(Plenary Court) The court described and approved the way in which an ‘institutional’ right to vote had developed into ‘subjective rights of participation – the ‘right to vote’ and the ‘right to stand for election’.’ It described the ambit of Article 3: ‘In their internal legal orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and stand for election subject to conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3. They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol No 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, such conditions must not thwart ‘the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’.’
There is room for ‘implied limitations’ on the rights enshrined in Article 3, and Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere.
R. RYSSDAL, P
9267/81,  ECHR 1, (1988) 10 EHRR 1
European Convention on Human Rights A3P1
Cited – Robertson, Regina (on the Application of) v Experian Ltd and Another (2) Admn 21-Jul-2003
The claimant sought a judicial review of the regulations allowing sale of the electoral role by local government bodies to registered credit reference agencies. An adjournment was refused, and the case proceeded in his absence.
Held: The . .
Cited – Hirst v United Kingdom (2) ECHR 6-Oct-2005
(Grand Chamber) The applicant said that whilst a prisoner he had been banned from voting. The UK operated with minimal exceptions, a blanket ban on prisoners voting.
Held: Voting is a right not a privilege. It was a right central in a . .
Cited – Barclay and Others, Regina (on the Application of) v The Seigneur of Sark and Another Admn 18-Jun-2008
The claimants said that the the laws restricting residence and voting rights and oher constitutional arrangements on the Isle of Sark were in breach of European law, and human rights law.
Held: The claims failed. The composition of Chief Pleas . .
Cited – Barclay and Others, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice and others CA 2-Dec-2008
The claimant appealed against refusal of his challenge to the new constitutional law for Sark, and sought a declaration of incompatibility under the 1998 Act. He said that by restricting the people who could stand for election, a free democracy had . .
Cited – Barclay and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice and Others SC 1-Dec-2009
The claimants said that restrictions within the constitution of Sark on who could sit in the Chief Pleas were incompatible with their human rights. The claimants variously owned property on Sark but had restricted rights to vote and stand.
Cited – Moohan and Another v The Lord Advocate SC 17-Dec-2014
The petitioners, convicted serving prisoners, had sought judicial review of the refusal to allow them to vote in the Scottish Referendum on Independence. The request had been refused in the Outer and Inner Houses.
Held: (Kerr, Wilson JJSC . .
These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 06 January 2021; Ref: scu.164977