Lord Pearce (dissenting) discussed the assessment of a witness’ oral evidence: ‘Credibility involves wider problems than mere demeanour which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or, though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and, if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by overmuch discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. and lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness, and motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process and in the process contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part.’
Lord Pearce also reminded himself of the circumstances allowing the upsetting of a judgment of a lower court, saying: ‘The function of a Court of Appeal is to set aside a judgment that should not be allowed to stand because it occasions a substantial wrong or a miscarriage of justice. That wrong or miscarriage of justice may consist of a judgment in favour of the wrong party. It may also consist of a failure in the judicial process to which both parties are entitled as of right, namely, the weighing of their respective cases and contentions. Such failure may constitute a wrong or miscarriage of justice even though it may appear that the appellant may in the end fail to secure a judgment in his favour: But the fact that the right party seems to have succeeded in the Court below will naturally make a Court of Appeal extremely reluctant to interfere, and it would only do so in the rarest cases. Such matters are questions of degree.’
and ‘Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active.’
Lord Pearce
[1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Foodco UK Llp (T/A Muffin Break) and Others v Henry Boot Developments Ltd ChD 3-Mar-2010
The claimants had been persuaded to take up leases on a service area constructed by the defendants. They said that the publicity materials had wildly exaggerated the actual number of visitors, and sought damages for fraudulent misrepresentation.
Cited – Earles v Barclays Bank plc Merc 8-Oct-2009
earles_barclaysQBD2009
The claimant had lost his claim against the bank, but resisted the amount of costs claimed.
Held: The trial had been of a simple factual dispute, and the bank had failed adequately to disclose electronically held material in its possession. . .
Cited – In re Mumtaz Properties Ltd; Wetton v Ahmed CA 24-May-2011
Former directors appealed against finding as to their personal liability for directors’ and other loans.
Arden LJ discussed the task of a judge in fact finding: ‘By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what has impressed the judge most in . .
Cited – Piper v Hales QBD 18-Jan-2013
The claimant owned a very vauable vintage Porsche racing car. It was hired to the defendant. The car suffered severe mechanical damage whilst being driven, and the insurers declined liability.
Held: The Defendant as hirer was under an . .
Cited – Mcintyre and Another v The Home Office QBD 30-Jan-2014
Claim for compensation for injuries allegedly suffered by the claimants as a result of a minor car accident.
Held: There was a stark contrast between the parties. The court accepted the version of the events told by the defendants, and the . .
Cited – Nuttal and Another v Kerr and Another QBD 25-Jul-2019
The defendant sought to appeal from a judgment given only after a long delay.
Held: Permission to appeal was necessary, and given, but the appeal itself failed: ‘(1) There is no evidence of fault of the Judge at any or any material point other . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Litigation Practice
Leading Case
Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.402569
