Police evidence which had been impugned by suggestions of perjury was not to be used not to found a conviction. A senior officer can be in a position to infect the whole investigative process and evidence so as to render the conviction unsafe: ‘Once the suspicion of perjury starts to infect the evidence and permeate cases in which the witnesses have been involved, and which are closely similar, the evidence on which such convictions are based becomes as questionable as it was in the cases in which the appeals have already been allowed.’

Judges:

Beldam LJ

Citations:

Gazette 28-Feb-1996, Times 31-Jan-1996, [1996] 2 Cr App R 345

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Poole and Mills v Regina CACD 17-Jun-2003
The case was a reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The defendants had been convicted in 1990 of murder. The House of Lords had dismissed an earlier appeal. Police officers had allowed statements to be put forward which were false in . .
Cited – Deans, Regina v CACD 30-Jul-2004
In 1989 the defendant was convicted of assorted serious drugs crimes. His case came before the court once more but on the basis that the evidence against him had been fabricated by police officers who had subsequently been discredited.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 08 October 2022; Ref: scu.86622

Detailed directions were provided for the judge to give to a jury where a defendant chooses not to give evidence in his defence in the Crown Court.
Lord Taylor of Gosforth said: ‘1. The judge will have told the jury that the burden of proof remains upon the prosecution throughout and what the required standard is.
2. It is necessary for the judge to make clear to the jury that the defendant is entitled to remain silent. That is his right and his choice. The right of silence remains.
3. An inference from failure to give evidence cannot on its own prove guilt. That is expressly stated in section 38(3) of the Act.
4. Therefore, the jury must be satisfied that the prosecution have established a case to answer before drawing any inferences from silence. Of course, the judge must have thought so or the question whether the defendant was to give evidence would not have arisen. But the jury may not believe the witnesses whose evidence the judge considered sufficient to raise a prima facie case. It must therefore be made clear to them that they must find there to be a case to answer on the prosecution evidence before drawing an adverse inference from the defendant’s silence.
5. If, despite any evidence relied upon to explain his silence or in the absence of any such evidence, the jury conclude the silence can only sensibly be attributed to the defendant’s having no answer or none that would stand up to cross-examination, they may draw an adverse inference.’
The existence of previous convictions on which the defendant might be cross-examined was insufficient to claim that the jury should not be told that it might draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s failure to give evidence: ‘In particular, we should deal specifically with two of the suggested ‘good reasons.’ First, the general proposition that a previous criminal record upon which a defendant could be cross-examined(if he has attacked prosecution witnesses) is a good reason for directing a jury that they should not hold his silence against him, would lead to a bizarre result. A defendant with convictions would be in a more privileged position than one with a clean record. The former could avoid submitting himself to cross-examination with impunity; the latter could not. We reject that proposition.’ The court approved the JSB specimen direction: ‘We consider that the specimen direction is in general terms a sound guide. It may be necessary to adapt or add to it in the particular circumstances of an individual case. But there are certain essentials which we would highlight. (1) The judge will have told the jury that the burden of proof remains upon the prosecution throughout and what the required standard is. (2) It is necessary for the judge to make clear to the jury that the defendant is entitled to remain silent. That is his right and his choice. The right of silence remains. (3) An inference from failure to give evidence cannot on its own prove guilt. That is expressly stated in section 38(3) of the Act. (4) Therefore, the jury must be satisfied that the prosecution have established a case to answer before drawing any inferences from silence. Of course, the judge must have thought so or the question whether the defendant was to give evidence would not have arisen. But the jury may not believe the witnesses whose evidence the judge considered sufficient to raise a prima facie case. It must therefore be made clear to them that they must find there to be a case to answer on the prosecution evidence before drawing an adverse inference from the defendant’s silence. (5) If, despite any evidence relied upon to explain his silence or in the absence of any such evidence, the jury conclude the silence can only sensibly be attributed to the defendant’s having no answer or none that would stand up to cross-examination, they may draw an adverse inference.’ and ‘Finally, we wish to make it clear that the rule against advocates giving evidence dressed up as a submission applies in this context. It cannot be proper for a defence advocate to give to the jury reasons for his client’s silence at trial in the absence of evidence to support such reasons.’

Judges:

Lord Taylor of Gosforth LCJ

Citations:

Independent 25-Oct-1995, Gazette 25-Oct-1995, Times 13-Oct-1995, [1996] 1 Cr App R 1, [1996] QB 373, [1995] EWCA Crim 8, (1996) Crim LR 409, [1995] 4 All ER 939, [1995] 3 WLR 818

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Raymond Christopher Betts, John Anthony Hall v Regina CACD 9-Feb-2001
The defendants appealed convictions for causing grievous bodily harm. During interviw, the solicitor had advised that since the police had failed to make proper disclosure of the evidence, his client should not answer. He now appealed complaining of . .
Cited – Regina v Condron, Condron CACD 17-Oct-1996
The defendants were charged with the supply of heroin. They had declined to answer police questions and it was on the record that their solicitor had advised them not to do so, on the grounds that he considered them unfit because they were . .
Approved – Regina v Taylor CACD 1999
The appellant, who had previous convictions, did not give evidence, and the trial judge gave a direction in accordance with section 35.
Held: The Court rejected a submission by the appellant’s counsel that the judge should have not have told . .
Cited – Regina v Becouarn HL 28-Jul-2005
At his trial for murder, the defendant had not given evidence, and the court had allowed the jury to draw proper inferences under s35.
Held: The JSB direction ‘on drawing inferences [i]s sufficiently fair to defendants, emphasising as it does . .
Cited – Petkar and Farquar, Regina v CACD 16-Oct-2003
The defendants appealed their convictions and sentence for theft. Whilst employed by a bank thay had arranged for transfers to their own account. Each blamed the other. They appealed on the basis that the direction on their silence at interview was . .
Cited – Regina v Roble CACD 21-Jan-1997
The defendant appealed against his conviction for wounding with intent. He had answered ‘no comment’ in the police interview, but claimed self defence at trial. The court considered what note should be taken of the solicitor’s evidence of his advice . .
Cited – Gough, Regina v CACD 8-Nov-2001
Appeal against conviction for burglary: ‘The appeal is concerned only with the directions given to the jury as to the inferences which they might draw after the appellant absconded during the course of his trial.’
Held: The direction was . .
Cited – Hobson v Regina CACD 23-May-2013
Appeal against conviction and sentence in respect of two counts of indecent assault. Hecomplained that the judge’s treatment of his failure to give evidence had been unclear.
Held: Whilst the judge’s remark may have been unfortunate, in its . .
Cited – Black v Regina CACD 17-Jul-2020
Disclosure Sufficient to Support Inference
The court was asked whether sufficient evidence had been adduced about the strength of the prosecution case at the time of interview, to permit an adverse inference to be drawn from the failure to mention specific facts pursuant to section 34 of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 08 October 2022; Ref: scu.86455

The respondent had had a receivership order made after ex parte restraint orders were made. The orders were set aside as unlawful, but the receiver now sought his very substantial costs from the respondent’s assets.

Judges:

Underhill J

Citations:

[2012] EW Misc 6 (CCrimC)

Links:

Bailii

Citing:

See Also – Eastenders Cash and Carry Plc and Another v Revenue and Customs Admn 4-Nov-2010
Applications for judicial review in relation to alcoholic goods detained by the Defendants on grounds of a suspicion that duty may not have been paid in respect of them.
Sales J said: ‘In my view, there is a clear reason why Parliament wished . .
See Also – Eastenders Cash and Carry Plc v Revenue and Customs FTTTx 29-Dec-2010
FTTTx Excise Duty – warehouse – application for registration as an owner of goods under Warehousekeepers and Owners of Goods Regulations 1999 (‘WOWGR’) – whether decision of HMRC could reasonably have been . .
See Also – Eastenders Cash and Carry Plc v South Western Magistrates’ Court Admn 22-Mar-2011
The claimant sought judicial review of decisions by the magistrates first to issue search warrants, and then to refuse to disclose the information on which it had been based.
Held: The documentation now having been disclosed the second part of . .
See Also – Eastenders Cash and Carry Plc and Others v HM Revenue and Customs CA 20-Jan-2012
The Court considered the lawfulness of the exercise of the power claimed by the Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMRC) to detain goods temporarily for the purpose of investigating their status. . .
See Also – Eastenders Cash and Carry Plc v Revenue and Customs FTTTx 27-Mar-2012
FTTTx Procedure – costs – application for costs out of time – whether discretion to entertain an application should be exercised – Rule 5 (3) (a) Tribunal Rules 2009 – whether direction should be made to apply . .

Cited by:

Appeal from – Crown Prosecution Service v The Eastenders Group and Another CACD 23-Nov-2012
‘application by the CPS for permission to appeal against . . orders made . . in the Central Criminal Court on 8 May 2012. I use the expression ‘in form’ because as will appear there are issues as to the jurisdiction of the court. The case raises . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 07 October 2022; Ref: scu.452957

Claim for judicial review of the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service (‘CPS’) not to pursue the prosecution of Mr. Elliot Fogel for harassment of the applicant, Ms Claire Waxman.

Judges:

Moore-Bick J

Citations:

[2012] EWHC 133 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Protection from Harassment Act 1997 5

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 07 October 2022; Ref: scu.452703

The appellant challenged her conviction in her absence. She had submitted a letter from her GP and been reassured that the matter would not proceed and had not attended. The prosecutor objected that the letter was weak, and the case did proceed, after failed attempts to obtain more information.
Held: The decision was quashed: ‘The decision of the court was taken without really considering the controverted fact. Nor did the court consider the Criminal Procedure Rules, which do assist courts and should be referred to in such a situation, balancing the rights of a defendant who is a witness against the strong need of the court not to have time wasted by adjournments that are not well-founded, particularly when poorly founded on very vague medical information. ‘

Judges:

Gross LJ, Irwin J

Citations:

[2012] EWHC 332 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Criminal Practice

Updated: 07 October 2022; Ref: scu.452700

Appeal against wasted costs order.

Judges:

Hughes VP LJ, Field, Beatson JJ

Citations:

[2012] EWCA Crim 319, [2012] PNLR 21, [2012] 3 Costs LR 502

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice, Costs

Updated: 06 October 2022; Ref: scu.452373

Appeal from conviction after refusal of adjournment and trial in absence of accused.

Judges:

Sir John Thomas P QBD, Beatson J

Citations:

[2012] EWHC 765 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 06 October 2022; Ref: scu.452382

Whether use of Watson direction was appropriate.

Citations:

[2010] EWCA Crim 2000

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v Watson CACD 1988
The court indicated how a jury might be directed in the event of an apparent deadlock, given two public interests which tend to pull in opposite directions: (i) the imperative that a jury should be put under no pressure; and (ii) the desirability of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 05 October 2022; Ref: scu.424861

Judges:

Rose LJ VP CACD

Citations:

[2003] EWHC 1726 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice, Costs

Updated: 05 October 2022; Ref: scu.185609

The appellant was supported in his appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. In addition the appellant sought to permission raise other grounds of appeal. The prosecution asserted that the court could filter the grounds of appeal already rejected by the Commission.
Held: The court could take any ground of appeal arising from the original case. An issue of jurisdiction raised in his case and decided against him had now been changed following the Manning case. However s 14(5) was clear, and once a reference had been made, the appellant could raise any issue allowed by that section. This was confirmed by Garner. The law might be better changed.

Judges:

Buxton LJ, Holman, Astill JJ

Citations:

Times 05-Dec-2002, Gazette 06-Feb-2003, [2003] 1 Cr App R 648

Statutes:

Criminal Appeal Act 1995 14(5)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v Manning CACD 23-Jul-1998
The accused dishonestly falsified a number of insurance cover notes which were said to be documents required for an accounting purpose, namely, those of the persons who had sought cover and to whom the cover notes were forwarded. The accused ran his . .
See Also – Regina v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 1) CACD 13-Nov-1995
In the offence of fraudulent trading, ‘creditors’ are those to whom money was owed, including future creditors, not just those who can presently sue. Deceptions practised in UK, but having their effect abroad are prosecutable here. The only feature . .
See Also – Regina v Smith, WD CACD 18-May-1999
The Court of Appeal Criminal Division has the discretion to adjourn an appeal, once it becomes clear that the point at issue was a point of law, which was itself the subject of a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. . .
See Also – Smith (Wallace Duncan), Regina v (No 4) CACD 17-Mar-2004
The defendant appealed convictions for fraudulent trading and obtaining property by deception, saying that the English court could not prosecute an offence committed principally in the US.
Held: Provided some substantial element (here the . .

Cited by:

Cited – Poole and Mills v Regina CACD 17-Jun-2003
The case was a reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The defendants had been convicted in 1990 of murder. The House of Lords had dismissed an earlier appeal. Police officers had allowed statements to be put forward which were false in . .
See Also – Smith (Wallace Duncan), Regina v (No 4) CACD 17-Mar-2004
The defendant appealed convictions for fraudulent trading and obtaining property by deception, saying that the English court could not prosecute an offence committed principally in the US.
Held: Provided some substantial element (here the . .
See also – Regina v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 1) CACD 13-Nov-1995
In the offence of fraudulent trading, ‘creditors’ are those to whom money was owed, including future creditors, not just those who can presently sue. Deceptions practised in UK, but having their effect abroad are prosecutable here. The only feature . .
See Also – Regina v Smith, WD CACD 18-May-1999
The Court of Appeal Criminal Division has the discretion to adjourn an appeal, once it becomes clear that the point at issue was a point of law, which was itself the subject of a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. . .
Cited – Hamilton and Others v Post Office Ltd CACD 15-Jan-2021
Good Reason to Pursue Second Appeal
The appellants had been convicted of fraud against the Post Office. The Criminal Cases Review Commission referred their convictions on two grounds, namely abuse of process for the inability to provide a fair trial, and that the trial was an affront . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 05 October 2022; Ref: scu.178325

The Court of Appeal Criminal Division has the discretion to adjourn an appeal, once it becomes clear that the point at issue was a point of law, which was itself the subject of a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission.

Citations:

Times 20-May-1999, Gazette 09-Jun-1999, [1999] EWCA Crim 1430, [1999] EWCA Crim 1452

Statutes:

Criminal Appeal Act 1995 9

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

See Also – Regina v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 1) CACD 13-Nov-1995
In the offence of fraudulent trading, ‘creditors’ are those to whom money was owed, including future creditors, not just those who can presently sue. Deceptions practised in UK, but having their effect abroad are prosecutable here. The only feature . .
See Also – Smith (Wallace Duncan), Regina v (No 4) CACD 17-Mar-2004
The defendant appealed convictions for fraudulent trading and obtaining property by deception, saying that the English court could not prosecute an offence committed principally in the US.
Held: Provided some substantial element (here the . .
See Also – Regina v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 3) CACD 28-Nov-2002
The appellant was supported in his appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. In addition the appellant sought to permission raise other grounds of appeal. The prosecution asserted that the court could filter the grounds of appeal already . .

Cited by:

See also – Regina v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 1) CACD 13-Nov-1995
In the offence of fraudulent trading, ‘creditors’ are those to whom money was owed, including future creditors, not just those who can presently sue. Deceptions practised in UK, but having their effect abroad are prosecutable here. The only feature . .
See Also – Regina v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 3) CACD 28-Nov-2002
The appellant was supported in his appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. In addition the appellant sought to permission raise other grounds of appeal. The prosecution asserted that the court could filter the grounds of appeal already . .
See Also – Smith (Wallace Duncan), Regina v (No 4) CACD 17-Mar-2004
The defendant appealed convictions for fraudulent trading and obtaining property by deception, saying that the English court could not prosecute an offence committed principally in the US.
Held: Provided some substantial element (here the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 05 October 2022; Ref: scu.157852

The Court heard an interim application to decide whether an appeal to the Supreme Court existed under the 2002 Act. A restraint order had been made as to the appellants assets.
Held: The statutory provisions substituting the Supreme Court for the House of Lords had omitted to deal with the 2005 Order appeal provisions. Leave to appeal was not required to have been given by the Court of Appeal, and it could not be imposed retrospectively.

Judges:

Lord Phillips P, Kerr, Sumption LL

Citations:

[2012] UKSC 3

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 40 41, Criminal Appeal Act 1968 33(3), Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 (SI 2005/3181)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal from – Stanford International Bank Ltd, Re CA 25-Feb-2010
Hughes LJ said: ‘it is essential that the duty of candour laid upon any applicant for an order without notice is fully understood and complied with. It is not limited to a duty not to misrepresent. It consists in a duty to consider what any other . .
Cited – The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited v Irving The Collector of Customs for Queensland PC 17-May-1905
(Queensland) A later Order cannot retroactively place restrictions upon a right of appeal that currently exists. . .
See Also – Re Stanford International Bank Ltd Misc 16-Jan-2012
Reasons for order releasing funds from sums subject to restraint order. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 05 October 2022; Ref: scu.451455

The A-G, using RSC Order 52, sought a finding that the defendant was in contempt when, as a juror she had conducted internet research about the case, revealing her results to other jury members.
Held: She was in contempt. She had deliberately disobeyed the judge’s instructions not to conduct internet research. It was a contempt of court in the context of jury misconduct within the jury room ‘for a juror deliberately to disobey the direction of the judge and [thereby] create a [real] risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice. What that removes is a specific intent in relation to the creation of the risk. The intent is directed at the deliberate disobedience.’
Lord Judge CJ set out four elements which would ordinarily establish the two elements of contempt in cases where there had been deliberate disobedience to a judge’s direction or order: i) The juror knew that the judge had directed that the jury should not do a certain act.
ii) The juror appreciated that that was an order.
iii) The juror deliberately disobeyed the order.
iv) By doing so the juror risked prejudicing the due administration of justice.
and . . ‘We have no doubt that the defendant knew perfectly well, first, that the judge had directed her, and the other members of the jury, in unequivocal terms, that they should not seek information about the case from the Internet; second, that the defendant appreciated that this was an order; and, third, that the defendant deliberately disobeyed the order. By doing so, before she made any disclosure to her fellow jurors, she did not merely risk prejudice to the due administration of justice, but she caused prejudice to it. This was because she had sought to arm and had armed herself with information of possible relevance to the trial which, although not adduced in evidence, might have played its part in her verdict. The moment when she disclosed any of that information to her fellow jurors she further prejudiced the administration of justice. In the result, the jury was rightly discharged from returning a verdict and a new trial was ordered. The unfortunate complainant had to give evidence of his ordeal on a second occasion. The time of the other members of the jury was wasted, and the public was put to additional unnecessary expense. The damage to the administration of justice is obvious.
This contempt is proved to the criminal standard.’

Judges:

Lord Judge CJ, Hallett LJ, Openshaw J

Citations:

[2012] EWHC 156 (Admin), [2012] 1 WLR 991

Links:

Bailii

Cited by:

Cited – HM Attorney General v Davey Admn 29-Jul-2013
The Attorney general sought the committal of the defendants for contempt of court alleging their misbehaviour as jurors. One had posted to a facebook account about the trial and lied about it to the judge. The second, in a different trial, had . .
At Admn – Dallas v The United Kingdom ECHR 11-Nov-2013
The applicant challenged her conviction for contempt of court in that whilst a juror, she researched the case before her on the internet, discovering that the defendant had faced an earlier allegation broadly similar. She now said that the . .
At Admn – Dallas v The United Kingdom ECHR 11-Feb-2016
Test for contempt was accessible and foreseeable.
The applicant had been convicted of contempt of court in that whilst acting as a juror, and in defiance of an explicit direction from the judge had researched the defendant in the internet, and passed on her findings to other jurors.
Held: the . .
Cited – HM Solicitor General v Cox and Another QBD 27-May-2016
Applications for committal of the defendants for having taken photographs of court proceedings when their friend was being sentenced for murder and publishing them on Facebook. The SG urged that the offences had aggravating features taking the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Contempt of Court, Criminal Practice

Updated: 05 October 2022; Ref: scu.452174

Lord Parker CJ discussed the duties of a judge in a criminal trial: ‘Of course it has been recognised always that it is wrong for a judge to descend into the arena and give the impression of acting as advocate . . Whether his interventions in any case give ground for quashing a conviction is not only a matter of degree, but depends to what the interventions are directed and what their effect may be. Interventions to clear up ambiguities, interventions to enable the judge to make certain that he is making an accurate note, are of course perfectly justified. But the interventions which give rise to a quashing of a conviction are really three-fold; those which invite the jury to disbelieve the evidence for the defence which is put to the jury in such strong terms that it cannot be cured by the common formula that the facts are for the jury . . The second ground giving rise to a quashing of a conviction is where the interventions have made it really impossible for counsel for the defence to do his or her duty in properly presenting the defence, and thirdly, cases where the interventions have had the effect of preventing the prisoner himself from doing himself justice and telling the story in his own way.’

Judges:

Lord Parker CJ

Citations:

Unreported, 9 June 1969

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Adopted – Regina v Hulusi and Purvis CACD 1973
The defendant appealed against his conviction, complaining of the judge’s repeated hostile interventions. Lawton LJ said: ‘Time and time again the judge intervened, got an answer and then asked questions on that answer. The impression he must have . .
Cited – Michel v The Queen (The Court of Appeal of Jersey) PC 4-Nov-2009
michel_rPC2009
(Jersey) The defendant appealed, complaining that the number and character of the judge’s interventions in his trial for money laundering had made it unfair.
Held: The conviction was quashed and the case remitted for a decision as to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 04 October 2022; Ref: scu.377805

Judges:

Blake J

Citations:

[2010] EWHC 353 (QB), [2010] WTLR 875

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 243 266

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 04 October 2022; Ref: scu.402609

An application was made for the quashing of two acquittals for murder and for a retrial.
Held: It would take only compelling new evidence of guilt to justify the quashing of an acquittal. The evidence of a witness who was ready to say whatever suited him could not count as such. The appeal failed.
‘Each case depends on its facts. The bar for the Crown is, as counsel rightly recognises, a high one. In particular, it is not enough that the new evidence presents the defendant with a case to answer. The time to present him with a case to answer is at the time of his trial. There are very powerful reasons why there ought normally to be a single trial, at which all the evidence on either side is assembled and assessed, and which produces an outcome which, whether conviction or acquittal, is, subject to any error of law or principle exposed on appeal, final. It is only where there is compelling new evidence of guilt, of the kind which cannot realistically be disputed, that the exceptional step of quashing an acquittal will be justified.’

Judges:

Hughes LJ VP, Penry-Davey, Stadlen JJ

Citations:

[2009] EWCA Crim 1207, [2009] EWCA Crim 1077, Times 09-Jul-2009, [2009] Crim LR 738

Links:

Bailii, Bailii

Statutes:

Criminal Justice Act 2003 78

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v Dobson CACD 18-May-2011
Retrial After Acquittal – New Scientific Evidence
The court heard an application for the quashing of a verdict of not guilty and the retrial of a defendant for the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. Other defendants previously acquitted were not to be tried, but a defendant not previously tried . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 04 October 2022; Ref: scu.347228

The defendant who was aged 16 gave a no comment interview on the advice of his solicitor. At trial he waived privilege and his solicitor gave evidence that he had given him before interview a very similar account of the incident to that which the defendant had himself given the jury at trial. The judge failed to tell the jury that they should only draw an inference against him if it was something which he could reasonably have been expected to mention.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Tuckey LJ discussed the operation of s34: ‘Once the preconditions to the operation of section 34 are satisfied the jury are entitled to draw: ‘such inferences from the failure as appear proper.’ ‘The usual inference which the jury are invited to draw is that at the time of the interview the defendant had no answer to the allegations being made against him or none that would stand up to questioning. In other words, his subsequent defence is a late fabrication or one which has been tailored to fit the prosecution case. But the prosecution in this case did not invite the jury to draw such inferences. In his directions to the jury the judge does not say what inference the jury could properly draw if they decided to do so. We think he should have done. He should have reminded the jury of the inference which the prosecution invited them to draw along the lines of the specimen direction.
. . . It was incumbent on the judge in his summing-up to identify the relevant inference.’

Judges:

Tuckey LJ

Citations:

Unreported, 9 June 2000

Statutes:

Criminal Justice nd Public Order Act 1994 34

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – Petkar and Farquar, Regina v CACD 16-Oct-2003
The defendants appealed their convictions and sentence for theft. Whilst employed by a bank thay had arranged for transfers to their own account. Each blamed the other. They appealed on the basis that the direction on their silence at interview was . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 04 October 2022; Ref: scu.244805

Citations:

[2006] EWHC 1607 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice, Costs

Updated: 04 October 2022; Ref: scu.243058

Reasons for order releasing funds from sums subject to restraint order.

Judges:

Gloster J DBE

Citations:

[2012] EW Misc 1 (CCrimC)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005

Cited by:

See Also – Stanford International Bank Ltd v Director of The Serious Fraud Office SC 15-Feb-2012
The Court heard an interim application to decide whether an appeal to the Supreme Court existed under the 2002 Act. A restraint order had been made as to the appellants assets.
Held: The statutory provisions substituting the Supreme Court for . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 04 October 2022; Ref: scu.450460

The defendants appealed against their convictions for sexual offences committed more than thirtyy years before the trial. They alleged abuse of process.
Held: The appeals succeeded. There had been no good reason for the long delay. The complainants’ mother had confronted the appellant 27 years previously but had not reported him to the police. The delay had provided an opportunity for collusion between complainants and other witnesses, a witness for the defendant had died and much of the other documentary evidence on which the defendant would have relied was no longer available.
After reviewing the case law, the Court laid down 5 propositions: ‘i. the court should stay proceedings on some or all counts of the indictment if and only if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that by reason of delay a fair trial is not possible on those counts;
ii. usually the proper time for the defence to make such an application and for the judge to rule upon it is at trial, after all the evidence is called;
iii. in assessing what prejudice has been caused to the defendant on any particular count by reason of delay, the court should consider what evidence directly relevant to the defence case has been lost through the passage of time. Vague speculation that the lost documents or deceased witnesses might have assisted the defendant is not helpful. The court should also consider what evidence has survived the passage of time. The court should then examine critically how important the missing evidence is in the context of the case as a whole;
iv. having identified the prejudice caused to the defence by reason of the delay, it is then necessary to consider to what extent the judge can compensate for that prejudice by emphasising guidance given in standard directions or formulating special directions to the jury. Where important independent evidence has been lost over time, it may not be known which party that evidence would have supported. There may be cases in which no direction to the jury can dispel the resultant prejudice which one or other of the parties much suffer, but this depends on the facts of the case;
v. if the complainant’s delay in coming forward is unjustified, that is relevant to the question whether it is fair to try the defendant so long after the events in issue. In determining whether the complainant’s delay is unjustified, it must be firmly borne in mind that victims of sexual abuse are often unwilling to reveal or talk about their experiences for some time and for good reason.

Judges:

Jackson LJ, Silber J, HH Barker QC CS

Citations:

[2011] EWCA Crim 2812, [2011] 2 Cr App R 13

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 04 October 2022; Ref: scu.450300

The prosecutor appealed against a termination ruling to the effect that the failure by the prosecutor in its disclosure obligations anounted to an abuse of process.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The defendants had been charged with fraudulent importation of large quantities of Class A and Class B drugs. The proposed defence was that their identities had been ‘hijacked’ by others to hide the activities of those others. Documents not disclosed would have supported that defence. However other of the judge’s criticisms were not well founded, and: ‘we have no doubt that the judge’s ruling could not be supported. In a case such as the present, the disclosure duty of the prosecution may be, and was in this case, onerous. It is for the judge to ensure that requests for disclosure are focused and not disproportionate. Orders for the entirety of case papers to be disclosed, when the point to be made from them is relatively circumscribed, are inappropriate. Moreover, deficiencies in disclosure may be censured, and were in this case, but it does not follow that the trial should not continue.’

Judges:

Stanley Burnton LJ, Stadlen, Morris QC JJ

Citations:

[2011] EWCA Crim 2854

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Criminal Justice Act 2003 61(4)(b)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 01 October 2022; Ref: scu.449858

The solicitors appealed against a wasted costs order. On the morning of the trial, they had produced further evidence leading to the collapse of the trial.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The solicitors had not been given notice of the application, and on the facts there was no evidence sufficient to establish the required failure: ‘ it was a perfectly proper decision for counsel to take in this case that they would not volunteer the e-mails, particularly since the Crown knew of them and were not pressing for them, because they did not believe the prosecution would be able to prove their case. It was an entirely sensible decision in the interests of the client to put the prosecution to proof of its case and to keep the e-mails in reserve in order to advance a defence of honesty should that be necessary. Accordingly, we think that both as a matter of substance and fundamentally as a matter of procedure, that this order should not have been made.’

Judges:

Elias LJ, MacKay, Hickinbottom JJ

Citations:

[2011] EWCA Crim 819, [2011] 4 Costs LR 616

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Costs in Criminal Cases (General) Regulations 1986 3C

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Re A Barrister (Wasted Costs Order); Re A (No 1 of 1991) CA 1992
The section provided that the Court could order a legal practitioner to pay ‘wasted costs’, which were defined as costs incurred by a party ‘as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any representative’. . .
Cited – Ridehalgh v Horsefield; Allen v Unigate Dairies Ltd CA 26-Jan-1994
Guidance for Wasted Costs Orders
Guidance was given on the circumstances required for the making of wasted costs orders against legal advisers. A judge invited to make an order arising out of an advocate’s conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the fact that an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 29 September 2022; Ref: scu.449730

The first defendant appealed, submitting that he did not receive a fair trial because a juror had discovered on the internet prejudicial information about him and passed that information on to the other jurors, being information which was not, it was agreed, relevant and admissible.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The difficulty had been identified, and the judge had done what he could by way of clear directions to ensure that the jury disregarded the materials. Nevertheless tere was a real possibility that one or more of the jurors would not follow the directions.

Judges:

Hooper LJ, Nelson, Maddison JJ

Citations:

[2009] Crim LR 357, [2008] EWCA Crim 2359

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 29 September 2022; Ref: scu.277884

The court indicated how a jury might be directed in the event of an apparent deadlock, given two public interests which tend to pull in opposite directions: (i) the imperative that a jury should be put under no pressure; and (ii) the desirability of avoiding the delay, expense and uncertainty which is bound to arise if there has to be a second trial after a jury disagreement.
Held: ‘In the judgment of this Court there is no reason why a jury should not be directed as follows: ‘Each of you has taken an oath to return a true verdict according to the evidence. No one must be false to that oath, but you have a duty not only as individuals but collectively. That is the strength of the jury system. Each of you takes into the jury box with you your individual experience and wisdom. Your task is to pool that experience and wisdom. You do that by giving your views and listening to the views of the others. There must necessarily be discussion, argument and give and take within the scope of your oath. That is the way in which agreement is reached. If, unhappily [10 of] you cannot reach agreement you must say so.’ It is a matter for the discretion of the judge as to whether he gives that direction t all and if so at what stage of the trial. There will usually be no need to do so. Individual variations which alter the sense of the direction, as can be seen from the particular appeals which we have heard, are often dangerous and should, if possible be avoided. Where the words are thought to be necessary or desirable, they are probably best included as part of the summing up or given or repeated after the jury have had time to consider the majority direction —

Citations:

[1988] 87 Cr App R 1, [1988] QB 690

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Confirmed – Regina v Buono CACD 1992
. .
Cited – Regina v Tarlock Singh (Deceased) CACD 4-Jun-1998
A departure from a Watson direction will not necessarily make a jury verdict unsafe. . .
Cited – Regina v Morgan CACD 26-Mar-1997
A failure to five a jury warning in the precise form suggested in Watson need not make the trial unfair. . .
Cited – Morrison v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police CA 17-Feb-2003
The claimant sought damages from the police for the manner of her arrest. At the civil trial, the jury had been undecided, and the court directed the jury as to resolution. The respondents appealed saying that the judge had put too much pressure on . .
Cited – Regina v Durrant CACD 6-Mar-1998
The foreman of the jury effectively indicated that there was no reasonable prospect of the jury reaching an agreed verdict, but the judge interrupted saying that he would ask them to retire again for a while and read out verbatim the Watson . .
Cited – Regina v Pinches CACD 22-Jun-2010
Whether use of Watson direction was appropriate. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 29 September 2022; Ref: scu.184709

D was charged with three co-defendants with conspiring to import cannabis. He gave a largely no comment interview to the interviewing customs officer, but at trial said that the contacts with his co-defendants were innocent. Since this account had not been given in interview, the judge gave a section 34 direction.
Held: The appeal failed ‘the words ‘any fact’ do not fall to be read only in the narrow sense of an actual deed or thing done but in the fuller sense contemplated by the Oxford English Dictionary of ‘something that . . is actually the case . . hence, a particular truth known by actual observation or authentic testimony, as opposed to what is merely inferred, or to a conjecture or to fiction’.’ and ‘it seems to us necessary to approach the meaning to be attributed to ‘any fact’ having regard to the apparent purpose of the statute and, in particular, the context and stage of proceedings with which s.34(1)(a) is concerned, that is to say the questioning of a suspect at a stage when the facts available to the prosecution without the benefit of any explanation of the defendant give rise to a suspicion or inference of his involvement in the crime under investigation, and the questioning is being directed to establishing whether such suspicion or inference is well founded in fact. The facts relevant to establishing whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime in respect of which he is being interrogated go far wider than the simple matter of what might have been observed to happen on a particular occasion and frequently involve what reasons or explanations the defendant gives for his involvement in the particular event observed which, if true, would absolve him from the suspicion of criminal intent or involvement which might otherwise arise. The significance for the jury of a failure by the defendant when first questioned to mention facts relied on at his trial is whether or not that failure is an indication that the facts which he now adopts or advances before the jury (including any explanation for his involvement in undisputed but equivocal events) can or cannot be relied on.’

Judges:

Potter LJ

Citations:

[2000] EWCA Crim 84

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Criminal Justice amd Public Order Act 1994 34

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Cited – Regina v Bowden (BT) CACD 10-Feb-1999
The defendant was charged with robbing a McDonald’s restaurant. He had refused to answer questions when interviewed on arrest, and his solicitor had put on record that this was on the grounds that the solicitor did not think the evidence strong . .

Cited by:

Cited – Regina v Webber HL 22-Jan-2004
The defendant complained that the judge had given a direction under s34 even though his counsel had only put matters to witnesses for the prosecution.
Held: A positive suggestion put to a witness by or on behalf of a defendant may amount to a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 29 September 2022; Ref: scu.158734

Citations:

[2020] NIQB 76

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

Northern Ireland

Criminal Practice

Updated: 27 September 2022; Ref: scu.658835

Two applications for judicial review, arising out of prosecutions for driving with a breath alcohol level in excess of the statutory limit, contrary to section 5(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘the RTA’). In both cases, following the service of a defence statement, the District Judge allowed a defence application for disclosure pursuant to section 8 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (‘the CPIA’), ordering the Crown to make disclosure of the further material sought. The DPP seeks to review the decision of the District Judge in each case and asks us to quash the orders for disclosure.

Judges:

The Rt Hon the Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ and the Hon Mrs Justice Ma

Citations:

[2019] EWHC 3317 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 27 September 2022; Ref: scu.645838

The claimants challenged the legality of the issue and execution of search warrants issued on the request of the respondent.
Held: The search was executed unlawfully, but the relief granted was confined to a declaration.

Judges:

Laws LJ, Simon J

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 2998 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 8

Cited by:

Cited – Global Cash and Carry Ltd, Regina (on The Application of) v Birmingham Magistrates’ Court and Others Admn 19-Feb-2013
The claimant sought an order quashing a search warrant, and for damages. The officer had said that he had evidence that the claimants were storing an distributing from the premises large quantities of counterfeit goods and drugs.
Held: The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 26 September 2022; Ref: scu.448507

The trial judge had directed his jury at a criminal trial: ‘You will make your decision about this case based solely upon the evidence which you hear during this trial, in this courtroom and upon nothing else. Most of us these days have access to the internet, it contains lots of fascinating information, some of about the criminal justice system and some it about specific criminal offences. If you do have access to the ‘net, members of the jury, please do not go on the ‘net during this trial to explore any issues which may arise. That would be wrong. As I have said, you must base your decision in this case solely on what you hear in this courtroom and upon nothing else.’ Following acquittal verdicts in respect of one of the defendants at trial (Ms Sewart), and while the deliberations were continuing in respect of other defendants and charges, one of the jurors (Ms Fraill) contacted Ms Sewart on Facebook, a social networking site. They had a conversation over that site. Ms Fraill had also researched once of the defendants on the internet. Contempt of court proceedings were subsequently brought against Ms Fraill and Ms Sewart. Ms Fraill pleaded guilty to contempt of court.
Held: The court noted: ‘Fraill is, as she has admitted, guilty of contempt of court because as a juror she communicated with Sewart via the internet and conducted an online discussion about the case with her when the jury deliberations had not been completed and verdicts had not been returned. During the course of the discussion she provided Sewart with information about the state of the jury’s deliberations. This conduct contravened the provisions of section 8 of the 1981 Act . . and disobeyed the clear and unequivocal series of directions given by the trial judge prohibiting such conduct. She was also guilty of contempt of court for conducting research on the internet into the defendants in the criminal trial in which she was sitting as a juror for the purpose of obtaining further information of possible relevance to the issues at trial.’
As to sentencing, the court explained: ‘The starting point is simple. Misuse of the internet by a juror, or contravention of the contempt of court provisions in section 8(1) of the 1981 Act, is always a most serious irregularity and contempt. In the context of a two year maximum custodial period, a custodial sentence is virtually inevitable. The sentence is intended to ensure the continuing integrity of trial by jury.’ The court considered Ms Fraill’s conduct in visiting the internet repeatedly to be directly contrary to her oath as a juror and constituted a flagrant breach of the orders made by the judge for the proper conduct of the trial. Noting, in mitigation, that she had assisted in the investigation into contempt and had pleaded guilty at the earliest possible opportunity, the court imposed an order for immediate custody for a period of eight months.

Judges:

Judge LCJ, Ousely, Holroyde JJ

Citations:

[2011] EWCh 1629 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Contempt of Court Act 1981 8

Cited by:

Cited – Dallas v The United Kingdom ECHR 11-Nov-2013
The applicant challenged her conviction for contempt of court in that whilst a juror, she researched the case before her on the internet, discovering that the defendant had faced an earlier allegation broadly similar. She now said that the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice, Contempt of Court

Updated: 26 September 2022; Ref: scu.448500

The appellant challenged rejection of his appeal against his conviction for common assault on his wife.

Judges:

Elias LJ, Beatson J

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 1648 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Criminal Practice

Updated: 25 September 2022; Ref: scu.447509

Citations:

[2007] EWCA Crim 2647, [2008] 1 Cr App Rep 18, (2008) 172 JP 17

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 22 September 2022; Ref: scu.402506

Judges:

Mr Justice Edis

Citations:

[2019] EWHC 767 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 22 September 2022; Ref: scu.643820

Judges:

Sweeney J

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 175 (QB), [2011] Lloyd’s Rep FC 276

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

Criminal Practice

Updated: 20 September 2022; Ref: scu.444869

Appointment of receivers.

Citations:

[2010] EWHC 3740 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 17 September 2022; Ref: scu.443281

(St. Vincent and The Grenadines) A notice of appeal which was required by statute to be given ‘in such manner as may be directed by rules of court’, but which did not comply with such rules because it was not signed by the appellant personally, was nonetheless a notice within the meaning of the relevant statutory provision, at least once the irregularity was waived by the court, and that such waiver validated the notice from the date of its lodging and did not merely bring into existence for the first time a valid notice.

Judges:

Jauncey, Browne-Wilkinson, Mustill, Slynn of Hadley, LL, Hardie Boys J

Citations:

[1995] UKPC 40

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

Commonwealth

Cited by:

Cited – Hughes v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 12-Oct-2009
The defendant appealed against her conviction for aggravated vehicle taking. She was found near the scene of a road traffic accident involving a stolen car, and her fingerprint on an inside rear window. She submitted that the officers had asked as . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 17 September 2022; Ref: scu.442346

New Criminal Practice forms for disclosure and witness statements.

Citations:

Times 15-Oct-2009

Statutes:

The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2009

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 17 September 2022; Ref: scu.376135

Citations:

[2002] EWHC 1430 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 17 September 2022; Ref: scu.347798

(High Court of Australia) Barwick CJ considered the circumstance where, in a criminal trial, a judge was asked to exclude evidence for unfairness: ‘Whenever such unlawfulness or unfairness appears, the judge has a discretion to reject the evidence. He must consider its exercise. In the exercise of it, the competing public requirements must be considered and weighed against each other. On the one hand there is the public need to bring to conviction those who commit criminal offences. On the other hand there is the public interest in the protection of the individual from unlawful and unfair treatment. Convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may be obtained at too high a price. Hence the judicial discretion.’

Judges:

Barwick CJ

Citations:

[1971-72] 126 CLR 321

Jurisdiction:

Australia

Cited by:

Cited – Attorney General’s Reference No. 3 of 1999 HL 14-Dec-2000
An horrific rape had taken place. The defendant was arrested on a separate matter, tried and acquitted. He was tried under a false ID. His DNA sample should have been destroyed but wasn’t. Had his identity been known, his DNA could have been kept . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 17 September 2022; Ref: scu.374691

The defendants appealed convictions for assault saying that the judge’s directions to the jury given in answer to a question from them after retirement made their convictions unsafe. The jury had asked whether one defendant alone could be found guilty of the more serious assault. The judge answered that they were charged jointly. It was said his answer should have been clearer.
Held: The appeal succeeded.
‘the learned judge’s further direction, with its reference to somebody being a party to an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, begs a question. The question begged is what has to be proved to make someone a party to the intention of somebody else? We are conscious that sometimes an apparent ambiguity appears on paper whereas the position was at trial completely clear in the context in which the words were spoken. We have therefore looked at the body of the summing-up in order to see whether the case had so plainly been left to the jury on the basis that actual intention to cause grievous bodily harm had to be proved against any defendant before that defendant could be guilty of the section 18 offence that this jury could not have been misled. We regret that we do not think that we can say that the matter had clearly been left to this jury on that basis.’

Citations:

[1998] EWCA Crim 3164

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 16 September 2022; Ref: scu.156038

Applications within application for a Civil Recovery Order, as to the obtaining of evidence from witness resident in Pakistan.

Judges:

Walker J

Citations:

[2014] EWHC 4742 (QB)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 16 September 2022; Ref: scu.553268

Citations:

[2013] EWCA Crim 990

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 16 September 2022; Ref: scu.510927

On a trial of several defendants, on charge against one defendant remained unresolved. A co-defendant, released on bail, met with two jurors in a pub at a break for about two hours and discussed the remaining defendant. The court was not informed. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to 23 years imprisonment. He now appealed.

Judges:

Thomas, Sweeney LJJ, Paget QC J

Citations:

[2011] EWCA Crim 1778

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 16 September 2022; Ref: scu.442002

The defendant sought judicial review of a decision by the Crown Court, the Respondent, to authorise the retention by the Serious Organised Crime Agency of material seized by it pursuant to a warrant which, by reason of a technical defect on its face, was admitted by SOCA to be unlawful.

Citations:

[2011] EWHC 1853 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 16 September 2022; Ref: scu.441872

Challenge to conviction based upon identity parade

Citations:

[2005] EWHC 1218 (Admin)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Criminal Practice

Updated: 16 September 2022; Ref: scu.226736

A youth was charged with causing grievous bodily harm. His trial was fixed for 11 October 1988. On the date of trial, the prosecution applied for an adjournment on the grounds that, if the trial proceeded immediately and the magistrates decided that the victim did not have sufficient understanding to take the oath by reason of his age, unsworn testimony would, on the law as it then stood, have to be corroborated by other independent evidence which the prosecution could not produce. The prosecution pointed out that the law would be changed the following day and the law requiring corroboration would be abolished. The trial was adjourned ‘in the interests of justice’. The applicant applied to the Divisional Court for an order quashing the magistrates’ decision.
Held: The court may grant an adjournment for ‘extraneous reasons’ thereby causing a defendant to suffer from the consequences of a change in the law. ‘If for extraneous listing reasons a trial is fixed for the day after rather than the day before a change in the relevant law, we find it difficult to see how a defendant could feel any legitimate sense of grievance, or be able to say that he had been unfairly prejudiced. He might well be regarded as unlucky to have got the later date rather than the earlier, and equally a person whose trial commenced the day before might be regarded as lucky to have his trial when he did, but luck or chance seems to be a rather unsatisfactory foundation for the suggested right of the defendant. Again, if the prosecution in a case sought and obtained an adjournment for quite extraneous reasons (eg the non-availability of an expert through no one’s fault) and the trial then started after rather than before a relevant change in the law, it is difficult to see what injustice would be done to the defendant, nor (to our minds) could it be suggested that, despite a perfectly good reason for an adjournment, it should nevertheless be refused so as to preserve the defendant’s suggested right to be tried on the law as it stood when the trial would otherwise have been held. Yet the result in these examples would be precisely the same as in the present case. In short, in the absence of special circumstances it is difficult to see why in justice a defendant should have the suggested right.’ ‘To our minds, the arguments against accepting some unqualified inalienable right or entitlement in a defendant to be tried on the law as it stands on the day which happens to be fixed for his trial, so that it cannot be adjourned if the law will change, are overwhelming. However, that is not the end of the matter. Quite apart from rights vested in the defendant are the duties and responsibilities of the court. It is common ground that it would be unjudicial for a court (as in R v Boteler (1864) 4B and S 959, 122 ER 718) to refuse to apply the substantive law on the grounds that the court regarded that law as unfair or wrong. In the present case the magistrates concluded, in effect, that the law as it stood on 11 October 1988 would not do justice (or as much justice) as the law on the following day; and on that basis adjourned the trial. We consider that it must follow that what the magistrates were doing was to pass a qualitative judgment on the existing law and finding it wanting in justice (or sufficient justice) acted as they did. They were therefore doing essentially the same thing as the magistrates did in R v Boteler, namely choosing not to apply the law in force on the basis that they considered that it was lacking in justice. The fact that they did so because they preferred the law as it would be on the following day seems to us to be neither here not there, for the fact remains that the trial did not proceed because the magistrates felt that the law in force on the day fixed for it would not do proper justice. That in our view is not a legitimate basis for ordering an adjournment.’

Judges:

Saville J

Citations:

[1990] 1 QB 253

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

Cited – North British Housing Association Ltd v Matthews, Same v Others CA 21-Dec-2004
In each case the tenants requested adjournment of the possession proceedings brought against them by the landlord for arrears of rent to allow them time to bring the arrears below the level at which a possession order could be made. In each case it . .
Distinguished – Kingcastle Limited v Owen-Owen CA 19-Feb-1999
In a claim for possession of residential premises, the defendant who was the gay partner of the deceased tenant, to have succeeded to his partner’s tenancy as a member of his family.
Held: A court may adjourn a case pending the outcome of an . .
Cited – Regina v Dudley Magistrates Court ex parte Hollis; Robert v Same Admn 25-Nov-1997
An award of costs is inevitable after a finding of statutory nuisance and such costs include cost of establishing the nuisance. ‘The wide discretion as to whether to grant an adjournment conferred by section 10 and section 54 of the Magistrates’ . .
Cited – City Council of Bristol v Lovell HL 26-Feb-1998
A County Court may stay a right to buy application by the tenant, even though terms had been agreed, in order to await the result of court proceedings for possession against the secure misbehaving tenant. A court’s case management powers can be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 16 September 2022; Ref: scu.221435