Although the Court has jurisdiction to extend the time for registration of a charge, its settled practice is not to do so when the company that granted the charge has already entered into liquidation. An application to extend the time for registration should be made on realisation that the deadline had been missed, and any delay may be taken to indicate a calculation fatal to the application.
The rationale of the rule was explained: ‘Ever since [the decision of Buckley J in Re Joplin Brewery Co Ltd [1902] 1 Ch 79] it has been the practice to insert in an order extending the time for registration some such words as: ‘but that this order be without prejudice to the rights of parties acquired prior to the time when the debentures shall be actually registered.’ The reason for the proviso is as valid today as it was then. Such an application would be made either ex parte by the chargor company, which had the statutory duty to register, or by the chargee, in which case the company would be joined as the only respondent, if there were any respondent at all. It was not the practice to advertise for creditors and to make one of them a respondent. Consequently, it was necessary to protect persons whose rights would otherwise be overridden in their absence . .
It soon became established that, so long as the company was a going concern at the date of registration, the proviso did not protect, and was not intended to protect, an unsecured creditor who had lent money at a time when the charge should have been but was not registered . . The reason for this was that such unsecured creditor could not have intervened to prevent payment being made to the lender whose charge was not registered (whom we will call ‘the unregistered chargee’). Nor could such unsecured creditor have prevented the creation of a new charge, duly registered, to take the place of the unregistered charge. The proviso was intended to protect only rights acquired against, or affecting, the property comprised in the unregistered charge, in the intervening period between the date of the creation of the unregistered charge and the registration of such charge. Such persons would include a subsequent chargee of the relevant property, a creditor who has levied execution against the relevant property, and an unsecured creditor if, but only if, the company has gone into liquidation before registration is effected. Once the company has gone into liquidation, the existing unsecured creditors are interested in all the assets of the company, since the liquidator is bound by statute to distribute the net proceeds pari passu among the unsecured creditors, subject to preferential debts. The assets of the company are at that stage vested in the company for the benefit of its creditors. The unsecured creditors are in the nature of cestuis que trust with beneficial interests extending to all the company’s property.
It follows from this approach that the court must invariably refuse to extend the time for registration once the company has gone into liquidation. If an order extending time were made and the proviso included, registration would be of no assistance whatever to the unregistered chargee because the unsecured creditors at that stage would be protected by the proviso. Such an order after liquidation would be futile and will be refused . .
The position accordingly became firmly established that the court (i) invariably adds to an order extending time the proviso which we have mentioned and (ii) will not make an order once liquidation has supervened, because the effect of the proviso would be to render the order futile. This is a matter of discretion and not of law. It is possible to imagine a case, for example where fraud is involved, in which the court might extend the time for registration after the commencement of liquidation and omit the proviso which would render the order futile; we do not know of such a case in practice, and certainly the instant case does not fall into the category of fraud.’
Citations:
[1982] 3 All ER 66, [1982] 3 WLR 964
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Re Joplin Brewery Co Ltd ChD 1902
The applicants, owners of a solvent family business, sought to register a charge over the company’s assets out of time.
Held: Buckley J saw the application under s 15 of the 1900 Act as a similar application to the application to register out . .
Cited – in Re Resinoid and Mica Products Ltd CA 1967
(From 1967) An order extending time for registration of a charge will not normally be made after a company has gone into liquidation. . .
Cited by:
Cited – Rehman v Chamberlain and Another ChD 6-Sep-2011
The claimant asserted as against the liquidator, a floating and registered charge over the company’s assets. The liquidator said that it had been granted within the twelve months prior to the onset of the insolvency, was caught by section 245(3)(b), . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Company, Insolvency
Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.444531