The ‘entire agreement’ clause contained in a lease not only had the effect of rendering evidence of an alleged collateral warranty inadmissible, but also deprived the warranty of all legal effect. It did not collapse the lease in on itself. Lightman J said: ‘The purpose of an entire agreement clause is to preclude a party to a written agreement from threshing through the undergrowth and finding in the course of negotiations some (chance) remark or statement (often long forgotten or difficult to recall or explain) on which to found a claim such as the present to the existence of a collateral warranty. The entire agreement clause obviates the occasion for any such search and the peril to the contracting parties posed by the need which may arise in its absence to conduct such a search. For such a clause constitutes a binding agreement between the parties that the full contractual terms are to be found in the document containing the clause and not elsewhere, and that accordingly any promises or assurances made in the course of the negotiations (which in the absence of such a clause might have effect as a collateral warranty) shall have no contractual force, save insofar as they are reflected and given effect in that document. The operation of the clause is not to render evidence of the collateral warranty inadmissible in evidence as is suggested in Chitty on Contract 28th ed. Vol 1 para 12-102: it is to denude what would otherwise constitute a collateral warranty of legal effect.’
Lightman J continued: ‘In neither case was it necessary to decide whether the clause would have been sufficient if it had been worded merely to state that the agreement containing it comprised or constituted the entire agreement between the parties. That is the question raised in this case, where the formula of words used in the clause is abbreviated to an acknowledgement by the parties that the Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between them. In my judgment that formula is sufficient, for it constitutes an agreement that the full contractual terms to which the parties agree to bind themselves are to be found in the Agreement and nowhere else and that what might otherwise constitute a side agreement or collateral warranty shall be void of legal effect. That can be the only purpose of the provision.’
Lightman J
[2000] 3 EGLR 31, [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 2(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – North Eastern Properties Ltd v Coleman and Another ChD 20-Aug-2009
The parties agreed for the developer to build and the defendants to purchase several apartments. The properties were not completed after a notice to complete and the purchasers purported to rescind the contract. The claimant completed the flats and . .
Cited – North Eastern Properties Ltd v Coleman and Another CA 19-Mar-2010
The appellants challenged specific performance orders obliging them to complete the purchase of apartments, saying that the contracts had not complied with the 1989 Act, and that their repudiation of the contracts had been accepted. The contracts . .
Cited – Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd SC 16-May-2018
The parties disputed whether a contract (licence to occupy an office) had been varied by an oral agreement, where the terms prohibited such.
Held: The ‘no oral variation’ clause applied. Such clauses were in common commercial use and served a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 July 2021; Ref: scu.374693
