References:  EngR 609, (1825) 1 Car & P 673, (1825) 171 ER 1362 (B)
Ratio:Thls case having been again argued, by J L Adolphus, for the plaintiffs, and Campbell, for the defendants, the Court now gave Judgment on the motion for a new trial.
Abbot CJ (after stating the nature of the case) — On the general question, whether on a sale of goods for a specific purpose, a warranty is to be implied that they are resonably fit and proper for that purpose, I continue to be of the same opinion that was expressed by me at the trial, although some of my Brother Judges are as strongly of a contrary opinion We do not, however, feel ourselves called upon to decide that question , for, allowing that a person who sells a commodity fora specific shall be taken, by law, to undertake that it was reasonably fit and proper for that purpose, yet the plaintiffs have not, in this case, declared on that implied warranty, as the declaration states, in general terms, that the defendants undertaok that the copper in question should be good, substantial, and serviceable. Now we are all of opinion, that a warranty to that extent, and in those unqualified terms, could not be implied by law out of the circumstances attending the sale of an article like this, of which the defects were equally unknown to both parties at the time of the sale. The rule must therefore be made absolute.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
This case cites:
- See Also – Bromage and Another -v- Prosser (Commonlii,  EngR 822, (1824) 1 Car & P 475, (1824) 171 ER 1280)
Semble, that malice is necessary to ground an action for words ; and that if words be proved to be spoken bona fide and without malice, no action lies for the speaking of them, though they be false and actionable in themselves; and though injury . .
- See Also – Bromage And Another -v- Prosser (Commonlii,  EngR 42, (1825) 4 B & C 247, (1825) 107 ER 1051)
Bayley J distinguished ‘malice in law’, inferred from the defendant’s intentional interference with the plaintiff’s rights, from ‘malice in fact’ and Malice in common acceptation of the term means ill-will against a person, but in its legal sense it . .
(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 30-Jun-16