The court considered the jury’s verdict as to the meaning of the words complained of. Field J said: ‘If, therefore, as I think, the jury had only relevant evidence submitted to them and were properly directed as to the use they were to make of it, the only remaining question is whether the verdict ought to be set aside as being unreasonable. The limits within which this jurisdiction of the court ought to be exercised in an action like this are thus laid down by Chief Justice Tindal in Broome v Gosden (1 CB 731): – ‘unless the jury are manifestly wrong in not finding the alleged libel to bear the meaning that the plaintiff has thought fit to put upon it by the innuendo (or now any defamatory meaning), and unless the court can say with certainty that there has been a miscarriage of justice, no new trial will be granted.’ In other words the jury are the appointed tribunal for the decision of the question of libel or no libel, and the court ought not to invade their province unless it can be plainly seen that the verdict is perverse or so unreasonable as to lead to the conclusion that the jury have not honestly taken the facts into their consideration.’
Judges:
Field J
Citations:
(1889) 6 TLR 137, (1889) 54 JP 215
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Another HL 24-Oct-2002
The claimant appealed against a decision of the Court of Appeal quashing the judgement in his favour for damages for defamation.
Held: The Court of Appeal was not able to quash a jury verdict as perverse, and the appeal succeeded. An appellate . .
Cited – Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Another CA 18-Jan-2001
The claimant had been awarded andpound;85,000 damages in defamation after the defendant had wrongly accused him of cheating at football. The newspaper sought to appeal saying that the verdict was perverse and the defence of qualified privilege . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Defamation
Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.272785
