The wife appealed against an order refusing to set aside an earlier order for ancillary relief in her divorce proeedings, arguing that it had been made under a mistake. The sum available for division had had deducted an expected liabiliity to the Inland Revenue and otherwise in respect of failed business. The husband had prepared a briefing paper on the issues, but had not disclosed it until after the order.
Held: There had not been a mistake of such a nature as to allow an amendment of the order. The case did not fall within any of the established categories allowing the re-opening of a final judgment. The wife’s application had been properly rejected.
Wilson LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1458, [2009] 1 FLR 1287
Bailii
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Family Proceedings Rules 1991 2.71(4)(a)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – de Lasala v de Lasala PC 4-Apr-1979
No Revisiting of Capital Claim after Compromise
(Hong Kong) Where capital claims are compromised in a once-for-all court order they cannot be revisited or reissued in the absence of a substantial mistake. Capital orders are ‘once-for-all orders’. The legal effect of the order derives not from the . .
Cited – Barder v Caluori HL 2-Jan-1987
In divorce proceedings, the husband had transferred his interest in the matrimonial home to the wife who had been awarded care and control of the two children of the family. The order was made on 20 February 1985 and on 25 March the wife unlawfully . .
Cited – Thompson v Thompson CA 1991
. .
Cited – Shaw v Shaw CA 31-Jul-2002
Thorpe LJ said it was difficult to see how a failure to disclose assets in ancillary relief proceedings could be both substantial and unintentional.
As to Bodey J’s analysis of the power to vary an award of a lump sum in Westbury: ‘I am in . .
Cited – Cornick v Cornick (No 1) FD 1994
. .
Cited – White v White HL 26-Oct-2000
The couple going through the divorce each had substantial farms and wished to continue farming. It had been a long marriage.
Held: Where a division of the assets of a family would satisfy the reasonable needs of either party on an ancillary . .
Cited – Charman v Charman (No 4) CA 24-May-2007
The court considered what property should be considered in an ancillary relief claim on divorce, and said: ‘To what property does the sharing principle apply? The answer might well have been that it applies only to matrimonial property, namely the . .
Cited – Robinson v Robinson (Disclosure) Practice Note CA 1982
The court considered the duty of parties in finacial relief proceedings to give full disclosure.
Held: In proceedings for ancillary relief, there was a duty, both under the rules and by authority, on the parties to make full and frank . .
Cited – Hertfordshire Investments Ltd v Bubb and Another CA 25-Jul-2000
When considering an application for a re-hearing of a County Court action in order to consider and admit new evidence, the county court and High Court practice is now the same and the judge should consider the list of questions in Ladd v Marshall, . .
Cited – Ladd v Marshall CA 29-Nov-1954
Conditions for new evidence on appeal
At the trial, the wife of the appellant’s opponent said she had forgotten certain events. After the trial she began divorce proceedings, and informed the appellant that she now remembered. He sought either to appeal admitting fresh evidence, or for . .
Cited – Cinpres Gas Injection Ltd v Melea Ltd CA 24-Jan-2008
A final judgment may be impugned for fraud. . .
Cited – Dixon v Marchant CA 24-Jan-2008
The parties had only recently settled their ancillary relief proceedings by consent when the former wife remarried. The former husband sought the setting aside of the order. The wife had denied the relationship. The judge had found the conditions in . .
Cited – In re Barrell Enterprises CA 1972
A judge has power to reconsider a judgement which he has delivered before the order consequent upon it has been sealed, but the judge should only exercise this power if there are strong reasons for doing so. When oral judgments have been given the . .
Cited – B v B (Ancillary Relief Consent Order: Appeal Out of Time) FD 26-Oct-2007
. .
Cited – The Ampthill Peerage Case HL 1977
There was a dispute about the legitimacy of an heir to the title. New evidence had been discovered after the trial.
Held: The House considered whether a new trial of an action might be ordered after discovery of new evidence: ‘The law knows, . .
Cited – Taylor v Lawrence CA 4-Feb-2002
A party sought to re-open a judgment on the Court of Appeal after it had been perfected. A case had been tried before a judge. One party had asked for a different judge to be appointed, after the judge disclosed that he had been a client of the firm . .
Cited – Tommey v Tommey FD 1983
W asked the court to set aside a consent financial relief order. She was to transfer her half of the home to H, in return for andpound;8,000 paid by H in settlement of her financial provision. She said that in the negotiations leading up to the . .
Cited – Stewart v Engel, BDO Stoy Hayward CA 17-May-2000
A judge may reopen a case even after he has delivered his final judgment. A judge invited counsel to amend his pleading to incorporate an improvement, but in the face of his repeated failure to take up the invitation, entered final judgment against . .
Cited by:
Cited – Baker v Rowe CA 6-Nov-2009
H and W, though very elderly, set out for a divorce. A former son-in-law now appealed against a costs order made against him as an intervener under the 1996 Act. The parties disputed his right to appeal without permission.
Held: Under the . .
Cited – Richardson v Richardson CA 8-Feb-2011
Application was made to vary an ancillary relief order on the basis of a Calouri style change of circumstances. . .
Cited – Gohil v Gohil SC 14-Oct-2015
The Court was asked ‘Do the principles referable to the admissibility of fresh evidence on appeal, as propounded in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, have any relevance to the determination of a spouse’s . .
Cited – S v S FD 29-Apr-2013
W sought to re-open a sttlement of the financial arrangement on her divorce, saying that there had been substantial non-disclosure by H.
Held: ‘any order which would have been made if proper disclosure had taken place would not have been . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Family
Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.278980