(Solomon Islands) The appellant had been convicted of murder. He now said that the automatic life sentence, and the use of a recommended rather than determined minimum sentence was unconstitutional.
Held: The Board first had to determine whether it retained a jurisdiction to hear such appeals from the Solomon Islands.
Held: ‘ there has been no express abrogation of the right to petition the Privy Council for special leave under the 1833 and 1844 Acts. But it considers that the clear implication or necessary intendment of the new Constitution and other legislation by which Solomon Islands achieved their independence was to remove all right of appeal to the Privy Council, whether as of right, by leave of the Court of Appeal or by special leave of the Privy Council. The Board adds that it is no doubt possible for a country to preserve a right to petition for special leave, while removing all other possibilities of appeal to the Privy Council, and also to restrict any such right to petition to a particular area, such as criminal law, but it would seem on its face unlikely that a state achieving independence would so determine. However that may be, the Board sees no indication that that was what was intended here. On the contrary, the Board concludes with confidence that the intention must have been that there should be no further appeals whatever, other than in respect of matters for which leave had already been given prior to independence.’
Lord Mance, Lord Wilson, Lord Hodge
[2016] UKPC 14
Bailii
Judicial Committee Act 1833, Judicial Committee Act 1844, The Solomon Islands Courts Order 1975, The Solomon Islands Independence Order 1978
Commonwealth
Criminal Sentencing, Constitutional
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.565339
