltd PC ([1912] AC 1)
    The board discussed the approach to the incorporation of arbitration clauses and jurisdiction clauses from one contract into another such as a bill of lading. . .
  • Cited – The Mahkutai PC (Times 24-Apr-96, [1996] AC 650, [1996] 3 WLR 1)
    (Hong Kong) The question was whether shipowners, who were not parties to the bill of lading contract between the charterers and carriers on the one part, and the cargo-owners, the bill of lading being a charterer’s bill, could enforce against the . .
  • Cited – Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen GmbH v Voest Alpine Intertrading GmbH (‘The Jay Bola’) CA ([1997] 2 Lloyds Rep 279)
    The insurance company claimant had insured a cargo under a voyage charter made by the defendant as charterer with the claimant as time charterer and disponent owner of the vessel. The charter had an arbitration clause. The cargo was damaged in a . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 26 March 2020
Ref: 187699

Black King Shipping Corpn and Wayang (Panama) SA v Massie (The Litsion Pride”): 1985″

References: [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437
Coram: Hirst J
Ratio: The LITSION PRIDE was insured against war risks. The terms required of her owners, notice as soon as practicable of her entry into specified war zones and then to pay an additional premium. The owners traded her into a war zone without giving notice, dishonestly intending to avoid the payment of the additional premium if the vessel got out unscathed. When she was hit by a missile and sunk, they gave the required notice by a letter which they dishonestly backdated to a date before the vessel entered the war zone. The fraud was irrelevant to the merits of the claim, because the vessel was held to be insured under a held covered clause with or without prior notice.
Held: The claim was forfeit on the ground that it was a breach of the insured’s duty of good faith. His decision has not fared well in subsequent decisions.
Jurisdiction: England and Wales

Last Update: 26-Sep-18
Ref: 623434

Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dredge Willemstad”: 9 Dec 1976″

References: [1976] HCA 65, (1976) 136 CLR 529
Links: Austlii
Coram: Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ.
Ratio: Austlii (High Court of Australia) Negligence – Duty of care – Foreseeability of harm – Economic loss not consequential upon damage to person or property – Damage to property of one person – Economic loss suffered by person as a result – Pipeline carrying oil to plaintiff’s depot – Damaged by defendant’s negligence – Supply interrupted – Pipeline and depot owned by different persons – Expense incurred by plaintiff in arranging alternative means of delivery – Whether recoverable – Remoteness of loss or damage.
Shipping and Navigation – Action in rem – Action against ship – Negligence – Master not sued as defendant – Appearance entered by master – No proprietary interest in ship – Whether master liable to judgment.
A pipeline was damaged and the owner of the terminal (who was not the owner of the pipeline) incurred expense in transporting refined oil to the terminal while the pipeline was out of use.
Held: The plaintiff was entitled to recover that expense from the dredger which had damaged the pipeline. Jacobs J said that the duty of care owed to the owner of the pipeline was also owed to ‘a person whose property was in such physical propinquity to the place where the acts of omissions of the dredge . . had their physical effect that a physical effect on the property of that person was foreseeable as the result of such acts or omissions’.
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Jurisdiction: Australia

Last Update: 13-Jul-18
Ref: 331084

Parsons Corporation and others v CV Scheepvaartonderneming Happy Ranger”: ComC 9 Feb 2006″

References: [2006] EWHC 122 (Comm)
Links: Bailii
Coram: Mrs Justice Gloster DBE
Ratio: A large cylinder part was damaged as it was being loaded on board the Happy Ranger in Italy. A hook on the crane was brittle and did not meet the approriate specification. It had not been tested as required.
This case cites:

(This list may be incomplete)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales

Last Update: 14-Apr-17
Ref: 238654

Corps v Owners of the Paddle Steamer ‘The Queen of the South’: 1968

References: [1968] 1 All ER 1163, [1968] 2 WLR 973, [1968] P 449, [1968] 1 Lloyds Rep 182
Ratio: Among the peope who might intervene on a ship’s arrest are the harbour authority itself claiming statutory rights of detention and sale.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Bristol Airport Plc and Another v Powdrill and Others CA (lip, [1990] 2 WLR 1362, [1990] Ch 744, [1990] BCLC 585)
    An airline company went into administration. The airport seized two airplanes. The administrators claimed they were property within the administration, could not be seized without a court order, and the court should exercise its discretion not to . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 02-Aug-16
Ref: 181066

John Grahame, James Coulter, and Others, Underwriters of The Ship ‘The Jean,’ and Her Cargo v Robert M’Nair: HL 29 Mar 1770

References: [1770] UKHL 2_Paton_244
Links: Bailii
Ratio Marine Insurance – Deviation.-
Held that deviation of the ship in the course of the voyage insured, must be wilful, in order to void the policy, and that accidental or involuntary deviation will not have that effect. Circumstances in which held wilful deviation not proven.

Last Update: 14-Apr-16
Ref: 561672

The Ship ‘Marlborough Hill’ v Alex Cowan and Sons Limited: PC 1921

References: [1921] AC 444
Coram: Lord Phillimore
The question was whether a document, describing itself as a bill of lading but written in the form of a receipt of goods for (rather than of) shipment, was a bill of lading for the purposes of the Act, which set out the jurisdiction of the admiralty court for an action in rem. The claim had been brought by consignees which provided for delivery to the shipper’s order.
Held: It was a bill of lading within the Act. The court noted that it purported to be negotiable. If this document is a bill of lading, it is a negotiable instrument. Other incidents of the document were standard for a bill of lading, such as detailed terms and conditions in familiar form; the fact that the document was called a bill of lading many times in the course of such provisions and that it was made subject to the US Charter Act; the fact that it provides that ‘If required by the shipowner, one signed bill of lading, duly endorsed, must be surrendered on delivery of the goods’; and that it ‘ends in the time honoured form’, viz ‘In witness whereof the master or agent of said vessel has signed three bills of lading, all of this tenor and date, of which if one is accomplished, the others shall be void’ The court emphasised that the document would work as merchants would expect a bill of lading to work. It accorded wit hstandard commercial practiceand the parties agreed to call it a bill of lading, and entered into obligations and acquired rights proper to a bill of lading. All the other incidents in its very detailed language are such as are proper to such a document.
Statutes: Admiralty Court Act 1861
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 31-Jan-16 Ref: 181886

Britain Steamship Company Limited v The King and Others (‘The Matiana’): HL 1921

References: [1921] 1 AC 99
Coram: Lord Atkinson, Lord Wright, Viscount Cave, Lord Shaw
The House considered the relationship between a merchant vessel in convoy and a convoying naval vessel.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Lord Atkinson: ‘With all respect, I am quite unable to concur in the learned judge’s view that the merchant ships convoyed, whose task was simply to sail peacefully on the course they might be directed to follow, and to keep their proper places in the convoy, became so identified with the ships of war directing and protecting them, as to be treated as members of a joint flotilla on a common enterprise. I concur with Atkin LJ in thinking that the learned judge treats as he said the sheep and the shepherd as both engaged in the operation of shepherding. The duties and proper tasks of convoying warships and the ships they convoy are respectively indicated in ss 30 and 31 of the Naval Discipline Act of 1866 . . The naval officers are to diligently perform the duties of convoying and protecting the ships they are appointed to convoy according to instructions, to defend these ships and the goods they carry without deviation, to fight in their defence if they are assailed and not to abandon them or expose them to hazard. Every master or other officer in command of any merchant or other vessel convoyed is bound to obey the commanding officer of the ships of war in all matters relating to the navigation or security of the convoy, and is also bound to take such precautions for avoiding the enemy as may be directed by this commanding officer. It does not appear, however, that this latter officer has any power to require the master, officers or crew of any merchant ship which is being convoyed to take combative action against a vessel of any kind, or to join in such action if taken by all or any of the ships of war. The roles of the two classes of ships are entirely different in nature and character. That of the ships of war is protective and if need be combative; that of the merchantmen is not at all combative in nature and character as would be their enterprise in time of peace’ Viscount Cave: ‘But in the present case the orders were a part of the convoying operation which included the choice of the route, the setting of the course, and the precautions taken on the voyage; and I do not think that the transaction can be split up and treated as in part an operation and in part something other than an operation . . .’
Lord Shaw: ‘ . . I think that the putting of a vessel under convoy, with all that that involves, is an actual and accomplished change of circumstances and an operation which is conducted in the course of hostilities or war . . .’ and ‘To all intents and purposes it is the same as if he had placed on the convoyed ship a naval officer in command as subordinate to himself. In short, so far as the direction of the course of the vessel was concerned, the merchant captain and officers were no longer in control. The naval officers were. Not only so, but the orders of the commander of the convoy were clothed with the instant sanction of force . . . I myself see great force in the view which Bailhache J. so clearly expresses to the effect that all the vessels – those acting as convoy and those under convoy – must be treated as a unity. . . . I am humbly of opinion that, so far as ships under convoy are concerned, all these ships are, along with the ships acting as convoy, under a unified command, and that command issuing from the commander of the convoy is, as part of the direction of the convoy, a military operation.’
Statutes: Naval Discipline Act 1866 30
This case cites:

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 16-Dec-15 Ref: 237694

Brownsville Holdings Ltd v Adamjee Insurance Co Ltd (‘The Milasan’): 2000

References: [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 458, [2000] EWHC 223 (Comm)
Links: Bailii
Coram: Aikens J
A 90 foot motor yacht sank in calm weather in the course of a voyage from Piraeus to Sardinia with a crew of three: a skipper, an engineer and a deckhand.
Held: The owner’s insurance claim failed. There had been a breach of warranty in these terms: ‘Warranted professional skippers and crew in charge at all times.’ The claimants accepted that this was a promissory warranty – there was no argument that it was a term simply delimiting or describing the risk. Aikens J: ‘I accept . . that a practical construction must be given to the words of the warranty. I think it is clear that the insurers were concerned to ensure that the vessel was properly looked after all the time, both winter and summer, and wherever she was – whether cruising or in a marina for the winter months.
The ‘skipper’ together with the ‘crew’ has to be ‘in charge’ of the vessel ‘at all times’. In my view the wording ‘professional skippers and crew to be in charge’ means that the skipper and the crew’ together are to take care of and manage the vessel; that is the sense in which they are to be ‘in charge’ of her. They are also to be ‘in charge’ of the vessel together ‘all the time’. The last phrase is . . quite clear. It means that there must be a professional skipper and a crew that looks after the vessel the whole time, as opposed to intermittently or at intervals.’ As the claimants had not employed anyone who was a ‘professional skipper’ over a period of time, they were in breach of warranty. In summary ‘On the proper construction of the ‘professional skipper warranty’ the claimants were obliged to keep a suitably qualified skipper on board the yacht at all times . . ..’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – GE Frankona Reinsurance Ltd -v- CMM Trust No.1400 (the ‘Newfoundland Explorer’) AdCt (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 429 (Admiralty), Times 02-May-06, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 704)
    The owner sought to claim under his insurance policy. The yacht was, in the policy warranted to be fully crewed at all times. The owner had left the boat to return a few hours later when it was found on fire.
    Held: The insurance claim failed. . .
  • Cited – Pratt -v- Aigaion Insurance Company SA (‘the Resolute’) CA (Bailii, [2008] EWCA Civ 1314, Times, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep IR 149, [2008] 2 CLC 756, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 387, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 225)
    The court considered the interpretation of a term in a contract of insurance to the effect that ‘Warranted Owner and/or Owner’s experienced skipper on board and in charge at all times and one experienced crew member.’, asking whether ‘at all times’ . .

(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 25-Oct-15 Ref: 242640

The Calder And Hebble Navigation Company v Pilling And Others; 23 Apr 1845

References: [1845] EngR 685, (1845) 14 M & W 76, (1845) 153 ER 396
Links: Commonlii
By a local act, 6 Geo. 4, c. Ixxi., the company of proprietors of a public navigation were empowered to make bye-laws for the good government of the company and for the good and orderly using the navigation, and also for the well-governing of the burgemen, watermen, and boatmen, who should carry any goods, wares, or merchandise upon any part of the said navigattion, and to impose and inflict such reasonable fines or forfeitures upon all persons offending against the same, as to the major part of the company should seem meet, not exceeding £5. The company made a bye-law that the navigatiori should be closed on every Sunday throughout the year, and that no business should be transacted thereon during such time, (works of necessity only excepted), nor should any person during such time navigate any boat, &c nor should any boat, &c. pass along any part of the said navigation on any Sunday, except for a reasonable distance for the purpose of mooring the same, and except on some extraordinary necessity, or for the purpose of going to, or returning from, any place of divine worship, under a penalty of £5 :-Held, that the act did not authorize the company to make the above bye-law, and that it was illegal and void.
Last Update: 04-Sep-15 Ref: 303827

Goddart v Garrett; 16 Jun 1692

References: [1692] EngR 46, (1692) 2 Vern 269, (1692) 23 ER 774 (A)
Links: Commonlii
One having no interest in the ship, lends £300 on a bottomry bond, and insures £450 on the ship ; policy decreed to be delivered up. — One having no interest in a ship insures it, the insurance is void, though the policy runs, interest or no interest. But if he is interested in the ship, he may insure more than the value of his interest. Where one insures a ship, if he would have any benefit of the insurance, he must renounce his interest in the ship.
Last Update: 02-Sep-15 Ref: 393135

Diplock And Others v Blackburn; 19 Jul 1811

References: [1811] EngR 468, (1811) 3 Camp 43, (1811) 170 ER 1300 (A)
Links: Commonlii
If the master of a ship in a foreign port, from the state of the exchange, receives a premum for a bill drawn upon England on account of the ship, this belongs to his owner, although there may have been a usage for masters of shps to apprapriate such premiums to their own use.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – FHR European Ventures Llp and Others -v- Cedar Capital Partners Llc SC (Bailii, [2014] UKSC 45, [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 471, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 425, [2014] WTLR 1135, [2014] 4 All ER 79, [2015] 1 AC 250, [2014] Lloyd’s Rep FC 617, [2014] 3 WLR 535, [2014] WLR(D) 317, [2014] 2 BCLC 145, [2015] 1 P &CR DG1, Bailii Summary, WLRD, UKSC 2013/0049, SC, SC Summary, SC Video)
    The Court was asked whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent is held by the agent on trust for his principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or . .

Regina v The Inhabitants Of Hickling; 27 Jun 1845

References: [1845] EngR 1051, (1845) 7 QB 880, (1845) 115 ER 719
Links: Commonlii
By stat. 34 Q 3, c. 64, when the boundary of two parishes lay along the centre of a highway, justices were empowered, on information of the fact, to summon the surveyors of the respective parishes, hear the parties and their witnesses, and finally determine the matter by order, apportioning the highway between the parishes for the purpose of repair. Forms of information, summons and order were given. By an order under this Act, the justices recited an information laid before them that one side of a certain highways in, and repairable by, parish E, and the other side in, arid repairable by, parish W., praying an apportionment that they had summoned the surveyors, who attended, and that they had examined witnesses : and they ordered that the highway should be apportioned between H. & W., dividing it by a traversing line.

Bridge Oil Ltd v The Owners and/or demise charters of the Ship ‘Guiseppe Di Vittorio’ (No. 2): AdCt 21 Nov 1997

References: [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 661
Coram: Clarke J
Effect of State Immunity (Merchant Shipping) Order 1997 Court ordered sale of vessel pendente lite on 15th July. Court of Appeal dismissed appeal on 29th October and refused a stay. State Immunity (Merchant Shipping) Order 1997 made on 30th October and came into force on 1st November. Republic submitted that the court should not allow vessel to be sold by reason of paragraph 3 of the Order. Held that paragraph 3 should not be construed as applying to vessels which the court had already ordered to be sold, inter alia, because to do so would be to interfere with or impair plaintiffs’ earlier rights under an Order of the court.
Statutes: State Immunity (Merchant Shipping) Order 1997 3
This case cites:

This case is cited by:

Iraqi Ministry of Defence v Arcepey Shipping ‘The Angel Bell’: 1979

References: [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 491, [1981] 1 QB 65
Coram: Donaldson J, Robert Goff J
Creditors of the defendant who was subject to a Mareva injunction applied to the court to authorise the repayment of a loan out of monies otherwise subject to the order.
Held: The purpose of a freezing order is to avoid dissipation of a defendant’s assets in order to avoid a judgment, it is only bona fide debts in the ordinary course of business of a defendant whose assets are frozen that will be permitted to be paid out, including debts which are not themselves enforceable.
Robert Goff J said: ‘Mr. Hobhouse submitted that the purpose of the Mareva jurisdiction was to freeze a foreign defendant’s assets in this country to ensure that there is a fund available in this country from which the plaintiff will be able to satisfy a judgment. In support of this he relied in particular on the form of the order usually made in these cases which restrains the defendant from dealing with his assets within the jurisdiction and from removing his assets from the jurisdiction. I do not, however, see that the usual form of the order as such assists his argument. As was made plain by Mustill J. in the Third Chandris case, the point of the Mareva jurisdiction is to proceed by stealth, to pre-empt any action by the defendant to remove his assets from the jurisdiction. To achieve that result the injunction must be in a wide form because, for example, a transfer by the defendant to a collaborator in the jurisdiction could lead to the transfer of the assets abroad by that collaborator. But it does not follow that, having established the injunction, the court should not thereafter permit a qualification to it to allow a transfer of assets by the defendant if the defendant satisfies the court that he requires the money for a purpose which does not conflict with the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdiction.’
and ‘All the interveners are asking is that the defendants should be free to repay such a loan if they think fit to do so, not that the loan transaction should be enforced. For a defendant to be free to repay a loan in such circumstances is not inconsistent with the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdiction. He is not in such circumstances seeking to avoid his responsibilities to the plaintiff if the latter should ultimately obtain a judgment; on the contrary, he is seeking in good faith to make payments which he considers he should make in the ordinary course of business. I cannot see that the Mareva jurisdiction should be allowed to prevent such a payment. To allow it to do so would be to stretch it beyond its original purpose so that instead of preventing abuse it would rather prevent businessmen conducting their businesses as they are entitled to do.’
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Anton Durbeck Gmbh -v- Den Norske Bank Asa ComC (Bailii, [2005] EWHC 2497 (Comm))
    The defendant bank arrested a ship carrying the claimant’s load of bananas. The cargo deteriorated while under arrest and was lost. It was not insured. The consignee sought damages from the arresting bank on the ground that it wrongfully interfered . .

Harrison v Wright; 11 Feb 1811

References: [1811] EngR 164, (1811) 13 East 343, (1811) 104 ER 402
Links: Commonlii
In assumpsit upon a memorandum for a charter-party, describing the agreement of the defendant, the shipowner, to proceed with all convenient speed to a foreign port, and there load, within 20 running days, a cargo from the plaintiff’s factors, and therewith return home, and in 15 running days deliver the same, on payment of certain freight, concluding with a certain penalty for non-performance : held that the plaintiff might recover damages on the breach of the contract, in the defendant’s not permitting the vessel to proceed on the voyage, beyond the amount of the penalty.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Total Transport Corporation -v- Arcadia Petroleum Ltd (‘the Eurus’) CA (Times 16-Dec-97, Gazette 08-Jan-98, Bailii, [1997] EWCA Civ 2754, [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 351, [1998] CLC 90)
    Arcadia chartered the Eurus, and had succeeded in their application for an award in arbitration proceedings against Total. The award had been reversed, and they now appealed against that order. The parties disputed whether the amount was an award of . .

Jindal Iron and Steel Co Ltd and others v Islamic Solidarity Shipping Company Jordan Inc (‘The Jordan II’): HL 25 Nov 2004

References: [2004] UKHL 49, Times 26-Nov-2004, [2005] 1 WLR 1363, [2005] 1 All ER 175
Links: Bailii, House of Lords
Coram: Lord Bingham of Cornhill Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Steyn Lord Hoffmann Lord Scott of Foscote
Cargo was damaged by rough handling during loading and/or discharging, and/or inadequate stowage due to failure to provide dunnage, failure to secure the coils and/or stacking them so that the bottom layers were excessively compressed. The House was asked to depart from an interpretation of the rules which had stood and been applied for more than fifty years.
Held: There was no sufficient reason for departing from the rule in Renton. The House had to be aware that many commercial contracts had been put in place in reliance upon the existing interpretation, and other parties would be affected. Any change ought to make allowance for each of those interests. A review was current by UNCITRAL, and the House refused to overturn the long standing interpretation of the rules.
Statutes: Hague-Visby Rules A2
This case cites:

  • Cited – Pyrene Co Ltd -v- Scindia Navigation Co Ltd QBD ([1954] 2 QB 402)
    The fob contract has become a flexible instrument and it does not necessarily follow that the buyer is an original party to the contract of carriage. The effect of article III, r. 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules was not to override freedom of contract to . .
  • Appeal from – Jindal Iron and Steel Co Ltd and others -v- Islamic Solidarity Company Jordan Inc and Another CA (Bailii, [2003] EWCA Civ 144, [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 87)
    The question was whether a carrier is liable to cargo owners when the latter, or their stevedores, perform their duties improperly or carelessly; whether an agreement which transfers responsibility for these operations from the shipowners to . .
  • Cited – Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) HL ([1966] 3 All ER 77, [1966] 1 WLR 1234)
    The House gave guidance how it would treat an invitation to depart from a previous decision of the House. Such a course was possible, but the direction was not an ‘open sesame’ for a differently constituted committee to prefer their views to those . .
  • Cited – The Ciechocinek CA ([1976] 1 Lloyds Rep 489)
    . .
  • Cited – The Coral CA ([1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1)
    . .
  • Cited – The Holstencruiser ([1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 378)
    . .
  • Cited – The Arawa ([1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 416)
    . .
  • Cited – The Panaghia Tinnou ([1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 586)
    . .
  • Cited – The Strathnewton CA ([1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 219)
    . .
  • Cited – The Filikos ([1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 555)
    . .
  • Cited – Regina -v- Governor of Her Majesty’s Prison Brockhill ex parte Evans (No 2) HL (Times 02-Aug-00, House of Lords, Gazette 17-Aug-00, Bailii, [2000] 3 WLR 843, [2001] 2 AC 19, [2000] UKHL 48, [2000] 4 All ER 15, [2000] UKHRR 836)
    The release date for a prisoner was calculated correctly according to guidance issued by the Home Office, but case law required the guidance to be altered, and the prisoner had been detained too long. The tort of false imprisonment is one of strict . .
  • Cited – Vallejo -v- Wheeler ((1774) 1 Cowp 143)
    ‘In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one way or the other. Because speculators in trade then know what . .
  • Cited – Homburg Houtimport BV -v- Agrosin Private Ltd (the ‘Starsin’) HL (House of Lords, [2003] UKHL 12, Bailii, Times 17-Mar-03, Gazette 15-May-03, [2003] 2 WLR 711, [2004] 1 AC 715, [2003] 1 CLC 921, 2003 AMC 913, [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 571, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 625, [2003] 2 All ER 785, [2003] 1 LLR 571)
    Cargo owners sought damages for their cargo which had been damaged aboard the ship. The contract had been endorsed with additional terms. That variation may have changed the contract from a charterer’s to a shipowner’s bill.
    Held: The specific . .
  • Cited – Chandris -v- Isbrandtsen-Moller Co Inc CA ([1951] 1 KB 240, (1950) 2 All ER 618, (1950) 84 Lloyds Rep 347)
    Although section 3(1) of the 1934 Act expressly empowered only courts of record to include interest in sums for which judgment was given for damages or debt, arbitrators were nevertheless empowered by the agreement of reference to apply English law, . .
  • Cited – Regina -v- G and R HL (House of Lords, [2003] UKHL 50, Bailii, Times 17-Oct-03, Gazette 13-Nov-03, [2003] 3 WLR 1060, [2004] 1 AC 1034, Bailii, (2003) 167 JP 621, (2003) 167 JPN 955, [2004] 1 Cr App R 21, [2003] 4 All ER 765)
    The defendants, young boys, had set fire to paper and thrown the lit papers into a wheelie bin, expecting the fire to go out. In fact substantial damage was caused. The House was asked whether a conviction was proper under the section where the . .
  • Cited – Brys & Gylsen -v- J and J Drysdale & Co ((1920) 4 Ll L Rep 24)
    A literal interpretation of the Rules indicates that, where shippers and consignees select and pay for stevedoring, cargo claimants may recover compensation from owners for the negligence of cargo owners or the negligence of their stevedores, but . .
  • Cited – Chandris -v- Isbrandtsen-Moller Co Inc CA ([1951] 1 KB 240, (1950) 2 All ER 618, (1950) 84 Lloyds Rep 347)
    Although section 3(1) of the 1934 Act expressly empowered only courts of record to include interest in sums for which judgment was given for damages or debt, arbitrators were nevertheless empowered by the agreement of reference to apply English law, . .
  • Cited – Fothergill -v- Monarch Airlines Ltd HL ([1980] 2 All ER 696, [1980] 3 WLR 209, [1981] AC 251, mercatoria, Bailii, [1980] UKHL 6)
    The plaintiff, on arriving at the airport found that his luggage had been lost. The defendant denied liability saying he had not notified his claim within the requisite period.
    Held: Elementary justice requires that the rules by which the . .
  • Cited – Riverstone Meat Co Pty Ltd -v- Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd HL ([1961] AC 807)
    Cargo was damaged in the course of a voyage by the failure of a fitter employed by ship repairers to secure the inspection cover on a storm valve. The cargo owner sued the shipowner in contract, and recovered.
    Held: It was no defence that the . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Golden Strait Corporation -v- Nippon Yusen Kubishka Kaisha (‘The Golden Victory’) HL (Bailii, [2007] UKHL 12, Times 30-Mar-07, [2007] 2 Lloyds Rep 164, [2007] Bus LR 997, [2007] 3 All ER 1, [2007] 2 AC 353, [2007] 1 CLC 352, [2007] 2 WLR 691, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 97)
    The claimant sought damages for repudiation of a charterparty. The charterpary had been intended to continue until 2005. The charterer repudiated the contract and that repudiation was accepted, but before the arbitrator could set his award, the Iraq . .
  • Cited – Golden Strait Corporation -v- Nippon Yusen Kubishka Kaisha (‘The Golden Victory’) HL (Bailii, [2007] UKHL 12, Times 30-Mar-07, [2007] 2 Lloyds Rep 164, [2007] Bus LR 997, [2007] 3 All ER 1, [2007] 2 AC 353, [2007] 1 CLC 352, [2007] 2 WLR 691, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 97)
    The claimant sought damages for repudiation of a charterparty. The charterpary had been intended to continue until 2005. The charterer repudiated the contract and that repudiation was accepted, but before the arbitrator could set his award, the Iraq . .