The petitioners in a combined section 459 and contributories’ winding up petition sought interim relief akin to an ordinary freezing order but which was designed specifically to prevent the assets of the company from dissipation, and similar relief against certain of the company’s subsidiaries. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the application for that interim relief was fatally flawed (under Ravenhart) because the petition did not assert any cause of action for restitution or other monetary payment, but rather an order for the purchase of the petitioner’s shares by one or more of the respondents, or alternatively an order for compulsory winding up. The continuation of relief against the subsidiaries was abandoned by consent.
Held: The court rejected counsel’s submissions based upon Premier Electronics. It expressly adopted Pumfrey J’s. conclusion that a section 459 petition asserted a sufficient cause of action against the company to justify Mareva relief, that an interim order preventing the dissipation of the company’s assets pending the hearing of the petition was well within the court’s jurisdiction as a means of preserving the effectiveness of any order which might be made upon the hearing of the petition.
Judges:
Etherton J
Citations:
[2004] 2 BCLC 376, [2004] EWHC 76 (Ch)
Statutes:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – HM Revenue and Customs v Egleton and others ChD 19-Sep-2006
The claimants had applied for the winding up of a company for very substantial sums of VAT due to it. Anticipating that hearing, it now sought restraining orders against the director defendants, alleging that there had been a carousel or missing . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Company, Litigation Practice
Updated: 15 April 2022; Ref: scu.245161
