Category: Planning

Stirk and others v Bridgnorth District Council: CA 11 Oct 1996

Where a Council was both proposer and judge in respect of a planning application, the obligation to deal thoroughly, consistently and fairly with any objection was enhanced.

Judges:

Thorpe LJ

Citations:

[1996] EWCA Civ 701, (1996) EGCS 159, (1997) 73 P and CR 439

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v Bromsgrove District Council ex parte Barratt West Midlands Limited Admn 17-Dec-1996
The applicant sought to challenge by judicial review the decision of the respondent to grant to itself planning permission for the residential development of land. The land was designated fo removal from the green belt under a Draft Local Plan. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 31 October 2022; Ref: scu.140568

Barker v London Borough of Bromley: Admn 23 Nov 2001

The claimant challenged the grant of outline permission to develop the Crystal Palace, arguing that no Environmental Assessment had taken place. The need for one depended upon whether the directive had been properly incorporated into English Law. Did an outline permission and subsequent approval of reserved matters require an environmental impact assessment?
Held: The Directive was to be interpreted so as to give it a wide scope. The reserved matters would affect the appearance of the site. The 1988 Regulations would not require an assessment for approval of reserved matters. Nevertheless the Directive did not require assessments at each stage of a permission. There is no lacuna in the Regulations.

Judges:

Lord Justice Brooke Lord Justice Latham And Mr Justice Burton

Citations:

[2001] EWHC Admin 1038, [2000] Env LR 1

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1988, Directive 85/57/EEC

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v North Yorkshire County Council, ex parte Brown and Another HL 12-Feb-1999
When a mineral planning authority set conditions on the continued operation of a quarry which had been operating since pre-1947, that decision was a development consent, and it required to be supported by an environmental impact assessment, since it . .
Cited – Berkeley v Secretary of State For The Environment and Others HL 11-May-2000
The claimant challenged the grant of planning permission for a new football ground for Fulham Football club, saying that an Environmental Impact Assessment had not been obtained, but was required.
Held: Where a planning application if . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Barker, Regina (on the Application of) v London Borough of Bromley CA 23-Nov-2001
The court considered when time began to run for an application for judicial review where the question arose in the context of an outline planning permission granted subject to the approval of reserved matters.
The claimant challenged proposed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Administrative, Planning, European

Updated: 31 October 2022; Ref: scu.169844

Henriques v Swale Borough Council: CA 7 Oct 1996

The appellant challenged refusal of the Lands Tribunal to authorise him to fell a tree protected under a Tree Preservation Order. He complained that the decision had not been certified properly by the authority as was required.
Held: ‘ The word ‘certificate’ does not require a document or a statement to be in any particular form. It requires there to be a formal and clear statement of facts or conclusions.’ No particular form of words was required. A notice had been given which satisfied this requirement. The fact that the actual signatory had no part in the actual decision did not invalidate the certificate he gave. The appeal failed.

Citations:

[1996] EWCA Civ 675, [1997] 1 PLR 1

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1971 60 61

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Beyers v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and Regions and Uttlesford District Council Admn 31-Aug-2000
The appellant challenged refusal of leave to fell a tree protected by a tree preservation order. The tree was old and large, and its roots had begun to undermine the claimant’s buildings. The original consent to a reduction of the crown of the tree . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 31 October 2022; Ref: scu.140542

Norfolk Homes Ltd v North Norfolk District Council and Another: QBD 5 Mar 2020

Norfolk Homes applied for summary judgment of its claim for a declaration that residential development of land in Holt, Norfolk was not bound by obligations contained in an agreement made pursuant to section 106 Town and Country Planning Act 1990

Judges:

The Hon. Mrs Justice Thornton

Citations:

[2020] EWHC 504 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning, Land

Updated: 31 October 2022; Ref: scu.648931

Shimizu (UK) Ltd v Westminster City Council: CA 20 Dec 1994

The phrases ‘demolition’ and ‘alteration’ are mutually exclusive concepts when used for the purposes of the Planning Acts.
Held: When section 27(1)(a) referred to ‘an application for . . consent for the alteration . . of a listed building’, the words in their context did not include an application for consent for works which consisted of or included demolition of part of a building. The concepts of ‘demolition’ and ‘alteration’ were mutually exclusive, to the extent of precluding the demolition of a part of the building from amounting to an alteration of the whole. Millett LJ said: This was with reluctance and regret, but he was persuaded that the opposite view could not be maintained in view of the provisions of section 8 of the Act, as they dealt separately with the authorisation of works of alteration or extension on the one hand and works of demolition on the other.
Russell LJ (dissenting) said that the question whether a particular activity was ‘demolition’ or ‘alteration’ of a building was essentially a question of fact to be determined in the light of all the relevant circumstances, that the court should not interfere in the finding of the Lands Tribunal if the member was entitled on the material before him to reach he conclusion that he did and that, as he was entitled to reach that conclusion, his decision should not be disturbed.

Judges:

Millett LJ and Sir Ralph Gibson, Russell LJ dissenting

Citations:

Ind Summary 13-Feb-1995

Statutes:

Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 8

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Appeal from – Shimizu (UK) Ltd v Westminster City Council HL 11-Feb-1997
The removal of a listed building’s chimney stacks was an alteration allowing a claim for compensation. The phrases ‘alteration’ and ‘demolition’ are mutually exclusive. Although part of a building may be a listed building, a part of a listed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 27 October 2022; Ref: scu.89239

Wheeler and Another v JJ Saunders Ltd and Others: CA 19 Dec 1994

The existence of a planning permission did not excuse the causing of a nuisance by the erection of a pighouse. The permission was not a statutory authority, and particularly so where it was possible it had been procured by the supply of inaccurate and incomplete information.
The court considered the function of a gate: ‘The function of a gate is different from that of a fence. A gate is intended to prevent ingress and egress only when it is shut. It is of the essence of a gate that it can be opened whereas a fence cannot be opened and . . the covenant to fence does not refer to a gate.’ (Peter Gibson LJ)
Staughton LJ considered the significance of planing permissions as to nuisance: ‘One can readily appreciate that planning permission will, quite frequently, have unpleasant consequences for some people. The man with a view over open fields from his window may well be displeased if a housing estate is authorised by the planners and built in front of his house; the character of the neighbourhood is changed. But there may be nothing which would qualify as a nuisance and no infringement of his civil rights. What if the development does inevitably create what would otherwise be a nuisance? Instead of a housing estate the planners may authorise a factory which would emit noise and smoke to the detriment of neighbouring residents. Does that come within the first proposition of Cumming-Bruce LJ, that a planning authority has no jurisdiction to authorise a nuisance? Or is it within the second, that the authority may change the character of a neighbourhood?’ and
‘It would in my opinion be a misuse of language to describe what has happened in the present case as a change in the character of a neighbourhood. It is a change of use of a very small piece of land, a little over 350 square metres according to the dimensions on the plan, for the benefit of the applicant and to the detriment of the objectors in the quiet enjoyment of their house. It is not a strategic planning decision affected by considerations of public interest. Unless one is prepared to accept that any planning decision authorises any nuisance which must inevitably come from it, the argument that the nuisance was authorised by planning permission in this case must fail. I am not prepared to accept that premise. It may be – I express no concluded opinion – that some planning decisions will authorise some nuisances. But that is as far as I am prepared to go.’

Judges:

Staughton LJ, Peter Gibson LJ

Citations:

Times 03-Jan-1995, [1996] Ch 19, [1994] EWCA Civ 8, [1994] EWCA Civ 32, [1995] 3 WLR 466, [1995] 2 All ER 697

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates plc HL 31-Oct-1984
The House was asked whether the 1971 Act permitted the relevant authorities, by resort to their development plans, to support the retention of traditional industries or was the ambit of the Act such as to permit only ‘land use’ aims to be pursued? . .
Cited – Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd CA 1992
Neighbours complained at the development of a new commercial port on the site of a disused naval dockyard. Heavy vehicle traffic at night had a seriously deleterious effect on the comfort of local residents.
Held: Although a planning consent . .
Cited – Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd CA 1980
The exercise of the permission to develop granted by the local planning authority may have the result that the character of the neighbourhood changes and that which would previously have been a nuisance must be held no longer to be so

Cited by:

Cited – Hunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd HL 25-Apr-1997
The claimant, in a representative action complained that the works involved in the erection of the Canary Wharf tower constituted a nuisance in that the works created substantial clouds of dust and the building blocked her TV signals, so as to limit . .
Cited – Adam v Shrewsbury, Shrewsbury CA 28-Jul-2005
The neighbour parties disputed the existence of a right of way over one plot. The grant was for the use of a garage yet to be constructed, on ground to be excavated by the grantor, accessible only from a roadway which was only partly constructed, at . .
Cited – Watson and others v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd CA 26-Jan-2009
The claimants were neighbours of the Croft motor racing circuit. They alleged nuisance in the levels of noise emanating from the site. The defendants denied nuisance saying that the interference was deemed reasonable since they operated within the . .
Cited – Lawrence and Another v Fen Tigers Ltd and Others QBD 4-Mar-2011
The claimants had complained that motor-cycle and other racing activities on neighbouring lands were a noise nuisance, but the court also considered that agents of the defendants had sought to intimidate the claimants into not pursuing their action. . .
Cited – Coventry and Others v Lawrence and Another SC 26-Feb-2014
C operated a motor racing circuit as tenant. The neighbour L objected that the noise emitted by the operations were a nuisance. C replied that the fact of his having planning consent meant that it was not a nuisance.
Held: The neighbour’s . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Nuisance, Planning, Land, Nuisance

Updated: 27 October 2022; Ref: scu.90439

William Boyer (Transport) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another: CA 7 Feb 1996

Renewed enforcement notices still had to be issued within a ten year period. A previous enforcement action taken by authority, needed itself to have been valid if it was to be used as a basis for keeping time running. ‘The breach of planning control alleged by the ‘second bite’ enforcement notice under section 171B(4) has to be the same breach as that alleged in the first defective enforcement notice…’ An immunity accrued under the previous statutory provisions was not prejudiced by the 1991 provisions.

Judges:

Jeremy Sullivan QC

Citations:

Gazette 28-Feb-1996, Times 07-Feb-1996, 69 P and CR 630, [1996] 1 PLR 103

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 171B(4)(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 27 October 2022; Ref: scu.90508

Huggett v Secretary of State for the Environment Etc; Wendy Fair Markets Ltd v Same; Bello v Etc: CA 1 Mar 1995

There is no power for Court of Appeal itself to give leave to appeal after High Court’s refusal of leave on an enforcement notice. The court rejected the applicant’s submission that a High Court judge’s decision refusing permission to appeal under section 289 fell within section 16 of the 1981 Act. The Master of the Rolls, with whom Kennedy and Millett LJJ agreed, said: ‘The difficulty which faces her with that submission is that although, as Miss Ellis rightly observes, none of the reported cases have arisen in the planning field, there is a considerable body of authority which makes it plain that appeals against refusals of leave to appeal to the court below are not something which the higher court has jurisdiction to entertain. The relevant line of authority begins with Lane v Esdaile (1891) AC 210, continues through Ex Parte Stevenson (1892) 1 QB 609, embraces Bland v Chief Suppelentary Benefit Officer [1983] 1 WLR 262, and perhaps ends with Geogas SA v Trammo Gas Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 776. Those authorities make plain that a decision of this kind refusing leave to appeal to the court below does not give rise to an order or judgment of a kind which can be challenged in the court above. The matter was clearly put by Fry J in Ex parte Stevenson at p.611, where he said: ‘The Judicature Act has given a general right of appeal to this court from judgments and orders of the High Court or any Judge or Judges thereof. The question is whether that provision applies to a refusal of leave to submit the question of compensation to a jury under this Act.’ He concluded that the sort of question which arises in this instance is not such as can give rise to jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by the superior court, and he described the object of the legislation at p.612 as being to make the grant or refusal of leave final. The same point was made by Sir John Donaldson MR in Bland v Chief Supplementary Benefit Officer at p.267 where, referring to s. 14 of the Social Security Act 1980, he said: ‘I would accept that in a sense the grant or refusal of leave to appeal to the Commissioner is a decision, just as in Ex parte Stevenson [1982] 1 QB, 609 it was accepted that the grant or refusal of leave to appeal was an order of the High Court, but it is not the kind of decision which, in my judgment, s.14 contemplate.’ Very much the same point was made by the House of Lords in the most recent case, which is Geogas.
Miss Ellis urged that a purposive approach is appropriate in considering the combined effect of s.16(1) and s.289(6). I agree with that, although I am bound to say that adopting a purposive approach is in my judgment fatal to her argument. All the cases have emphasized that the requirement of leave is intended to deter frivolous or unmeritorious appeals and that this object would be frustrated were the refusal of leave itself to be the subject of appeal. As Lord Jauncey observed in Geogas SA. v Tammo Gas Ltd at p.780H with reference to s.1 of the Arbitration Act 1979: ‘No appeal lies to the Court of Appeal unless the High Court or Court of Appeal gives leave. The legislative intention of limited review would be rendered nugatory if appeals were to lie to the Court of Appeal and then to this House against a decision of a Judge refusing or granting leave to appeal an award to the High Court and if an appeal were to lie against a decision of the Court of Appeal to refuse or grant leave to appeal from the High Court to itself under s.1(7).’
That observation is I think entirely consistent with the purposive construction which has been put on similar provisions in all the cases that I have mentioned.
Miss Ellis did contend, in looking at s.289, that it would lead to the risk of discrepancy and inconsistent decisions if an appeal could be brought without any leave at all under s.288 but a refusal of leave could not be challenged under s.289. For my part, I consider that the answer to that submission is the answer Mr Richards gives on behalf of the Secretary of State, which is that there is a plain disparity between the two sections. One imposes a requirement of leave; the other does not. The legislature must have intended the procedures to be different, because the provisions of the two sections are different, and I cannot see any intention that there should be less dissimilarity between these two sections than the language would itself suggest.
The second main argument which Miss Ellis advanced was based on s.289(6) itself. She submitted that on a plain reading this conveyed the impression that there was intended to be a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal against any decision of the High Court, and that accordingly one should give effect to that legislative intention. She did suggest that it was a matter of impression, and I am bound to say, for what it is worth, that my own impression is unfavourable to her submission. But I think that there are powerful reasons for holding as a matter of construction that her submission is wrong. The first is, as initially drafted before the amendment, subs.(6) cannot have been intended to embrace an appeal against the refusal of leave by the High Court, because there was then no requirement to obtain leave from the High Court. She is therefore obliged to say that the second half of the subsection bears a different meaning after the amendment from the meaning it bore before. There, however, are additional points, one of which is that when the legislature wished to make it clear that a decision was to be regarded as a decision falling within s.16 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, that was made plain as in the case of subs.(4). Furthermore, it would appear to me right to assume that, when subs.(6) was drafted, the parliamentary draftsman responsible for the provision would have been well aware of the meaning which had for a hundred years been put on a provision of this kind by courts at all levels. In other words, it must have been appreciated that if leave to appeal were refused by the High Court there would be no jurisdiction in the Court of Appeal to entertain an appeal against that refusal of leave . . Therefore, well though Miss Ellis developed her arguments, it appears to me impossible on the strength of those arguments alone to accept the conclusion that she would urge upon us.’

Judges:

Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Kennedy and Millett LJJ

Citations:

Times 01-Mar-1995, [1995] 159 LGLR 769

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 289-6

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Lane v Esdaile HL 5-May-1891
The court considered the extent of the House’s jurisdiction as an appellate court. Section 3 of the 1876 Act provided that an appeal should lie to the House of Lords from ‘any order or judgment of . . Her Majesty’s Court of Appeal in England’. The . .
Cited – In re Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890, Ex parte Stevenson CA 1892
A party had applied to a judge for what in effect amounted to leave to appeal and had been refused.
Held: Wherever power is given to a legal authority to grant or refuse leave to appeal, the decision of that authority is, from the very nature . .
Cited – Geogas SA v Trammo Gas Ltd (The Baleares) CA 26-Nov-1990
Judge Wrong to Accept Appeal of Fact
The charterers had sought to appeal the arbitrators’ findings on foreseeability and remoteness. The judge had set aside the arbitration award. Though he certified that a point of law existed which was of general public importance, he had refused . .
Cited – Bland v Chief Supplementary Benefit Officer SSCS 1-Dec-1982
Application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against a ruling of the Social Security Commissioner. The tibunal was asked if the Court of Appeal any jurisdiction to give leave to appeal from the refusal of a Social Security Commissioner to . .

Cited by:

Cited – Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government CA 6-Feb-2013
The Council sought permission to appeal against the setting aside of two enforcement notices, leave having been refused by the Administrative court. The court now considered whether it had jusridiction, and whether the rule in Lane v Esdaile was to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 27 October 2022; Ref: scu.81515

Regina v Cornwall County Council ex parte Huntington and Another: CA 1994

No application for judicial review could be made before the Secretary of State had confirmed a modification order. Simon Brown LJ identified three categories of case excluded from the statutory review procedure: ‘a) A failure by the statutory decision maker to exercise his jurisdiction . .
b) The reasoning underpinning the decision which is otherwise in the applicant’s favour . .
c) Some antecedent step quite separate and distinct from the eventual decision reviewable under the statute . . ‘
there were obvious benefits to a procedure that allowed a challenge to be brought only after a statutory decision making process had run its course. The first of these was ‘that the very fact that an application for judicial review cannot be made at this preliminary stage means that the inquiry will not be delayed thereby.’ Another was ‘that the Secretary of State may in any event refuse to confirm the order, thus making unnecessary any legal challenge whatever.’

Judges:

Simon Brown LJ

Citations:

[1994] 1 All ER 694

Statutes:

Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Jones v Welsh Assembly Government Admn 15-Dec-2008
The County Council had made an order under section 53, establishing a footpath over the claimant’s land. The land owner now appealed. The court had previously quashed the inspector’s decision on the basis that he had not allowed for the interruption . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Planning

Updated: 27 October 2022; Ref: scu.541526

Horsham District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment: CA 1993

Judges:

Nolan LJ

Citations:

[1993] 1 PLR 81

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Raissi, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Admn 22-Feb-2007
The claimant sought judicial review of a refusal to make an ex gratia payment for his imprisonment whilst successfully resisting extradition proceedings. Terrorist connections had been suggested, but the judge made an explicit finding that at no . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 27 October 2022; Ref: scu.249004

Christchurch Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment: CA 16 Dec 1993

The council appealed against the inspector’s decision to grant permission to a construction company to build houses on land. The land had formerly been used as a school playing field and was now surplus to requirements. The Council wished to put the land to recreational uses. They said the inspector had failed to ask whether the existing informal land use would continue if the permission had been refused, and also to give reasons for his implicit conclusion that one planning use was more beneficial than the other.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The inspector should not have felt bound by the competing use test formulated in British Waterways. His task was to whether the relevant objections outweighed the presumption if one did arise, together with any other material consicerations. The inspector had not dealt with the existing use and potential use as public open land. A planning decision can be quashed if the inspector fails properly to assess the actual use of land. ‘The planning system fails in its function whenever it prevents, inhibits or delays development which can reasonably be permitted. There is always a presumption in favour of allowing applications for development, having regard to all material considerations, unless that development would cause demonstrable harm to interests of acknowledged importance . .’
Although the inspector’s duty was to decide whether the application should be granted or refused on the basis of the evidence before him, he had failed to complete his task because it was crucial for those who were dealing with the site in question to know whether there would continue to be formal or informal free access by members of the public to the site. Thus there was, as well as the primary task which the inspector had to perform a secondary task which he was not only expected to perform but which was a crucial feature of the decision which he had to make.

Judges:

Ralph Gibson LJ, Evans LJ, Sir John Megaw

Citations:

Times 05-Jan-1994, [1993] NPC 167, [1994] 68 P and CR 116

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina (Westminster City Council) v British Waterways Board HL 1985
The tenant occupied land next to a canal under a lease from the Defendants. The landlord opposed a renewal saying they wished to occupy the land themselves for the purposes of a marina. The tenant said the plan was unrealistic, because it would not . .
Cited – Federated Estates Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and Gillingham Borough Council 1983
‘There was no obligation on an inspector to undertake an investigatory role, though he had certain powers to call for information if he considered it necessary. He should arrive at his conclusions on the basis of what the parties (including third . .
Followed – London Residuary Body v Lambeth London Borough Council HL 1990
Planning battles had raged over the use of the former GLC County Hall. The question was whether it was desirable and appropriate to retain use of part of the building for London Government offices and centred on the ‘competing needs’ test.
Cited – Clyde and Co v Secretary of State for the Environment CA 1977
Planning permission had been granted for an office block, together with 8 flats as part of the same building. The building was largely erected, with the residential part incomplete. There was an application to change the existing permitted use of . .

Cited by:

Cited – Bannertown Developments Limited v Secretary of State for Environment Cotswold District Council Kimberley Securities Plc CA 6-Oct-1998
. .
Cited – Fuller v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another Admn 14-Jan-2015
The claimant challenged grant of a planning permission to erect a two story dwelling, saying that a tree would be lost.
Held: The policy does not only provide a condition under which only development will be permitted: it also requires that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 26 October 2022; Ref: scu.79112

Linden Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions: CA 27 Nov 2002

The developer made it clear in his application that only a development on the large scale envisaged would be satisfactory. The Inspector refused the application, and he appealed saying the Inspector had not said what size of development would have been acceptable.
Held: The Inspector was not obliged to specify what alternate scheme might be acceptable. He suffered no prejudice by the failure since he had put his case on the basis that only a large scheme was acceptable.

Judges:

Brroke, Kay, Dyson LLJ

Citations:

Times 12-Dec-2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 1737

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Save Britain’s Heritage v Number 1 Poultry Ltd HL 28-Feb-1991
An order allowing demolition of a listed building was possible even though the building itself remained viable. The function of the courts was to validate the decision making process, not the merits of the decision.
Lord Bridge analysed the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 24 October 2022; Ref: scu.178427

Henry Boot Homes Limited v Bassetlaw District Council: CA 28 Nov 2002

The claimant asserted that the behaviour of the local authority gave rise to a legitimate expectation such as to allow them to commence works in breach of a planning condition.
Held: The circumstances under which a claimant might rely upon a legitimate expectation in a planning context will be very rare, and difficult to envisage, because of the presence of interests of third parties. The plea is founded in fairness, and the applicant here was experienced in planning matters, and knew exactly the risks it was running. Planning law is a matter of public interest; and the powers of a local planning authority cannot be fettered by private arrangements between developers and planning authorities.

Judges:

Lord Justice Brooke, Lord Justice Keene, Mr Justice Bodey

Citations:

Times 16-Dec-2002, Gazette 19-Dec-2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 983, [2002] 4 PLR 108, [2003] P and CR 372, [2002] All ER (D) 421

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Rowland v The Environment Agency CA 19-Dec-2003
The claimant owned a house by the river Thames at Hedsor Water. Public rights of navigation existed over the Thames from time immemorial, and its management lay with the respondent. Landowners at Hedsor had sought to assert that that stretch was now . .
Cited – Fowles v Heathrow Airport Ltd ChD 15-Feb-2008
The landlord had opposed the tenant’s application to renew his tenancy, and the tenant also claimed title to additional land by adverse possession. The tenant asserted various business uses, some of which the landlord denied. The landlord went into . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Local Government

Updated: 24 October 2022; Ref: scu.178438

Regina (Goodman and Another) v Lewisham London Borough Council: CA 14 Feb 2003

Claimants challenged the grant of planning consent for the construction of a storage and distribution facility without first undertaking an environmental impact assessment.
Held: The local authority had concluded that the project could not be encompassed by the phrases ‘infrastructure project’ or ‘urban development project’. Whilst there might be some scope for disagreement, that did not mean that a decision could only be challenged by way of review as to its Wednesbury unreasonableness. If in law the interpretation was incorrect, the judge had a duty to correct it, and that did not involve such considerations, though the issue might arise later. The interpretation was outside the range of reasonable responses, and the appeal was allowed.

Judges:

Brooke, Buxton, LJJ, Morland J

Citations:

Times 21-Feb-2003, [2003] EWCA Civ 140, Gazette 03-Apr-2003, [2003] JPL 1309

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999 (1999 No 293) Sch 2 10(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation CA 10-Nov-1947
Administrative Discretion to be Used Reasonably
The applicant challenged the manner of decision making as to the conditions which had been attached to its licence to open the cinema on Sundays. It had not been allowed to admit children under 15 years of age. The statute provided no appeal . .

Cited by:

Cited – Younger Homes (Northern) Ltd v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 26-Nov-2003
The claimant sought to quash a planning decision on the basis that a screening decision had not been made.
Held: Though the procedures within the authority could have been bettered, there was no formal requirement for a screening option to . .
Cited – Richardson and Orme v North Yorkshire County Council CA 19-Dec-2003
The claimants appealed against an order dismissing their application for a judicial review of the respondent’s grant of planning permission. They contended that a councillor with an interest in the matter had wrongfully not been excluded from the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Environment, Planning, Local Government

Updated: 22 October 2022; Ref: scu.179729

City and Country Bramshill Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and Others: CA 9 Mar 2021

Questions on the interpretation and application of policies in the National Planning Policy Framework against the development of ‘isolated homes in the countryside’ and on the assessment of harm and benefit to ‘heritage assets’.

Citations:

[2021] EWCA Civ 320

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 22 October 2022; Ref: scu.659486

The First Secretary of State and Another v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd: CA 6 May 2005

Sedley LJ: ‘the interpretation of policy is not a matter for the Secretary of State, what a policy means is what it says. Except in the occasional case where a policy has been ambiguously or un-clearly expressed (see R v Derbyshire CCC, ex p Woods [1997] JPL 958), so that its maker has to amplify rather than interpret it, ministers are not entitled to thwart legitimate expectations by putting a strained or unconventional meaning on it. But what ministers do have both the power and the obligation to do – and Miss Lieven (for the Minister) readily acknowledged that this is her real point – is to apply their policy from case to case, keeping in balance the countervailing principles (a) that a policy is not a rule but a guide and (b) that like cases ought to be treated alike.’

Judges:

Sedley LJ

Citations:

[2005] EWCA Civ 520

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Raissi, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Admn 22-Feb-2007
The claimant sought judicial review of a refusal to make an ex gratia payment for his imprisonment whilst successfully resisting extradition proceedings. Terrorist connections had been suggested, but the judge made an explicit finding that at no . .
Cited – Raissi, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 14-Feb-2008
The claimant appealed against refusal of his request for judicial review of the defendant’s decision not to award him damages after his wrongful arrest and detention after he was wrongly suspected of involvement in terrorism. He had been discharged . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Administrative

Updated: 21 October 2022; Ref: scu.249003

White v Lynch: QBD 7 Jul 2011

The claimant was landlord of the tenant’s restaurant property. He sought an injunction to require the defendant to comply with planning permissions requiring the premises to close at midnight.

Judges:

Edwards-Stuart J

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 1664 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning, Land

Updated: 21 October 2022; Ref: scu.441883

Guilford Borough Council v Smith: QBD 18 May 1993

An injunction had been obtained to enforce planning controls against the defendant gypsies, and the council now sought committal for breach.
Held: Committal was refused. Only a deliberate or wilful contempt attracted imprisonment and the failure to obey the injunction could not be so described because it was accepted that the gypsies had nowhere else to go. If he was wrong in that legal conclusion he would exercise his power not to impose a punitive order, not even a suspended sentence. Sedley J pointed out as an example, that one of the respondents was a seventy year old widow who had only her old age pension and occasional donations from her family on which to survive.

Judges:

Sedley J

Citations:

Times 18-May-1993

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Broxbourne Borough Council v Robb and Others QBD 27-Jun-2011
The Council applied for the committal of the defendant for an alleged breach of a without notice injunction. Notice of the injunction had been placed at the site, requiring nobody to move caravans onto the land.
Held: The application . .
Cited – Broxbourne Borough Council v Robb and Others QBD 27-Jun-2011
The Council applied for the committal of the defendant for an alleged breach of a without notice injunction. Notice of the injunction had been placed at the site, requiring nobody to move caravans onto the land.
Held: The application . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Litigation Practice

Updated: 21 October 2022; Ref: scu.441229

Regina v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex Parte Milne (2): QBD 31 Jul 2000

Developers submitted applications for outline permission for the development of a business park. The applicant sought to quash the grant on the basis that the environmental assessment was insufficiently detailed, and contained reserved matters, and that the development conflicted with the applicable unitary development plan.
Held: The intent of the legislation had been satisfied, and as much information as was available had been provided. Some residual flexibility was inevitable: ‘a legalistic approach to the interpretation of development plan policies is to be avoided’. It was also common for such permissions to conflict in part with the UDP.
Where outline planning consent is being applied for, it is at the outline consent stage that the planning authority must have sufficient details of the proposed development, sufficient details of any impact on the environment, and sufficient details of any mitigation to enable it to comply with its article 4(2) obligation. An authority need not require further details of a matter where it is ‘satisfied that such details , provided they are sufficiently controlled by condition, are not likely to have significant effect.’ Mr Jones submits that such is the case here. There was a well established mitigating technique involving negative pressure which virtually eliminated any environmental problem. A planning authority is entitled to assume that the Environmental Agency will carry out its functions ‘with a reasonable degree of competence.’
‘the development which is described and assessed in the Environmental Statement must be the development which is proposed to be carried out and therefore the development which is a subject of the development consent and not some other development’ and the ‘ . . ..local planning authority will need to be satisfied that the description of the proposed development in the outline planning permission is adequate, given that it will be able to impose conditions in respect of reserved matters so that matters of detail can be dealt with at a later stage’.
and ‘Any major development project will be subject to a number of detailed controls, not all of them included within the planning permission. Emissions to air, discharges into water, disposal of the waste produced by the project, will all be subject to controls under legislation dealing with environmental protection. In assessing the likely significant environmental effects of a project the authors of the environmental statement and the local planning authority are entitled to rely on the operation of those controls with a reasonable degree of competence on the part of the responsible authority: see, for example, the assumptions made in respect of construction impacts, above. The same approach should be adopted to the local planning authority’s power to approve reserved matters. Mistakes may occur in any system of detailed controls, but one is identifying and mitigating the ‘likely significant effects’, not every conceivable effect, however minor or unlikely, of a major project.’
‘It is not at all unusual for development plan policies to pull in different directions. A proposed development may be in accord with development plan policies which, for example, encourage development for employment purposes, and yet be contrary to policies which seek to protect open countryside. In such cases there may be no clear cut answer to the question: ‘is this proposal in accordance with the plan?’ The local planning authority has to make a judgment bearing in mind such factors as the importance of the policies which are complied with or infringed, and the extent of compliance or breach.’

Judges:

Sullivan J

Citations:

Gazette 31-Aug-2000, [2001] JPL 470, [2001] Env LR 406, (2001) 81 PandCR 365

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 54A 70

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Se Also – Regina v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Andrew Tew; George Daniel Milne; and Steven Garner Admn 7-May-1999
An outline application for a shopping development, gave no details of the expected floor area, and nor was there an environmental assessment.
Held: The failure to give the floor area was not critical, but even at this stage the ommission of . .
Cited – City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State for Scotland and Another; Same v Same (Conjoined Appeals) HL 31-Oct-1997
The Listed buildings registers are to be read consistently; the trading level is a material consideration in listed buildings consent applications. The weight to be given to a material consideration once identified was a matter of judgment for the . .
Cited – Regina v North Yorkshire County Council, ex parte Brown and Another HL 12-Feb-1999
When a mineral planning authority set conditions on the continued operation of a quarry which had been operating since pre-1947, that decision was a development consent, and it required to be supported by an environmental impact assessment, since it . .
Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for Environment ex parte Webster Admn 8-Mar-1999
A legalistic approach to the interpretation of policies in local and other plans is to be avoided. . .
Cited – Berkeley v Secretary of State For The Environment and Others HL 11-May-2000
The claimant challenged the grant of planning permission for a new football ground for Fulham Football club, saying that an Environmental Impact Assessment had not been obtained, but was required.
Held: Where a planning application if . .
Cited – World Wildlife Fund and Others v Autonome Provinz Bozen and Others ECJ 12-Oct-1999
The court considered a project for converting Bolzano airport in Italy from military to civilian use. The national law did not require the project to be subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The court asked whether the national law . .
Cited – Regina v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council Ex Parte Trustees of the Council for the Protection of Rural England CA 12-Jun-2000
. .
Cited – Regina v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council Ex Parte Trustees of the Council for the Protection of Rural England QBD 26-Oct-1999
The authority gave permission for a new shopping centre up to 600,000 sq ft as an urban project. The Trustees sought that the permission be set aside since the council had not undertaken an environmental impact assessment, and under the EC Treaty . .

Cited by:

Cited – Hereford Waste Watchers Ltd v Hereford Council Admn 18-Feb-2005
. .
Cited – Jones, Regina (on the Application Of) v Mansfield District Council Admn 20-Jan-2003
. .
Cited – Regina (Smith) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and others Admn 19-Dec-2001
. .
Cited – Burkett, Regina (on the Application of) v Hammersmith and Fulham Admn 15-May-2003
Outline permission was granted for a large development, reserving certain matters. The applicant challenged the permission saying that the application had not included the information required under the Regulations, and the authority had failed to . .
Cited – PPG11 Ltd, Regina (on the Application Of) v Dorset County Council and Another Admn 6-Jun-2003
. .
Cited – Kent, Regina (on the Application Of) v First Secretary of State and others Admn 3-Dec-2004
. .
Cited – JD Wetherspoon Plc, Regina (on the Application Of) v Guildford Borough Council Admn 11-Apr-2006
The company sought judicial review of the decision of the respondent to apply its cumulative impact policy to their application for extended licensing hours.
Held: The company’s application amounted to a material variation of the license, and . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Environment

Updated: 21 October 2022; Ref: scu.87639

Brightlingsea Haven Ltd and Another v Morris and others: QBD 30 Oct 2008

The caravan park operated under planning consents requiring the caravans to be occupied only during certain months. The defendants had bought their mobile homes from the claimants to occupy full time, and said that the claimants knew of this. The claimants purported to impose new leases with clauses requiring the site not to be occupied during those months.

Judges:

Jack J

Citations:

[2008] EWHC 1928 (QB), [2009] 1 EGLR 117, [2009] 2 PandCR 11

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 3, Caravan Act 1968 13(1), Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 2

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Babbage v North Norfolk District Council CA 1990
The court considered the extent of its ability to insert conditions into caravan site agreements under the 1960 Act. The site licence contained two relevant conditions. One required that no caravan should be occupied between November 1 and March 19. . .
Cited – Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd and Another v Cobbe HL 30-Jul-2008
The parties agreed in principle for the sale of land with potential development value. Considerable sums were spent, and permission achieved, but the owner then sought to renegotiate the deal.
Held: The appeal succeeded in part. The finding . .
Cited – Yaxley v Gotts and Another CA 24-Jun-1999
Oral Agreement Creating Proprietory Estoppel
The defendant offered to give to the Plaintiff, a builder, the ground floor of a property in return for converting the house, and then managing it. They were friends, and the oral offer was accepted. The property was then actually bought in the name . .
Cited – Carter and Another v Secretary of State for the Environment and the Carrick District Council CA 6-Apr-1994
The District Council issued an established user certificate for a caravan on the appellants’ lands. The appellants then replaced the caravan with a ‘park home’ for which planning permission was refused and enforcement notices were issued by the . .
Cited – Byrne v Secretary of State for Environment and Arun Admn 27-Feb-1997
The appellant sought to quash the decision to confirm an enforcement notice which required him to remove a log cabin from his land. The issue arose whether the cabin was a caravan in law.
Held: It was not a caravan since it was not assembled . .
Cited – Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd ChD 1981
The fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine of estoppel. In the light of the more recent cases, the principle ‘requires a very much broader approach which is . .

Cited by:

Cited – Bury Metropolitan Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another Admn 12-Aug-2011
The council appealed against the inspector’s decision to quash its enforcement notice. The land-owner occupied a wooden structure which he said was a caravan, but the council said was a residence and an unlawful change of use of agricultural land. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Planning

Updated: 21 October 2022; Ref: scu.277378

Regina v Swansea City Council, ex parte Elitestone Ltd: CA 5 May 1993

The company appellant, E, wished to develop its land. The Council had declared it to be a conservation area. E said that they had not given the necessary notice of the meeting of the sub-committee at which the initial decision had been made. E appealed against a finding that due notice had been given.
Held: E’s appeal failed. The reference to ‘three clear days’ in the statute referred to working days only. Of the days to be counted, the 1st May had been a public holiday. The notice was not therefore as required, and the meeting was procedurally defective and ineffective in law. However the later decision of the full committee was the effective decision, and achieved that which the sub-committee had failed to achieve.
The chalets sought to be replaced were structures or erections, and therefore buildings within planning law.

Judges:

Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Staughton LJ, Mann LJ

Citations:

[1993] 46 EG 181

Statutes:

Local Government Act 1972 100B

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Applied – The King v The Justices of Herefordshire 9-May-1820
By 49 G 3, c 68, s 5, ten clear days’ notice of the intention to appeal is required.
Held, that the ten days are to be taken exclusively, both of the day of serving the notice and the day of holding the sessions.
One Joseph Stinton, having . .
Appeal From – Regina v Swansea City Council, ex parte Elitestone Ltd QBD 1993
On 1 May a sub-committee held a meeting at which land was declared to be a conservation area. Under the Act, the agenda had been open for inspection for three clear days. They were available from April 26, and there was no suggestion that they had . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Planning

Updated: 19 October 2022; Ref: scu.449987

Day, Regina (on The Application of) v Shrewsbury Town Counci and Another: Admn 19 Dec 2019

The court was asked whether the council held land as public open space. Its predecessor had acquired the land for that purpose in 1926, and had used it as such. During the war, part of the land had been temporarily appropriated for allotment purposes under powers contained in Defence Regulations. By the late 1970s the land had fallen into disuse. The council operated a tree nursery on that part of the land for some 30 years, but it closed in the late 1990s. The council proposed to grant planning permission for house building on the land. An officer’s report presented to the relevant committee expressed the view that the land was not held as public open space; and that it was separate from the remainder of the recreation ground. Based on that report the council granted planning permission for housing.
Held: The decision was set aside.
Part of her reasoning was based on the inadequate inquiries that had been made before concluding that the land was not held a public open space. She found that the land had been originally acquired as public open space. She then went on to consider whether there had been any change in that state of affairs. The question she posed was whether the land had been appropriated for uses other than public recreation. Having set out the statutory powers of appropriation, and some of the case law, she said: ‘If Shropshire Council had considered the application of these legal principles to the evidence in this case, it would have been very likely to conclude that, aside from the temporary war time allocation allotments, there had been no formal appropriation of any part of the Greenfields Recreation Ground to a purpose other than recreational use. There was no evidence of a resolution by the Borough Council or Town Council that a portion of the Recreation Ground was no longer required for recreational purposes and should be appropriated for another use. Nor was there any evidence that the formal procedures for appropriation had been followed. There was no evidence of ministerial approval for appropriation under the previous legislation, nor formal notices advertising proposed appropriation and consideration of objections under the LGA 1972, as amended.
In my view, it is very likely that the Borough Council was authorised to appropriate a portion of the recreation ground for use as temporary allotments during World War II. Mr Goodman’s research revealed that the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 conferred on local authorities a temporary power to allocate its land for use as allotments, including land forming part of a park or open space, as part of the ‘Dig for Victory’ project. The temporary power was revoked by section 5(1) of the Emergency Laws (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1953. Section 5(1) also made provision for local authorities to let land for the purpose of allotment gardens, ‘notwithstanding anything in any Act . . . or any trust or covenant or restriction affecting the land’. However, there was no evidence that the Borough Council ever resolved to exercise its powers under the 1953 Act to continue to let the land as allotments on a more permanent basis.’
There was, therefore, no evidence either of a formal decision by the council; nor evidence of satisfaction of any of the conditions required to be fulfilled before a lawful appropriation could be made. The mere fact that the land had been used for other purposes (including as allotments and as a tree nursery) was not enough.

Judges:

Mrs Justice Lang DBE

Citations:

[2019] EWHC 3539 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Adamson, Regina (on The Application of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 18-Feb-2020
Appropriation was not in sufficient form
The claimants had challenged an order supporting the decision of the Council to use their allotments for a new primary school, saying that the land had be appropriated as allotment land, and that therefore the consent of the minister was needed.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Land, Local Government

Updated: 19 October 2022; Ref: scu.648115

Regina v Leeds City Council: 1997

The Court was asked whether land had been appropriated for planning purposes.
McCullough J said: ‘I do not find the concept of ‘appropriation’ easy to grasp, since land which is ‘appropriated’ is already in the council’s ownership. More must surely be involved than a mere decision that land held for one purpose will henceforth be held for another. Otherwise, for example, if an authority decided to build houses on a small part of land it was holding for future light industrial development, the change of purpose would involve, indeed require, an ‘appropriation’, and, as a consequence of section 237, could materially effect the rights of any interested third parties. It seems to me that, at least in a case where third parties are known to have rights, an authority cannot properly embark on such a course unless it has good reason to believe that interference with such rights is necessary. I regard it as significant that a single provision in the 1990 Act, section 226, empowers an authority both to acquire land compulsorily and to ‘appropriate’ its own land. I see ‘appropriation’, therefore, as the equivalent of compulsory purchase of a council’s own land, and the same degree of ‘requirement’ or ‘necessity’ should apply in each case.’

Judges:

McCullough J

Citations:

(1997) 73 P and CR 70

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Adamson, Regina (on The Application of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 18-Feb-2020
Appropriation was not in sufficient form
The claimants had challenged an order supporting the decision of the Council to use their allotments for a new primary school, saying that the land had be appropriated as allotment land, and that therefore the consent of the minister was needed.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Local Government, Planning

Updated: 19 October 2022; Ref: scu.648251

Ramsgate Town Council v Thanet District Council: ChD 9 Nov 2018

The question at the heart of this matter is what is needed to constitute an effective appropriation of land from one designated use to another, and in particular from designated use as allotment land to land able to be used for other purposes. The judge described Thanet’s case: ‘[Thanet’s] case is simply that in 2006 (a) the Land had not been used for allotment purposes for some time, (b) [Thanet] had decided it was surplus to requirements, (c) [Thanet] had formally sought the Secretary of State’s consent to sale on the basis that it was surplus, and (d) the Secretary of State accepted that the Land was surplus and gave consent. Thereafter, the Land was not held as allotment land, but was simply held pending sale. Alternatively, if the Secretary of State’s consent was not sufficient to change the basis on which the Land was held, then the status changed when the [Thanet] formally decided to sell, in 2008, and thus appropriated the land to be held for sale, as it was permitted to do given the 2006 Consent.’
Held: The defendant’s case succeeded. Once the Secretary of State had given consent to the disposal of the land, it was no longer held for allotment purposes (even though it continued to be used for that purpose).
Thanet had obtained the consent of the Secretary of State as required by section 8 of the Allotments Act 1925. She continued: ‘Since there are no statutory formalities required for an effective appropriation, such an appropriation ought sensibly to be regarded as having been made when [Thanet] put on formal record its intention to behave henceforth in a particular way, and seeks the necessary consents to enable it to do so legitimately. Once those consents have been received, the appropriation of the Land to another use is effective unless the imposed conditions make other provision, e.g. for continued use as allotment land for a further period before the consent to another use is effective. There were no such conditions imposed in this case, so the appropriation to another use occurred, on this analysis, on 26 September 2006 when the Secretary of State gave consent to alternative use of the Land.’

Judges:

Sarah Worthington QC

Citations:

[2018] EWHC 3042 (Ch)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Adamson, Regina (on The Application of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 18-Feb-2020
Appropriation was not in sufficient form
The claimants had challenged an order supporting the decision of the Council to use their allotments for a new primary school, saying that the land had be appropriated as allotment land, and that therefore the consent of the minister was needed.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 17 October 2022; Ref: scu.628964

Lancashire County Council, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Another: CA 12 Apr 2018

The court was asked: ‘Did the concept of ‘statutory incompatibility’ defeat an application for the registration of land as a town or village green under section 15 of the Commons Act 2006? ‘ At first instance, the judge had held that he could not properly interfere with the inspector’s conclusion.
Held: The CA agreed with the court at first instance

Judges:

Rupert Jackson, Lindblom, ThirlwallLJJ

Citations:

[2018] EWCA Civ 721

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Lancashire County Council v The Secretary of State for The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Another Admn 27-May-2016
Ouseley J he said that he would have arrived at a different conclusion from the Inspector as to the purpose for which the Authority had acquired the land at issue; but considered that that did not entitle him to interfere with the inspector’s . .

Cited by:

At CA – Lancashire County Council, Regina (on The Application of) v SSEFRA and Another SC 11-Dec-2019
Two appeals as to the circumstances in which the concept of ‘statutory incompatibility’ will defeat an application to register land as a town or village green where the land is held by a public authority for statutory purposes. In the first case, . .
Cited – Adamson, Regina (on The Application of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 18-Feb-2020
Appropriation was not in sufficient form
The claimants had challenged an order supporting the decision of the Council to use their allotments for a new primary school, saying that the land had be appropriated as allotment land, and that therefore the consent of the minister was needed.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Land, Local Government, Planning

Updated: 17 October 2022; Ref: scu.608721

Goodman, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs: Admn 30 Jul 2015

The local council had acquired land for open space purposes. It subsequently appropriated the land for industrial and employment purposes. But the land continued to be used for recreation. On an application to register the land as a town or village green, the inspector held that it could be inferred from the council’s conduct that it had re-appropriated the land to open space use, alternatively, it had impliedly granted permission for lawful sports and pastimes to be carried out on the land.
Held: The decision was quashed. Under section 163 of the 1933 Act (and now section 122 of the Local Government Act 1972) the local authority must decide whether or not the land is required for the purpose for which it is held, it must carry out what has been described as a conscious deliberative process. Thus the suggestion that an appropriation can be inferred from use alone is problematic.
Dove J said: ‘First, section 122(1) contains no prescribed formula for the procedure to be adopted when a council appropriates land from one purpose to another. It does however need the council to determine that it no longer requires the land for the purpose for which it was holding it up to the point of that appropriation.’
Dove J continued: ‘The difficulty with that suggestion is the need for the authority, when exercising the power under section 122 of the 1972 Act, to be satisfied that the land ‘is no longer required’ for the purpose for which it is held. That requires some conscious deliberative process so as to ensure that the statutory powers under which the land is held is clear and appropriation from one use to another cannot, in my view, be simply inferred from how the council manages or treats the land.’

Judges:

Dove J

Citations:

[2015] EWHC 2576 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Adamson, Regina (on The Application of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council CA 18-Feb-2020
Appropriation was not in sufficient form
The claimants had challenged an order supporting the decision of the Council to use their allotments for a new primary school, saying that the land had be appropriated as allotment land, and that therefore the consent of the minister was needed.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Land, Local Government

Updated: 17 October 2022; Ref: scu.552359

Silver v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another: Admn 1 Aug 2014

The claimant sought to have quashed an inspector’s decision not to grant retrospective planning permission for an extesion built to his property.

Judges:

Supperstone J

Citations:

[2014] EWHC 2729 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and Country Planning Act 1990 288

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 16 October 2022; Ref: scu.535540

Gosbee and Another, Regina (on the Application Of) v First Secretary of State and Another: Admn 20 Mar 2003

A bungalow was not demolished as required by a condition when planning permission for a new dwelling was given. An enforcement notice was issued requiring the demolition of the bungalow.
Held: ‘in determining whether the interference is proportionate both parties accept, and I agree in this case, that the Court should adopt the two-fold test adumbrated by Dyson LJ in [Samaroo]’. The Inspector had not in terms disentangled the two questions referred to in Samaroo but stated that the key issue was whether the proper balancing of factors had taken place: ‘I do not think there can be any real doubt that the inspector considered both that the condition was the least intrusive interference to achieve the policy of one for one replacement, as he put it, and that the environmental interest which he assessed to be very important outweighed the Article 8 interest in the circumstances of this case. This was essentially a balancing exercise for him in the light of the information he had.’

Judges:

Elias J

Citations:

[2003] EWHC 770 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment HL 1980
Issues arose as to a new planning permission for two existing hangars.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The question of the validity of conditions attached to planning permissions will sometimes be a difficult one. To be valid, a condition must be . .
Cited – Regina v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Andrew Tew; George Daniel Milne; and Steven Garner Admn 7-May-1999
An outline application for a shopping development, gave no details of the expected floor area, and nor was there an environmental assessment.
Held: The failure to give the floor area was not critical, but even at this stage the ommission of . .

Cited by:

Cited – Lough and others v First Secretary of State Bankside Developments Ltd CA 12-Jul-2004
The appellants challenged the grant of planning permission for neighbouring land. They sought to protect their own amenities and the Tate Modern Gallery.
Held: The only basis of the challenge was under article 8. Cases established of a breach . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 14 October 2022; Ref: scu.185579

Veolia ES (UK) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Others: Admn 22 Jan 2015

Application to quash respondent’s decision to refuse application for planning permission for the demolition of existing buildings and the construction and operation of a Recycling and Energy Recovery Facility to treat municipal, commercial and industrial wastes, together with ancillary infrastructure landscaping, habitat creation, drainage and highway improvements

Judges:

Holgate J

Citations:

[2015] EWHC 91 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 14 October 2022; Ref: scu.541721

Wokingham Borough Council v Scott and Others: CACD 17 Jan 2019

The Registrar referred to the court an application by the prosecution, for leave to appeal under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 against a terminating ruling.

Citations:

[2020] 4 WLR 2, [2019] EWCA Crim 205

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See Also – Wokingham Borough Council v Scott and Others QBD 20-Feb-2017
Application for injunction to cease alleged breaches of planning control. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice, Planning

Updated: 13 October 2022; Ref: scu.647062

Wokingham Borough Council v Scott and Others: QBD 20 Feb 2017

Application for injunction to cease alleged breaches of planning control.

Judges:

Karen Walden-Smith HHJ

Citations:

[2017] EWHC 294 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Town and County Planning Act 1990 187B

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See Also – Wokingham Borough Council v Scott and Others CACD 17-Jan-2019
The Registrar referred to the court an application by the prosecution, for leave to appeal under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 against a terminating ruling. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning

Updated: 13 October 2022; Ref: scu.577508

Smith, Regina (on The Application of) v Warwickshire County Council: QBD 27 Jul 2016

Claim for judicial review of the grant of planning permission by the Defendant, Warwickshire County Council to itself for the change of use of land from use as a storage site for road chippings to use as an emergency stopping place for up to 12 caravans.

Judges:

Lewis J

Citations:

[2016] EWHC 1854 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Planning

Updated: 13 October 2022; Ref: scu.567800

Carter Commercial Developments v Bedford Borough Council: Admn 27 Jul 2001

The claimant brought proceedings in the Administrative Court by way of Part 8 claim seeking to establish by way of declaration that a planning appeal rejected by the Secretary of State in August 2000 as being out of time had in fact been commenced within time.
Held: The proceedings had been brought in that form simply in order to circumvent the time limit imposed by Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules and ought therefore to be struck out. It was an abuse of process to seek to decide an issue of public law by means of a private law action such as an application for a declaration.

Judges:

Jackson J

Citations:

[2001] EWHC (Admin) 669

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Stancliffe Stone Company Ltd v Peak District National Park Authority QBD 22-Jun-2004
The claimants sought a declaration. Planning permission had been confirmed for four mineral extraction sites by letter in 1952. In 1996, two were listed as now being dormant. The claimant said the letter of 1952 created on single planning permision . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Planning, Administrative

Updated: 11 October 2022; Ref: scu.228575