Minister of Health v Bellotti: CA 1944

298 blocks of flats had been requisitioned to provide accommodation for persons evacuated from Gibraltar during the war. The evacuees occupied the various flats as licensees. They were given only one week’s notice terminating their licences.
Held: Where the relevant period has not been specified by the licence itself, a licensee is entitled, following revocation of the licence, to whatever in all the circumstances is a reasonable time to remove himself and his possessions. It was an unreasonably short period, although possession proceedings were not in fact begun until after the lapse of a reasonable time.
Had the licences been validly terminated? A licensor can terminate a licence at any time as long as reasonable time is given within which the determination is to take effect. However, the question of what the licensee is entitled to expect and the matter of determination of his licence is one that is impossible to answer by reference to other cases in different circumstances.
Mackinnon LJ said: ‘I think the rule of law is that the licensor can revoke his licence at any time, but the licensee has thereafter a reasonable time, having regard to all the circumstances, to comply with the revocation.’
Lord Greene rejected the proposition that the only notice to terminate a licence which the law required was a period sufficient to enable the licensee to remove himself and his property from the premises comprised in the licence: ‘I refer to that because it appears to me that where a question arises as to the lawful method of terminating a licence, the circumstances in which the licence came to be granted are most relevant to consider. Where a licence is granted under a contract, it may very well be that the contract will make express provision for those matters which must be observed, but what is to happen where the contract is silent in that regard? I cannot take the view that there is some cast-iron principle of law which lays down for every type of contract, whatever the circumstances and whatever the purposes for which it was entered into, some rule which is always to operate. In my opinion, the true rule is that the implications of the contract are to be determined by regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case. Thus, in the judgment of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. The King, the following paragraph appears: ‘Whether any and what restrictions exist on the power of a licensor to determine a revocable licence must, their Lordships think, depend upon the circumstances of each case.’ That is the only proposition of general application which I find it possible to extract from that authority; and although the case is not binding on this court, the law there is, in my opinion, laid down with complete accuracy.
The notice given by each letter operates as a clear determination of the licence at the expiration of one week. It conveys to the mind of the recipient as clearly as anything can notice that the licence is determined. It goes on, however, to indicate that the recipient of the letter, together with his possessions, is to be removed from the premises within one week. So far as the letter gives that instruction, it was, in my opinion, quite inoperative. The true view is that where a licence is revoked, the licensee has, in spite of the revocation, whatever in the circumstances is a reasonable time to enable him to remove himself and his possessions from the scene of the licence. I have already said that in the circumstances of this case such a reasonable time must extend to whatever is a reasonable time to find alternative accommodation, and, if the day after this notice expired, proceedings had been taken by the minister to eject the defendants, those proceedings would have failed because the defendants were entitled to a reasonable time, and a week was not a reasonable time, to enable them to find alternative accommodation. The circumstance that the threat to remove them before the expiration of what would have been a reasonable time was inserted in the letter does not prevent the letter from being a good notice to determine the licence. That being the position, the county court judge decided that the interval which elapsed between the expiration of the week mentioned in that document and the commencement of these proceedings was a sufficient time to enable alternative accommodation to be found. In view of that finding of fact, the defendants could not complain at the time these proceedings were instituted that they had not been allowed sufficient time in the circumstances to remove themselves and their possessions and find alternative accommodation.’
References: [1944] 1 KB 298, [1944] 1 All ER 238
Judges: Lord Greene MR, Mackinnon LJ
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Approved – The Canadian Pacific Railway Company v The King PC 19-Feb-1931
    (Canada) ‘Whether any and what restrictions exist on the power of a licensor to determine a revocable licence must, there Lordships think, depend upon the circumstances of each case.’
    A licencee whose licence is revocable is entitled to . .
    (, [1931] UKPC 18, [1931] AC 414)

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Gibson v Douglas and Another CA 8-Dec-2016
    Appeal against rejection of claim for damages for wrongful eviction and damages to goods.
    Held: The judge had found not that the defendant had failed to give appropriate notice, but that he had not been personally involved other than as an . .
    (, [2016] EWCA Civ 1266)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192089