The defendants appealed against their convictions for conspiracy to launder money under section 49(2) of the 1994 Act. The appellants said that the effect of the decision in Montila, alongside sections 1(1) and 1(2) of the 1997 Act, was that a person could not be guilty of a conspiracy to commit an offence against section 49(2) or section 93C(2) unless he and another person knew at the time of the agreement that the property was the proceeds of drug trafficking or of other criminal conduct. So a count of conspiracy to commit either of these offences which included the words ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ or even the word ‘suspect’ was bad in law under section 1(1)(a) of the 1977 Act in the light of Montila. And a count in these terms fell foul also of section 1(2) of the 1977 Act in the light of Montila, as that subsection required the defendant and another co-conspirator to intend or know at the time of the agreement that the property was in fact the proceeds of drug trafficking or other criminal conduct.
Held: The appeals succeeded. As the jury were directed to convict only if they were sure that at least part of the money was in fact the proceeds of drug trafficking, section 1(1)(a) of the 1977 Act was satisfied. But, applying Montila, the substantive offences under section 49(2) and 93C(2) required proof that the defendant was in fact dealing with the proceeds of drug trafficking or other criminal conduct. Section 1(2) of the 1977 Act came in at this stage, and the jury could only convict of conspiracy if the defendant knew that he was dealing with such proceeds. Singh did not survive Montila. An intention to launder illicitly obtained money was not enough. The money must be proved to have been the proceeds of drug trafficking or other criminal conduct and, as he put it, ‘onto that requirement, section 1(2) of the 1977 Act bites’. The court recognised that its decision was unsatisfactory, having the consequence was that, if it was right, the prosecution had a heavier burden to discharge that it would have in order to prove the substantive offence. But the prosecution accepted that it would not have been open to it to charge each delivery of money separately, given the rule against duplicity in rule 4(2) of the Indictment Rules 1971.
Judges:
Hooper LJ, Tugendhat J, Sir Douglas Brown
Citations:
[2005] EWCA Crim 87, [2006] 2 WLR 316,
Links:
Statutes:
Drug Trafficking Act 1994, Criminal Law Act 1977 1(1)
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Regina v Montila and Others HL 25-Nov-2004
The defendants faced charges under the two Acts. They raised as a preliminary issue whether it is necessary for the Crown to prove that the property being converted was in fact the proceeds, in the case of the 1994 Act, of drug trafficking and, in . .
Cited by:
Cited – Saik, Regina v HL 3-May-2006
The defendant appealed aganst his conviction for conspiracy to engage in moneylaundering. At trial he pleaded guilty subject to a qualification that he had not known that the money was the proceeds of crime, though he may have suspected that it . .
Cited – Suchedina v Regina; similar CACD 27-Oct-2006
Four defendants appealed convictions in money laundering cases. The first defendant operated a money exchange through which substantial volumes of cash were moved, but claimed that he believed the money to have been honestly acquired.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Crime
Updated: 30 June 2022; Ref: scu.226269
