The claimant asserted constructive dismissal.
Held: The trbunal rejected a submission that the absence of any provision for vicarious liability in the 1978 Act indicated that the general rule that an employer is vicariously liable for his employee’s acts done in the course of his employment did not apply. Knox J: ‘We do not regard this argument as compelling because the context of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is quite different from the context of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is dealing with a very wide multiplicity of different situations besides the master and servant employer-employee relationship. In relation to many of those relationships where there is no necessary contractual nexus, it was necessary in our view to define in general terms the circumstances in which employers were liable for their employees’ actions. Accordingly there being a different context which justifies the inclusion of the specific provisions in s. 41(1) we do not think it right to draw conclusions from the absence of such a provision in the different context of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.’
Judges:
Knox J
Citations:
[1990] IRLR 316
Statutes:
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Employment, Torts – Other
Updated: 24 October 2022; Ref: scu.241432
