(Barnsley Magistrates Court) The defendant owned a Segway, a two wheeled vehicle. He was charged with having driven it on a public footpath despite its being a motor vehicle. He denied that it was a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on the road’.
Held: ‘If I am satisfied from all the evidence presented, that a reasonable person was to say ‘yes, the Segway might well be used on a road’, then, applying the test, the vehicle is intended or adapted for such use.
In my judgement, the conclusion must be that general use on the roads is to be contemplated.’

Michael Rosenberg District Judge
[2011] EW Misc 3 (MC)
Bailii
Highways Act 1835, Road Traffic Act 1988 185(1), Road Traffic Regulation Act 1988 136(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v King Admn 13-Feb-2008
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn 1-Nov-2000
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . .
Cited – Burns v Currell 1963
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . .
Cited – Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD 1987
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.430057

The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, saying that the collection of a sample of urine had not been in accordance with the requirements of section 7. He had had the samples taken whilst in hospital from a catheter bag. He said there had not been two samples.
Held: The appeal failed.
Langstaff L said: ‘what must be applied, as it seems to me, is the plain English of the statute. If one asks here whether or not two samples — I shall call them samples to distinguish them from the statutory requirement, which is that of a specimen for analysis — were provided, then factually, as it seems to me, there could be no other conclusion to which the Bench could come other than that they were. Urine came within the hour after the request from the motorist. It went to the officer in some suitable container. The motorist knew that it would, and had accepted the procedure. The urine was plainly ‘provided’.’ and
‘if a flow of urine is connected in a chamber and that chamber is emptied, as it was here, into another chamber, the urine which thereafter collects in the first chamber is not the same sample, not the same urine as that which has been drained away. A specimen of that second filling seems to me to constitute a second specimen of urine. In this case, there were in fact three samples, one or two specimens being disregarded before that which was taken for evidential purposes shortly before 6.00 a.m. in the morning. Given that the purpose of the provisions was to ensure that the urine ultimately sent for analysis was a fresh specimen, and properly reflected the bodily condition of the person from whom it was taken, it seems to be entirely consistent with that principle that the statutory words should be interpreted here as the Bench interpreted them, , that there was here more than one specimen.’

Langstaff, Spencer JJ
[2011] EWHC 4003 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 5(1)(a) 7, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 2
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Roney v Matthews QBD 1975
The LCJ considered an argument that the officer had not complied with the requirement that a defendant to be requested to provide two specimens within one hour of the request. He said: ‘The reference to two specimens of urine, I think, is explained . .
Cited – Prosser v Dickeson QBD 1982
The motorist who had been arrested and required to provide a laboratory test specimen under what was then section 9, under which it was for him to choose to provide a specimen of either blood or urine. He decided to provide two specimens of urine . .
Cited – Regina v Radcliffe CACD 1977
In the procedure for giving two specimens of urine at a police station to test for driving over the prescribed limit, it does not matter that the first specimen was of any particular quantity. It therefore follows that, provided two specimens are . .
Cited – Regina v Musker 1985
The motorist defendant had been required to provide a laboratory test specimen, under section 9(1). He filled one-third of a two-pint container at 2:15 am. A constable disposed of that pursuant to section 9(6) and the container was washed out. A . .
Cited – Nugent v Ridley 1987
May LJ considered the need to require two samples of urine under the Road Traffic act. He said that the only construction that he could give to that subsection was to read it precisely as it reads, namely that a specimen was to be provided within . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.463084

The defendant sought judicial review, on a renewed application, to challenge the decision to issue a speeding fine, and in the alternative that he had failed to identify the driver as required. The defendant had supplied the information but under a condition not allowing that information to be used for prosecution, citing Funke.
Held: The defendant had provided the information required, but his condition was not worth the paper it was written on. The Chief Constable had been wrong to proceed with a prosecution under section 172, but should simply have proceeded with the allegation of speeding. Permission was refused.

Collins J
[2008] EWHC 209 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Offences Act 1988 12
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.264593

The defendant sat on a motor bike, propelling it on a pavement with his feet; although the engine was running the machine, according to the defendant, was not in gear.
Held: The justices were correct to have found that the defendant, even on his version of the facts, was riding within the meaning of section 72. The justices had been referred to the definition of ‘ride’ taken from the Concise Oxford Dictionary.
An alleyway was not a footpath by a roadway.
Henry J said: ‘The difficulty that faces him in making such a submission is that it clearly would be riding a bicycle and it would be a curious state of affairs if something that amounted to riding in the case of a bicycle was not riding in the case of a motor cycle simply because the motor cycle is power-assisted in a way that a bicycle is not. It seems to me that this was riding and the justices were quite right to find that as such.’
Taylor LJ said: ‘the justices’ view as to what amounted to riding was correct. In my judgment, riding is being carried out if a person is being carried on a motor cycle as it moves on its wheels, whether propelled by the engine, by his feet or by gravity.’

Henry J, Taylor LJ
[1994] RTR 157
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Coates v Crown Prosecution Service Admn 29-Jul-2011
The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Leading Case

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.442518

Bus Lane Signage was not as required

The Council sought review of decisions against it as to the infringement of bus lane rules. The Adjudicator had found that its signage was inadequate.
Held: The Council had not used the sign required and the request for review failed.

Lang DBE J
[2017] EWHC 430 (Admin)
Bailii
Local Authorities Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 18, Bus Lane Contraventions (Penalty Charges, Adjudication and Enforcement) (England) Regulations 2005, Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984
England and Wales

Road Traffic

Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.579638

The defendant appealed against his conviction for speeding, saying that the device used to measure his speed was not approved. The only evidence relied on was that the officer said it had been installed in many police vehicles.
Held: The magistrates had not been entitled to take judicial notice of such an opinion. Though a court hearing a case stated might have wide powers in such cases, the powers were not available here because of the restricted nature of the magistrates’ decision. The court would remit the matter for trial before a new bench. An argument that a remittal would lead to unfair prejudice or prejudice failed, since the delay was only nine months.

Hooper LJ, Parker J
[2010] EWHC 2357 (Admin)
Bailii
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 84 89(1), Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 Sch 2, Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 20, Senior Courts Act 1981 28(8)(iii)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Nicholas v Penny QBD 1950
A police officer’s assessment of a defendant’s speed could be corroborated by evidence as to the reading of a speedometer, even if the latter device had not been checked for the accuracy of its reading, unless there were particular reasons for . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Thornley Admn 3-Feb-2006
The prosecution appealed dismissal of an allegation of speeding. The defendant had argued that the prosecution had not served the required evidence. The prosecution sought to rely upon the evidence of the officer.
Held: The provisions of . .
Cited – Nicholas v Penny QBD 1950
A police officer’s assessment of a defendant’s speed could be corroborated by evidence as to the reading of a speedometer, even if the latter device had not been checked for the accuracy of its reading, unless there were particular reasons for . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Road Traffic

Updated: 31 October 2021; Ref: scu.424952

The court took a strict view of a vehicle owner’s potential liability to injured third parties.
Held: A person who suffered injury by reason of a breach of s35 could maintain an action in damages for that breach: ‘The Road Traffic Act, 1930, under which the question arises, was passed in these circumstances: it had become apparent that people who were injured by the negligent driving of motor cars were in a parlous situation if the negligent person was unable to pay damages. Accordingly two statutes were passed, one for the purpose of enabling persons who were thus injured to recover, in the case of the bankruptcy of an insured defendant the money which would be payable to him by the insurance company. Parliament enacted that in such circumstances the insurance money should go not to the general creditors of the bankrupt defendant but to the injured person; in other words the injured person, although not a party to the insurance could make the insurance company liable. That Act-the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act, 1930, did not meet the whole difficulty that had arisen because motor car owners sometimes lent their cars to uninsured persons, and if a person who borrowed a car and in driving it caused injury to a third person the remedy provided by that Act did not avail the injured person. Consequently the Road Traffic Act, 1930, was passed for the very purpose of making provision for third parties who suffered injury by the negligent driving of motor vehicles by uninsured persons to whom the insured owner had lent such vehicles. How could Parliament make provision for their protection from such risks if it did not enable an injured third person to recover for a breach of s.35? That section which is in Part II of the Act headed ‘Provision against third-party risks arising out of the use of motor vehicles,’ would indeed be no protection to a person injured by the negligence of an uninsured person to whom a car had been lent by the insured owner, if no civil remedy were available for a breach of the section.’
Greer LJ
[1935] 1 KB 75, [1934] All ER 373
Road Traffic Act 1930 35
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Philip Owen Lloyd-Wolper v Robert Moore; National Insurance Guarantee Corporation Plc, Charles Moore CA 22-Jun-2004
The first defendant drove a car belonging to his father and insured by his father. The father consented to the driving but under a mistaken belief that his son was licensed. The claimant was injured by the defendant in a road traffic accident.
Cited – Campbell v Gordon SC 6-Jul-2016
The employee was injured at work, but in a way excluded from the employers insurance cover. He now sought to make the sole company director liable, hoping in term to take action against the director’s insurance brokers for negligence, the director . .
Applied – McLeod v Buchanan HL 1940
Buchanan allowed his brother to use a vehicle without restriction as to the purpose of use; Buchanan did not actually know (although he had reason to think) that the vehicle the subject of the permission was being used for private purposes. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 22 October 2021; Ref: scu.199929

The accused, who was alleged to have been driving a motor car, had been walking beside it as it ran down a slight incline, and had steered it by placing his hand on the wheel. The car had run out of petrol.
Held: The question turned on whether the defendant was ‘in a substantial sense controlling the movement and direction of the car,’ and held that this test was satisfied.
1969 JC 1
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v MacDonagh CA 1974
The Road Traffic Acts do not define the word ‘drive’ and in its simplest meaning it refers to a person using the driver’s controls for the purpose of directing the movement of the vehicle. It matters not that the vehicle is not moving under its own . .
Cited – Hoy v McFadyen HCJ 2000
The accused was charged with driving whilst disqualified. He had been in the driver’s seat and had started the engine. On turning off the engine the car lurched forward slightly. The handbrake was defective and would not hold the car on a slope. To . .
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Alderton Admn 25-Nov-2003
The defendant had been found sat in his car. He had been spinning its wheels, but not moving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of a charge of attempting to drive whilst under the influence of alcohol.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 16 October 2021; Ref: scu.189934

Medical emergency to be treated as defence of duress rather than special reason.
Ind Summary 05-Jun-1995, [1996] RTA 154
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Ubhi Admn 11-Feb-2003
The prosecutors appealed the finding by the magistrates that there were special reasons for not disqualifying the defendant from driving after finding him guilty of driving with excess alcohol. He had driven his sister to hospital after she fell and . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 July 2021; Ref: scu.80055

References: [1971] RTR 11
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

• Cited – West Yorkshire Trading Standards Service v Lex Vehicle Leasing Ltd QBD 9-Feb-1995
  It was alleged that the maximum permitted front axle weight of the vehicle in question was exceeded. The court was asked what were the circimstances defing a ‘user’ of a motor vehicle in prosecutions for use of the vehicle.
  Held: ‘The . .
  ([1996] RTR 70)
• Cited – Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 26-Mar-1998
  A van was stopped carrying a delivery of coal. The insurance was for social domestic and pleasure purposes only. The owner appealed a conviction for using it without insurance.
  Held: ‘using’ when the description of the offence in connection . .
  (Times 23-Apr-98, , [1998] EWHC Admin 363)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.190481

References: [1974] RTR 304, [1974] 1 All ER 1087, [1974] QB 424
Coram: Lord Widgery Chief Justice
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered when it should find special reasons allowing it a discretion not to disqualify a driver who was subject to an automatic disqualification for driving with excess alcohol. The test of whether the circumstances exist to find special reasons is an objective one. A higher reading would make the exercise of the discretion more difficult.
Lord Widgery CJ said: ‘This is not the first case in which the court had had to consider whether driving in an emergency can justify a conclusion that there are special reasons for not disqualifying the driver. If a man, in the well-founded belief that he will not drive again, puts his car into the garage, goes into his house, and has a certain amount of drink in the belief that he is not going to drive again, and if thereafter there is an emergency which requires him, in order to deal with it, to take his car out despite his intention to leave it in the garage, then that is a situation which can in law amount to a special reason for not disqualifying a driver.
On the other hand, justices who are primarily concerned with dealing with this legislation, should approach the exercise of the resultant discretion with great care. The mere fact that the facts disclosed a special reason does not mean that the driver is to escape disqualification as a matter of course. There is a very serious burden on the justices, even when a special reason had been disclosed, to decide whether in their discretion they should decline to disqualify in a particular case. The justices should have very much in mind that if a man deliberately drives when he knows he has consumed a considerable quantity of drink, he presents a potential source of danger to the public which no private crisis can lightly excuse.
One of the most important matters which justices have to consider in the exercise of this discretion is whether the emergency — and I call it such for want of a more convenient word — was sufficiently acute to justify the driver taking his car out. The Justices should only exercise the discretion in favour of the driver in clear and compelling circumstances. They ought to remember that the special reasons which they are considering and which are relevant are not the reasons which caused the driver to take his car on the road . . . The Justices therefore must consider the whole of the circumstances. They must consider the nature and degree of the crisis or emergency which has caused the defendant to take the car out. They must consider whether there was alternative means of transport or methods of dealing with the crisis other than and alternative to the use by the defendant of his own car. They should have regard to the manner in which the defendant drove, because if he committed traffic offences such as excessive speed or driving without due care and attention this again is a consideration which tells against his having discretion exercised in his favour, and they should generally have regard to whether the defendant acted responsibly or otherwise.’
The test for the existence of special reasons for not disqualifying is an objective one and not a subjective one, and ‘Last but by no means least, if the alcohol content of the defendant’s body is very high, that is a very powerful reason for saying that discretion should not be exercised in his favour. Indeed, if the alcohol content exceeds 100 milligrams per hundred millilitres of blood, the Justices should rarely exercise the discretion in favour of the defendant driver.’
This case cites:

• Cited – Jacobs -v- Reid ([1974] RLT 71)
  The test for whether magistrates may find special reasons for not disqualifying a driver is not a subjective one as to what the defendant thought. . .

This case is cited by:

• Cited – Khan, Regina (on the Application of) -v- Director of Public Prosecutions Admn (Bailii, [2004] EWHC 2505 (Admin))
  Defendant pleaded guity to drink driving – claim for special reasons – appeal against finding of absence of special reasons to disqualify. . .
• Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Bristow QBD (Times 28-Oct-96, [1998] RTR 100)
  The prosecutor appealed against the decision of the magistrates, having found the defendant guilty of driving with excess alcohol, then not to disqualify him, finding special reasons for so doing. He had gone in answer to a call that a child niece . .
• Cited – Fleming -v- Mayne CANI (Bailii, [2000] NICA 5)
  The court set out the circumstances in which it could find special reasons for not disqualifying a driver who had driven with excess alcohol. . .
• Cited – Police Service of Northern Ireland -v- Cassells CANI (Bailii, [2007] NICA 12)
  . .
• Cited – Vaughan -v- Dunn ([1984] RTR 376)
  Goff LJ considered the circumstances where, a defendant having been convicted of driving wih excess alcohol, the court could find special reasons for not disqualifying him. He referred to Taylor v Rajan and said: ‘The first is that the exercise of . .
• Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Tucker Admn (Bailii, [1996] EWHC Admin 198)
  . .
• Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Elsender Admn (Bailii, [1999] EWHC Admin 529)
  . .
• Cited – Police Service for Northern Ireland -v- Mullan CANI (Bailii, [2008] NICA 10)
  . .
• Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Goddard Admn (Bailii, [1998] EWHC Admin 27)
  . .
• Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Ellis Admn (Bailii, [1998] EWHC Admin 1025)
  . .
• Cited – Regina -v- St Albans Crown Court ex parte O’Donovan Admn (Bailii, [1999] EWHC Admin 664)
  . .
• Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Ubhi Admn (Bailii, [2003] EWHC 619 (Admin))
  The prosecutors appealed the finding by the magistrates that there were special reasons for not disqualifying the defendant from driving after finding him guilty of driving with excess alcohol. He had driven his sister to hospital after she fell and . .

References: [1997] EWHC Admin 306
Links: Bailii