Charterers appealed against the decision of the arbitrator on the meaning of the phrase ‘any other cause’. The performance of the contract had been interrupted by the intervention of the authorities in Chittagong.
Held: The appeal failed. The arbitrators were correct to decide that the vessel was not off-hire. Rix J said: ‘ In my judgment it is well established that those words, in the absence of ‘whatsoever’, should be construed either ejusdem generis or at any rate in some limited way reflecting the general context of the charter and clause . . A consideration of the named causes indicates that they all relate to the physical condition or efficiency of either vessel (including its crew) or, in one instance, cargo. There is, moreover, the general context . . that it is for the owners to provide an efficient ship and crew. In such circumstances it is to my mind natural to conclude that the unamended words ‘any other cause’ do not cover an entirely extraneous cause, like the boom in Court Line, or the interference of authorities unjustified by the condition (or reasonably suspected condition) of ship or cargo. Prima facie it does not seem to me that it can be intended by a standard off-hire clause that an owner takes the risk of delay due to the interference of authorities, at any rate where that interference is something beyond the natural or reasonably foreseeable consequence of some named cause. Where, however, the clause is amended to include the word ‘whatsoever’, I do not see why the interference of authorities which prevents the vessel performing its intended service should not be regarded as falling within the clause, and I would be inclined to say that that remains so whether or not that interference can be related to some underlying cause internal to the ship, or is merely capricious. That last thought may be controversial, but it seems to me that if an owner wishes to limit the scope of causes of off-hire under a clause which is deliberately amended to include the word ‘whatsoever’, then he should be cautious to do so.’
In the absence of the word ‘whatsoever’ in the clause, the unexpected and unforeseeable interference by the authorities at the conclusion of a normal discharge was: ‘a totally extraneous cause . . unconnected with, because too remote from, the merely background circumstance of the cargo residues of 15.75 tonnes. There was no accident to cargo, and there was nothing about the vessel herself, her condition or efficiency, nor even anything about the cargo, which led naturally or in the normal cause of events to any delay. If the authorities had not prevented the vessel from working, she would have been perfectly capable of discharging the residues or of sailing and dumping them without any abnormal delay.’
Judges:
Rix J
Citations:
[1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Distinguished – Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd and Another v M/V ‘Saldanha’ C/P Dated 25/06/08 ComC 11-Jun-2010
The court considered the effect of a ship being taken by pirates at sea on the obligations in the charterparty contract. The insurers said that a claim for ‘average accident’ must include an element of physical damage – absent in this case.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Transport, Contract
Updated: 23 November 2022; Ref: scu.416719
