The Court quashed a deprivation order made against a defendant who had been conditionally discharged: ‘On March 28, 1983 at the Crown Court in Manchester, the appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of handling stolen goods and was sentenced to a conditional discharge for 12 months in respect of each count. The learned trial judge then made a deprivation order under section 43 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 in respect of her Vauxhall Viva motor car.
The point taken on this appeal is that the learned judge was wrong in law to make a deprivation order under section 43 in respect of her motor car. The submission is based upon an authority of this Court, Hunt, which is unreported other than in  Crim.L.R. 697, though we have a transcript. That case was heard by a Division of this Court, and the judgment of the Court was given by Kenneth Jones J. on July 27, 1978.
In that case the applicant had pleaded guilty to stealing five calculators, and an order of absolute discharge was made, coupled with an order to deprive him of his rights in his motor car. The Court there held, having referred to other unreported cases of Menocal and Lidster, that an order under section 43 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act involved an order punishing the offender by depriving him of his rights in his motor car, and, by reason of the wording of section 7(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act under which the order of absolute discharge was made, such an order could not be coupled with an order of absolute discharge.
‘This Court takes exactly the same view and has therefore come to the conclusion that an order under section 43 of the Act is a punitive order. The making of such an order amounts to the infliction of a punishment. It follows therefore that the making of such an order is quite inconsistent with the making of an order of absolute discharge. Such an order under the provisions of section 7 of the 1977 Act can only be made after the Court has found that it is inexpedient to inflict punishment.’
The relevant words of section 7(1) are: ‘Where a court . . is of opinion, having regard to the circumstances including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, that it is inexpedient to inflict punishment and that a probation order is not appropriate, the court may make an order discharging him absolutely, or, if the court thinks fit, discharging him subject to the condition that he commits no offence during such period, not exceeding three years from the date of the order, as may be specified therein.’ There can therefore be no distinction whatsoever between an order of absolute discharge and an order of conditional discharge.
In those circumstances it is wrong to couple such an order of conditional discharge with an order of deprivation in respect of a motor car, as it was in the case of an absolute discharge as found by this Court in Hunt. Therefore the result is that this appeal must be allowed insofar as the deprivation order is concerned.
(1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 216
England and Wales
Cited – Clarke v Regina CACD 12-Jun-2009
The defendant had pleaded guilty to concealing criminal property. He was conditionally discharged but also made subject to a confiscation order. He appealed saying that one could not be made if only a conditional discharge was imposed.
Held: . .
Cited – Regina v Magro CACD 8-Jul-2010
Each defendant appealed against confiscation orders made when the sentence imposed was an absolute or conditional discharge. They said that Clarke made such orders unlawful.
Held: The decision in Clarke was a difficult limitation on the . .
These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 April 2021; Ref: scu.375146