Ammari (EEA Appeals – Abandonment) Tunisia: UTIAC 2 Mar 2020

i. Under the 2000 and 2006 EEA Regulations there was provision for appeals brought under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to be treated as abandoned where an appellant was issued with documentation confirming a right to reside in the United Kingdom under EU law. Following the changes to the 2002 Act brought about by the Immigration Act 2014 that abandonment provision was revoked and never replaced.
ii. There has never been provision under any of the EEA Regulations for an appeal against an EEA decision brought under those Regulations to be treated as abandoned following a grant of leave to remain or the issuance of specified documentation confirming a right to reside in the United Kingdom under EU law. iii. It follows that a grant of leave to remain following an application under the EU Settlement Scheme does not result in an appeal against an EEA decision brought under the 2016 EEA Regulations being treated as abandoned.

Citations:

[2020] UKUT 124 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 25 November 2022; Ref: scu.650787

Buci (Part 5A: ‘Partner’ : Albania): UTIAC 27 Feb 2020

(1) The word ‘partner’ is not defined in Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The definition of ‘partner’ in GEN 1.2 of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules does not govern the way in which ‘partner’ is to be interpreted in Part 5A.
(2) A person who satisfies the definition in GEN 1.2 should, as a general matter, be regarded as being a partner for the purposes of Part 5A, Where, however, a person does not fall within that definition, the judge will need to undertake a broad evaluative assessment of the relationship, bearing in mind that a ‘partner’ is a person to whom one has a genuine emotional attachment, of the same basic kind as one sees between spouses and civil partners, albeit not necessarily characterised by present cohabitation. A ‘partner’ is not the same as a friend; nor is an adolescent’s or other young person’s boyfriend or girlfriend necessarily a ‘partner’.
(3) The fact that, in the absence of a statutory definition, judges may reach different conclusions as to whether an individual has been shown to be another person’s partner is unlikely to pose significant difficulties, since the fundamental question in section 117C(5) is the effect of deportation on the partner. A relationship which is categorised as that of partners, where the parties have only recently met and are not cohabiting is, in general, far less likely to generate unduly harsh consequences for the remaining partner, if the foreign criminal is deported, compared with where a relationship is longstanding and there has been significant co-habitation.
(4) Where, conversely, a relationship is not categorised as that of partners, it will still be necessary to consider the effect of deportation on the other person, by reference to section 117C(6). In the light of NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662, it is the substance of the relationship that needs to be examined and, in this type of case, it will be productive of error to draw too bright a line between section 117C(5) and (6).

Citations:

[2020] UKUT 87 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 25 November 2022; Ref: scu.650780

Belkevich, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department: Admn 3 May 2013

Claim for judicial review, initially lodged on 31 July 2012, impugning the failure by the Home Secretary to make a decision, or to provide a reasoned decision, under what is known as the ‘Legacy’ Programme

Citations:

[2013] EWHC 1389 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 25 November 2022; Ref: scu.512354

A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another: 1997

(Australia) A claim to refugee status was made by a husband and wife who had come from China to Australia. They said that they feared sterilization under the ‘one child policy’ of China if they were returned.
Held: There is a general principle that there can only be a ‘particular social group’ within the Convention if the group exists independently of the persecution, ‘ . . If it were otherwise, Art. 1(A)(2) would be rendered illogical and nonsensical. It would mean that persons who had a well founded fear of persecution were members of a particular social group because they feared persecution. The only persecution that is relevant is persecution for reasons of membership of a group which means that the group must exist independently of, and not be defined by, the persecution . . .’ and ‘Nevertheless while persecutory conduct cannot define the social group, the actions of the persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the creation of a particular social group in a society.’ (McHugh)

Judges:

Dawson, McHugh, Kirby and Gummow JJ

Citations:

(1997) 142 ALR 331

Statutes:

Geneva Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (1951) (Cmd 9171) 1A(2), Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 8(2)

Jurisdiction:

Australia

Cited by:

CitedRegina v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another ex parte Shah HL 25-Mar-1999
Both applicants, Islam and Shah, citizens of Pakistan, but otherwise unconnected with each other, had suffered violence in Pakistan after being falsely accused them of adultery. Both applicants arrived in the UK and were granted leave to enter as . .
AppliedChun Lan Liu v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 17-Mar-2005
The applicant for refugee status said she had a well founded fear of persecution if returned to China, saying that as a pregnant mother of a third child, the foetus had been removed at eight months against her will. She had refused sterilisation, . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration

Updated: 25 November 2022; Ref: scu.194497

MO (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 14 May 2007

The applicant sought asylum. He was found to have a well founded fear of prosecution if returned but other parts of his story were rejected. After appeal on a point of law, his entire case was then rejected as untruthful – propriety of issues of credibility being reconsidered and also the approval of the tribunal second time round, to consideration of the medical and objective evidence.

Judges:

Auld, Rix, Moses LJJ

Citations:

[2007] EWCA Civ 1276

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.264465

OH (Serbia and Montenegro) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 5 Dec 2007

Renewed application for permission to appeal

Judges:

Lord Justice Buxton

Citations:

[2007] EWCA Civ 1440

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

LeaveOH (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 30-Apr-2008
Wilson LJ considered N (Kenya) and said: ‘Primary responsibility for the public interest, whose view of it is likely to be wide and better informed than that of a tribunal, resides in the respondent and accordingly a tribunal hearing an appeal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.263644

Secretary of State for the Home Department, Regina (on the Application of) v Chief Asylum Support Adjudicator and Another: Admn 30 Nov 2006

The claimant had sought support which had been refused by the Home Secretary on the basis that he was no longer an asylum seeker. The claimant sought judicial review of the refusal of his appeal by the Chief Asylum Support adjudicator. The Home Secretary said that there was no jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.
Held: The review was refused on the facts, but the Adjudicator did have the jurisdiction claimed by virtue of the 2000 Regulations. S103 made provision for such disputes to be adjudicated swiftly.

Judges:

Judge Gilbart, QC

Citations:

[2006] EWHC 3059 (Admin), Times 22-Dec-2006

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 95 103, Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (SI 2000 No 704) 3

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

EndorsedRegina (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Chief Asylum Support Adjudicator and Another (Ahment Godan) CA 28-Oct-2003
The applicant was an asylum applicant. She sought to appeal a decision to stop support payments. She appealed a decision that she had no right to appeal.
Held: A decision which might give rise to an appeal only occurred if the applicant had an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Benefits

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.246757

EL (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 14 May 2007

Renewed application for permission to appeal the decision of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal on a reconsideration upholding the Secretary of State’s refusal to allow the applicant to remain here on the basis of his marriage to a person present and settled here.

Judges:

Auld LJ

Citations:

[2007] EWCA Civ 591

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.253683

The East India Company v Sandys: 1684

A nation has a right to control who comes within its borders: ‘I conceive the King had an absolute power to forbid foreigners, whether merchants or others, from coming within his dominions, both in times of war and in times of peace, according to his royal will and pleasure; and therefore gave safe-conducts to merchants strangers, to come in, at all ages, and at his pleasure commanded them out again.’

Judges:

Jeffreys CJ

Citations:

(1684) 10 ST 371

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRegina v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another, ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and others HL 9-Dec-2004
Extension oh Human Rights Beyond Borders
The appellants complained that the system set up by the respondent where Home Office officers were placed in Prague airport to pre-vet applicants for asylum from Romania were dsicriminatory in that substantially more gypsies were refused entry than . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.220648

Kan Zhou v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 31 Jan 2003

The applicant had been granted leave to enter the UK as a student. He challenged by way of review a decision to curtail that leave. He had taken part time work.
Held: The decision to revoke the leave was unlawful. The statement said that he had been given leave to enter the country as a student. Chapter 4 of Annex A of the Statement was in effect a standing order allowing a student to work part time when construed according to its natural meaning. It was not possible to construe the words to read that the permission to work was dependent upon satisfactory attendance as a student.

Judges:

Mr Justice Scott Baker, Lord Justice Rix, Lord Phillips MR

Citations:

Times 07-Feb-2003, [2003] EWCA Civ 51

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Immigration and Asylum act 1999 10, Statement of Changes in the Immigration Rules (1994) (HC 395)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedRegina v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Alexander HL 5-Jul-1982
The appellant had sought to enter the UK. She first showed an entry clearence certificate which had been obtained by deception. She then sought entry as a student. The officer refused, saying that he had no discretion in the matter. The plaintiff . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.178888

Sambasivam v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 10 Nov 1999

Where an Immigration Appeal Tribunal heard a case and the judgment would depend upon an assessment of the applicant as to his credibility, a delay of three months between the hearing and the delivery of the judgment was too long. The impression made by the characters involved would have faded, and such a finding could not be supported, and the case merited a rehearing.

Citations:

Times 10-Nov-1999, [2000] Imm AR 85, [2000] IMLR 105

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedSS (Sri Lanka), Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for The Home Department CA 15-Jun-2018
The court was asked whether, in cases heard by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) where the credibility of the appellant is in issue, there is a rule that a delay of more than three months between the hearing of oral evidence . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.88991

Mujahid, Regina (on The Application of) v First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) and The Secretary of State for The Home Department (Refusal of Human Rights Claim): UTIAC 25 Feb 2020

(1) A person (C) in the United Kingdom who makes a human rights claim is asserting that C (or someone connected with C) has, for whatever reason, a right recognised by the ECHR, which is of such a kind that removing C from, or requiring C to leave, would be a violation of that right.
(2) The refusal of a human rights claim under section 82(1)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 involves the Secretary of State taking the stance that she is not obliged by section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to respond to the claim by granting C leave.
(3) Accordingly, the Secretary of State does not decide to refuse a human rights claim when, in response to it, she grants C limited leave by reference to C’s family life with a particular family member, even though C had sought indefinite leave by reference to long residence in the United Kingdom

Citations:

[2020] UKUT 85 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650783

Patel (British Citizen Child – Deportation): UTIAC 29 Jan 2020

(1) In its application to a ‘qualifying child’ within the meaning of section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 117C(5) imposes the same two requirements as are specified in paragraph 399(a)(ii) of the Immigration Rules; namely, that it would be unduly harsh for the child to leave the United Kingdom and for the child to remain.
(2) In both section 117C(5) and paragraph 399(a)(ii), what judicial decision-makers are being required to assess is a hypothetical question – whether going or staying ‘would’ be unduly harsh. They are not being asked to undertake a predictive factual analysis as to whether such a child would in fact go or stay.
(3) Nationality (in the form of British citizenship) is a relevant factor when assessing whether the ‘unduly harsh’ requirements of section 117C(5) are met. However, it is not necessarily a weighty factor; all depends on the facts.
(4) The possession of British citizenship by a child with whom a person (P) has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship does not mean that P is exempted from the ‘unduly harsh’ requirements. Even though the child may be British, it has to be unduly harsh both for him or her to leave with P or to stay without P; not just harsh. Thus, some substantial interference with the rights and expectations that come with being British is possible, without the position becoming one of undue harshness to the child.

Citations:

[2020] UKUT 45 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650776

Chandran v Secretary of State for The Home Department: CA 14 May 2020

Refusal of discretionary leave to remain. The appellant had entered the UK clandestinely in 2007 as a child, but his mother’s asylum claim for herself and him was refused. Eventually his mother was granted discretionary leave to remain.

Judges:

Flaux, Popplewell, Dingemans LJJ

Citations:

[2020] EWCA Civ 634

Links:

Bailii, Judiciary

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration, Human Rights

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650772

Sahebi (Para 352(III): Meaning of ‘Existed’) Pakistan: UTIAC 12 Nov 2019

On its true construction, para 352A(iii) of the Immigration Rules is satisfied by showing nothing more than the formal existence of a marriage or civil partnership as at the time of the refugee’s departure from his/her country of former habitual residence. In contrast to less formal relationships, there is no requirement to show that the relationship had the qualitative character of it having subsisted at the time of the refugee’s departure.

Citations:

[2019] UKUT 394 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650801

Mansoor, Regina (on The Application of) v The Secretary of State for The Home Department: UTIAC 11 Mar 2020

The process required by the Court of Appeal in Balajigari may be carried out by the Tribunal in effect applying that guidance, such that the Secretary of State’s failure to do so is rendered immaterial.

Citations:

[2020] UKUT 126 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650789

SMO, KSP and IM (Article 15(C); Identity Documents) CG Iraq: UTIAC 20 Dec 2019

A. INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE IN IRAQ: ARTICLE 15(C) OF THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE
1. There continues to be an internal armed conflict in certain parts of Iraq, involving government forces, various militia and the remnants of ISIL. Following the military defeat of ISIL at the end of 2017 and the resulting reduction in levels of direct and indirect violence, however, the intensity of that conflict is not such that, as a general matter, there are substantial grounds for believing that any civilian returned to Iraq, solely on account of his presence there, faces a real risk of being subjected to indiscriminate violence amounting to serious harm within the scope of Article 15(c) QD.
2. The only exception to the general conclusion above is in respect of the small mountainous area north of Baiji in Salah al-Din, which is marked on the map at Annex D. ISIL continues to exercise doctrinal control over that area and the risk of indiscriminate violence there is such as to engage Article 15(c) as a general matter.
3. The situation in the Formerly Contested Areas (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din) is complex, encompassing ethnic, political and humanitarian issues which differ by region. Whether the return of an individual to such an area would be contrary to Article 15(c) requires a fact-sensitive, ‘sliding scale’ assessment to which the following matters are relevant.
4. Those with an actual or perceived association with ISIL are likely to be at enhanced risk throughout Iraq. In those areas in which ISIL retains an active presence, those who have a current personal association with local or national government or the security apparatus are likely to be at enhanced risk.
5. The impact of any of the personal characteristics listed immediately below must be carefully assessed against the situation in the area to which return is contemplated, with particular reference to the extent of ongoing ISIL activity and the behaviour of the security actors in control of that area. Within the framework of such an analysis, the other personal characteristics which are capable of being relevant, individually and cumulatively, to the sliding scale analysis required by Article 15(c) are as follows:
Opposition to or criticism of the GOI, the KRG or local security actors;
Membership of a national, ethnic or religious group which is either in the minority in the area in question, or not in de facto control of that area;
LGBTI individuals, those not conforming to Islamic mores and wealthy or Westernised individuals;
Humanitarian or medical staff and those associated with Western organisations or security forces;
Women and children without genuine family support; and
Individuals with disabilities.
6. The living conditions in Iraq as a whole, including the Formerly Contested Areas, are unlikely to give rise to a breach of Article 3 ECHR or (therefore) to necessitate subsidiary protection under Article 15(b) QD. Where it is asserted that return to a particular part of Iraq would give rise to such a breach, however, it is to be recalled that the minimum level of severity required is relative, according to the personal circumstances of the individual concerned. Any such circumstances require individualised assessment in the context of the conditions of the area in question.
B. DOCUMENTATION AND FEASIBILITY OF RETURN (EXCLUDING IKR)
7. Return of former residents of the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) will be to the IKR and all other Iraqis will be to Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities will allow an Iraqi national (P) in the United Kingdom to enter Iraq only if P is in possession of a current or expired Iraqi passport relating to P, or a Laissez Passer.
8. No Iraqi national will be returnable to Baghdad if not in possession of one of these documents.
9. In the light of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in HF (Iraq) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1276, an international protection claim made by P cannot succeed by reference to any alleged risk of harm arising from an absence of a current or expired Iraqi passport or a Laissez passer, if the Tribunal finds that P’s return is not currently feasible on account of a lack of any of those documents.
10. Where P is returned to Iraq on a Laissez Passer or expired passport, P will be at no risk of serious harm at the point of return by reason of not having a current passport.
C. CIVIL STATUS IDENTITY DOCUMENTATION
11. The CSID is being replaced with a new biometric Iraqi National Identity Card – the INID. As a general matter, it is necessary for an individual to have one of these two documents in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Many of the checkpoints in the country are manned by Shia militia who are not controlled by the GOI and are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or an INID to pass. A valid Iraqi passport is not recognised as acceptable proof of identity for internal travel.
12. A Laissez Passer will be of no assistance in the absence of a CSID or an INID; it is confiscated upon arrival and is not, in any event, a recognised identity document. There is insufficient evidence to show that returnees are issued with a ‘certification letter’ at Baghdad Airport, or to show that any such document would be recognised internally as acceptable proof of identity.
13. Notwithstanding the phased transition to the INID within Iraq, replacement CSIDs remain available through Iraqi Consular facilities. Whether an individual will be able to obtain a replacement CSID whilst in the UK depends on the documents available and, critically, the availability of the volume and page reference of the entry in the Family Book in Iraq, which system continues to underpin the Civil Status Identity process. Given the importance of that information, most Iraqi citizens will recall it. That information may also be obtained from family members, although it is necessary to consider whether such relatives are on the father’s or the mother’s side because the registration system is patrilineal.
14. Once in Iraq, it remains the case that an individual is expected to attend their local CSA office in order to obtain a replacement document. All CSA offices have now re-opened, although the extent to which records have been destroyed by the conflict with ISIL is unclear, and is likely to vary significantly depending on the extent and intensity of the conflict in the area in question.
15. An individual returnee who is not from Baghdad is not likely to be able to obtain a replacement document there, and certainly not within a reasonable time. Neither the Central Archive nor the assistance facilities for IDPs are likely to render documentation assistance to an undocumented returnee.
16. The likelihood of obtaining a replacement identity document by the use of a proxy, whether from the UK or on return to Iraq, has reduced due to the introduction of the INID system. In order to obtain an INID, an individual must attend their local CSA office in person to enrol their biometrics, including fingerprints and iris scans. The CSA offices in which INID terminals have been installed are unlikely – as a result of the phased replacement of the CSID system – to issue a CSID, whether to an individual in person or to a proxy. The reducing number of CSA offices in which INID terminals have not been installed will continue to issue CSIDs to individuals and their proxies upon production of the necessary information.
D. INTERNAL RELOCATION WITHIN GOI-CONTROLLED IRAQ
17. Where internal relocation is raised in the Iraqi context, it is necessary to consider not only the safety and reasonableness of relocation but also the feasibility of that course, in light of sponsorship and residency requirements in operation in various parts of the country. Individuals who seek to relocate within the country may not be admitted to a potential safe haven or may not be permitted to remain there.
18. Relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas. With the exception of the small area identified in section A, the general conditions within the Formerly Contested Areas do not engage Article 15 QD(b) or (c) or Article 3 ECHR and relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas may obviate a risk which exists in an individual’s home area. Where relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas is under contemplation, however, the ethnic and political composition of the home area and the place of relocation will be particularly relevant. In particular, an individual who lived in a former ISIL stronghold for some time may fall under suspicion in a place of relocation. Tribal and ethnic differences may preclude such relocation, given the significant presence and control of largely Shia militia in these areas. Even where it is safe for an individual to relocate within the Formerly Contested Areas, however, it is unlikely to be either feasible or reasonable without a prior connection to, and a support structure within, the area in question.
19. Relocation to Baghdad. Baghdad is generally safe for ordinary civilians but whether it is safe for a particular returnee is a question of fact in the individual case. There are no on-entry sponsorship requirements for Baghdad but there are sponsorship requirements for residency. A documented individual of working age is likely to be able to satisfy those requirements. Relocation to Baghdad is likely to be reasonable for Arab Shia and Sunni single, able-bodied men and married couples of working age without children and without specific vulnerabilities. Other individuals are likely to require external support, ie a support network of members of his or her family, extended family or tribe, who are willing and able to provide genuine support. Whether such a support network is available is to be considered with reference to the collectivist nature of Iraqi society, as considered in AAH (Iraq).
E. IRAQI KURDISH REGION
20. There are regular direct flights from the UK to the Iraqi Kurdish Region and returns might be to Baghdad or to that region. It is for the respondent to state whether she intends to remove to Baghdad, Erbil or Sulaymaniyah.
Kurds
21. For an Iraqi national returnee (P) of Kurdish origin in possession of a valid CSID or Iraqi National Identity Card (INID), the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by land is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
22. P is unable to board a domestic flight between Baghdad and the IKR without either a CSID, an INID or a valid passport. If P has one of those documents, the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by land is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
23. P will face considerable difficulty in making the journey between Baghdad and the IKR by land without a CSID or an INID. There are numerous checkpoints en route, including two checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the airport. If P has neither a CSID nor an INID there is a real risk of P being detained at a checkpoint until such time as the security personnel are able to verify P’s identity. It is not reasonable to require P to travel between Baghdad and IKR by land absent the ability of P to verify his identity at a checkpoint. This normally requires the attendance of a male family member and production of P’s identity documents but may also be achieved by calling upon ‘connections’ higher up in the chain of command.
24. Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governorates for Kurds.
25. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.
26. If P has family members living in the IKR cultural norms would require that family to accommodate P. In such circumstances P would, in general, have sufficient assistance from the family so as to lead a ‘relatively normal life’, which would not be unduly harsh. It is nevertheless important for decision-makers to determine the extent of any assistance likely to be provided by P’s family on a case by case basis.
27. For Kurds without the assistance of family in the IKR the accommodation options are limited:
(i) Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members;
(ii) If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month;
(iii) P could resort to a ‘critical shelter arrangement’, living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing;
(iv) In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary Returns Scheme, which could give P access to pounds 1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS rations.
28. Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking the following matters into account:
(i) Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment;
(ii) The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%;
(iii) P cannot work without a CSID or INID;
(iv) Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him;
(v) Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available;
(vi) If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers.
Non-Kurdish Returnees
29. The ability of non-Kurdish returnees to relocate to the IKR is to be distinguished. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, although single Arab and Turkmen citizens require regular employment in order to secure residency. Arabs from former conflict areas and Turkmen from Tal Afar are subject to sponsorship requirements to enter or reside in Dohuk. Although Erbil and Sulaymaniyah are accessible for such individuals, particular care must be taken in evaluating whether internal relocation to the IKR for a non-Kurd would be reasonable. Given the economic and humanitarian conditions in the IKR at present, an Arab with no viable support network in the IKR is likely to experience unduly harsh conditions upon relocation there.
F. EXISTING COUNTRY GUIDANCE DECISIONS
30. This decision replaces all existing country guidance on Iraq.

Citations:

[2019] UKUT 400 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650807

Nimo (Appeals: Duty of Disclosure : Ghana): UTIAC 27 Feb 2020

(1) In an immigration appeal, the Secretary of State’s duty of disclosure is not knowingly to mislead: CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 59, citing R v SSHD ex parte Kerrouche No 1 [1997] Imm AR 610.
(2) The Upper Tribunal was wrong to hold in Miah (interviewer’s comments; disclosure; fairness) [2014] UKUT 515 that, in every appeal involving an alleged marriage of convenience, the interviewer’s comments in the Secretary of State’s form ICD.4605 must be disclosed to the appellant and the Tribunal. No such general requirement is imposed by the respondent’s duty of disclosure or by rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014.

Citations:

[2020] UKUT 88 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650785

Hysaj (Deprivation of Citizenship:Delay) Albania: UTIAC 19 Mar 2020

1. The starting point in any consideration undertaken by the Secretary of State (‘the respondent’) as to whether to deprive a person of British citizenship must be made by reference to the rules and policy in force at the time the decision is made. Rule of law values indicate that the respondent is entitled to take advice and act in light of the state of law and the circumstances known to her. The benefit of hindsight, post the Supreme Court judgment in R (Hysaj) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 82, does not lessen the significant public interest in the deprivation of British citizenship acquired through fraud or deception.
2. No legitimate expectation arises that consideration as to whether or not to deprive citizenship is to be undertaken by the application of a historic policy that was in place prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hysaj.
3. No historic injustice is capable of arising in circumstances where the respondent erroneously declared British citizenship to be a nullity, rather than seek to deprive under section 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981, as no prejudice arises because it is not possible to establish that a decision to deprive should have been taken under a specific policy within a specific period of time.
4. The respondent’s 14-year policy under her deprivation of citizenship policy, which was withdrawn on 20 August 2014, applied a continuous residence requirement that was broken by the imposition of a custodial sentence.
5. A refugee is to meet the requirement of article 1A(2) of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and a person cannot have enjoyed Convention status if recognition was consequent to an entirely false presentation as to a well-founded fear of persecution.
6. Upon deprivation of British citizenship, there is no automatic revival of previously held indefinite leave to remain status.
7. There is a heavy weight to be placed upon the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the system by which foreign nationals are naturalised and permitted to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship. Any effect on day-to-day life that may result from a person being deprived of British citizenship is a consequence of the that person’s fraud or deception and, without more, cannot tip the proportionality balance, so as to compel the respondent to grant a period of leave, whether short or otherwise.

Citations:

[2020] UKUT 128 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650788

Regina (on The Application of MW) v Secretary of State for The Home Department (Fast Track Appeal: Devaseelan Guidelines): UTIAC 16 Dec 2019

(1) The fact that an appeal was decided pursuant to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Fast Track Procedure) Rules 2005 does not mean that the weight to be attached to the decision necessarily falls to be materially reduced, when applying the Guidelines in Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKAIT 702.
(2) Under those Guidelines, the first judicial decision is ‘the starting point’ for the subsequent judicial fact-finder. The ‘starting point’ principle is not a legal straitjacket. It permits subsequent judicial fact-finders to depart from the earlier judicial decision on a principled and properly-reasoned basis.

Citations:

[2019] UKUT 411 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650806

Alliance of Turkish Business People Ltd), Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department: CA 28 Apr 2020

Appeal and cross appeal concerning the appellant’s challenge to changes made by the respondent to the Immigration Rules and guidance affecting the right of Turkish self-employed businesspeople and their dependants to obtain indefinite leave to remain (‘ILR’) in the United Kingdom.

Citations:

[2020] EWCA Civ 553

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 24 November 2022; Ref: scu.650489

RK (Allowed Appeals – Service On Respondent) Albania: UTIAC 2 Jun 2015

1. Service by the First-tier Tribunal of a determination allowing the appeal on the Presenting Officers’ Unit in Cardiff rather than on the Specialist Appeals Team in Angel Square was good service despite what was said to be an agreement to serve all allowed appeals on the Angel Square team.
2. Accordingly on the evidence before it, the Upper Tribunal upheld the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to refuse to admit the Secretary of State’s appeal from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal as the appeal was out of time and it was not in the interests of justice to extend time.

Citations:

[2015] UKUT 331 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.550621

AM (Cameroon), Regina (on the Application of) v Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and Another: CA 20 Feb 2008

The applicant had sought judicial review, but before it was heard, and by a listing error, the statutory review went ahead. She now sought leave to continue the judicial review notwithstanding the final decision against her.
Held: The error if uncorrected would cause injustice. The court had power to hear the application for judicial review and did so. The procedure under section 103A was intended to provide speedy review of issues falling exceptionally outside the statutory review procedure. This case was one such.

Citations:

[2008] EWCA Civ 100, Times 07-Mar-2008, [2008] 4 All ER 1159, [2008] 1 WLR 2062

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002& 103A

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.264633

GO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 16 May 2007

Renewed application for permission to appeal after refusal of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s decision on a reconsideration of the respondent’s decision to deport him following his conviction and sentence to three and a half years in prison for theft, handling stolen goods and obtaining property by deception. He came to this country in 1989, where he married a woman resident and settled here and on that basis was granted indefinite leave to remain. He has two children by that marriage and one from another relationship with whom he has regular contact.

Citations:

[2007] EWCA Civ 593

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.253684

Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Oladehinde: HL 18 Oct 1990

A decision at Senior Executive Officer level was accepted as appropriate in a deportation case. There was an express form of delegation, and acts of the immigration officers required to be regarded as the acts of the Home Secretary.
Lord Griffiths said: ‘it would not be right to authorise an inspector to take a decision to deport in any case upon which he had been engaged as an immigration officer, for to do so would be too much like asking a prosecutor to be judge in the same cause’.
It is a pre-condition to the exercise of the power to detain under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 that the notice of the decision to make a deportation order is served on the person to be deported.
Lord Griffiths said: ‘It is well recognised that when a statute places a duty on a minister it may generally be exercised by a member of his department for whom he accepts responsibility: this is the Carltona principle. Parliament can of course limit the minister’s power to devolve or delegate the decision and require him to exercise it in person.’

Judges:

Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Templeman, Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner

Citations:

[1991] 1 AC 254, [1989] UKHL 3, [1990] UKHL 11, [1990] 3 All ER 393, (1991) 3 Admin LR 393, [1990] 3 WLR 797, (1991) 3 Admin LR 393,

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Statutes:

Immigration Act 1971

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

AppliedCarltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works CA 1943
Ministers May Act through Civil Servants
The plaintiffs owned a factory which was to be requisitioned. They sought a judicial review of the lawfulness of the order making the requisition, saying that the 1939 Regulations had been implemented not by the Minister as required, but by an . .
AdoptedRegina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Malhi CA 1990
Parliament would not have intended to give an adjudicator powers to review the decisions of the respondent which were co-extensive with those of a court in a judicial review since this would simply cause duplication. On the true construction of . .
At Divisional CourtRegina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Oladehinde Admn 1990
The Home Secretary authorised certain officials in the immigration department of the Home Office to act on his behalf to decide whether to issue a notice of intention to deport persons under the Immigration Act 1971.
Held: The court granted . .
Appeal fromRegina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Oladehinde CA 2-Jan-1990
The Court allowed appeals against a decision quashing decisions for the deport the applicants: there was no legal impediment to the Home Secretary authorising immigration inspectors to take the decision to deport immigrants who are in breach of . .

Cited by:

CitedNational Association of Health Stores and Another, Regina (on the Application of) v Department of Health CA 22-Feb-2005
Applications were made to strike down regulations governing the use of the herbal product kava-kava.
Held: The omission of any transtitional provisions had not affected anyone. Nor was the failure to consult as to the possibility of dealing . .
CitedBeggs v Scottish Ministers HL 7-Feb-2007
The claimant, a serving prisoner, had sought to sue the prison authorities for the conditions in which he was kept. He complained that his correspondence with his lawyers had been unlwafully opened by the prison. Repeatedly, undertakings were given . .
CitedCastle v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 24-Jan-2014
The defendant appealed from his conviction for having driven in excess of a variable speed limit on the motorway. He said that the Order under which the speed limit had been imposed was irregular. . .
CitedBourgass and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice SC 29-Jul-2015
The Court considered the procedures when a prisoner is kept in solitary confinement, otherwise described as ‘segregation’ or ‘removal from association’, and principally whether decisions to keep the appellants in segregation for substantial periods . .
CitedAdams, Regina v (Northern Ireland) SC 13-May-2020
Secretary of State alone to consider confinement
The appellant had been detained under an Interim Custody Order (ICO) during internment during the troubles in Ireland, and then convicted of attempting to escape and escaping. He now appealed from that conviction saying that the order under which he . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Administrative

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.200648

Gezer, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: Admn 14 Apr 2003

Judges:

Moses J

Citations:

[2003] EWHC 860 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

See AlsoGezer v Secretary of State for Home Department and others CA 2-Apr-2004
Application adjourned pending decision of House of Lords . .
Appeal fromGezer v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 17-Dec-2004
. .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Human Rights, Immigration, Benefits

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.185315

A, X and Y, and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 25 Oct 2002

The applicant challenged regulations brought in by the respondent providing for foreigners suspected of terrorism to be detained where a British national suspect would not have been detained. The respondent had issued a derogation from the Convention for this purpose.
Held: The people detained were those who could not be returned to their own country for fear of persecution. The reasons for detention were ones of suspicion only. The order was discriminatory, but was set against a background of a national emergency following the terrorist attacks in September 2001. A court should be careful before seeking to challenge a conclusion of the Respondent relating to matters of national security. A non-national did not enjoy the same rights as a national. The discrimination was real but not unjustified. Proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission are not criminal proceedings for the purposes of Article 6. The result is that Article 6 (2) and (3) do not apply.

Judges:

Woolf, LCJ, Brooke, Chadwick LLJ

Citations:

Times 29-Oct-2002, Gazette 28-Nov-2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 1502, [2004] QB 335

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

European Convention on Human Rights Art 15, Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (2001 No 3644), Terrorism Act 2001

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedChahal v The United Kingdom ECHR 15-Nov-1996
Proper Reply Opportunity Required on Deportation
(Grand Chamber) The claimant was an Indian citizen who had been granted indefinite leave to remain in this country but whose activities as a Sikh separatist brought him to the notice of the authorities both in India and here. The Home Secretary of . .
Appeal fromA, X and Y, and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department SIAC 30-Jul-2002
The applicants challenged their detention without trial as foreign nationals suspected of terrorist associations. The Home Secretary considered ‘that the serious threats to the nation emanated predominantly (albeit not exclusively) and more . .

Cited by:

CitedA, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, Mahmoud Abu Rideh Jamal Ajouaou v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 11-Aug-2004
The claimants had each been detained without trial for more than two years, being held as suspected terrorists. They were free leave to return to their own countries, but they feared for their lives if returned. They complained that the evidence . .
Appealed toA, X and Y, and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department SIAC 30-Jul-2002
The applicants challenged their detention without trial as foreign nationals suspected of terrorist associations. The Home Secretary considered ‘that the serious threats to the nation emanated predominantly (albeit not exclusively) and more . .
Appeal fromA v Secretary of State for the Home Department, and X v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 16-Dec-2004
The applicants had been imprisoned and held without trial, being suspected of international terrorism. No criminal charges were intended to be brought. They were foreigners and free to return home if they wished, but feared for their lives if they . .
CitedMB, Re, Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB Admn 12-Apr-2006
The applicant challenged the terms of a non-derogating control order. It was anticipated that unless prevented, he would fight against UK forces in Iraq.
Held: The section allowed the Secretary of State to impose any necessary conditions, but . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Human Rights

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.177834

Hadiova v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 9 May 2003

Citations:

[2003] EWCA Civ 701

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedHandyside v The United Kingdom ECHR 7-Dec-1976
Freedom of Expression is Fundamental to Society
The appellant had published a ‘Little Red Schoolbook’. He was convicted under the 1959 and 1964 Acts on the basis that the book was obscene, it tending to deprave and corrupt its target audience, children. The book claimed that it was intended to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.182344

El Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Daraz v Same, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, intervening: CA 26 Jul 2002

The applicants contended that as children of Palestinian Arabs who were entitled to be treated as asylum applicants, they were to be treated on the same basis. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal had decided that they had to establish such entitlement themselves.
Held: The entitlement was not ‘inherited’ but had to be established for the children in their own right. This opinion contradicted that of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, but had been reached after careful consideration, and was correct.

Judges:

Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice May and Lord Justice Laws

Citations:

Times 12-Aug-2002, Gazette 10-Oct-2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 1103, [2003] 1 WLR 95, [2003] Imm AR 179

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (Cmd 9171) 1D

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration, Children

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.174695

Regina v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Bawa: Admn 27 Oct 1997

The court considered the effect of a decision letter issued by the Secretary of State but which was not sent to the applicant. Nevertheless it had the effect of stopping his benefits.
Held: The letter was clear and unambiguous; it is in no way inadequate. It puts beyond doubt the determination of the Secretary of State that this applicant did not qualify for asylum and gives clear and cogent reasons for so concluding. …. [The letter] is a sufficient record of the determination that the applicant was not entitled to asylum and had ceased to be an asylum seeker. The Benefits Agency was entitled to act accordingly.

Judges:

Potts J

Citations:

[1997] EWHC Admin 929

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedRegina v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte F S Salem Admn 11-Dec-1997
The applicant sought judicial review of a decision refusing him asylum. The decision had been made and his benefits stopped, but he was not given any detail of the notice for several months.
Held: The decision did appear to have been made and . .
CitedSalem v Secretary of State for Home Department CA 6-Mar-1998
The Secretary of State having decided against an application for asylum could direct non-payment of benefits although he would hear representations.
Held: Regulation 70(3A)(b)(i) defines a date by reference to the recording by the Secretary of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Benefits

Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.137874

AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for The Home Department: SC 29 Apr 2020

Ability to deport the appellant, a Zimbabwean citizen, who, while lawfully resident here, has committed serious crimes. He seeks to challenge the order for his deportation by reference to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights providing: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. He is HIV positive and wishes to argue that if deported to Zimbabwe he would be unable to access the medication which he receives in the UK
and which prevents his relapse into full-blown AIDS.

Judges:

Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lady Black, Lady Arden, Lord Kitchin

Citations:

[2020] UKSC 17

Links:

Bailii, Bailii Summary

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 22 November 2022; Ref: scu.650485

MW (Liberia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 20 Dec 2007

The child was to come to the UK to stay with relatives. Permission was refused.
Held: To be allowed to come, it had to be shown that the child would be maintained here without recourse to public funds and by the people he or she was to stay with. In this case that support was to be supplemented by a third party. Such support was not maintenance as required by the Rules. Tuckey LJ said; ‘Third party arrangements of the kind in question in this case are necessarily more precarious and . . more difficult to verify. Furthermore the rules do not provide for undertakings to be taken from third parties. These are policy reasons which I think justified the amendment.’
Lawrence Collins LJ, ‘with some regret’, agreed with that construction of rule 297(v), but hoped ‘that consideration can be given to amending the rule, consistently with the policy considerations mentioned by Tuckey LJ . . to facilitate reunion where there is verifiable evidence of long-term support from third parties.’

Judges:

Tuckey, Lawrence Collins and Rimer LJJ

Citations:

[2007] EWCA Civ 1376, Times 15-Jan-2008, [2008] 1 WLR 1068, [2008] INLR 328, [2008] Imm AR 323

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Immigration Rules 297(v)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedMahad (Previously referred to as AM) (Ethiopia) v Entry Clearance Officer SC 16-Dec-2009
The claimants each sought entry to be with members of their family already settled here. The Court was asked whether the new Immigration Rules imposed a requirement which permitted third party support by someone other than the nominated sponsor.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Immigration, Children

Updated: 22 November 2022; Ref: scu.262938

Onotota, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: Admn 4 Apr 2007

The claimant challenged the decision of the entry clearance officer to refuse her entry clearance until the issue of a replacement immigration document in the form of a work permit was received. The claimant said that her existing work permit was valid. The respondent said that the letter relied on was not sufficient, and that in any event it had only six months to run.

Judges:

Silber J

Citations:

[2007] EWHC 797 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 22 November 2022; Ref: scu.251162

S, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department: Admn 28 Jan 2014

The claimant, ‘S’, claimed damages for his alleged unlawful immigration detention in Corby Police Station and Colnbrook and Harmondsworth IRCs between 3 December 2011 and 21 March 2012 and for the alleged series of significant breaches by the defendant, of the policies relating to immigration detention, the detaining of those suffering from serious mental illness and of the treatment and conditions of detention of such immigration detainees.
The background facts
The claimant, a Ghanaian, had been unlawfully resident in the UK since 19 February 2005. He had lawfully entered the UK on a 6-month visitor’s visa and a valid passport. He remained as an unlawful overstayer and in the nearly 7 years he had overstayed, he is not recorded as having worked, drawn any benefits or committed any crime. He was arrested by the police in Corby where he was living in accommodation provided for free by his Church on 3 December 2011 having been brought to their attention on 2 December 2011 behaving in a strange fashion in the street. His unlawful status came to light when one of the officers who had observed him in the street checked his details against the UKBA computerised details and ascertained that he was an unlawful overstayer.
No passport, valid or invalid, was found in the claimant’s possession and, from the outset, he was considered to be subject to and fit for administrative removal and his arrest and detention were made and maintained on that basis. There were four separate stages in his detention: his arrest and acceptance into police custody in Corby Police Station (‘CPS’) between 3 and the early hours of 5 December 2011- a total of about 34 hours whilst enquiries were made and the decision was being taken to detain him by officers of the Cambridgeshire and Northamptonshire Local Immigration Team (‘CNLIT’) and then arrangements were being made to transfer him to an Immigration Removal Centre (‘IRC’); between 5 and the early hours of 14 December 2011 in Colnbrook IRC when he was transferred to Harmondsworth IRC; between 14 December 2011 and 10 February 2012 when he was detained in Harmondsworth whilst CNLIT was responsible for his case and between 10 February and 21 March 2012 when he was detained in Harmondsworth in the Detained Fast Track whilst the Harmondsworth DFT team was responsible for his case.
He was released from detention on the orders of an Immigration Judge who had been listed to hear his asylum appeal in the DFT in Harmondsworth at the outset of the hearing on discovering from his appearance, behaviour, demeanour and from reading the two psychiatric reports that had been prepared for the hearing that he was unfit to participate in the hearing, was lacking in capacity and was incapable of representing himself – he was unrepresented at the hearing.
S’s mental illness
S’s behaviour immediately prior to his arrest and behaviour whilst in detention are now known to have been symptoms of florid and largely untreated psychosis which has been diagnosed as paranoid Schizophrenia with symptoms of cognitive impairment, perplexity, suspiciousness and severe depressive symptoms requiring stabilisation with the use of antipsychotic and mood stabilisation medication and other appropriate treatment following a lengthy period of assessment in a hospital setting. This illness had, it can now been seen, started to develop some months earlier but was, until his arrest, wholly untreated and its florid and fluctuating state had become active just before, or as a result of, his arrest. The illness was only finally brought under control after S had been released from detention and had been treated by a community-based psychiatric team between March and October 2012.
Unlawful detention
S’s claim is based on a series of allegations to the effect that his detention from the outset and throughout was unlawful because it infringed the SSHD’s related and intertwined policies of detention and detention of those suffering from mental illness. In short, S was suffering from a serious mental illness which could not be managed satisfactorily or at all by either Colnbrook or Harmondsworth IRCs and which clearly precluded his being removed from the UK in the foreseeable future. In order to consider this case, it has been necessary to examine in considerable detail the entire periods of detention – which lasted for 110 days counting the day of arrest and of release from detention. In essence, S’s case was that he was never properly assessed save on two occasions by an independently instructed psychiatrist who attended at Harmondsworth IRC on 21 December 2011 and 6 March 2012 but whose reports were completely ignored by those responsible for his detention until the Immigration Judge who considered his second report which had been included in the hearing bundle for his appeal hearing on 21 March 2012. He was considered from the outset to be fit for detention, for participation in his – as it turned out – lengthy immigration and asylum claims and proceedings, for removal and for flying and, although unfit for all of those activities, was left virtually untreated throughout the period of detention.
The findings
The inevitably lengthy and factually complex judgment examines the claimant’s claims in four stages: (1) a consideration with specific findings of fact of each of the four stages of detention; (2) an analysis of the claimant’s claim and of the various legal issues that arose in the consideration of the claim; (3) a consideration of the general features of the claim and (4) a detailed discussion and series of findings.
The result
The overall conclusion is that the claimant’s detention was throughout unlawful and that each of the decisions taken to detain and to confirm his detention were also unlawful as being Wednesbury unreasonable, and unlawful as having failed to take into account highly significant facts related to the claimant’s mental health.
Particular failings arose from the failure by Immigration Officers to visit or interview the claimant whilst he was in CPS; by Colnbrook Healthcare Centre to report, and to ensure that its locum psychiatrist, who correctly assessed the claimant but whose assessment was never reported to anyone or acted upon, issued or caused to be issued a revised IS91 and a Rule 35 report (these were never issued); by Harmondsworth Healthcare Centre who failed to treat or manage the mental illness of the claimant throughout his time in Harmondsworth; and by the various Immigration Officers who failed to pick up and give effect to the evidence of S’s serious mental illness and to obtain further details from all three detention locations which would have highlighted it.
In addition to establishing that his detention was unlawful, the claimant has established that those responsible for his detention and for his assessment, treatment and illness management in detention were in breach of his rights that were protected by articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR.
The claimant is entitled to substantial damages for his unlawful detention, since he would not have been held in detention for any part of the claimed period had the SSHD operated its policies lawfully, and if necessary additional damages for the sustained breaches of articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The damages for unlawful detention will need to reflect not only the period of unlawful detention but also the conditions under which the claimant was detained and an additional award to provide just satisfaction will be needed for the breaches of articles 3 and 8 if and to the extent that the claimant’s damages for unlawful detention do not fully and fairly reflect satisfaction for the matters giving rise to those breaches.
Damages
The claimant’s damages will now have to be assessed if these cannot be agreed. Given the complexity of that assessment process, I will myself undertake that assessment – either by a paper assessment following the receipt of further evidence and submissions or at an oral hearing if that is sought and granted. I will give directions for this assessment at the handing down hearing of this judgment which will have built into them an initial period during which the parties are to attempt to reach agreement on the award figure and thereby avoid a further hearing altogether.

Judges:

HH Judge Anthony Thornton QC

Citations:

[2014] EWHC 50 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Torts – Other, Immigration, Prisons

Updated: 20 November 2022; Ref: scu.520773