The subject matter of statutes is so varied that generalised maxims are not a reliable guide. An arbitrator can dismiss a claim for inordinate and inexcusable delay, even where this had arisen before the Act which created the power.
Lord Mustill said: ‘Precisely how the single question of fairness will be answered in respect of a particular statute will depend on the interaction of several factors, each of them capable of varying from case to case. Thus, the degree to which the statute has retrospective effect is not a constant. Nor is the value of the rights which the statute affects, or the extent to which that value is diminished or extinguished by the retrospective effect of the statute. Again, the unfairness of adversely affecting the rights, and hence the degree of unlikelihood that this is what Parliament intended, will vary from case to case. So also will the clarity of the language used by Parliament, and the light shed on it by consideration of the circumstances in which the legislation was enacted. All these factors must be weighed together to provide a direct answer to the question whether the consequences of reading the statute with the suggested degree of retrospectivity are so unfair that the words used by parliament cannot have been intended to mean what they might appear to say.’ and
‘My Lords, it would be impossible now to doubt that the Court is required to approach questions of statutory interpretation with a disposition, and in some cases a very strong disposition, to assume that a statute is not intended to have retrospective effect. Nor indeed would I wish to cast any doubt on the validity of this approach for it ensures that the Courts are constantly on the alert for the kind of unfairness which is found in, for example, the characterisation as criminal of past conduct which was lawful when it took place, or in alterations to the antecedent national, civil or familial status of individuals. Nevertheless, I must own up to reservations about the reliability of generalised presumptions and maxims when engaged in the task of finding out what Parliament intended by a particular form of words, for they too readily confine the Court to a perspective which treats all statutes, and all situations to which they apply, as if they were the same. This is misleading, for the basis of the rule is no more than simple fairness, which ought to be the basis of every legal rule.’
Gazette 26-Jan-1994, Independent 19-Jan-1994, Times 17-Dec-1993,  1 AC 486,  1 All ER 20,  1 Lloyds Rep 251,  2 WLR 39
England and Wales
Cited – Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) HL 10-Jul-2003
The respondent appealed against a finding that the provision which made a loan agreement completely invalid for lack of compliance with the 1974 Act was itself invalid under the Human Rights Act since it deprived the respondent lender of its . .
Cited – Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 20-May-2009
The appellant had applied for leave to remain as a postgraduate doctor. Before her application was determined, the rules changed. She said that her application should have been dealt with under the rules applicable at the time of her application. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 05 May 2022; Ref: scu.90653