ECJ Several related decisions may be contested in a single application. Nowhere does the Treaty prescribe that any infringement of the rules governing price publication amounts in itself to one of the practices prohibited under article 60 (1). The absence of any precise definition by the high authority of the meaning of exceptional transactions and comparable transactions does not make the concept of discrimination meaningless. The comparability-like the exceptional nature-of a transaction can only be assessed in the light of the state of the market. The duty to make the price-lists and conditions of sale public allows of no exception. The price-lists must precede any sale effected in the common market. The treaty requires the publication of exact prices. It is not enough to publish average or approximate prices. The powers conferred on the high authority by the words contained in article 60 (2) ‘ to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the high authority ‘ are powers to prescribe the extent, that is to say, the scope, of publications, in so far as it is a question of settling their details. On the other hand, they do not make it possible to set up a system providing for mean variations from published prices, which would have the effect of authorizing disregard of published price-lists. The extent of the publication of price-lists is insufficient if they are communicated only to the high authority; the high authority must ensure that the price-lists are made available to anyone interested. The power to obtain information provided for in article 47 of the treaty can lawfully be used in order inter alia to supervise the observance of the rules on non-discrimination and on the publication of price-lists. When adopting the measures necessary for the implementation of article 60, the high authority has not merely a right but a duty to take into account all the aims laid down in articles 2, 3 and 4, such as the fixing of prices at as low a level as possible and the attempt to prevent prohibited agreements. Consequently, in order to achieve the latter two aims, the high authority is not bound to confine itself exclusively to the measures provided for in articles 61 and 65. Where more than one aim is being pursued, even if the grounds for a decision include improper grounds in addition to the valid ones, this would not make the decision invalid for misuse of powers, provided that the decision does not sacrifice the main aim. The objective of article 30 (2) of the convention on the transitional provisions is to prevent non-italian undertakings from competing with italian undertakings on the italian steel market by undercutting their own price-lists. A decision of the high authority, without the agreement of the italian government, authorizing variations from the price-lists of non-italian undertakings is consequently contrary to article 30. When a decision of the high authority is contested, the high authority must transmit to the court its minutes relating to the decision; the court may authorize the omission of the names of speakers. The court may, nevertheless, waive production of such documents if it considers that they are not indispensable for deciding the issue.
Citations:
C-2/54
Links:
Jurisdiction:
European
Utilities
Updated: 20 May 2022; Ref: scu.131528
