The claimants appealed from rejection of their claim to compensation under the 1984 Act as tenants of a pier closed by the Authority. The Authority said that it had failed to comply with its leasehold obligations of repair, and was in default under that Act.
Held: Default was limited to default under the 1984 Act. Earlier statutes had included defaults under related statutes, but: ‘The phrase ‘in default’ in section 106 of the 1984 Act means in breach of an obligation arising under the 1984 Act. The provision does not require the court or the arbitrator to conduct a wide-ranging review of other legislation and the common law in order to see whether the claimant is in breach of any duties arising outside the 1984 Act.’
. . And: ‘[Stylus] has acted responsibly at all stages. It did its utmost to compel the landlord to carry out remedial works. Ultimately it stepped into the breach and did the works itself. If the local authority had wished to avoid liability to pay compensation under section 106, it could have brought proceedings under section 77 of the 1984 Act sooner and thereby avoided the need to take emergency action under section 78.
Finally, on this point, [the council’s] general arguments will still be available at the quantum hearing before the arbitrator. The local authority will be entitled to argue that even if it had not fenced off the pier, [Stylus] could have made little use of its two units.’
The default proviso was the ‘control mechanism which eliminated claims that are unacceptable on grounds of public policy’. It left no room for the application of the ex turpi causa rule: ‘Having said that, I do accept that the structural condition of the pier will be relevant to the quantum of the claim. The local authority will be entitled to argue in the arbitration due to be held under section 106(2) that the loss of profit caused by the local authority’s conduct must be substantially reduced by reason of the structural condition of the pier. Indeed the local authority would be entitled to argue that the quantum is reduced to nil, although on the evidence which I have seen that outcome seems unlikely.’
Jackson LJ, Aikens LJ, PattenLJ
[2014] EWCA Civ 562, [2014] 1 WLR 4030, [2014] WLR(D) 193, [2014] BLR 389
Bailii, WLRD
Building Act 1984
England and Wales
Citing:
At TCC – Manolete Partners Plc v Hastings Borough Council TCC 12-Apr-2013
Application for compensation under s.106 of the Building Act 1984 for compensation as a result of the Council exercising its powers to prevent access to Hastings Pier under s.78 of the 1984 Act.
Held: The court rejected the defence, holding . .
Cited – Hobbs v Winchester Corporation CA 18-Jun-1910
Meat had been seized under section 116 of the 1875 Act as unfit for human consumption. Although the butcher was acquitted of any offence under section 117 of that Act, on the grounds that he was unaware that it was unfit for consumption, it was . .
Cited – Lingke v Christchurch Corporation CA 1912
The householder sought compensation under the Act, for the disturbance in the laying of a drain in the highway abutting the claimant’s house and furniture shop. Because of the constraints of the work site, excavated soil had been thrown up against . .
Cited – Leonidis v Thames Water Authority 1979
Access to the plaintiff’s motor repair business was interfered with by work to reconstruct a sewer. Whilst access was still possible it required a long detour and there was no physical interference with the entrance to the premises.
Held: If a . .
Cited by:
At CA – Hastings Borough Council v Manolete Partners Plc SC 27-Jul-2016
The council appealed against the decision that it is liable to pay compensation under section 106 of the Building Act 1984, for loss to a business on Hastings Pier arising from its closure during 2006 under the council’s emergency powers. The . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Local Government
Updated: 14 January 2022; Ref: scu.525117
